




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THE LONGEVITY PARADOX

Longer Lives, Greater Opportunity, and the Persistence of Power

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Longevity is usually presented as an unambiguous good: if people can remain healthy for longer, they gain more years of life, autonomy and opportunity. At the level of the individual, that promise is difficult to dispute. At the level of society, however, the implications are more complicated. The same additional years that could reduce the burden of ageing and preserve health could also extend working lives, delay inheritance, compound wealth, and allow political, corporate and scientific influence to persist for longer.

This is the longevity paradox. The strategic significance of longer healthy lives does not depend on the achievement of immortality, or even on people routinely reaching 150. It depends on whether ageing becomes sufficiently manageable to change the assumptions built into modern institutions. Education, employment, retirement, pensions, inheritance, housing and political succession all reflect a life course in which biological decline eventually limits participation and transfers assets and authority between generations. If healthy lifespan changes, the timing of those transitions changes as well.

The science remains uncertain. No intervention has yet demonstrated dramatic extension of healthy human lifespan at scale, and many commercial claims remain ahead of clinical evidence. Yet investment, research and government interest are expanding across genomics, regenerative medicine, cellular reprogramming, diagnostics and AI-enabled drug discovery. That direction of travel is strategically relevant even before a transformative breakthrough because incremental gains in healthspan could alter labour markets, healthcare demand, pension liabilities and the value of accumulated human capital.

The consequences will also depend on distribution. A longer healthy life could give individuals more time for education, family, creativity, entrepreneurship, civic participation and multiple careers. It could also become a resource that employers and governments seek to convert into additional years of labour and tax contributions. Wealthier people and countries may be better positioned to access new interventions, allowing biological advantages to reinforce economic and technological advantages over decades. At the international level, states able to develop, manufacture and regulate longevity technologies could gain an additional source of human-capital and technological power.

The central question is therefore not simply how long people might live, but who benefits from additional healthy time, how that time is used, and how institutions respond when biological decline becomes less predictable.

Longevity matters strategically because it can change the amount of healthy time available to learn, work, create, accumulate wealth, exercise authority and contribute to society. Whether that becomes a broad healthspan dividend or another mechanism for concentrating advantage will depend as much on institutional choices as on scientific breakthroughs.


Signal	What it indicates
761 million → ~1.6 billion people aged 65+, 2021–2050	Ageing is already a global demographic transformation, not a distant consequence of radical life extension.
50+ population: ~USD 45 trillion economic impact in 2020	Older populations already represent a major component of global economic activity.
50+ economic impact projected at ~USD 118 trillion by 2050	The economic importance of later life is expected to grow even without a radical longevity breakthrough.
Longevity market: ~USD 25bn (early 2020s) → USD 66.4bn by 2035	Capital is treating longevity as an emerging commercial field despite continuing scientific uncertainty.
TAME trial	The field is moving toward human evidence on delaying multiple age-related diseases rather than relying only on laboratory lifespan claims.

From Medical Innovation to Strategic Capability

Transformative technologies rarely remain confined to the field in which they originate. The internet moved from a specialised communications technology into the infrastructure of the global economy. AI has moved from a branch of computer science into industrial policy, military modernisation, and diplomacy. Nuclear physics became a foundation of the postwar balance of power. In each case, the strategic significance of the technology emerged from its interaction with wider systems rather than from its technical properties alone.

Longevity research is beginning to display a similar pattern. The field increasingly combines genomics, cellular reprogramming, regenerative medicine, precision therapeutics, advanced diagnostics, and AI. Private capital is funding companies that target the mechanisms of ageing, while governments are incorporating biotechnology and healthy ageing into broader development strategies. The emerging longevity market is already being built around diagnostics, preventive medicine, therapeutics, wearables, and personalised health services, even though the scientific evidence for dramatic lifespan extension remains limited.

The capital already committed illustrates the point. Altos Labs, backed by Jeff Bezos, and Calico, funded by Alphabet, sit alongside firms such as Juvenescence and dedicated vehicles including Andreessen Horowitz's Bio+Health arm and the Longevity Vision Fund. Academic researchers such as David Sinclair at Harvard and Nir Barzilai at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine are running clinical work such as the TAME (Targeting Aging with Metformin) trial, while scientists including Judy Campisi and Brian Kennedy are advancing the study of cellular senescence in partnership with institutions such as the Buck Institute for Research on Aging. Estimates of the market's size vary because providers define the longevity market differently. A 2026 Market Research Future estimate values the global longevity market at USD 32.15 billion in 2025 and projects it to reach USD 34.57 billion in 2026 and USD 66.40 billion by 2035, implying a compound annual growth rate of 7.52%. The estimate should be treated as an indicator of commercial expectations rather than evidence that the underlying science has been validated at the same pace.



CAGR: 7.52% (2026–2035) • Chart: Al Habtoor Research Centre • Source: Market Research Future (2026)

This distinction between current commercialisation and future scientific success is important. Longevity does not need to produce a single breakthrough capable of extending life by decades to become economically and politically consequential. Incremental improvements that delay chronic disease, preserve cognitive function or allow people to remain active for longer could already change labour markets, pension assumptions, and healthcare demand. A larger breakthrough would magnify those effects.

What makes longevity unusual is that it acts directly on human capital. Governments invest in education, health and skills because productive people generate economic output, innovation, and state capacity. If people remain healthy for longer, the return on those investments could extend across a larger portion of the life course.

The same capability, however, could also extend the period during which existing wealth and influence are accumulated and exercised. Longevity is therefore not inherently beneficial or harmful. Its consequences depend on who benefits, how institutions adapt and whether gains in healthy time are widely distributed.

Demography, Fertility, and the Limits of Growth

The demographic transformation that makes longevity strategically relevant is already underway. The United Nations projects that the global population aged 65 and older will rise from 761 million in 2021 to around 1.6 billion by 2050. Population ageing is being driven by longer survival and, increasingly, smaller families and lower fertility. Governments are consequently already confronting pressures on pensions, healthcare, labour supply, and systems of intergenerational support.

Number of people aged 65 years or above in millions, world



Chart: AI Habtoor Research Centre • Source: United Nations (2022a) • Created with Datawrapper

A further extension of healthy lifespan would interact with this transition rather than create it from scratch. If people remain healthy and economically active for longer, the effective labour supply could expand even as the conventional working-age population shrinks. Additional years of employment could mean additional tax contributions and a larger pool of experienced workers, while healthier older populations could reduce some forms of disability and long-term care. But these benefits would depend on whether institutions actually allow people to use those additional years. A society that extends life without extending healthy working capacity would face a very different fiscal outcome from one that adds productive years to the life course.

The opposite outcome remains possible if longevity increases without corresponding institutional adaptation. Pension systems based on fixed retirement ages could face longer periods of benefit payments, while healthcare systems could experience sustained demand from populations living longer with chronic conditions. This makes healthspan more important than maximum lifespan as a policy indicator.

Governments will increasingly need to distinguish chronological age from functional capacity because two people of the same age can represent radically different economic and fiscal realities. The relevant policy question becomes how many additional years can be lived in good health, not simply how many years can be added to life expectancy.

The relationship with fertility is equally important. Longer lives do not automatically translate into larger populations and unavoidable pressure on resources. Longer horizons for education, work, and wealth accumulation tend to raise the cost of raising children relative to other uses of time, and modelling of repeated life-extension scenarios suggests population size tends to stabilise rather than expand indefinitely, even as lifespans are extended repeatedly. That stabilisation is unlikely to be distributionally neutral, however: it plausibly comes with a more polarised distribution of wealth, separating households able to sustain repeated life extension from those without the resources to do so. Migration adds another variable. Countries facing shrinking working-age populations may become less dependent on immigration if older residents remain productive, while countries without access to longevity technologies could experience stronger incentives to attract healthy and skilled migrants.

Resource pressure should therefore be understood through the interaction of population size, age structure, longevity, consumption, and productive capacity. Longer lives could increase lifetime demand for housing, food, water, energy, and healthcare, particularly if fertility does not fall sufficiently to offset lower mortality. Yet healthier and more experienced populations could also generate productivity gains, technological innovation, and better resource efficiency. This is why claims that longevity will automatically produce either demographic collapse or resource scarcity are too simple. The strategic risk lies in the possibility that demographic change, environmental pressure and technological progress move at different speeds, leaving governments with institutions designed for an older model of the life course.

The Political Economy of Longer Lives

The economic weight of older populations is already large before any breakthrough in ageing science is considered. People aged 50 and older supported an estimated one billion jobs worldwide and generated USD 23 trillion in labour income in 2020, alongside roughly USD 45 trillion in overall economic impact, equivalent to about a third of global GDP. On current demographic trends alone, that impact is projected to reach USD 65 trillion by 2030 and USD 118 trillion by 2050, or some 39% of global GDP, while the jobs the 50-plus population supports are projected to grow from one billion to 1.5 billion over the same period. The 50-plus population's share of global consumer spending is projected to rise from USD 35 trillion in 2020, about half of the world total, to USD 96 trillion by 2050, some 59% of global consumption. These figures describe demographic ageing that is already under way; a genuine extension of healthy lifespan would be layered on top of a population whose economic footprint is already substantial and growing.




Chart: Al Habtoor Research Centre • Source: AARP and Economist Impact (2023)

Labour, Retirement, Human Capital, and the Individual

Longer healthy lives could transform the conventional relationship between education, employment and retirement. A forty-year career followed by retirement makes sense when adult life is relatively short; it becomes less convincing if people can remain healthy and capable for substantially longer. Working lives could become more flexible, with multiple careers, periodic retraining and repeated transitions between employment and education. Older workers could retain valuable institutional knowledge, while employers and governments could benefit from a larger pool of experienced workers and additional tax contributions.

But treating longevity primarily as a way to extend labour supply would miss its most important human dimension. The value of additional healthy years cannot be reduced to the number of years an individual can remain economically productive. Longer life could create more time for family, education, creativity, entrepreneurship, community participation and leisure, as well as work. If policy responds to longer lives mainly by raising retirement ages or shifting pension risks onto individuals, a potential expansion of human freedom could instead become an expansion of the period over which labour is expected to be supplied. The question is therefore not only whether people can work longer, but whether they will have meaningful choice over how additional healthy years are used.

This distinction matters because the benefits and costs of longer working lives will not be distributed evenly. Highly skilled professionals may be able to convert additional healthy years into higher earnings, new careers and greater autonomy, while workers in physically demanding or insecure occupations may have less capacity to remain employed. A uniform increase in retirement ages could therefore transfer value from workers to employers and governments without providing equivalent benefits to everyone. Future retirement systems may need to become more flexible and differentiated, allowing phased retirement, part-time work, retraining and periods outside paid employment rather than treating chronological age as a universal measure of capacity.

The scale of existing retirement systems illustrates what is at stake. Canada's Canada Pension Plan alone holds more than CA\$675 billion in assets, while the World Economic Forum reports that 44% of people worldwide fear outliving their retirement savings, rising to 70% of Americans surveyed. A longer working life could ease some of this pressure, but only if pension design, not simply retirement age, is reformed. Otherwise, longevity could shift the financial burden of a longer life towards individuals who must accumulate enough assets to fund an increasingly long retirement.

Longer healthy lives could also change the distribution of wealth. An individual who remains healthy and economically active for several additional decades has more time to earn, invest and benefit from compound returns, while inheritance may be delayed because assets remain with the original owner for longer. Younger generations could therefore encounter slower access to housing, investment capital and family wealth even as aggregate wealth rises. The effect could be particularly strong where access to longevity interventions is already correlated with income, education and healthcare. Wealth could enable better health; better health could permit longer participation in high-value economic activity; longer participation could generate further income and investment returns; and accumulated wealth could finance further access to advanced healthcare.

This creates a form of inequality that is distinct from conventional differences in income. It is inequality in the amount of healthy time available to convert other advantages into further advantages. If expensive interventions extend healthspan first among those able to afford them, the additional decades could compound existing differences in wealth, education and influence. The result could be a new intergenerational politics in which younger people face delayed inheritance and slower access to senior positions while older and wealthier groups retain assets and institutional influence for longer. Yet the opposite outcome is possible: longer healthy lives could allow people to mentor younger generations, create businesses, contribute to communities and transfer knowledge over longer periods. The policy question is therefore whether institutions can turn additional healthy time into broadly distributed opportunity rather than allowing it to become another mechanism through which advantage compounds.

The implications extend from individuals to institutions. Longer healthy lives could preserve valuable expertise, but they could also slow the circulation of authority if senior positions remain occupied for substantially longer. This applies not only to presidents and monarchs but to corporate executives, investors, military commanders, media owners, scientific leaders and technology founders. Universities, corporations, financial institutions and scientific communities all depend on succession and generational renewal. Longer tenure could preserve institutional memory, but it could also restrict opportunities for younger cohorts to acquire authority, build networks and introduce new ideas.

The effect could be particularly significant in personalist political systems, where succession is already a point of vulnerability. If leaders believe they can remain physically and cognitively capable for decades longer, incentives around succession could change.

Potential successors may have fewer opportunities to develop independent influence, while incumbents may have stronger incentives to preserve existing arrangements. Longevity would not guarantee political stability; by delaying succession, it could postpone instability and make eventual transitions more consequential. In democracies, elections and term limits would continue to constrain formal office, but longer-lived corporate, financial, media and scientific elites could still influence the distribution of opportunity for longer periods.

Therefore, Longevity raises an institutional design problem: how can societies preserve the benefits of experience without allowing additional healthy years to become a mechanism for permanently extending existing advantage? Lifelong education, flexible employment, phased retirement, intergenerational mobility and meaningful pathways for new leadership could become as important as the technologies that extend healthspan itself. The objective should not be to assume that older people are less capable, nor to impose arbitrary age limits. It should be to ensure that longer lives expand human choice while maintaining circulation of opportunity, wealth, authority and ideas.

The Global Longevity Gap

The distribution of longevity technologies may ultimately matter as much as their scientific effectiveness. Transformative technologies tend to concentrate first where capital, research capacity, manufacturing infrastructure, and skilled labour are already abundant. Longevity shows early signs of following this pattern. The United States combines deep private capital with leading academic and biotechnology ecosystems; China has linked healthy ageing to demographic and industrial policy; Gulf states are investing heavily to build biotechnology and research capacity; and smaller hubs such as Singapore are using targeted public investment and regulatory agility to attract specialised firms and researchers. If these ecosystems produce effective interventions first, they could generate advantages that extend beyond healthcare into human capital, productivity, and technological influence.

Four national approaches illustrate how differently this concentration is being pursued, and each represents a distinct model for how a state can try to enter the field. Saudi Arabia's Hevolution Foundation, launched in 2022 with an announced commitment of USD 1 billion a year for a decade, has taken a hub-and-spoke approach: it places strategic grants in established Western research centres, including USD 21 million awarded in 2023 to the Buck Institute for Research on Aging in California, while building a domestic ecosystem through its Riyadh BioHub initiative, which offers regulatory flexibility for clinical trials unavailable in many Western jurisdictions.

China has taken a more state-led, domestically focused path: its 2023 Silver Economy strategy and the 14th Five-Year Plan's prioritisation of "active ageing" have channelled roughly USD 300 million in central and provincial funding into institutions such as the Shanghai Institute of Aging and Developmental Biology, while its Healthy China 2030 strategy explicitly frames ageing intervention as a matter of demographic stability and labour-force productivity. Singapore has pursued a narrower strategy built on regulatory agility: a USD 50 million state investment in the Centre for Healthy Longevity at the National University of Singapore, combined with an expedited approval pathway operated through the Health Sciences Authority's Innovations Office, has been enough to attract companies such as CohBar, Gero, and Juvenescence to establish clinical operations there, allowing a small state to punch above its demographic weight.

The UAE offers a fourth model, built around sovereign capital and healthcare consolidation rather than grants or regulatory sandboxes alone: Abu Dhabi's M42, formed through the merger of G42 Healthcare and Mubadala Health, has taken direct equity stakes in longevity biotechnology, including its 2025 investment in the UK-based firm Juvenescence, while the emirate's newly launched Health, Endurance, Longevity and Medicine cluster is targeting USD 11.5 billion in investment and USD 25.6 billion in GDP contribution by 2045, backed by Mubadala's broader USD 330 billion sovereign portfolio. Together, these four cases show that there is no single template for competing in this field: capital, regulation, state planning, and sovereign consolidation can each buy a country a position in the race, and which combination proves most durable is itself one of the signals worth tracking.

This concentration creates a potential cumulative feedback loop. Countries that develop effective longevity technologies may gain healthier and more productive populations. Higher productivity can strengthen tax revenues and domestic investment, while a larger pool of experienced researchers and entrepreneurs can deepen innovation ecosystems. Those ecosystems can attract additional capital and talent, producing further biomedical advances. Biological advantage could therefore reinforce economic advantage, which then reinforces technological advantage. The reverse is also possible: countries that cannot finance research, retain talent or manufacture advanced therapies may become increasingly dependent on external suppliers for a capability with growing implications for national resilience.

For countries without comparable capacity, the reverse could occur. Many low- and middle-income countries are ageing without the institutional buffers available to wealthier states, including comprehensive pensions, universal healthcare, and strong biomedical research systems. If access to healthspan-extending technologies remains concentrated, the resulting gap would add a biological dimension to existing differences in income, education, and infrastructure.

This does not mean that a global longevity divide is inevitable. Medical technologies can diffuse through international cooperation, generic production, technology transfer, and public investment. But without deliberate mechanisms for diffusion, the incentives of private capital and national competition may favour concentration. Longevity could then become not only a health issue but a development issue and, ultimately, a question of international power.

The strategic significance of longevity therefore lies partly in its capacity to alter the quality and duration of human capital. States that can preserve the health of their populations for longer may gain advantages in productivity, scientific capacity, military readiness, and fiscal resilience. In that sense, a healthy lifespan could eventually become one of the less visible but more consequential components of national power.

Security, AI, and the Bio-Digital Race

Longevity research also sits within a wider security environment because the technologies required to modify ageing overlap with capabilities that governments already treat as strategically sensitive. Gene editing, cellular reprogramming, advanced bioinformatics and large-scale biological datasets can have applications beyond longevity. The concern is not that longevity research will inherently become a weapon, but that the expansion of powerful biological capabilities can create dual-use risks and dependencies that outpace existing oversight. Control over specialised manufacturing, genomic datasets or key research platforms could become strategically important in the same way that access to advanced chips and computing infrastructure has become a concern in other technology races.

The private-sector structure of the field makes this challenge more difficult. Venture capital can move faster than public research institutions, while commercial longevity clinics and direct-to-consumer services can bring interventions to consumers before long-term evidence is established. Weak standards, misleading claims or a serious adverse event could undermine public confidence and provoke abrupt regulatory responses.

The governance problem is therefore not limited to deciding which therapies should be approved. It also concerns the quality of evidence, the use of biological data and the oversight of a rapidly expanding private ecosystem.

AI could accelerate both opportunity and risk. AI is increasingly used to analyse biological data, identify therapeutic targets, and accelerate drug discovery. If AI development and longevity biotechnology advance together, progress may become less predictable because improvements in one field can increase the capabilities of the other. Countries and firms that control advanced computing, biological datasets and biotechnology infrastructure could accumulate advantages across multiple strategic domains.

This creates a potential concentration-of-power problem. The same small group of companies, investors, and states may gain influence over both frontier AI and frontier biology. Control over computing infrastructure could accelerate biological discovery, while control over biological data could strengthen AI systems. The result would not simply be faster research. It could be a more concentrated technological architecture in which access to human biological capability depends on a small number of actors.

The security dimension therefore extends beyond traditional biosecurity. It includes data sovereignty, cybersecurity, intellectual property, talent competition, supply-chain dependence, and the possibility that states treat longevity-related capabilities as strategic technologies subject to export controls or investment screening. A country that depends on foreign suppliers for critical biological inputs could face a different strategic risk from one that controls the full research-to-manufacturing chain. The countries that build trusted governance around biological data and biotechnology may therefore gain advantages alongside those that simply develop the underlying science.



Signals to Track

The uncertainty surrounding longevity makes prediction difficult, but it does not make foresight impossible. The most useful approach is to monitor signals that would indicate whether the field is moving from scientific possibility towards systemic transformation. No single indicator will be decisive. The important signal will be convergence across science, capital, national strategy, regulation, and institutional adaptation.

First, clinical evidence should be monitored for measurable improvements in healthspan rather than headline claims about maximum lifespan. Demonstrated reductions in age-related disease, sustained cognitive function or preserved physical capacity would carry greater strategic significance than isolated laboratory results. Second, investment flows should be tracked across venture capital, sovereign funds, and corporate research. Sustained growth would indicate that market and state actors increasingly view longevity as strategically viable.

Third, national strategies provide a political signal. The inclusion of longevity or healthy ageing in biotechnology, industrial or demographic policy would indicate that governments are beginning to treat the field as a component of national competitiveness. Fourth, regulatory changes, including specialised approval pathways and clinical-trial sandboxes, would signal competition to attract longevity research and commercialisation.

Fifth, institutional reforms should be monitored. Changes to retirement ages, pension design, lifelong learning, workforce participation and actuarial assumptions would indicate that governments are beginning to prepare for longer productive lives. Sixth, the global distribution of access should be tracked alongside restrictions on biomedical data, technology transfer, and critical supply chains. These would indicate whether longevity is becoming a source of systemic inequality and strategic dependence.

Finally, the convergence of AI and biotechnology deserves particular attention. Rapid increases in AI-assisted biological discovery, concentration of ownership across both sectors, or the emergence of new biological capabilities that substantially shorten development timelines would represent potentially important discontinuities. Early warning should also distinguish isolated commercial enthusiasm from systemic change. A single highly valued company is not enough; a more consequential signal would be simultaneous movement in clinical evidence, public funding, national strategy, regulation, and institutional reform. The purpose of early warning is not to predict the exact year of a breakthrough. It is to identify when several weak signals begin pointing in the same direction and when the cost of waiting for certainty becomes greater than the cost of preparing.

Strategic early-warning indicators for longevity

Indicator	What to monitor	Why it matters
Clinical evidence	Validated human healthspan gains; stronger evidence beyond biomarkers	Separates genuine progress from speculative claims
Investment flows	Public funding, venture capital, sovereign and corporate R&D	Signals growing confidence in strategic and commercial viability
National strategy	Longevity in biotechnology, demographic or industrial policy	Shows movement from healthcare issue to national capability
Regulation	Approval pathways, trial sandboxes, data, and clinical standards	Signals competition to attract research and commercialisation
Institutional reform	Pensions, retirement, lifelong learning, and workforce policy	Shows adaptation to longer productive lives
Global inequality	Access gaps, technology transfer, and biomedical data restrictions	Indicates whether longevity is becoming a development divide
Security and AI-bio convergence	Export controls, espionage, dual-use incidents, AI-enabled biological discovery	Signals integration into strategic technology competition

Several of these indicators are already moving, even if none is yet decisive on its own. On clinical evidence, the ongoing TAME trial is testing whether a repurposed diabetes drug can delay multiple age-related diseases in humans, the kind of healthspan-focused endpoint the field still lacks at scale. On investment, independent market analysts now put the global longevity market on a growth path from the low tens of billions of dollars today to an estimated USD 66.4 billion by 2035, a sustained annual growth rate above 7%, which points to continued capital commitment rather than a speculative spike. On national strategy, four very different states, Saudi Arabia, China, Singapore, and the UAE, have each moved from rhetorical interest to funded programmes within the space of a few years, which is itself notable: strategic priorities backed only by statements rarely attract the scale of capital and institutional infrastructure now visible in each case. On regulation, Singapore’s expedited approval pathway for age-related interventions remains the clearest working example of a regulatory sandbox built specifically for this field, though other jurisdictions are beginning to explore similar mechanisms. Monitoring whether these signals continue to converge, rather than treating any single one as proof of a breakthrough, is the more useful discipline.

Plausible Futures

The future of longevity is unlikely to follow a single trajectory. In a gradual scenario, therapies produce modest improvements in healthy ageing without a dramatic increase in maximum lifespan. Even this outcome would matter because it could extend working lives, reduce some age-related disease, and force incremental reform of pensions, healthcare, and employment. In a disruptive scenario, interventions produce much larger healthspan gains but remain expensive and concentrated among wealthy individuals and technologically advanced states. The result could be a longevity divide in which biological health becomes another form of accumulated economic privilege.

A third scenario would see longevity become part of strategic technology competition. Major powers could compete for researchers, biological data, intellectual property, clinical trials and manufacturing capacity, treating healthy lifespan as an extension of the wider AI-biotechnology race. The important consequence would not necessarily be a dramatic increase in lifespan itself, but the emergence of a new field in which technological leadership generates human-capital advantages. A fourth possibility is fragmentation: different countries experience different combinations of scientific progress, regulation, and access, producing a world in which some populations gain substantial healthspan improvements while others experience only incremental gains.

These futures are not mutually exclusive, and none is inevitable. Their value lies in showing why governments should prepare for several possibilities rather than anchor policy to a single prediction. The most robust policies are those that improve institutional resilience across scenarios: stronger health systems, adaptable pension structures, lifelong learning, credible biotechnology regulation, biosecurity capacity, and mechanisms for equitable access.

Preparing Before the Breakthrough

Waiting for definitive evidence of radical life extension would be a mistake because institutional change takes longer than technological adoption. Governments can begin by stress-testing pensions, labour markets and public finances against different assumptions about healthy life expectancy rather than relying on a single forecast. They can also improve measurement of healthspan, because chronological age will become a weaker guide to economic participation if functional capacity changes. The aim is not to redesign society around an uncertain technology, but to identify which institutions would become fragile if healthy life expectancy rose substantially and which reforms would strengthen them regardless of the exact trajectory.

Governments can also strengthen the foundations of the longevity economy without betting on a particular therapy. Investment in biomedical research, data infrastructure, public health and biomanufacturing can generate benefits even if radical life extension never materialises. At the same time, regulatory systems should be capable of distinguishing validated interventions from speculative products and should require stronger evidence as claims become more ambitious.

The distributional dimension requires equal attention. Policymakers should anticipate how reimbursement, insurance and public procurement could affect access to effective therapies. Clinical research should include diverse populations, while international cooperation should address technology transfer and the capacity of lower-income countries to adopt proven interventions.

Finally, longevity should be incorporated into national technology and security assessments. Governments should identify critical dependencies in biological data, computing, specialised manufacturing, and scientific talent, while monitoring the possibility of export controls, intellectual-property disputes, and strategic competition around longevity-related capabilities. Governments should also consider whether public procurement, insurance and reimbursement rules would widen or narrow access if effective interventions emerge. The objective is not to securitise healthcare unnecessarily, but to recognise that technologies affecting human biological capability can eventually acquire strategic significance and that preparedness is easier before dependence and inequality become entrenched.



Conclusion

Longevity is often presented as a question about how long an individual might live. Its strategic significance lies elsewhere. If people can remain healthy, cognitively capable, and economically productive for substantially longer, the change will affect the systems through which modern societies organise time, wealth, work, and authority. It could alter the balance between workers and dependants, change the timing of inheritance, extend the productive lives of skilled people and reshape the institutions that manage retirement and public finance.

The consequences could also extend into the distribution of power. Longer healthy lives may preserve expertise and human capital, but they could also allow existing economic, political and scientific elites to retain influence for longer. If access is unequal, additional healthy years could become a mechanism through which wealth and social advantage compound. At the international level, countries capable of developing and deploying longevity technologies could gain advantages in productivity, research capacity, and resilience, reinforcing existing differences in technological power.

The resource implications are similarly conditional. Longevity does not automatically mean a larger population or inevitable scarcity. Fertility, migration, consumption and technological efficiency will shape the outcome. But longer lives will change the timing and composition of demand for food, water, energy, housing, and healthcare. These effects deserve attention precisely because they interact with demographic and environmental pressures that are already changing.

The most important uncertainty is therefore not simply whether longevity science will succeed. It is how quickly institutions, markets and states will adapt if it does. Scientific progress could produce a broad healthspan dividend, allowing societies to retain human capital and reduce some costs of ageing, or it could deepen inequality and strategic dependence if benefits remain concentrated. AI and biotechnology could accelerate beneficial innovation, or concentrate biological capability in a small number of firms and states. The outcome will be shaped not only by scientific breakthroughs but by decisions about access, regulation, labour, taxation, pensions and international cooperation made before the consequences become obvious.

Longevity should consequently be treated as a strategic capability under development rather than a distant promise of immortality. Policymakers do not need to believe that humans will soon live to 150 to take the issue seriously. They need only recognise that a gradual increase in healthy, productive years would be enough to challenge institutions built around a shorter life course. The prudent response is to monitor the signals, stress-test existing systems and build governance capacity while the direction of the transition is still open.

The defining question is therefore not whether humanity can defeat ageing. It is whether societies can adapt to a world in which biological time becomes less fixed. If healthy lifespan becomes increasingly manageable, the most valuable resource may no longer be simply life itself, but the additional decades of healthy time that people, economies, and states can convert into knowledge, productivity, and power. How that time is distributed may become one of the defining political questions of the century.

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