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Europe is no longer just enduring hotter summers; it is absorbing a structural economic blow. With authorities reporting over 13,000 lives lost to severe thermal extremes this season, the crisis has escalated far beyond a public health emergency. As persistent 2026 heatwaves lock the continent in a loop of compressed labour capacity, strained energy grids, and collapsing corporate investment, extreme heat has evolved from a seasonal inconvenience into a multi-hundred-billion-euro drag on potential growth. Beneath the surface of record temperatures lies a complex macroeconomic transmission channel that is quietly reshaping inflation, public debt, and the long-term trajectory of European capital.

Access to low Earth orbit has undergone a structural transformation over the past fifteen years, shifting from a sovereign undertaking financed by the budgets of major states into a logistics service bought and sold by the kilogram. The global space economy reached roughly $626 billion in 2025, with commercial activity accounting for close to 78% of that total, and projections place it between $1 trillion and $1.8 trillion by 2035 — even though launch services on their own amount to no more than $14 billion. That disparity points to a basic truth: launch is not the market being contested. It is the gateway whose price determines the nature and the scale of everything that can be built beyond the atmosphere.   This structural shift rests on a single pivotal engineering innovation: recovering the first stage of the rocket and flying it again rather than discarding it after every mission. Recovery allows the capital cost of manufacturing to be distributed across multiple flights, and it demolished the price floor that had governed the market for decades. The consequence has been to narrow the technological contest over low-orbit reusability to two principal powers: the United States, which operates a mature fleet flying at an intensive and near-routine cadence, and China, which since mid-2024 has been conducting an accelerated, high-risk test campaign in pursuit of the same capability. The threshold of reaching orbit has therefore ceased to function as the technological dividing line between the two; the real remaining challenge lies in mastering precision guidance through the final metres before a safe landing.   Therefore, this analysis aims to unpack the economics of reusability and locate the true bottleneck within the cost structure; to then measure the gap between Washington and Beijing through two distinct indicators, namely the number of launches and the mass delivered to orbit; and finally to estimate the technical and temporal distance separating China from its first successful recovery, together with what its completion would mean for global launch pricing and for the budgets of the megaconstellations on which satellite internet services depend.

The global trading system underwent a fundamental transformation in July 2026, as the United States abandoned limited sector-specific protection in favour of a complex, multi-tiered tariff architecture that turned access to its domestic market into an instrument of economic and political pressure. Four major decisions converged within that single month. The first was the outright repeal of the de minimis exemption, which had allowed small consignments valued below eight hundred dollars to enter the country duty-free. The second was the application of the Section 301 forced-labour tariffs across two distinct bands, imposing 10% and 12.5% according to the compliance record of each partner state. The third was the activation of Section 338, a statutory provision that had lain dormant since the 1940s, to levy 50% duties on a range of Canadian goods. The fourth was the approval of a phased escalation reaching 200% on imports of generic pharmaceuticals.   The consequences of this package extended well beyond the raising of customs duties. They amounted to a comprehensive re-engineering of rules of origin and customs compliance requirements, which in turn altered the cost calculus of every manufacturer and supplier across global supply chains. This new reality pushed firms to search for alternative routes designed not merely to reduce transport costs, but to change the identity of the country of origin itself and so escape punitive duties. That search is precisely what turned the Middle East from a transit corridor into an industrial and logistical node positioned to play a pivotal role on the new map of world trade.   This analysis therefore aims to unpack the effects of the July 2026 package across three connected levels: its domestic cost to the American economy in terms of inflation, compliance friction and the feasibility of reshoring; the realignment of trading partners and the trade diversion and origin leakage that follow from it; and finally its direct implications for the economies of the Middle East and North Africa, together with quantitative estimates of price, investment and shipping trends through the end of the decade.

The events of 2026 have placed global energy markets before an unprecedented test of their resilience. When the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz in February removed roughly 13 million barrels per day (mb/d) from available supply, Saudi Arabia redirected most of its exports westward to the Red Sea — only to find that outlet itself imperiled when, on 20 July, the Houthis threatened a naval blockade of the Bab al-Mandeb strait aimed squarely at Saudi shipping. For the first time in its modern history, the Kingdom's oil found itself exposed between the two maritime corridors it straddles, and the question “What if navigation through Bab al-Mandeb is severed?” shifted from a theoretical exercise to an operational probability. The answer, however, is not a single figure: it hinges on the scale of the shortfall, the nature of the cargo held back, and the market's capacity to reroute it.   This analysis therefore sets out to quantify the impact of a Bab al-Mandeb closure across three graduated halt scenarios; to unpack the mechanism by which the shock travels from cargo entrapment to a price spike; to trace its non-price consequences for refined products, aviation, and maritime shipping; and to arrive at the fiscal paradox that leaves the gravest harm to Saudi Arabia latent in the intermediate scenario rather than the full halt.

Michigan expected to deliver a Senate nominee on Tuesday night. Instead, it may have delivered the Democratic Party's most consequential ideological test since Trump returned to the White House. Abdul El-Sayed defeated Representative Haley Stevens for the party's Senate nomination against the wishes of much of the Democratic establishment, in one of the most expensive primaries in American history. His win immediately turned what had been treated as a routine state primary into a national argument over who actually speaks for the Democratic Party now. The bigger question, though, is not whether progressives can win a Democratic primary. It is whether Michigan just revealed where the party is genuinely heading, or whether it simply revealed what a narrow, highly engaged slice of primary voters wants, a distinction the party will need to answer honestly before November.   El-Sayed's win did not happen in isolation either. It followed Zohran Mamdani's insurgent rise in New York City, and it arrived on the same Michigan ballot as Rashida Tlaib's renomination and Donavan McKinney's defeat of sitting Congressman Shri Thanedar. Four results, one pattern. Together, they raise a question far bigger than any single race, whether Democratic voters are beginning to reject both the party's traditional leadership and its long-standing relationship with major donors, particularly on Israel and campaign finance.

The race to dominate AI is no longer being fought only in laboratories; It is now being fought at the ballot box. As the US struggles to establish comprehensive rules for one of the world's fastest-moving technologies, the companies developing it have begun competing over something even more valuable than market share, namely political influence. During the 2026 midterm election cycle, AI companies and their affiliated political action committees have poured tens of millions of dollars into congressional races, backed rival candidates, and expanded their lobbying operations across Washington. For the first time, elections themselves are becoming part of the battle over who will shape the future of AI governance.   This marks a significant shift in the relationship between technology and politics. Rather than waiting for governments to determine how AI should be regulated, leading firms are increasingly attempting to shape the political environment before those decisions are made. As Congress remains divided over comprehensive AI legislation, electoral politics has become another arena in the competition over AI. Consequently, the 2026 midterms may offer an early indication of whether democratic institutions can establish the rules governing AI before the industry's growing political influence begins shaping those rules instead.

The international system is undergoing one of its most significant periods of transformation since the end of the Cold War. Intensifying geopolitical competition, prolonged armed conflicts, growing tensions between major powers, and mounting criticism of international institutions have all raised fundamental questions about the future of global governance. As confidence in the post-1945 international order declines, debates over multipolarity, the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation, and the legitimacy of international organizations have become increasingly central to global political discourse. /* Make the container take 100% width ONLY when it contains .outer-post-summary */ .container:has(.outer-post-summary) { width: 100%; max-width: 100%; padding:0px; } /* Hide the col-lg-2 elements inside outer-post-summary */ .outer-post-summary .col-lg-2 { display: none; } /* Make the col-lg-8 element take 100% width */ .outer-post-summary .col-lg-8 { width: 100%; flex: 0 0 100%; max-width: 100%; } .post-summary-section { padding: 0px 0 25px; padding: 0px 0 0px; } .comment-section { display: none; } #related_publications_slider_sec { display: none; } .like_dislike { display:none; } .hero-banner.post-details-banner.program-banner { display: none; } :root{ --bg-a:#8C241C; --bg-b:#6B1414; --bg-c:#3A0909; --card:rgba(0,0,0,0.24); --card-2:rgba(0,0,0,0.16); 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} 50%{ opacity:.22; } } @keyframes bg-flow{ to{ stroke-dashoffset:-320; } } main, footer, .hero, .intro{ position:relative; z-index:1; } @media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce){ .scroll-cue .line{ animation:none !important; } .bg-anim .ring-group, .bg-anim .ring-group.reverse, .bg-anim .node, .bg-anim .link{ animation:none !important; } } Pulse Survey Series The New World Order The old system is fracturing — and no clear successor is in sight. Findings from Al Habtoor Research Centre. Read the findings The international system is undergoing one of its most significant periods of transformation since the end of the Cold War. Intensifying geopolitical competition, prolonged armed conflicts, growing tension between major powers, and mounting criticism of international institutions have all raised fundamental questions about the future of global governance. As confidence in the post-1945 order declines, debates over multipolarity, the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation, and the legitimacy of international organizations have moved to the center of global political discourse. This Pulse survey examines how the public reads that shift — their trust in institutions, their view of recent great-power behaviour, and their expectations for who, if anyone, leads next. 87%say Trump's positions have hurt international bodies 75%see multilateral cooperation as weaker than a decade ago 43%expect a multipolar world of major powers Confidence in institutions has collapsed 56.5%say bodies like the UN, WHO and World Bank are no longer as reliable as they once were Only 4.3% of respondents still describe these institutions as trustworthy and dependable. A further 39.1% express just moderate confidence — a qualified trust that, combined with outright distrust, means 96% of respondents now hold some degree of reservation about the institutions built to anchor the post-war order. International institutions derive their effectiveness from broad public confidence in their impartiality. When that confidence is this thin, it points to a legitimacy challenge rather than a passing mood — and it sets the baseline against which future Pulse surveys will track whether the erosion is cyclical or structural. How much confidence do you currently have in international institutions? The "Trump effect" reads as corrosive, not neutral 87%view Donald Trump's recent positions as a negative influence on international institutions Positive, neutral, and unsure responses are essentially tied at 4.3% each — a rare degree of consensus in an otherwise divided survey. Respondents appear to read the "Trump effect" as more than disagreement with one leader: when the world's most influential power openly questions or selectively engages with international institutions, it creates permission for other states to do the same. Over time, that dynamic risks weakening respect for international law, reducing compliance with multilateral rules, and accelerating the fragmentation of the global governance system this survey documents throughout. How do you view recent Trump positions on international institutions? No successor to the current order is in sight 43.5%believe no clear leader will shape global governance in the years ahead Emerging powers are the next most likely candidate at 29%, while the United States (13%) and regional coalitions (14.5%) trail closely behind — essentially split. Rather than a single successor to the current order, respondents anticipate a diffusion of influence. The absence of a dominant choice suggests people don't expect a straightforward handover from one hegemon to the next, but a more fluid, contested environment where power is dispersed among multiple actors without a universally accepted leader. Who is most likely to shape global governance in the future? A decade-long slide in multilateral cooperation 75.4%say multilateral cooperation is weaker today than a decade ago Only 8.7% believe it has strengthened; 15.9% see it as roughly unchanged. This perception reinforces the broader narrative running through the survey: a system seen as increasingly fragmented and less able to coordinate collective action — on security, public health, climate, or economic governance. If this view persists, it may further erode public expectations that international institutions can manage the next global crisis. Cooperation vs. a decade ago Multipolarity is the expected — not the feared — outcome 43.5%expect power distributed among several major states; another 36.2% expect regional coalitions to lead instead Together, multipolar and coalition-led futures account for close to four-fifths of all responses. Just 17.4% remain unsure, while a return to unipolarity (2.9%) draws only marginal support. The post–Cold War unipolar moment, in the public's view, is ending — not in favour of a new single power, but of a system with multiple centres of influence and greater reliance on flexible coalitions. Which future model of global order is most realistic? "Respondents don't simply believe the existing order is weakening — they expect the emerging one to be more fragmented, more competitive, and less predictable." Managing diffusion, not replacing a hegemon Taken together, the five findings point to one conclusion: the challenge for global governance in the coming years is less about which power replaces the last one, and more about managing a world where power is increasingly diffused across multiple, uncoordinated actors — with public trust in the referee institutions already running low. Pulse Survey Series Al Habtoor Research Centre Figures reflect the share of respondents selecting each response option and may not sum to 100% due to rounding. function initCharts(){ Chart.defaults.font.family = "'Barlow', sans-serif"; Chart.defaults.color = '#D9A793'; const palette = { rank1:'#7B1315', rank2:'#994238', rank3:'#D07465', rank4:'#F09988' }; function tooltipBase(){ return { backgroundColor:'#3A0909', borderColor:'rgba(242,198,176,0.4)', borderWidth:1, titleFont:{family:"'Barlow', sans-serif", size:11, weight:700}, bodyFont:{family:"'Barlow', sans-serif", size:13}, padding:10, displayColors:true }; } function donutTooltip(){ return Object.assign(tooltipBase(), { callbacks:{ label:(ctx)=> ` ${ctx.label}: ${ctx.parsed}%` } }); } function barTooltip(){ return Object.assign(tooltipBase(), { callbacks:{ label:(ctx)=> ` ${ctx.label}: ${ctx.parsed.x}%` } }); } function buildLegend(canvasId, labels, data, colors){ const panel = document.getElementById(canvasId).closest('.chart-panel'); const legend = document.createElement('div'); legend.className = 'legend-custom'; labels.forEach((label,i)=>{ const item = document.createElement('div'); item.className = 'item'; item.innerHTML = `${label} ${data[i]}%`; legend.appendChild(item); }); panel.appendChild(legend); } // Chart 1 — Confidence in institutions (()=>{ const labels=['No confidence','Moderate confidence','Confident & trustworthy']; const data=[56.5,39.1,4.3]; const colors=[palette.rank1, palette.rank2, palette.rank3]; new Chart(document.getElementById('chart1'), { type:'doughnut', data:{ labels, datasets:[{ data, backgroundColor:colors, borderColor:'#3A0909', borderWidth:3, hoverOffset:10 }] }, options:{ cutout:'68%', plugins:{ legend:{display:false}, tooltip:donutTooltip() } } }); buildLegend('chart1', labels, data, colors); })(); // Chart 2 — Trump effect (()=>{ const labels=['Negative impact','Positive impact','Neutral impact','Not sure']; const data=[87,4.3,4.3,4.3]; const colors=[palette.rank1, palette.rank2, palette.rank3, palette.rank4]; new Chart(document.getElementById('chart2'), { type:'doughnut', data:{ labels, datasets:[{ data, backgroundColor:colors, borderColor:'#3A0909', borderWidth:3, hoverOffset:10 }] }, options:{ cutout:'68%', plugins:{ legend:{display:false}, tooltip:donutTooltip() } } }); buildLegend('chart2', labels, data, colors); })(); // Chart 3 — Who shapes global governance (horizontal bar) (()=>{ const labels=['No clear leader','Emerging powers','Regional coalitions','The United States']; const data=[43.5,29,14.5,13]; const colors=[palette.rank1, palette.rank2, palette.rank3, palette.rank4]; new Chart(document.getElementById('chart3'), { type:'bar', data:{ labels, datasets:[{ data, backgroundColor:colors, borderRadius:4, barThickness:26 }] }, options:{ indexAxis:'y', maintainAspectRatio:false, plugins:{ legend:{display:false}, tooltip:barTooltip() }, scales:{ x:{ max:50, grid:{color:'rgba(242,198,176,0.12)'}, ticks:{callback:(v)=>v+'%'} }, y:{ grid:{display:false} } } } }); })(); // Chart 4 — Cooperation trend (()=>{ const labels=['Weaker','About the same','Stronger']; const data=[75.4,15.9,8.7]; const colors=[palette.rank1, palette.rank2, palette.rank3]; new Chart(document.getElementById('chart4'), { type:'doughnut', data:{ labels, datasets:[{ data, backgroundColor:colors, borderColor:'#2A0808', borderWidth:3, hoverOffset:10 }] }, options:{ cutout:'68%', plugins:{ legend:{display:false}, tooltip:donutTooltip() } } }); buildLegend('chart4', labels, data, colors); })(); // Chart 5 — Future model of order (()=>{ const labels=['Multipolar world','Regional coalitions','Not sure','Return to unipolarity']; const data=[43.5,36.2,17.4,2.9]; const colors=[palette.rank1, palette.rank2, palette.rank3, palette.rank4]; new Chart(document.getElementById('chart5'), { type:'bar', data:{ labels, datasets:[{ data, backgroundColor:colors, borderRadius:4, barThickness:22 }] }, options:{ indexAxis:'y', maintainAspectRatio:false, plugins:{ legend:{display:false}, tooltip:barTooltip() }, scales:{ x:{ max:50, grid:{color:'rgba(242,198,176,0.12)'}, ticks:{callback:(v)=>v+'%'} }, y:{ grid:{display:false} } } } }); })(); } if (typeof Chart !== 'undefined') { initCharts(); } else { window.addEventListener('chartjs-ready', initCharts); }

What if the sea lanes were no longer free? For seventy years, the assumption that ships pass through the world's strategic straits without permission, payment, or political approval has underpinned global trade so completely that it was rarely stated, let alone defended. In 2026, that assumption stopped being safe. In one of the world's most critical waterways, passage is now vetted, priced, and rationed by political alignment. At another, a price for safe transit has been openly announced. Along the polar routes, permits and fees are already the law, and older managed regimes are quietly expanding. These are not isolated crises. Taken together, they form the early signal of something larger: the transformation of maritime chokepoints from global commons into sovereign assets, and with it, the quiet repricing of the geography on which world trade depends.

Since Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali left office as UN Secretary-General in 1996, after a US veto blocked his bid for a second term, no Arab has held the organisation's highest office for nearly three decades. This prolonged absence is neither a matter of chance nor, as some suggest, the result of a lack of Arab diplomatic expertise or competence. Rather, it stems from the interplay between the UN's complex selection process and the calculations of global powers, which together create a barrier to the emergence of new Arab candidates for the organisation's leadership.   The roots of this problem lie in the UN's regional group structure and the rules governing geographic rotation. The selection process does not treat Arab states as a single geographic bloc, but divides them between the "African Group" and the "Asia-Pacific Group". This division dilutes Arab voting strength. When it is Africa's or Asia's turn to put forward candidates for the post, Arab contenders must compete with major states that wield considerable political influence and demographic weight within their respective regions, making it difficult to secure the regional backing and consensus required for a successful candidacy.   Alongside this internal division, divisions among the major powers on the Security Council play a decisive role. The Middle East and North Africa is a key arena of great-power competition, subjecting any Arab candidate to intense political scrutiny by the five permanent members. Since securing the post necessarily requires avoiding a veto from any one of them, identifying a candidate acceptable to all the competing powers becomes exceptionally difficult, particularly as each contender is assessed in light of their country's international relationships and global alignments.   This analysis therefore seeks to unravel the reasons behind this prolonged absence. Does the reluctance of Arab capitals to enter the race in recent decades reflect a retreat and an acknowledgement of diplomatic limitations, or does it instead represent a tactical withdrawal and a calculated strategic decision to avoid electoral contests whose rules are structured in ways that effectively exclude candidates from regions at the fault lines of intense geopolitical rivalry?

On July 15, 2026, reports revealed that the EU has authorised Ukraine to purchase Chinese drone components using EU defence funds. This decision is striking, as although Europe accuses China of supporting Russia's military-industrial development and seeks to contain China’s military capabilities, the new shift suggests that it may represent a new geopolitical reality rather than a temporary wartime exception.   This decision represents a new direction where Europe has been obligated to finance Chinese defence-related industries because no viable alternative exists. This points to a broader strategic aspiration where China tries to position itself to become an indispensable supplier of military components. It means supplying the core parts and technologies upon which global weapons production increasingly depends. This raises a crucial question: can China leverage its dominance in military components to become the indispensable infrastructure of global defence production?

On July 4th, 2026, the United States celebrated its 250th anniversary of independence in true American fashion. With such celebrations taking place, numerous news outlets have been running polls and stories celebrating some of the US’ greatest achievements in its 250-year history, including and not limited to cinema. The New York Times ran a poll with the topic focused on which film best represents the American experience, with some respondents picking American classics such as The Godfather, Citizen Kane, Easy Rider, and American Graffiti as well as social commentary-based films such as Do the Right Thing. Although respondents have selected classic American movies that symbolise the American experience, there is one movie that stood out as the most quintessential movie that captures the American experience, having garnered 3,000 votes from poll respondents: Mike Judge’s 2006 satirical comedy Idiocracy.   Idiocracy was intended to serve as a satirical movie focused on the growing anti-intellectualism in the US during 2006, while also tackling societal and cultural issues such as dysgenics, consumerism, commercialism, and overpopulation. However, 20 years later in 2026, the satire portrayed in the movie seems to have become an absurdist reality. From flamboyant and incompetent governance to the inescapable commercialisation of society to raging anti-intellectualism (and everything in between), it seems that life has begun to imitate the art. Therefore, one can argue Idiocracy does not necessarily serve as a prophecy of the dumbing down of American society, but rather a framework for understanding the transition from competent policy-based governance to prioritising attention-based politics and economy.

The Middle East is witnessing a new geopolitical crisis centred on the Bab al-Mandab Strait after Yemen’s Houthi movement announced on 20 July 2026 the imposition of a naval blockade on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in application of a principle the group terms “blockade for blockade”. The measure comes as a direct response to the restrictions Saudi Arabia has placed on the airports and ports lying under Houthi control, most notably Sanaa Airport and the ports of Hodeidah, and the decision followed a military escalation that included strikes on Sanaa Airport and the launching of missiles and drones towards Saudi airports.   Through this closure the Houthis seek to transfer the cost of the blockade from the Yemeni interior to a corridor vital to Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, by closing the strait to vessels flying the Saudi flag or bound for the Kingdom. The closure also coincides with the disruption affecting the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the ongoing Iranian–American war, where the Revolutionary Guard’s interception rate of vessels transiting the strait has reached some 89 per cent. This has driven the Kingdom over the past four months to reroute its oil exports westwards, moving 4.5 million barrels of oil a day through a pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea in order to provide an alternative passage, an increase of close to fivefold on the period before the war began.   On another front, Pakistan faces a complex strategic position as a result of these developments, since Islamabad is bound by a mutual strategic defence agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed in September 2025, alongside the presence of Pakistani forces stationed in the Kingdom. The agreement stipulates that any aggression against either state is deemed an aggression against the other, while Islamabad simultaneously performs the role of diplomatic mediator between the United States and Iran, having sponsored the signing of a ceasefire memorandum of understanding between the two parties in June 2026. In this context, Pakistani officials regard attacks on Saudi Arabia as a red line, which makes the naval blockade not merely a problem touching Saudi security but a direct test of Pakistan’s ability to balance its role as mediator with Tehran against its military commitments towards Riyadh. This tension places the Pakistani leadership before a clear challenge and raises an important question as to whether it will persist in its neutral position, or move towards a firmer stance should the crisis develop into a regional confrontation affecting the interests of its Saudi partner.