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Defense Density in Modern Air Warfare

What European NATO Can Learn from the Gulf

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The US-Israel-Iran war and Recent events that followed in Gulf countries have provided one of the clearest real-world demonstrations of modern air and missile defence under sustained pressure. Modern air warfare is increasingly defined by the ability of states to withstand large-scale saturation attacks involving drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The proliferation of relatively inexpensive unmanned systems and precision-guided weapons has altered the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities, allowing even modest actors to launch high volumes of aerial threats. In this environment, the success of air and missile defence no longer depends solely on technological sophistication but also on defence density, the concentration of defensive systems relative to territory and population. Dense, layered air-defence networks provide multiple interception opportunities and reduce the likelihood that incoming salvos can overwhelm defensive systems. As recent conflicts have demonstrated, resilience against saturation attacks increasingly depends on whether states can deploy sufficient numbers of interceptors, overlapping defensive layers, and integrated detection networks.

Across the region, Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC) have intercepted large numbers of incoming drones and missiles, achieving strikingly high interception rates despite the scale and diversity of the threats involved.



Attacks, Detections, and Interceptions



Chart: Al Habtoor Research Centre • Source: Official reporting of defence ministeries • Created with Datawrapper

In the contemporary security environment, where drones and precision missiles have become accessible to both state and non-state actors, defence density has emerged as a decisive factor in determining whether states can withstand saturation attacks. The ability to deploy overlapping layers of interceptors, backed by radar and early-warning systems, increasingly determines whether a country can prevent incoming salvos from overwhelming its defensive network. This raises a critical question for European security. If European NATO member states were confronted with a similar pattern of missile and drone attacks, would they be able to defend their territory with comparable effectiveness?

By comparing air-defence architectures across selected Gulf states and European NATO members, the analysis finds significant disparities in defensive density, system layering, and interception capacity. Gulf states maintain some of the highest air-defence concentrations in the world, with countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates deploying over 10 air-defence batteries per 100,000 square kilometres. In contrast, several European NATO states included in this study maintain fewer than two batteries per 100,000 square kilometres, despite facing far larger territories and populations to defend.

The gap becomes even clearer when measured relative to population. Qatar and the UAE operate more than 1 air-defence battery per million inhabitants, while large European NATO members such as Germany and Poland deploy around 0.1 batteries per million people, nearly an order of magnitude lower. These figures suggest that while Gulf states have prioritised dense national missile defence networks, many European states continue to rely on limited interceptor inventories supplemented by alliance integration.

Structural differences in defensive architecture further widen this gap. Several Gulf states operate three-layer air-defence systems capable of engaging drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles at multiple stages of flight. Many European NATO states rely primarily on two-layer systems, often centred on medium-range interceptors with fewer ballistic missile defence capabilities at the national level. While NATO integration provides strong radar coverage and command networks, interceptor density and stockpiles remain comparatively limited.

Section 1.1: The Changing Character of Air Warfare

The transformation of air warfare over the past decade is not primarily a story about technology. It is a story about cost, volume, and the strategic logic that follows from both. Historically, the ability to strike targets from the air required platforms of considerable sophistication and expense, which meant that only well-resourced states could mount meaningful air campaigns. That constraint has dissolved. The widespread diffusion of ballistic missile technology, combined with the industrial scaling of cheap loitering munitions, has placed serious airborne strike capacity within the reach of actors who could never have competed with Western air forces on conventional terms.

Attrition Over Airspace

Nowhere is this more legible than in Ukraine. Since September 2024, Russia has dramatically escalated its use of Shahed-type drones, increasing weekly launch rates from approximately 200 to more than 1,000 by March 2025. By October 2025, Russia launched over 5,300 Shahed drones in a single month, alongside 148 ballistic missiles and 74 cruise missiles, representing one of the most intensive sustained air campaigns in modern history. Crucially, these are not high-precision weapons in the traditional sense. Their strategic value lies not in individual accuracy but in cumulative pressure. It does not matter whether any individual Shahed hits its target. What matters is the compound effect on civilian morale and the exhaustion it imposes on air defence networks.

Additionally, the costs are measurable and severe. By mid-2024, Russian strikes had cumulatively destroyed 9 gigawatts of Ukraine's domestic power generation capacity, roughly half of its pre-war output. According to a United Nations Development Programme report, Ukraine will require $524 billion for reconstruction over the next decade. These are not the outcomes of air superiority in the traditional sense. Russia never achieved meaningful control of Ukrainian airspace. Instead, it waged what is called an algorithmic war of attrition, substituting volume and persistence for precision and aerial dominance.

Simultaneously, across the Gulf, Iran has deployed the same basic logic. In the first 36 hours after US-Israeli strikes began in late February 2026, Iran launched hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones simultaneously against all six Gulf Cooperation Council member states. The UAE alone reported 196 ballistic missiles detected in the opening days, with residents in Dubai and Abu Dhabi witnessing nightly interceptions over their cities. The real story of this escalation is not whether the Gulf can intercept. It is whether it can sustain interception at the tempo these attacks create. That framing captures precisely what has changed. The central challenge of modern air defence is no longer whether a system can intercept a given threat. It is whether it can keep intercepting, wave after wave, without exhausting its magazine.



Four Structural Trends

This shift has been driven by four interlocking trends. The first is the proliferation of ballistic missiles across state and non-state actors, reducing the technological barrier to long-range precision strike. This trend long predates the wars in Ukraine and the Gulf. North Korea's sustained ballistic missile development through the 2000s and 2010s, Iran's progressive expansion of its missile arsenal since the 1980s, and the global diffusion of short-range ballistic missile technology to non-state actors such as Hezbollah all show how widely this capability had already spread before either conflict began.

The second is the mass production of cheap drones, which can be manufactured at a fraction of the cost of the interceptors designed to destroy them. The commercial drone revolution of the 2010s accelerated this trend dramatically, as off-the-shelf technology was progressively militarized by state and non-state actors alike, from the Islamic State's improvised drone bombs in Syria and Iraq to Houthi drone and missile campaigns against Saudi Arabia that began in 2015.

The third is the deliberate adoption of saturation attack doctrine, which exploits the cost asymmetry between offense and defence by flooding systems with more incoming weapons than they can economically or physically absorb.

This logic was not invented in Ukraine; it was demonstrated in the Falklands War, where Argentine air attacks overwhelmed British naval defences through persistence and volume, and refined over decades by Iran and its proxies in Yemen and Lebanon. The fourth is the growing precision of these systems, which means that even a small percentage of penetrating strikes can produce strategic effects. The 2019 Aramco attack, in which a combination of cruise missiles and drones struck Saudi oil infrastructure with sufficient accuracy to temporarily cut the kingdom's oil output by half, showed this dynamic with particular clarity. Also, Russia's campaign in Ukraine has since shown the same logic applied at industrial scale: in 2024, 58.5% of the missiles it fired successfully reached their targets, and even with interception rates hovering between 80 and 95% on drones, the proportion of weapons getting through was sufficient to sustain a campaign of meaningful destruction.

What this means strategically is that the traditional assumption embedded in Western air doctrine, namely that destroying or suppressing the enemy's strike capacity through offensive air operations will prevent it from threatening defended territory, has become insufficient on its own. An adversary that manufactures drones by the thousands and ballistic missiles by the hundreds does not require air superiority to impose costs. It requires only production capacity, operational persistence, and a defender whose interceptor stockpiles are finite. The defence, in other words, faces a structural disadvantage that air superiority alone cannot resolve.

Section 1.2: Two Competing Defence Doctrines

There are two fundamentally different doctrines through which states organize their air defense. One is built around the offensive pursuit of air superiority; the other around the layered, ground-based construction of defence density. Understanding the distinction between these two doctrines, their underlying logic, and the conditions under which each is adequate is essential to any serious assessment of what the Gulf experience can teach European NATO.

Doctrine One: Air Superiority

The air superiority doctrine holds that the most effective way to protect national territory from aerial attack is to destroy the enemy's capacity to mount such attacks in the first place. This means achieving control of the airspace above the battlefield through the suppression of enemy air defenses, the destruction of opposing aircraft, and offensive counter-air operations that neutralize strike systems before they are launched. The doctrine has its intellectual roots in the theories of Giulio Douhet and the operational experience of the Second World War, and it was refined and validated through decades of Western military investment. Its defining characteristic is that it is inherently offensive: the defense of one's own territory is achieved by attacking the enemy's.

NATO's strategic posture, particularly that of the United States, has been built around this doctrine for the better part of seven decades. The alliance's overwhelming air advantage, its investment in fifth-generation fighter aircraft, its suppression of enemy air defence capabilities, and its forward basing structures all reflect the logic that the best air defence is one that prevents hostile aircraft and missiles from ever being launched. In three years of war in Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian air forces have been effectively neutralized by the density and effectiveness of integrated air defence systems, compelling a fundamental reassessment of the Anglo-American doctrinal approach to airpower built on the lessons of the Second World War, Korea, Vietnam, and the 1991 Gulf War. That reassessment is not yet complete within NATO.

Doctrine Two: Defence Density

Defence density, the competing doctrine, operates from an entirely different premise. Rather than seeking to destroy the enemy's strike capacity before it is employed, it seeks to intercept and neutralize strikes after they are launched. Its core elements are layered missile defence systems operating across multiple altitude bands, dense radar and early warning networks that provide early detection and tracking, ground-based interceptors capable of engaging ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, and the integration of these elements under unified command and control. The goal is not air superiority in the traditional sense. It is saturation resilience: the ability of a defended territory to absorb repeated waves of incoming weapons without suffering catastrophic or strategically decisive damage.

This doctrine has been most systematically developed in three regional contexts. Israel, facing decades of rocket and missile threats from multiple directions, built what is arguably the world's most sophisticated layered defence architecture, combining the Iron Dome for short-range rockets, David's Sling for medium-range threats, and the Arrow series for long-range ballistic missiles. Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, invested heavily in US-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defence systems and Patriot PAC-3 batteries in response to the sustained missile and drone threat from Iran and Iranian-aligned proxies.

Taiwan presents perhaps one of the most instructive cases outside the Middle East. Facing a Chinese ballistic missile arsenal that numbers in the thousands, Taiwan has built a layered air and missile defence network combining US-supplied Patriot PAC-3 batteries, indigenously developed Tien Kung surface-to-air missiles, and dense radar coverage across the Taiwan Strait. Its entire defensive architecture is premised not on the ability to destroy Chinese strike capacity before it is used, but on the ability to absorb and attrite an initial missile salvo while preserving command, control, and retaliatory capacity. East Asian states more broadly, including South Korea and Japan, have developed dense defensive architectures in response to North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile programs.

What these practitioners share is a strategic environment in which the threat cannot be reliably pre-empted. Israel cannot destroy every rocket launcher in Gaza or Lebanon before a war begins. Gulf states cannot eliminate Iran's missile program through offensive air operations alone. Taiwan cannot neutralize China's missile forces through any conceivable offensive air campaign. In each case, the conclusion reached, sometimes through painful experience rather than doctrinal choice, is that defence density must serve as the primary guarantor of territorial security, rather than as a supplement to offensive airpower.

NATO's posture has historically sat closer to the air superiority end of this spectrum. The post-Cold War drawdowns of the 1990s eliminated much of the ground-based air defence infrastructure that had been deployed in Western Europe during the Soviet period. The logic, not entirely unreasonable at the time, was that the collapse of the Soviet threat removed the need for layered missile defence on European soil. Fighter aircraft and NATO's integrated air command structure were deemed sufficient. The consequence, as a 2024 NATO Parliamentary Assembly report acknowledged, is that much remains to be done in developing modern, tailored, integrated air and missile defence as a comprehensive defensive response to current and future threats. That gap, between NATO's offensive air dominance and its ground-based defensive capacity, is precisely what the Gulf and Ukrainian conflicts have brought into focus.

The doctrinal divergence is not merely theoretical; it has direct operational consequences. When Russia entered Ukrainian airspace in February 2022, its opening strikes targeted Ukrainian radar installations and airfields, following the air superiority playbook: suppress defences, establish aerial control, then strike at will. What followed instead was a protracted failure of coordination. Russia's air force operated largely in parallel to ground forces, with limited coordination, and never unified its electronic warfare units, missile forces, and tactical aviation under a coherent suppression strategy. Ukraine, meanwhile, built a defensive architecture piece by piece, integrating Soviet-era systems with Western Patriot batteries and leveraging NATO intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to reposition mobile surface-to-air missile units ahead of Russian strikes.

The result was a grinding defensive effectiveness that confounded initial expectations, sustained across three years of conflict and at enormous cost in interceptor consumption.

Moreover, the Gulf experience adds a further dimension. Unlike Ukraine, Gulf states did not face an adversary capable of sustained manned aircraft operations. Iran's principal tools are ballistic missiles and Shahed-type loitering munitions, precisely the weapons against which air superiority provides the least direct protection. A fleet of F-35s cannot intercept a ballistic missile in its terminal phase. Only a ground-based interceptor, positioned in the right location with adequate radar support and magazine depth, can do that. This is why the UAE and Saudi Arabia's investment in THAAD and Patriot systems has been the decisive factor in their ability to defend populated areas, and why the depletion of interceptor stockpiles, rather than any failure of airpower, has emerged as the central strategic vulnerability of the current conflict.

Section 1.3: Defining Defence Density

Defence density, then, is not simply a technical term for the quantity of missiles a country possesses. It is a strategic concept that captures the relationship between a defender's capacity to intercept incoming weapons and the tempo, volume, and diversity of the threats it faces. A country with high defence density maintains enough layered interceptor coverage, across short, medium, and long-range bands, supported by sufficient radar integration and resupply logistics, to sustain effective interception through repeated attack waves without exhausting its capacity. A country with low defence density may intercept the first wave effectively but find its magazines depleted before the second or third wave arrives. Once conflicts involve repeated raids, mixed salvos, and long-duration drone pressure, the limiting factor becomes magazine depth, resupply speed, and the economics of using very expensive interceptors against cheap, persistent threats.

Defining defence density in operational terms allows for meaningful comparison across different strategic environments. For the purposes of this study, defence density refers to the concentration of air and missile defence assets, expressed relative to territorial size and population, enabling sustained interception capacity against saturation attacks.

This definition deliberately incorporates three variables that pure systems counts miss: geographic distribution of assets relative to the territory they must protect, the layering of those assets across threat altitudes, and the industrial and logistical depth required to sustain interception over time. By this measure, the Gulf states, for all the strain they are currently experiencing, have invested more systematically in defence density than any NATO member state on Europe's eastern flank. Whether that gap can be closed, how quickly, and at what cost, is the subject the sections that follow will address in detail.

It is not suggested that air superiority has become irrelevant; it suggests that it has become insufficient. A doctrine built entirely around offensive airpower leaves defended territory exposed to the attritional logic of saturation attack, in which the attacker needs only production capacity and operational persistence to impose strategic costs. Defence density does not replace air superiority; it complements it by providing the sustained interception capacity that prevents saturation attacks from becoming strategically decisive. Therefore, the two doctrines are not competitors. They are the twin pillars of a modern defence architecture that neither the Gulf states, still going through their interceptor stockpiles, nor NATO's eastern flank, still operating beneath the shadow of a ground-based missile defence gap, can yet claim to have fully built.

Measuring Air Density

An assessment of national air- and missile-defense architectures across GCC states and European NATO members remains important for. Rather than providing a full inventory of defense systems, the analysis evaluates how air-defense capabilities are distributed, structured, and supported in environments exposed to missile and drone threats. To do so, it employs four complementary metrics: air-defense density relative to territory, air-defense density relative to population, layered defensive architecture, and radar and early-warning capability. Together, these indicators capture key elements of the missile-defense chain, from detection to interception.

Cases are selected to represent two regional security environments where missile threats should play a central role in defense planning. The Gulf cases, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have invested heavily in air- and missile-defense systems over the past two decades due to the persistent threat posed by Iran's growing missile arsenal and regional proxy capabilities. These states also represent different strategic profiles within the Gulf: Saudi Arabia as the largest territorial defense environment, the UAE as one of the most technologically advanced missile-defense architectures in the region and the country that has been mostly affected by missile and drone attacks in the ongoing US-Isreal-Iran War, and Qatar as a small but highly defended state where defense density effects are particularly visible.

European cases, Germany, Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), represent NATO members operating within the alliance's eastern security environment. Poland and Romania are included as frontline states on NATO's eastern flank facing potential missile threats from Russia. Germany is included as a major Western European NATO power with a long-standing air-defense infrastructure and a central role in European defense planning. The Baltic states are treated collectively due to their shared geographic exposure and relatively limited national air-defense capabilities, which rely heavily on NATO's integrated air-defense network.

Section 2: Comparing Defense Density

Metric 1: Air-Defense Density (Batteries per km^2)

To construct the territorial air-defense density metric, the number of major ground-based air and missile defense batteries deployed in each selected country are identified . Because precise inventories of interceptors and operational units are rarely disclosed publicly, most comparative defense studies rely on battery counts as a proxy for interception capacity. A battery represents a deployable operational unit of systems such as Patriot, THAAD, NASAMS, or comparable medium- to long-range surface-to-air missile systems capable of providing area defense. Estimates used here are derived from open-source defense inventories and procurement records, including data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance, the Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arms transfer database. Where sources report ranges rather than exact figures, midpoint estimates are used and the associated uncertainty is noted.

For the United Arab Emirates, open-source assessments consistently indicate a layered missile defense architecture composed of nine Patriot batteries and two THAAD batteries, resulting in an estimated 11 major batteries deployed nationally. These systems provide both medium-range and ballistic missile defense coverage and form one of the most advanced integrated air-defense networks in the Gulf. Estimates of Patriot deployments appear in regional defense analyses and reporting on the UAE's missile defense infrastructure, while THAAD deployments are confirmed through procurement records and system deployment reports. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the number of operational Patriot batteries varies across sources, with estimates typically ranging from 18 to 25 batteries. Saudi Arabia has operated Patriot systems for decades and maintains one of the largest Patriot inventories globally due to persistent missile threats in the region. In addition, the country has begun deploying THAAD systems, adding a ballistic missile defense layer to its architecture. Because open-source estimates differ, the analysis uses a midpoint estimate of approximately twenty-two major batteries for the purposes of comparison.

For Qatar, available defense inventories suggest a smaller but modern missile defense network. Estimates generally indicate four to 6 Patriot batteries protecting key infrastructure and population centers. To avoid overstating density in a small territory, the dataset adopts a conservative estimate of four batteries.

Turning to Europe, Germany serves as a major NATO case with an established ground-based air defense capability. Germany operates Patriot batteries and is introducing the IRIS-T SLM system as part of its modernization efforts. Open-source inventories derived from IISS reporting indicate roughly 12 major batteries, though the precise operational configuration may fluctuate as new systems are introduced and older units are restructured. For Poland, which represents a frontline NATO state on the eastern flank, missile defense modernization is ongoing. Poland has begun deploying Patriot batteries under the Wisła program, while additional short- and medium-range systems are being developed through the Narew program. At present, open-source inventories suggest approximately 4 operational Patriot batteries, though this number is expected to increase in the coming years as procurement programs mature.

Romania represents another NATO state located on the alliance's eastern flank and currently fields Patriot air-defense systems acquired during recent modernization efforts. Publicly available inventories indicate approximately four operational batteries, although detailed deployment information remains limited. Finally, the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are treated collectively for the purposes of this comparison because of their shared security environment and reliance on NATO air policing. Studies of Baltic air defense consistently highlight the limited number of medium- and long-range ground-based systems available domestically, with most national capabilities focused on short-range systems. As a result, the combined Baltic states are estimated here as having approximately one major battery equivalent, a figure that should be interpreted as an approximation reflecting the limited scale of their area-defense capability.

Formula used

$$\text{Air defense density} = \frac{\textit{Number of major air defense batteries}}{\textit{territory km}^2}$$

Batteries per 100,000 km²

Country	Batteries	Territory km²	Batteries per 100k km²
Qatar	4	11,600	35
UAE	11	83,600	13
Germany	12	357,000	3
Romania	4	238,000	2
Poland	4	312,000	1
Saudi Arabia	22	2,150,000	1
Baltic States (combined)	1	175,000	1

Numbers of batteries are estimates as exact figures are not publicly disclosed.

Table: Al Habtoor Research Centre • Source: Various Dources • Created with Datawrapper

Metric 2: Air-Defence Batteries per Million Inhabitants

Formula used: Air defence density per population" = "Number of major air defence batteries" / "population" × 1,000,000

The second metric evaluates the concentration of air-defense systems relative to population. To construct this indicator, the analysis first compiles population estimates for each country included in the comparison. Population figures provide the denominator for calculating the number of air-defense batteries per million inhabitants, allowing the study to assess how concentrated defensive infrastructure is relative to the size of the population being protected. For the UAE, the dataset uses a population estimate of approximately 11 million inhabitants. The UAE's population fluctuates due to the large share of expatriate residents, but recent estimates place the population around this level.

This figure is therefore used as a rounded estimate for the purposes of comparison. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the population is estimated at approximately 35 million inhabitants. Saudi Arabia is the most populous Gulf state included in the analysis and has experienced steady population growth over the past decade. The figure used here reflects recent national population estimates. Qatar has a significantly smaller population but one that fluctuates due to the presence of a large expatriate workforce. For the purposes of this dataset, Qatar's population is estimated at approximately 3.2 million inhabitants. Because of its small territorial size and population, Qatar provides a useful case for examining the concentration of air-defense systems relative to the size of society.

Among the European NATO members included in the comparison, Germany represents the largest population, with approximately 84 million inhabitants. Germany therefore provides an important contrast with smaller Gulf states in terms of both territorial scale and population size. For Poland, the population used in this dataset is approximately 38 million inhabitants. Poland is included as a key NATO state on the alliance's eastern flank and serves as an important comparison case for evaluating air-defense density relative to population in a frontline European context. Romania has a population of approximately 19 million inhabitants, placing it between Poland and the smaller Baltic states in terms of demographic size within the European portion of the dataset.

Finally, the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are treated collectively because of their shared regional security environment and similar air-defense constraints. Estonia has roughly 1.3 million inhabitants, Latvia approximately 1.9 million, and Lithuania around 2.8 million, resulting in a combined population of approximately 6 million people. This aggregated figure is used for calculating the population-based air-defense density metric for the Baltic region.

Batteries per Million Inhabitants

Country	Batteries	Population	Batteries per Million People
Qatar	4	3.2 million	1
UAE	11	11 million	1
Saudi Arabia	22	35 million	1
Romania	4	19 million	0
Baltic States	1	6 million	0
Germany	12	84 million	0
Poland	4	38 million	0

Population figures are approximate estimates based on World Bank data. Air-defense battery numbers are also approximate, as exact operational figures are not publicly disclosed.

Table: Al Habtoor Research Centre • Source: Various Sources • Created with Datawrapper

Metric 3: Layered Air Defense and Engagement Depth

Modern air-defense strategies increasingly rely on layered defensive architectures, where different systems intercept threats at different ranges and altitudes. Contemporary missile warfare involves a combination of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, which require distinct interception capabilities. As a result, effective air-defense systems are typically structured in multiple layers rather than relying on a single interceptor platform. A layered architecture increases the probability of successful interception because an incoming threat may encounter several defensive systems sequentially, providing multiple opportunities to neutralize the attack before it reaches its target. The first layer consists of short-range air-defense systems, which are designed to intercept low-flying threats such as drones, helicopters, and certain cruise missiles. These systems typically protect military bases, critical infrastructure, and urban areas from short-distance or low-altitude attacks. Short-range systems therefore represent the innermost layer of the defensive architecture.

The second layer consists of medium-range air-defense systems, which provide broader territorial protection and are capable of intercepting aircraft and cruise missiles at longer distances. These systems often form the backbone of national air-defense networks because they can defend large population centers, military installations, and strategic infrastructure. The third layer consists of ballistic missile defense systems, which are specifically designed to intercept high-speed ballistic missiles. These systems operate at higher altitudes and longer ranges than conventional surface-to-air missile systems and are intended to engage ballistic threats during the terminal phase of flight. Because ballistic missile defense systems are technologically complex and costly, only a limited number of states deploy them as part of their national defense architecture.

Layered Defence Capability

Country	Short-Range Layer	Medium-Range Layer	Ballistic Missile Defense	Engagement Depth
UAE	NASAMS / SHORAD	Patriot	THAAD	3 layers
Saudi Arabia	SHORAD	Patriot	THAAD	3 layers
Qatar	NASAMS	Patriot	—	2 layers
Germany	IRIS-T SLM	Patriot	—	2 layers
Poland	Narew / CAMM	Patriot	—	2 layers
Romania	SHORAD	Patriot	—	2 layers
Baltic States	SHORAD	—	—	1 layer

The table focuses on major air-defense systems capable of providing area or regional defense. These systems are used because they represent the core architecture of national missile defense networks. Short-range point-defense systems (such as MANPADS or base-protection systems) are excluded because they defend specific installations rather than large territorial areas and therefore are not directly comparable across countries.

Table: Al Habtoor Research Centre • Source: Various Sources • Created with Datawrapper

Metric 3: Radar and Early-Warning Capability

Effective air and missile defense depends not only on interceptor systems but also on the ability to detect and track incoming threats at long range. Radar and early-warning systems form the first layer of the defensive chain by identifying incoming missiles, aircraft, or drones and transmitting targeting data to interceptor systems. Without reliable detection capabilities, even advanced air-defense systems cannot respond effectively to incoming attacks.

Modern missile defense architectures therefore rely on a network of long-range surveillance radars, tracking radars, and fire-control radars integrated into national or alliance-level command systems. Early-warning radars detect incoming threats at long distances, tracking radars calculate their trajectory, and fire-control radars guide interceptor missiles toward the target. Together these systems create a detection layer that allows air-defense systems to respond quickly to missile launches or aerial threats.

Some states also integrate their national radar systems into broader alliance networks. In Europe, several NATO members participate in the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence system, which links radar coverage and command structures across the alliance. In contrast, Gulf states rely primarily on national radar systems integrated with U.S.-supplied missile-defense technologies, such as the AN/TPY-2 radar associated with ballistic missile defense systems. The presence and sophistication of these detection systems therefore provide an additional indicator of the overall resilience of a country's air-defense architecture.

Radar and Early Warning Coverage

Country	Major Radar / Detection Systems	Integration Level
UAE	AN/TPY-2 radar, Patriot radar	High
Saudi Arabia	AN/TPY-2 radar, Patriot radar	High
Qatar	Patriot radar systems	Medium
Germany	Patriot radar, NATO radar network	High
Poland	Patriot radar, NATO radar network	High
Romania	Patriot radar, NATO radar network	High
Baltic States	NATO air-surveillance network	Medium

Radar and early-warning capabilities are based on publicly reported missile-defence systems and NATO air-defence integration. Exact radar deployment and coverage areas are not fully disclosed for security reasons.

Table: Al Habtoor Research Centre • Source: Various Sources • Created with Datawrapper

key Takeaways

Results of the comp Carative analysis highlight several important differences in how cases, GCC countries and European NATO states, exposed to missile threats organize defensive coverage across territory, population, and detection capabilities.

- **First, the analysis reveals significant variation in territorial defense density.**

Gulf cases, particularly Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, display substantially higher concentrations of air-defense batteries relative to territory than most European NATO members included in the comparison. This pattern reflects the smaller territorial scale of these states and the high priority given to missile defense in response to regional threats. In contrast, several European states must defend significantly larger territories with comparatively fewer ground-based systems, resulting in lower territorial defense density. This means that Gulf states can provide more overlapping coverage across their territory, reducing the likelihood that missile strikes can bypass defensive systems through geographic gaps. In contrast, countries such as Poland and Romania must defend far larger territories with relatively limited numbers of ground-based air-defense systems. As a result, air-defense coverage may be uneven across large geographic areas, potentially leaving certain regions more exposed during large-scale missile attacks.

- **Second, population-based defense density shows a similar pattern.**

When air-defense systems are measured relative to population size, Gulf states again demonstrate a higher concentration of defensive assets. Qatar and the UAE in particular exhibit relatively high numbers of air-defense batteries per million inhabitants. European NATO members, especially larger states such as Germany and Poland, display lower levels of population-based defense density, reflecting both larger populations and historically lower investment in ground-based air defense following the end of the Cold War.

- **Third, the comparison of defensive architectures**

Several Gulf states operate multi-layered missile-defense systems that include short-range systems, medium-range interceptors, and ballistic missile defense platforms such as THAAD. This layered architecture increases the number of interception opportunities against incoming threats and improves the ability to respond to diverse attack profiles involving drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. In contrast, many European NATO members rely primarily on medium-range systems such as Patriot and have more limited ballistic missile defense capabilities at the national level. This can reduce interception depth against certain types of missile threats and may increase reliance on alliance-level assets.

- **Fourth, radar and early-warning capability**

European NATO states benefit from participation in NATO's integrated air-defense network, which provides shared radar coverage and coordinated command structures across the alliance. This integration helps mitigate some of the limitations created by lower numbers of national interceptor systems. Gulf states, by contrast, rely primarily on nationally deployed sensors and radars, although many of these systems are technologically advanced and integrated with U.S.-supplied missile-defense architectures. While Gulf radar coverage is strong in certain areas, the absence of a fully integrated regional air-defense network may limit collective detection and coordination capabilities across the region.

Section 3: European NATO Vulnerability

Although a direct Russian attack on a NATO member state would be suicidal for Moscow, particularly because of the collective defence obligations under Article 5, recent developments have raised questions about the reliability and speed of alliance responses in grey-zone or limited escalation scenarios. Article 5 remains the cornerstone of NATO deterrence, and a large-scale attack on a member state would almost certainly trigger a collective response. However, several recent incidents illustrate that the political threshold for invoking Article 5 remains ambiguous. Russian drones have entered Polish airspace on multiple occasions, including an incident in September 2025 when several unmanned aerial vehicles crossed into Polish territory. Similarly, Estonian airspace has been violated during military activity in the Baltic region. in March 2026, when NATO forces shot down three Iranian missiles fired against Turkey, NATO members argued that the incident did not automatically warrant an Article 5 response. These events demonstrate that while NATO's collective defence clause remains powerful in theory, its practical application in ambiguous or limited attacks may be politically contested.

Beyond questions of alliance credibility, European vulnerability also stems from structural weaknesses in air and missile defence that developed during the post-Cold War period. By the end of the Cold War, many European NATO members considered air and missile defence to be a secondary military priority rather than a central component of deterrence during active conflict.

This assumption proved misguided once large-scale missile and drone warfare re-emerged in the twenty-first century. Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated how massed salvos of missiles and unmanned systems can overwhelm limited interceptor inventories and strain command and control systems. The risks are not hypothetical. When Russian unmanned aerial vehicles entered Polish airspace in September 2025, NATO allies mobilised a sophisticated multinational defensive response involving airborne early warning aircraft, Patriot missile defence batteries, fighter aircraft, and aerial refuelling assets. Italian airborne early warning and control aircraft supported German Patriot systems deployed in Poland, while Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35 fighters were scrambled to monitor and potentially intercept the drones. The scale of the defensive response revealed an important asymmetry. The cost and complexity of the defensive package vastly exceeded the cost of the relatively inexpensive drones that triggered the incident.

Europe's broader air defence posture remains uneven. Although European countries possess advanced fighter aircraft and a mix of American, European, and Israeli missile defence systems, their operational readiness for sustained high-intensity conflict remains limited. Interceptor stockpiles are insufficient for prolonged engagements, production timelines for new missiles remain slow, and short-range air defence gaps leave European forces exposed to the type of kamikaze drone warfare that has become routine in Ukraine. These weaknesses are not only military but also industrial. Europe's defence industrial base has struggled to scale production of interceptors quickly enough to match the potential volume of missile and drone attacks that could occur in a high-intensity conflict with Russia. This challenge has also revealed a strategic debate within Europe about how to close these gaps. One group of policymakers, sometimes described as "gap fillers," argues for the rapid procurement of proven systems from external suppliers in order to address immediate capability shortfalls. These proposals typically involve acquiring additional Patriot, NASAMS, Arrow-3, or Barak systems from the U.S., Israel, and other partners. Another group, often associated with France and advocates of European strategic autonomy, emphasises the importance of developing indigenous systems even if this slows the pace of deployment. The tension between these approaches continues to shape European air defence initiatives, including programmes such as the European Sky Shield Initiative and broader European rearmament plans.

Importantly, Europe cannot assume unlimited access to American interceptor production. The U.S. defence industrial base faces its own constraints, particularly as Washington shifts greater strategic attention toward competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. As a result, the U.S. has increasingly prioritised its own air defence requirements, which could limit the availability of interceptors for European allies in a prolonged conflict scenario. In contrast, Several Gulf states have pursued a broader range of suppliers for their air defence systems, including the U.S., Israel, and South Korea. Systems such as the Cheongung-II (KM-SAM Block II) from South Korea have been purchased by both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while American systems such as Patriot and THAAD remain central to Gulf missile defence architectures. The UAE has also reportedly acquired Israeli systems such as SPYDER and Barak MX, while some states have explored additional technologies including counter-drone systems and laser weapons.

Conclusion

The comparison presented in this study highlights a growing divergence in how states prepare for the realities of modern air warfare. Gulf states, operating under persistent missile threats, have prioritised dense and layered air-defence architectures capable of absorbing large volumes of incoming drones and missiles. The interception data examined in this study demonstrates that such systems can achieve high levels of effectiveness even under sustained attack. In contrast, several European NATO members maintain significantly lower defence density relative to both territory and population, rely on fewer defensive layers, and possess limited interceptor stockpiles for prolonged high-intensity engagements. While NATO's integrated radar networks and alliance structures provide important advantages, they cannot fully compensate for structural gaps in interceptor coverage and defensive depth.

These findings suggest that European security debates must move beyond the assumption that technological superiority alone will guarantee resilience against saturation attacks. The experience of recent conflicts shows that the arithmetic of modern air warfare often depends on numbers as much as sophistication, including the quantity of interceptors, the density of defensive systems, and the industrial capacity to sustain prolonged engagements. Strengthening European air and missile defence will therefore require not only additional procurement but also greater attention to defence density, layered architectures, and the rapid production of interceptors. As missile and drone warfare continues to proliferate, the ability to sustain defensive operations under saturation conditions may become one of the decisive factors shaping the future balance of military power.

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