Arab Airspace Blockade After Doha Attack

Lebanon today faces a critical crossroads that directly threatens its national sovereignty, and this challenge is reflected in the issue of confiscating Hezbollah’s weapons. On Aug. 5, 2025, the Lebanese government issued an important decision entrusting the armed forces with the task of developing a plan to establish the state's monopoly on weapons, restricting the possession of arms exclusively to state institutions, in implementation of the ceasefire agreement with Israel, with the plan to be executed before the end of the current year. This decision represents a strategic turning point that places Hezbollah before complex choices: voluntary disarmament, moving towards political transformation, or direct military confrontation with the Lebanese army.   Hezbollah, for its part, rejects this decision, describing it as a major sin, threatening to ignore it and considering disarmament a direct threat to Lebanon’s resistance against external aggression. The decision faces significant challenges due to the strong popular and political support Hezbollah enjoys, in addition to political maneuvers aimed at obstructing any measures targeting its weapons. Given the fragility of Lebanon’s political and sectarian system, there are significant risks of a confrontation breaking out that could escalate internal tensions and undermine security stability, making any direct military clash between the army and Hezbollah fraught with danger, with the likelihood of intensifying sectarian divisions and expanding the circle of violence. Will the Lebanese army be able to confront Hezbollah?

Iran’s uranium enrichment dilemma constitutes the central axis of the ongoing nuclear dispute, where technical considerations intersect with imperatives of national sovereignty, and where international legal frameworks collide with the strategic logic of deterrence. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic, the possession of a full nuclear fuel cycle—including domestic enrichment—is not merely a technical aspiration but an inherent sovereign right enshrined in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet, within Iran’s political consciousness, this “right” transcends legalistic interpretation; it has become a symbolic pillar of national autonomy and a manifestation of defiance against what is perceived as Western hegemony.   Conversely, the U.S. and its allies view the same enrichment capability as a direct gateway to weaponization. The centrifuge-based architecture of Iran’s program enables, with little more than a political decision, a rapid transition from low-enriched uranium to weapons-grade fissile material within a matter of weeks. These concerns escalated significantly following the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) May 2025 report confirming that Iran had amassed over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%—an amount theoretically sufficient to produce three to five nuclear weapons, should the enrichment level be increased to 90%, without requiring any additional infrastructure.   Iran’s historical experience—from its exclusion from the Eurodif consortium in 1979 to the collapse of the Tehran Research Reactor fuel deal in 2009—has deeply entrenched the belief among Iran’s ruling elite that reliance on external fuel guarantees is neither secure nor sustainable. As such, any negotiated settlement that requires Tehran to abandon domestic enrichment is perceived as a fundamental affront to its sovereign dignity and strategic autonomy.   Thus, the essence of the conflict lies not in centrifuge counts or enrichment levels per se, but in the deeply embedded political architecture of mutual distrust. A sustainable resolution cannot be achieved without a broader security framework that redefines Iran’s position within both the regional and global order.   This study adopts a multi-layered approach to the enrichment dilemma, treating it not as a narrowly technical issue but as a strategic contest between sovereign entitlement and non-proliferation imperatives. It proceeds along four main analytical axes: the technical properties of enrichment, the political and strategic motivations driving Iran’s position, the security calculus of Western powers, and the viability of proposed diplomatic frameworks. The study ultimately affirms that any lasting agreement must emerge from a comprehensive reconfiguration of Iran’s relationship with the international system.

The threat of nuclear weapons, once seemingly receding with the end of the Cold War, has resurged with alarming intensity. A renewed nuclear arms race and a dangerous erosion of the norms and treaties that have, for decades, helped prevent the unthinkable are being witnessed by the world. Since February 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the accompanying rhetoric—including overt and subtly veiled threats to employ nuclear weapons—have broken the post-Cold War taboo. Russia's nuclear weapon posture in Belarus increases tensions even more and normalises the debate about nuclear war. The invasion has had a ripple effect globally, with countries like South Korea, Germany, and Poland expressing renewed interest in nuclear deterrence, either through their own programmes or by hosting US nuclear weapons. Poland's consideration of joining Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey as a host for US nuclear weapons highlights this dangerous trend. Meanwhile, North Korea's continued, unchecked development of its nuclear arsenal and the persistent nuclear belligerence between India and Pakistan serve as concrete examples of the ongoing global threat.   The nuclear shadow over the Middle East has deepened in the aftermath of the October 7 events, which sharply re-escalated regional tensions and exposed the fragility of the existing security order. As Israel’s military operations in Gaza risk broadening into a wider regional confrontation, concerns about the potential use and further proliferation of nuclear weapons have intensified. The director general of the IAEA has recently warned that the intensification of hostilities in the region could acquire “nuclear dimensions,” underscoring the urgent need for full-scope safeguards and renewed diplomatic engagement to prevent further escalation. In this increasingly volatile context, the nuclear issue remains deeply intertwined with broader political and security dynamics, raising the spectre of a dangerous tipping point in regional proliferation. With the renewed conflict between Israel and Iran, talk of nuclear targets and their impact on the region has returned.   Against this backdrop, this paper examines the various forms of nuclear threats and assesses the vulnerability of selected case study countries. These cases—Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—were chosen based on their susceptibility to nuclear disasters, primarily determined by the presence of nuclear facilities that could be potential sources of risk. Geopolitical significance was also a key factor in the selection process. The threats are grouped into two main categories: the first relates to the dangers posed by nuclear warfare, while the second focuses on risks associated with nuclear or radioactive leaks. Each scenario is further broken down into sub-scenarios that analyse the projected impacts on the selected cases, including estimated fatalities and casualties. The primary criterion guiding case selection and analysis is human loss, with specific cities chosen based on population density, and consequences evaluated accordingly.   By evaluating projected impacts—including human loss and disruption to critical infrastructure—this paper aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of nuclear vulnerability in these key states. In doing so, it highlights how the evolving nuclear landscape in the Middle East region is shaped not only by technological and strategic factors but also by the interplay of domestic ambitions and external pressures. The findings underscore the urgent need for robust safeguards, regional cooperation, and international engagement to mitigate the growing risks posed by nuclear weapons and technology in an increasingly unstable global environment.

In George Orwell's classic 1984, his world was held together by unending war: In the book, messages of hate and reasons to fear were broadcast each day to encourage fearful, slavish masses to rail against an imaginary enemy rather than their actual masters.   US and British geo-strategists have historically been masters of manipulation, redrawing the map of the world to suit Western economic, geopolitical, and military interests, particularly in the MENA region. Their detractors are convinced that their broad goal is Western domination of the area via surrogates and partners such as Israel and Iran (via the back door) to retain control over natural resources and waterways while ensuring those resources do not fall into the hands of competitors such as China and Russia. A school of thought contends that they manufacture sectarian conflicts on the principle of “divide and rule,” creating tensions that justify the installation of military bases and fuel the military-industrial complex through arms sales.   A 2008 paper titled America’s Divide and Rule Strategies in the Middle East by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya highlights US efforts to create divisions within Middle Eastern and Central Asian populations through ethno-cultural, religious, sectarian, national, and political differences. According to this perspective, sectarian divides—particularly between Sunni and Shia Muslims—have been deliberately cultivated to weaken regional unity and facilitate geopolitical control.   The Iraq War (2003) and its aftermath further exacerbated these sectarian tensions. The dismantling of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated Ba'athist regime and the empowerment of Shia and Kurdish groups created a power vacuum, fueling sectarian violence. Groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq (later ISIS) thrived under these conditions, exploiting sectarian grievances. The redrawing of Iraq’s internal boundaries, particularly the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government, further solidified ethnic divisions. Toby Dodge, in Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a Road to Peace, argues that the US approach to state-building in Iraq inadvertently deepened these fault lines.   Similarly, US involvement in the Syrian Civil War (2011–2024), through support for various opposition groups, contributed to the country’s fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines. The conflict saw the rise of numerous factions, many of which received US backing. The emergence and territorial control of Kurdish-dominated forces in northeastern Syria, supported by the US in the fight against ISIS, created tensions with Arab populations and neighboring Turkey. The conflict has been widely analyzed as having a significant sectarian dimension, with regional powers backing different factions along Sunni-Shia lines.   Middle East expert and author Fred Reed states: “One might be forgiven for surmising that the current thrust of US policy in the Middle East and through the Muslim world is to exacerbate Sunni-Shiite divisions.”   US foreign policy in the region has often been perceived as favoring certain regional powers over others, sometimes along sectarian lines, exacerbating existing tensions. The complex relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia (a Sunni-majority state) and its rivalry with Iran (a Shia-majority state) has frequently been interpreted through this lens, even if US interests are primarily geopolitical. Support for different factions in conflicts like the Yemeni Civil War has similarly been framed within the context of regional sectarian rivalries.   Certain think tanks and policy circles in the US have promoted ideas that emphasize sectarian and ethnic divisions in the Middle East as a way to understand and potentially manage the region. Foreign Policy in Focus columnist Conn Hallinan argues that a major US concern in the Middle East is oil. With two-thirds of US oil expected to be imported by 2020, and 65% of the world's remaining oil reserves located in the Middle East, he suggests that a strategy of “divide and conquer” is aimed at keeping strategic control of these resources. Hallinan also highlights the lucrative nature of ongoing Middle Eastern tensions for the US arms industry, citing that countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman have spent over $150 billion on arms purchases.   While the significance of oil in US foreign policy has arguably shifted due to increased domestic production and diversification of energy sources, the Middle East remains strategically important for global energy security. A 2024 report from the Council for a Secure America notes that US oil imports from the Middle East have reached a record low, falling below 11% of total imports. However, this shift does not negate the region’s role in global energy markets.   The US continues to maintain strong relationships with key Gulf oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While policy priorities have expanded beyond securing oil supplies to include counterterrorism, regional stability, and containing rival powers, access to stable energy markets remains a key consideration. Events like the war in Ukraine have further underscored the interconnectedness of global energy markets and the importance of stable Middle Eastern oil production in preventing global price shocks. In fiscal year 2024, US military sales surged, with direct commercial sales rising to $200.8 billion from $157.5 billion in 2023. Government-facilitated arms sales also increased to $117.9 billion. The Middle East remains a significant market for US arms exports, with over $5.5 billion in approved arms sales to Egypt and Morocco alone in December 2024.   The underlying argument of this paper is that beyond the apparent hostilities and rivalries in the region, there exists a covert strategic alliance between Iran, Israel, and the United States. This cooperation manifests in various ways, including indirect coordination in conflict zones, intelligence-sharing, and economic transactions that defy public rhetoric. Despite Iran’s portrayal as a staunch adversary of both the US and Israel, instances of tacit collaboration—such as Iranian oil exports finding their way to markets through indirect channels, US tolerance of Iranian-backed militias in specific contexts, and shared interests in counterbalancing regional actors like Turkey and the Gulf states—suggest a more complex dynamic. This hidden alliance reflects a pragmatic approach to maintaining regional equilibrium, securing strategic interests, and preventing the emergence of truly independent powers that could challenge the existing order.

The United States started putting sanctions on Syria as early as 1979, mostly because Syria was labelled as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). The first designation was based on Syria's military occupation of Lebanon and its support for groups like Hezbollah that the government paid for. This early policy took a harsh and threatening stance against a government that was seen as hostile and supportive of non-state actors that were seen as a threat to U.S. interests.   After the Syrian conflict started in 2011, the U.S. greatly increased its sanctions against the Assad government. The goal of these more extensive measures was to stop the Syrian government from using violence against its people and to encourage political changes that could get to the bottom of the conflict. This was a big change from only focussing on counter-terrorism to a wider agenda that included human rights and changing the behaviour of the regime, with some elements of coercive diplomacy.   The end of Bashar al-Assad's rule in early December 2024 marks a major change in Syria's politics. This event changed the main goal of the long-standing U.S. sanctions, which were mostly aimed at the now-deposed government.   In May 2025, during a trip to Saudi Arabia, U.S. President Donald Trump made a big announcement: he would lift sanctions on Syria. He said this would "give them a chance at greatness." Many people see this announcement as a "historic development" that has "major potential to improve living conditions" and "support the Syrian political transition." The goal is to make the area more stable and improve Syria's economic prospects after years of being held back by harsh international sanctions. This paper looks at the United States' sanctions against Syria in depth, putting the recent change in policy in the context of its history and the law.

In today’s volatile political landscape, ceasefires are becoming increasingly relevant. While they are not designed to bring an immediate end to conflicts, they aim to provide a temporary respite in which opposing parties can engage in dialogue and work toward a resolution. Ideally, ceasefires function as transitional phases within ongoing wars, offering the opportunity for negotiation and compromise. However, as a political tool, ceasefires often fail to meet their objectives. Their effectiveness is not simply determined by military action, but by the political will and complex considerations of the parties involved. Ceasefires are heavily influenced by the intentions of the signatories, as not all parties are genuinely committed to ending hostilities. This raises important questions about how we define the success or failure of a ceasefire. If the stated goal is to end the war, yet political agendas remain hidden, the resumption of conflict may not necessarily mean that the ceasefire has failed—it could indicate that one party's objectives were unfulfilled, while the other may have achieved its goals.    Additionally, each ceasefire agreement is unique, shaped by the specific political dynamics at play, including the roles of mediators, guarantees, and the structure of the agreement itself. The Israel-Hamas ceasefire is a striking example of this complexity. While it may appear to be a failure from a broader, collective perspective, it could represent a significant political and military opportunity for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The influence of external actors, such as U.S. President Donald Trump, must also be considered as part of the equation. Ultimately, the fragile truce between Hamas and Israel raises a critical question: Is it merely a political process, or does it reflect a deeper, more strategic calculation that extends beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities?

Populism has recently risen in different regions, including Europe and the United States, constituting a challenge to local and global politics. While this phenomenon existed in Europe before the Second World War (WII), the rise of the Soviet Union as a principal threat to Europe after WII prompted them to neglect populism’s negatives and emphasise confronting the Soviet challenge. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe began an institutionalised process of identifying new internal and external threats, attempting to keep its capabilities mobilised for confronting challenges that might suddenly arise. This process led to identifying several internal threats, such as migration, lack of skilled employment, and populism as serious threats. Moreover, European integration began a new phase with the conclusion of the Maastricht agreement in 1992, creating the EU in its current form, which prompted Europeans to identify populism as a threat that might impede European integration.

The Gaza Strip, tragically marked by recurring cycles of conflict and destruction, faces a complex and deeply entrenched crisis that extends far beyond the visible damage to its buildings and infrastructure. The repeated devastation has crippled its economy, fractured its social fabric, and left its population in a state of perpetual vulnerability, demanding a comprehensive and transformative approach to recovery. Traditional reconstruction efforts, while necessary, have often fallen short by primarily focusing on the immediate task of rebuilding damaged structures. These efforts, though well-intentioned, have frequently failed to address the fundamental underlying economic and governance challenges that perpetuate instability and hinder long-term progress. This report, therefore, proposes a fundamentally different approach: a three-pillar framework that integrates immediate humanitarian relief with long-term strategies for economic sustainability and the establishment of durable peace. This holistic approach recognizes that true recovery requires not only rebuilding physical infrastructure but also fostering economic opportunity, strengthening governance, and promoting social cohesion, ultimately breaking the cycle of conflict and paving the way for a more stable and prosperous future for the people of Gaza. This three-pillar approach addresses the problem from a broader perspective.

In a significant escalatory move, Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, has notified the UN Secretary-General in writing that UNRWA must cease its operations and vacate its premises by January 30, 2025. This ultimatum follows Israel’s enactment of a law last October banning the agency’s activities within its territory, including occupied East Jerusalem. The decision is rooted in Israel’s allegations that UNRWA has been infiltrated by Hamas, with claims that some of its employees were involved in the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks.   This paper examines the evolving and contentious relationship between Israel and UNRWA. It also explores potential U.S. intentions to dismantle the agency, particularly in light of Donald Trump’s return to power and his recent remarks regarding the displacement of Gaza’s population and the repercussions of this ban.

In April 2025, the Trump administration stunned global markets by announcing a sweeping tariff expansion under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), introducing a flat 10% universal tariff on all imports. This move, framed as a national economic emergency response, immediately triggered global trade uncertainty and diplomatic friction. The policy marked a significant escalation of Trump’s protectionist agenda, signalling a break with multilateralism and targeting long-standing trade imbalances with strategic rivals and allies alike. We found that the United States (U.S.) trade structure is deeply imbalanced, with persistent deficits concentrated in sectors essential to industrial production, such as machinery, electronics, and vehicles. These deficits have exposed the U.S. to retaliatory measures from key trade partners—particularly China, Canada, and the EU—who have calibrated their responses to hit politically and economically sensitive export categories. Tariffs have initiated a multi-channel inflationary shock: direct consumer price increases, rising intermediate input costs, and cascading pressures on logistics and wages. The compounded effect has resulted in a net consumer price index (CPI) increase of approximately 1.2%, with higher spikes in key durable goods. Global supply chains are beginning to reconfigure.   The automotive sector, in particular, has seen disruption in bilateral flows with traditional partners, creating openings for new logistical nodes. The UAE stands out as a beneficiary, attracting redirected FDI and becoming a strategic re-export and final assembly hub. Collectively, these findings underscore a paradox: while the policy aims to reduce dependency and correct trade imbalances, it simultaneously accelerates external retaliation, domestic cost pressures, and global fragmentation in trade infrastructure.

The Kurdish dream of establishing an independent state was on the verge of realisation after centuries of demands in Jan. 1946. This came when “Qazi Mohammad,” the Iranian Kurdish leader, declared the establishment of the Mahabad Republic in the province of the same name, now part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, this dream quickly dissipated when the Soviet Union withdrew its financial support for the nascent state. The intensification of the economic blockade on the region further compounded the situation, preventing the entry of food supplies and reducing agricultural production. These pressures led to dramatic shifts in the loyalties of Kurdish tribal leaders who had initially allied with “Qazi” during the state's formation, hoping to secure a share of Soviet financial and food aid.   The food situation worsened over time, pushing some leaders of the Mahabad army to leave the capital, especially as Iranian forces were nearing its entrance, leaving the Kurdish leader and a small Kurdish group behind to face an unequal battle with the Iranian army. Therefore, to spare Kurdish blood, it was decided to surrender on December 15 of the same year, leading to the Iranian army's occupation of Mahabad and the declaration of the state's fall. In the end, “Qazi” was executed in March 1947, marking the end of the closest attempt to establish a Kurdish state.   About a quarter of a century later, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a series of rulings regarding Iraqi oil exported by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The latest ruling, issued in Feb. 2024, mandated the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers to hand over all oil and non-oil revenues to the central government in Baghdad. This could have a dual impact similar to that caused by the cessation of financial support and the Iranian blockade on the Mahabad army, but this time it affects the Peshmerga forces that represent the hope for preserving the “autonomy” of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq considered the second closest Kurdish attempt at establishing a national homeland for the Kurds.   Therefore, the First Part of this paper addresses the political situation of the Kurds, focusing on the status of the region in the Iraqi Constitution, the contentious issues between the region and the federal government, and the impact of these disputes on the continuity and existence of the Peshmerga. The Second Part reviews the economic situation, examining the effects of the series of judicial rulings on the conditions that undermine the autonomy of the regional government in selling oil and the repercussions of this on the Peshmerga as a Kurdish defence force that protects the “autonomy” of the region, forming the last line of defence against its collapse.

Language plays a fundamental role in preserving cultural identity and passing down traditions, but the rapid changes in today’s World have led to the decline of many languages. Arabic, despite being one of the most spoken languages globally, has shown signs of attrition in recent years. The study addresses the pressing issue of Arabic language attrition, exploring its causes, implications, and measures of preservation. Arabic language attrition is not a mere linguistic issue but it goes beyond that, it has implications on the national security, political stability, and Arab identity. As younger generations increasingly adopt global languages, particularly in the Gulf countries, the cultural legacy and intellectual contributions of the Arab World are at risk of diminishing. The study highlights several factors contributing to this phenomenon, including political instability, migration, urbanisation, economic development, and intermarriage, all of which are intertwined with globalisation. These forces push people toward adopting dominant languages, further marginalising Arabic.   The consequences of language attrition could lead to significant political and security consequences, including potential regional fragmentation and the rise of secessionist movements. However, the study emphasises that these scenarios can be mitigated through targeted measures. Promoting the Arabic language through education reforms, cultural exports, soft power strategies, and government policies are essential to preserving its usage and prestige. By fostering Arabic’s relevance in modern society, particularly through technology and media, the Arab World can reverse the trend of attrition and ensure the language’s future vitality.

Several indicators point out to the rise of far-right wing within the European bloc including polls for the upcoming European elections and the migration deal which was passed by the French parliament last December. Far right sentiments are reflected on many issues especially Migration which holds second place in the list of most pressing issues for European voters. The New European Migration Pact, which exempts Ukrainians from the new measures, reflects European leanings towards the right adding more restrictions on Migrants, refugees and Asylum seekers especially those arriving from the Middle East and Africa. The far-right leanings do not only hold significance for the European Union (EU) but they will definitely impact neighboring countries especially countries of North Africa who act as a transit for refugees and asylum seekers aiming at reaching European shores. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers will face catastrophic humanitarian situation due the Pact’s measures such as the screening procedure which will lead to diminished safeguards and a risk of mass detention at the borders, including for children, in countries of first arrival, the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation which regulates what happens if there is a “crisis” at the EU’s external border. European countries themselves will be put in an unenviable position due to transit countries’ levering their geopolitical positions. Using a multi-faceted criterion, the paper argues that the new pact is just a “rebranding” of ongoing European migration policies which are found to be unsuccessful. The paper uses the EU-Turkey migration deal showcasing shortcomings of European migration policies. Findings suggest that, among other losses, far-right measures taken by EU states tend to embolden transit countries vis-a-vis European states who will lose on the political as well as the economic side. Politically, they will have to make concessions in face of transit states while economically they will have to pay huge amounts of aid for the sake of borders’ externalization and keeping migrants away.

A recent statement from the European Union Foreign Policy Commissioner, Josep Borrell, urging Israel's allies, notably Washington, to cease supplying weapons to Israel has ignited widespread controversy. This call comes amid heightened concerns over the significant civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip. Coinciding with this plea, a Dutch appeals court decision has prohibited the export of all spare parts for F-35 fighter jets destined for Israel. These developments unfold against the backdrop of Israel's plans to initiate an expanded military operation in Rafah. Such an operation raises the spectre of a potential humanitarian catastrophe, particularly concerning the over 1.3 million displaced individuals from the Gaza Strip who have sought refuge in Rafah since the commencement of military activities in the enclave.   The United States provides Israel with annual military aid worth $3.8 billion, which stands as one of the most substantial military aid packages supplied by the U.S. to any country globally. This commitment was reaffirmed by U.S. officials, including President Joseph Biden, who, during his tenure as Vice President under Barack Obama, emphasised the enduring strategic alliance between the two countries. Then Vice President Biden said the U.S. commitment to Israel transcends moral obligations and is a deeply rooted strategic obligation. During a visit to Tel Aviv amid the events of Oct. 7, he underscored that “the existence of an independent and secure Israel within globally recognised borders aligns with the practical strategic interests of the United States.” He further emphasised, “I have long said: If Israel didn't exist, we would have to invent it.” Evidence of the depth of relations and continued support is further demonstrated by Congress' approval of an additional $14.1 billion in military aid to Israel. This aid is intended to bolster Israel's capabilities in its conflict with the Hamas movement, specifically by providing air and missile defence support and replenishing U.S. military stock granted to Israel. This level of support echoes the assistance provided by the United States to Israel during the October 1973 War with the Egyptian Army.   The generous and unconditional support provided by the U.S. to Israel prompts numerous inquiries, particularly in the context of the U.S.'s inability to exert pressure on Israel to stop its war on Gaza. Additionally, its loss of control over the right-wing government's decision-making process regarding the potential expansion of the war to include Rafah, portending an imminent conflict with Egypt. Hence, this analysis endeavours to address a pivotal question: Will these developments prompt a shift in the U.S. stance toward Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing government, potentially leading to a withdrawal from the notion of an expanded operation in Rafah? Furthermore, can the United States feasibly cease its military aid to this strategic ally in the Middle East?

Abstract The post-World War II arrangements generated several decisions that granted the victorious countries certain powers, most notably The Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, the Four Power Declaration, and Articles 106 and 107 of the United Nations Charter. Questions have recently been raised about the possibility of exploiting these powers to legitimize Russian intervention in Ukraine. However, given the nature and background of these articles and decisions, it turns out that they were part of the arrangements for a transitional period, followed by the transfer of these powers and tasks to the United Nations, and the subsequent new arrangements, most notably the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation, which arranged for a new legal situation. This does not contradict the rule of inheriting international treaties as one of the principles of international law but takes into account the change in the new legal status of states. Therefore, the countries that were under the guise of the Soviet Union have become independent members in the United Nations General Assembly, and by reviewing the contents of the documented sessions of the United Nations since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, it turns out that the defenses and arguments presented by the Russian delegate to legitimize the Russian intervention in Ukraine were based on two main arguments, which were repeated in most of the Russian President’s speeches. For the Russian Federation, especially the speech of the declaration of invasion, which was based on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which guarantees the right of states to defend themselves against threats, and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that all peoples have the right to self-determination, meaning that any Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine has the right to determine its political status and to pursue its economic, social and cultural development.   Since Putin announced his intention to invade Ukraine militarily, numerous analyses came up that the legal arguments Russia depend on to justify the invasion, and the talk about the arrangements made after World War II that gave the powers to the victorious nations that could be exploited by the Russian side has increased recently. There is even a rumor that claims that the Russian president talked to the secretary-general of the United Nations about the article contained in the United Nations charter and these arguments depended on two articles; 106 and 107 in the United Nations charter, that gives the right to the victorious countries and nations to take any needed decision against the countries that fought against them in World War II to avoid revising the results of World War II. In these decisions, it is specially allowed to utilize military power against these countries.

According to the McKinsey Global Institute report between 400 million and 800 million people worldwide could be displaced by automation and need to find new occupations by 2030, with 75 million to 375 million of those affected need to move to another new jobs and learn new skills.   Over the last two decades, there has been a surge in interest in automation and digital technologies, as well as their implications for our societies. Several writers have calculated experimentally the impact of automation technologies on employment and people by examining technology adoption at the business or industry level in previous years and related this to labour market outcomes, but their conclusions have been mixed. Some studies find that automation technologies positively impact employment, while others show that they have a negative impact.   Our study examined the impact of automation on UAE in terms of demographics, employment and economic sectors by implementing several scenarios of automation. These scenarios revealed that, in most cases, automation will positively impact UAE in terms of some macroeconomic indicators, and will lead to its economic growth and stability. Finally, we provided some recommendations that will enhance and facilitate the transition to automation in the UAE.

According to a report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the state of food security and nutrition in the world in 2022, it is estimated that between 702 and 828 million people were affected by hunger in 2021, consisting of 278 million people in Africa, 425 million in Asia, and 56.5 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. The number has grown by about 150 million since the outbreak of Covid-19. The Russia-Ukraine War, involving two of the biggest producers in agriculture and staple cereals globally, is disrupting supply chains and further affecting global grain, fertilizer, and energy prices, leading to shortages and fuelling even higher food price inflation. Additionally, food security is a significant challenge in the Arab region, which is facing rising economic, socio-political, and environmental challenges impacting the food security of its growing population.   Hence, our study has examined the factors that affect food security, and our analysis allowed us to determine the top five factors affecting food security: climate change, conflict, overpopulation, inflation, and scarce resources. The study will analyze each factor separately and their effect on food security globally and in many regions, with a focus on the Arab region. Secondly, the study will analyze factors of food insecurity separately and its impact on four significant countries: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.   We found that the factors we examined have mainly negative effects on food security, with the exception of climate change, which will positively affect some regions for the time being, and natural resources, which has some aspects that effect food security positively. Additionally, we found that the factors are interconnected since for example, conflict negatively affects food security, and it could increase food prices, as in the current Russia-Ukraine War. Likewise, the adverse impacts of climate change are expected to raise food prices further and dampen the region’s food demand translating into direct increases in malnutrition levels.   Finally, after reviewing the effects of factors on food security, we elaborated some recommendations in order to deal with the adverse effects.

One of the most critical issues currently facing the Middle East is the changing composition of its demographic structure. A massive cohort of young people — known as a youth bulge — is challenging policymakers, with youth policies affecting security, education, the labour market, and welfare programs, among other areas. Given the relative stability and wealth of the Gulf states, this is an issue that is not often associated with the region. However, handling a growing young population is just as challenging in the Gulf.   The Gulf is one of the wealthiest regions worldwide; in terms of GDP per capita, it is distinctive due to its unique hydrocarbon reserves compared to a relatively small national population. Gulf states rely on oil revenue — to varying degrees — to attract private investors and provide extensive public services and subsidies to nationals. With not enough diversification in their economies, government spending in the Gulf states will continue to be a barrier to economic diversification. To sustain the high standard of living attained by Emirati and Saudi societies to the youth and the coming generations, the two countries must set strategies and plans to integrate youth while continuing to diversify their economies away from oil. This study explores the impact of the post-oil reforms and strategy on the youth, including education, employment, social contract, and identity.   The study applies Late Rentier State Theory to analyse the relationship between youth, the Emirati and Saudi states, the post-oil reforms, and their future trajectories. The analysis is guided by some of the characteristics identified by Late RST which focus on the impact of globalization, modernization policies, diversification, the state’s encouragement of entrepreneurship, and the sustainability of their strategies with regards to the extent to which they accommodate youth’s needs and account for changing societal structures and expectations.   While the study does not refute the youth bulge hypothesis, which contends that states where young adults constitute a large proportion of the population are expected to face an elevated risk of political violence and interstate conflict, widely used in the literature; it adds to it by proposing that while those risks exist, they can be alleviated under certain circumstances. Those circumstances include policies and strategies to be taken by governments that are relevant to youth needs and the surrounding environment. Namely, taking into consideration both agency and structure.   The study finds that, for the United Arab Emirates, the results of education and Emiratisation policies are likely to shape the shifting social contract between young Emiratis and the government, and could lead to a range of outcomes, from the promising- a population of empowered, educated, and skilled Emirati youth- to the stagnant- disappointed and apathetic youth persistent in their preference of the public sector- to the more worrisome- yet unlikely- active opposition by dissatisfied youth.   With regards to the Kingdom Saudi Arabia, the study finds that while the government is investing massively in educational and employment reforms, young Saudis need to adopt entrepreneurial values and work ethic to ensure the success of “Neo-Saudism". This in turn requires a certain level of responsiveness from the government and possibly more opportunities for youth to participate in decision making in the near future. The speed of change and the extent to which youth’s values and perspectives may clash with those of older generations is yet to be determined. The real challenge for Saudi decision makers and strategists will be in maintaining balance and stable relations between different societal groups.

Nuclear cooperation attracts international and regional attention, many Arab countries have aspired to produce clean nuclear energy and have either begun or are seeking to join the nuclear energy club. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) , Egypt, and Jordan, are the frontrunners in the Middle East and therefore will be the focus of this paper. Nuclear power is an international industry in terms of operation, supply chains, and vendors, as well as nuclear safety, non-proliferation and waste management, therefore, there is an ongoing need for cooperation and collaboration between states. This cooperation can include sharing technical expertise and nuclear technology, establishing agreements that facilitate nuclear exports, agreements on nuclear safety and standards, and collaboration with regulatory frameworks.   The paper employs horizontal or environmental scanning to analyse the current position of nuclear energy in each country and their preparedness for nuclear cooperation, as well as existing models of nuclear cooperation in other regions. Thereafter, the paper explores the different incentives countries may have for engaging in nuclear cooperation, including the potential benefits to be gained. A SWOT analysis is used to structure the environmental scanning, evaluating the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats within each country with regards to their potential role and contribution to nuclear cooperation in addition to an overall SWOT analysis of the countries as a whole with regards to the prospect of ongoing collaboration.   The paper is divided into three chapters; the first chapter provides an overview of nuclear energy in each of the selected countries, the second chapter examines existing models of nuclear cooperation and analyses the different enabling factors which will later be used to identify opportunities for Arab nuclear collaboration, and the third chapter analyses the various economic, political, and security incentives that would drive countries to seek cooperation or that can be used to advocate for greater collaboration among policymakers.   A cooperation model is produced as a result of this analysis, highlighting key characteristics of the ideal regional partnership. Three scenarios for Arab nuclear cooperation are evaluated to demonstrate what could occur if this proposed cooperation occurs, how it would happen, and the scenarios of no collaboration or limited cooperation.