LEO Satellites

The landscape of modern air warfare has undergone a profound and structural transformation over the past decade. Air superiority is no longer the exclusive domain of those possessing the most expensive and technologically advanced platforms; rather, it has become accessible to actors capable of effectively leveraging scale and repetition against sophistication and complexity. This new equation has been clearly manifested in the widespread deployment of one-way attack drones, particularly the Iranian “Shahed” series, which has significantly altered established strategic calculations. In their early iterations, these drones operated on relatively simple logic: they were pre-programmed with target coordinates and then launched to navigate their trajectories using conventional satellite navigation systems such as the American GPS and its Russian counterpart, GLONASS. However, this reliance on such systems simultaneously made them the most exploitable vulnerability, as defenders rapidly developed electronic warfare capabilities, including jamming and spoofing tools, to disrupt their guidance and neutralise their missions.   However, this reality did not endure for long. As the intensity of conflicts involving these systems escalated, Iranian drones transitioned into a fundamentally different phase with the integration of communication modules operating via the commercial satellite network Iridium. This was not merely a technical upgrade but a calculated and direct response to GPS vulnerabilities, reflecting a strategic exploitation of civilian infrastructure for military purposes. While GPS satellites struggle to withstand ground-based jamming due to the weakness of their signals transmitted from altitudes exceeding 20,000 kilometres, Iridium satellites operate in low Earth orbit at altitudes of no more than 800 kilometres, emitting signals up to a thousand times stronger. These signals are further protected by layers of encryption that make spoofing or manipulation extremely difficult.   Shahed drones have thus evolved from inert projectiles following a fixed, unalterable path into connected platforms linked to their operators in real time, capable of receiving updates, changing course, sharing data with other airborne units, and even conducting precise strikes against moving targets such as ships at sea. This report therefore offers an in-depth technical and strategic examination of this transformation and its battlefield implications, beginning with the structure and operating logic of the Iridium network, moving through an analysis of the Shahed-131 platform and the integration of these communications into it, and culminating in an assessment of the operational impact this has had on some of the world’s most complex and densely layered air defence systems, namely Israel’s multi-layered architecture, which faced its most severe tests between 2024 and 2026.

In recent years, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations have emerged as a transformative layer within the global digital infrastructure, marking a departure from their original role as connectivity solutions for remote regions. These systems are now embedded within the operational cores of critical sectors such as civil aviation, maritime logistics, financial markets, and defence. The clearest manifestation of this structural shift is Starlink, operated by SpaceX, which by mid-2025 had exceeded 7 million users across more than 150 countries, with exponential growth rates in high-value, latency-sensitive industries.   This rapid technological and geographical expansion has positioned Starlink as a globally integrated utility—yet one that operates outside conventional regulatory regimes. It represents a structural concentration of control over global data flows in a single, privately held entity. The dual outages that occurred in July and September 2025 exposed deep systemic vulnerabilities within the Starlink network, including software architecture fragilities and environmental sensitivities to space weather events. These incidents prompted urgent questions about the stability of a critical infrastructure layer that now underpins sectors central to national sovereignty and global economic coordination.   This report interrogates the systemic risks embedded in the global economy’s growing dependence on LEO constellations through two interlinked analytical lenses. The first is a technical-political economy perspective, which examines the underlying architecture of the Starlink network and the typology of its failure modes—both endogenous and exogenous. The second is a forward-looking, scenario-based assessment that models the potential global economic consequences of a 24-hour Starlink outage in 2032. Through this dual approach, the analysis traces the contours of a new strategic dilemma: how to govern an emergent, transnational infrastructure whose failure could trigger multi-sectoral crises at planetary scale, yet whose design and control remain entirely privatized.