Germany "needs new partnerships more than ever," declared Chancellor Friedrich Merz as he opened a tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, announcing along the way that Berlin would loosen its long-standing restrictions on arms exports to the Gulf. Such words from a German chancellor would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. Yet the scene fits a wider pattern now visible across the continent: Korean tanks arriving at Polish ports, Turkish drones ordered for Baltic skies, Brazilian transport aircraft entering European fleets, and Gulf sovereign wealth courted from London to Berlin. Europe, long accustomed to a single security patron, is visibly assembling a new roster of defence partners, and officials on all sides describe it as a strategy of diversification. The pattern reaches its most symbolic setting this week, as NATO leaders convene in Ankara, the capital of the very partner Europe has never quite decided how to treat. But strategies imply choice, and choice implies a chooser. The pressing question is: is Europe actually selecting its new partners, or is something else doing the choosing?

Europe has spent the last few years watching its tech anxiety go from background hum to full orchestra. It's not hard to see why. In June 2026, France's intelligence services announced they were dropping Palantir, the American data analytics firm long embedded in European defence and policing work, in favour of a domestic provider, explicitly citing the need for "strategic autonomy." Germany's military reportedly will not touch Palantir at all, and the UK is now fielding parliamentary debates over a quarter-billion-pound contract with the company, partly because, as one legal analysis bluntly put it, even European data sitting in European data centres can still be pulled by U.S. authorities under American law, contracts or no contracts. It's the kind of detail that makes "data sovereignty" sound less like a policy buzzword and more like a genuine catch.   Then, just days before this was written, the U.S. government ordered Anthropic to cut off access to its most advanced AI model, Mythos, for anyone who wasn't a U.S. citizen, citing national security concerns. Anthropic's response was to switch the model off for everyone, Americans included, rather than build a citizenship checkpoint overnight. The episode lasted only days, but it landed exactly where Europe's anxieties already live: the frontier of AI doesn't just sit outside Europe's control, it sits inside one government's control, and that government can flip a switch.   None of this means Europe should panic, or try to build its own version of everything from scratch by Thursday. As the cost estimates make clear, chasing full autonomy across the entire AI stack would run into the trillions of euros, well past the point of being realistic. The more sensible response, is for Europe to get serious about which parts of the stack actually need to be sovereign, where partnership is a perfectly good substitute for ownership, and where its real strength, regulatory leadership, can be used deliberately rather than as a consolation prize. Sovereignty, in other words, isn't about owning everything. It's about knowing exactly what you can't afford to depend on.

Discussion surrounding a potential United States (U.S.) withdrawal from NATO has remained one of the defining debates since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second presidency. In recent months, particularly following the war involving the U.S. and Israel against Iran, tensions within the alliance have intensified, with President Trump openly criticising several European NATO allies and questioning their value to the alliance. As a result, the central question is no longer limited to whether Washington could formally leave NATO. Increasingly, attention should shift toward a more pressing issue: could Europe manage its security independently without substantial American support? What would be the strategic, military, and economic cost of such a shift, and would European states be capable of rebuilding or reorganising their defence capabilities quickly enough to confront emerging threats?   Importantly, despite the significant legal, political, and institutional constraints facing any U.S. president seeking to withdraw from NATO entirely, Washington could still adopt alternative approaches that stop short of formal withdrawal while substantially reducing its role within the alliance. Such measures could include lowering financial contributions, scaling back troop deployments across Europe, or withdrawing critical weapons systems and strategic capabilities currently provided by the U.S. In such a scenario, how vulnerable would Europe become, and how prepared would it be to fill the resulting gaps?

In recent years, European perceptions of Israel have undergone a noticeable shift, driven primarily by the war on Gaza following the events of 7 October 2023. What began as growing unease has gradually translated into a marked decline in public favourability across Europe, with many viewing Israel’s military response as disproportionately severe. This transformation in public sentiment, however, has not been immediately mirrored at the political level. European leaders have largely maintained a cautious and diplomatic posture, continuing to balance expressions of concern with longstanding commitments to “Israel’s right to self-defence”. That stance has begun to erode more recently. The regional escalation involving Iran has introduced direct economic and strategic pressures on Europe, prompting a more assertive, albeit still measured, response from policymakers. At the same time, political changes within Europe, including the emergence of leaders less firmly aligned with Israel, such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Péter Magyar, signal a gradual recalibration rather than a sudden rupture in policy.   This evolving landscape became particularly visible in late April 2026, when discussions emerged within the European Union around suspending the EU–Israel Association Agreement. Although the proposal did not advance, with key member states such as Germany and Italy blocking consensus, it nonetheless highlighted the extent to which previously unthinkable measures are now part of the policy debate. While the suspension of the agreement would carry significant economic consequences for Israel, its implementation remains constrained by the European Union’s (EU) internal political dynamics. Yet the inability to pursue this option does not imply a lack of leverage. The European Union retains a range of alternative instruments that can be deployed to exert pressure on Israel.

The Strait of Hormuz is currently facing a complex crisis following Iran’s deployment of a large number of naval mines during recent hostilities. Although Iran announced on 17 April 2026 that the strait is open, this declaration appears largely political rather than operational. Estimates of the number of mines vary significantly, ranging from around 5,000 mines according to Iranian figures to between 10,000 and 12,000 mines according to U.S. assessments. The strait normally carries about 20 million barrels of oil per day, representing roughly 20% of global energy flows, yet traffic has collapsed from approximately 140 ships per day before the crisis to only 7 ships shortly after the reopening announcement. This sharp decline illustrates that the core issue is not political permission to transit, but whether ships can safely pass through a heavily mined environment.

This Pulse survey, conducted in March 2026, explores perceptions of the ongoing war and its potential trajectories, focusing on expectations around its duration, outcomes, and broader regional and global implications. The findings reveal a high degree of uncertainty, with no clear consensus on how or when the conflict will end, reflecting the complexity and fluidity of the situation.

The United States–Israel–Iran war, which began with a set of vaguely defined objectives including regime change in Iran and the dismantling of its missile and nuclear capabilities, now appears to be shifting toward a different set of priorities. Iran has managed to internationalise the conflict in a way that has redirected attention toward containing the scale of global economic disruption. Put simply, the focus is increasingly on securing the flow of oil amid what is being described as one of the most severe energy crises in modern history. Much of the world’s attention has centred on the Strait of Hormuz, and rightly so. This vital shipping lane accounts for roughly 20% of global liquid petroleum consumption, as well as a significant share of global liquefied natural gas trade (LNG). However, with the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthis now entering the conflict, the risks facing regional oil exports and maritime routes have intensified further. As the de facto controllers of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Houthis are in a position to disrupt shipping through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.   This raises several critical questions. Why have the Houthis chosen this moment to enter the war? Under what conditions might they escalate their involvement? And what would be the consequences of a closure of the strait?

The U.S.-Israel-Iran war and Recent events that followed in Gulf countries have provided one of the clearest real-world demonstrations of modern air and missile defence under sustained pressure. Modern air warfare is increasingly defined by the ability of states to withstand large-scale saturation attacks involving drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The proliferation of relatively inexpensive unmanned systems and precision-guided weapons has altered the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities, allowing even modest actors to launch high volumes of aerial threats. In this environment, the success of air and missile defence no longer depends solely on technological sophistication but also on defence density, the concentration of defensive systems relative to territory and population. Dense, layered air-defence networks provide multiple interception opportunities and reduce the likelihood that incoming salvos can overwhelm defensive systems. As recent conflicts have demonstrated, resilience against saturation attacks increasingly depends on whether states can deploy sufficient numbers of interceptors, overlapping defensive layers, and integrated detection networks.

In remarks on 2 March 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump did not rule out the possibility of sending American ground troops into Iran if it became necessary. However, he didn’t acknowledge that such a move would carry serious risks given Iran’s size and military capability. Any U.S. ground invasion would likely involve significant casualties and could fail to achieve its goals.  Trump has generally shown reluctance to engage in large-scale ground wars. While he has authorized military actions, including airstrikes, against Iran and other states in recent months, his preference historically has been for limited use of force, such as air power and specialized units, rather than deploying tens of thousands of troops.   Part of this approach stems from his broader view that prolonged, chaotic conflicts are unpredictable and often produce uncertain outcomes. Major ground combat operations can create widespread instability and make strategic consequences hard to forecast. Throughout both his first term and the early part of his second term, Trump has shown no strong inclination to commit large numbers of U.S. ground forces abroad.   Trump and Bibi (also known as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) recognize that forcing a full regime change in Tehran would be one of the toughest strategic tasks imaginable. Iran’s political and military structure is robust and not solely driven by personalist rule; it is anchored in a religiously grounded system that has endured since 1979. With the challenges of a successful ground invasion in mind, their current strategy relies on a combination of military pressure and other techniques intended to weaken the regime over time, though there is no guarantee this will bring about its collapse.

“We need it for defence.” With these words, U.S. President Donald Trump sought to frame Greenland as a question of national security. The island’s vast reserves of critical minerals and its strategic position in the Arctic have long made it geopolitically significant, yet Trump’s rhetoric elevated it into a symbol of broader American ambitions. This move prompted a rare joint statement by the leaders of seven NATO member states, who rejected any attempt to annex Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of Denmark. Coming alongside U.S. actions elsewhere, including the removal of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and threats of intervention in other regions, these developments have fuelled growing concern within NATO that Washington is advancing a new international order driven primarily by its own interests. The prospect of Greenland’s annexation therefore raises serious questions not only about the future of the alliance, but also reveals Europe’s weakened position in the international system and its limited capacity to resist American pressure.

Recently, U.S. President Donald Trump issued sharp criticism of Europe, and while migration policies were not his only focus, his remarks on the topic were particularly striking. His criticism came shortly after he announced a policy to “permanently pause migration from what he called ‘third world countries’” following a National Guard shooting in Washington, highlighting his framing of migration as both a domestic security and international issue. The latest U.S. National Security Strategy under the Trump administration closely links European security to its migration policies, warning of what it describes as "civilisational erasure" from uncontrolled immigration and EU policies, and calling on Europe to enforce stricter border controls, support "patriotic" parties, and become more self-reliant. This approach is widely seen as critical of mainstream European leadership and supportive of far-right movements.   At the same time, far-right sentiment is gaining traction across Europe, visible in the electoral successes of parties such as France's National Rally, Italy's Lega, and Germany's Alternative for Germany. While public discourse often frames migration as a threat to security and civilisation, Western countries overlook a crucial point, which is that migration can be a dividend, contributing to economic growth. With populations ageing faster than the global average and shortages of labour in highly skilled professions, the West is increasingly dependent on migrants. The question is what might happen if far-right agendas succeed in curbing migration, and whether Western economies and security could sustain themselves without it.

This Pulse survey, conducted in November 2025, explores public attitudes toward AI in Arab societies, with a particular focus on reliance on foreign AI models and their impact on Arab values and identity. The findings highlight growing concerns about how AI systems may influence cultural norms, shape collective identity, and redefine societal priorities. By examining perceptions of the need for Arab-developed AI and views on who should lead its development, the survey offers insight into how technological dependence is increasingly understood as a strategic, cultural, and identity-related issue across the Arab world.

The global world order is based on a solid, yet fragile foundation. While it is solid for being intact for decades with systems and organisations built around it, its fragility stems from the inability to predict the reason that will one day blow it up. Nuclear weapons constitute a cornerstone in this world order; those who possess the fatal weapon, “the nuclear bomb,” among other capabilities, are the ones who dictate the rules of the game. What is important to ask now is: with the huge advancements in science taking place every day, will nuclear weapons become obsolete?   Scientists have discovered ways of genome editing by which cells negatively affected by ionized radiation can be detected, repaired, and even engineered to become immune to radiation entirely. This raises profound uncertainties about the future. If the destructive power of nuclear weapons can be neutralized at the biological level, the foundation of nuclear dominance may begin to erode. This leaves us facing a series of difficult questions. Would the traditional leverage of nuclear powers still hold? If weapons of mass destruction (WMD) lose their strategic value, will a new form of deterrence take shape, or will the very concept of deterrence fade? Who might emerge as the next global power, and by what tools or technologies will influence be asserted? And perhaps most importantly: would today’s nuclear states allow such a transformation, or resist it fiercely to preserve their status?

“Poland is at its closest to open conflict since World War Two,” warned Prime Minister Donald Tusk, after a sudden Russian airspace violation rattled the country. On September 9, a swarm of Russian drones entered Polish skies, prompting NATO aircraft to scramble and intercept several of them. It marked the first direct encounter between NATO and Moscow since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. While the incident might have been a test by Putin to gauge NATO’s and Europe’s response, it also raises the specter of a potential war between Poland and Russia. Given Poland’s critical role within NATO and the EU, far greater than Ukraine’s, the implications of such a conflict would place the entire continent in Jeopardy. The pressing question now is: how likely is this war to erupt, and would Europeans bear the brunt?

Since taking office, U.S. President Donald Trump’s unpredictable decisions have become a puzzle to follow, let alone to anticipate. Amid this growing political turbulence, a dose of rational analysis is badly needed. His recent move on the H-1B visa program, for instance, has reverberated across the globe. Though seemingly aimed at harrassing India, the policy has instead cornered the United States itself, fueling economic strain, draining valuable talent, and unsettling the tech industry. The ripple effects are already visible in Silicon Valley and among those aspiring to join it. Yet, this turbulence also opens a window of opportunity. Nations in Europe, Asia, and the Gulf, if swift and strategic, could position themselves to attract the very talent cast aside by Washington. Still, seizing this chance is no straightforward task. It demands structural reforms, long-term vision, and proactive policies. Dislodging Silicon Valley from its pedestal is not impossible, but neither is it simple or automatic. What matters now is understanding the impact on the U.S., its economy, its talent pool, and recognizing what ambitious countries must do if they wish to challenge the world’s current tech giant.

This Pulse survey, conducted in August 2025, examines public perceptions of the Arabic language and its role in shaping regional identity, security, and cohesion. The findings shed light on how populations view the weakening of Arabic as a potential threat, not only to cultural and social unity, but also to economic stability and national security. By exploring both immediate and long-term concerns, the survey provides valuable insights into how language is perceived as a pillar of resilience in the Arab world.

Netanyahu’s ambitions are no longer confined to diplomacy or the pursuit of normalisation agreements. The Abraham Accords, once seen as his utlimate goal of his contemporary regional strategy, now appear irrelevant, cast aside in favor of a far more aggressive vision. What is unfolding is not the politics of peace but the politics of expansion, where no Arab country can assume immunity. The question of which state will be targeted next is impossible to predict, precisely because Netanyahu’s actions are driven less by rational calculation than by the confidence that comes with unconditional American support. Few could have imagined that Doha, with its U.S. military base and status as a close Washington ally, would be struck, yet it happened. This unpredictability signals a dangerous reality: the scale of war is set to widen, and any country in the region could find itself Israel’s next target.

As enthusiasm for Artificial Intelligence (AI) grows each day, so too does anxiety about its potential impact on jobs and overall societal stability. Several studies highlight the possibility that full automation could disrupt economic and political systems. While these concerns are valid and should not be dismissed, it is important to remember that, like any other transformative technology, AI can be both celebrated for its potential and feared for its risks.   A stable society cannot function without a labour force; removing it entirely would violate basic economic principles such as supply and demand, while also undermining political stability, which depends on the resilience of the middle class. These structural realities suggest that, rather than erasing human work altogether, AI will likely be both automatically and deliberately integrated in ways that preserve social and economic balance. From this perspective, the future shaped by AI is not as dire as some anticipate.

In a future where genome editing redefines what it means to be human, the deepest divide is no longer drawn by race, wealth, or class—but by synthetic superiority. Cities are split; assimilation outlawed. The fortunate live enhanced lives; the rest remain unmodified, unseen, and unwanted.   The Gene Line: Synthetic Superiority as Border, a short story from AHRC’s Futures Imagined series, imagines a fractured tomorrow shaped by the unchecked promises of science. Echoing the legacy of Plato’s ‘high-quality parents’ and the dark path of modern eugenics, this story doesn’t just question what the future holds, it asks who gets to belong to it.   Futures Imagined is a publication exploring emerging trends through imaginative forecasting. Rather than relying on strict methodologies, this piece invites AHRC writers to creatively narrate a possible future reality shaped by current developments.

This Pulse survey, conducted in June 2025, explores perceptions of nuclear threats in the region, including the likelihood of nuclear events, levels of preparedness, and the need for collective emergency response. The findings offer insights into how geopolitical uncertainty is shaping public concerns about nuclear risks.     When asked about the likelihood of a nuclear event occurring in the Middle East within the next 10 years, the majority of respondents placed the probability between high (41%) and moderate (41%). Only a small minority believed such an event is unlikely (16%) or ruled it out entirely (3.1%). Indicating that a potential nuclear event is no longer seen as a distant possibility, but rather as a plausible risk shaped by current geopolitical dynamics and regional instability.     In response to the survey question on the most likely cause of a nuclear fallout event, participants felt that a nuclear war was the most likely cause (46%) over a nuclear reactor malfunction (38%). While historical incidents suggest that reactor malfunctions have been more frequent, respondents seem more preoccupied with the threat of nuclear war, likely influenced by ongoing geopolitical uncertainty in the wake of recent conflicts, including the now-concluded Iran-Israel War. Cyberattacks, although technically plausible, were considered less likely (13%), again perhaps due to comparison with the more immediate risks of war or malfunction. Meanwhile, terrorist attacks were seen as the least likely (4.2%) cause, reinforcing the perception that threats from rival states pose a greater nuclear risk than those from non-state actors.     When asked whether the Middle East should establish a joint nuclear emergency system, the majority of respondents (91%) supported regional cooperation, reflecting concerns over rising tensions and the limited capacity of some states to respond independently. A small minority (9%), however, opposed a fully inclusive system and favoured cooperation among select countries. Suggesting that those respondents perceive certain states as more vulnerable, or more responsible, than others, implying a belief in differentiated eligibility for participation. Ultimately, this response pattern may also highlight underlying perceptions of disparity among regional states and a reluctance to include perceived "free riders" in collective security efforts.     In response to whether the Middle East is prepared for a nuclear malfunction or cyberattack, the majority of participants (76%) expressed a clear sense of unpreparedness. With remaining respondents believing that the Middle East is somewhat (12%) or fully (12%) prepared. The strong emphasis on lack of preparedness reflects a prevailing sense of concern or fear among respondents. This sentiment is further reinforced by earlier responses, particularly the widespread support for establishing a joint nuclear emergency system, indicating that many view regional cooperation as essential to compensate for individual state limitations in crisis response.     When asked about the region’s preparedness for a potential nuclear war, an even larger share of respondents (87%) indicated that the Middle East is not equipped to handle such a scenario. Compared to the previous question on nuclear malfunctions and cyberattacks, the heightened perception of unpreparedness here reveals which category of threats weighs more heavily on respondents’ minds. This contrast suggests that nuclear war, in particular, is seen as a more pressing and dominant concern, likely due to its catastrophic scale and links to ongoing geopolitical instability in the region.   PULSE is a data-driven series that visualizes public sentiment on trending regional and global issues, curated and edited by the Al Habtoor Research Centre Early Warning Programme’s Senior Researchers Habiba Diaaeldin and Ahmed El Saeid.   The findings presented are based on data collected through social media polls and online forms distributed via email. While efforts are made to ensure a broad and diverse sample, the results reflect the views and opinions of respondents and should not be interpreted as representative of the entire population or Al Habtoor Research Centre.

In the wake of the recent NATO summit, European leaders have committed to a landmark pledge: raising defence spending to 5% of GDP. Hailed by its backers as a historic move, the agreement reflects a sharp shift in European threat perception, driven not only by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine but also by the renewed pressure from Washington under the return of the Trump presidency. The "Trump effect" has reignited long-standing fears over the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, pushing Europe to take on greater defence responsibilities.   But while the pledge signals a tougher European posture, it raises pressing concerns. Can Europe realistically meet such ambitious targets without undermining the very democratic model it seeks to defend? As defence budgets grow, many fear this could come at the cost of welfare, social cohesion, and democratic checks, exposing the continent to a deeper risk: the creeping militarisation of European politics and the erosion of its democratic dividend.

The war between Iran and Israel is arguably a war of survival for the regime in Iran. Attacking Iran seemed to be a logical step for Israel after almost destroying its arms of proxies in the region. the regime, which stands on three pillars, namely, its conventional missile arsenal, its extensive network of regional proxy forces, and its nuclear program, is facing a war of attrition that might eventually end the very survival of the regime. The fall of the regime in Iran goes beyond mere regime change, rather, it is considered a state collapse.   The collapse of the Iranian state would have dire consequences for the region. However, the possibility of the regime surviving remains a significant scenario. While the fall of Iran is widely regarded as a regional catastrophe, its continued survival, particularly with Tehran asserting itself as a regional superpower, could prove even more destabilizing for Israel and its allies. Both outcomes carry profound regional and global implications, signalling a transformation in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The pressing question is not whether change is coming, but rather: what will the new Middle East look like?

In a few months, the Trump administration is expected to push Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to sign a peace deal which is supposed to be followed by a bilateral minerals’ agreement between the U.S. and the DRC. The agreement puts some parties in an advantageous position while leaves others with a less fortunate fate. The U.S. is supposed to gain economically and politically by this agreement especially when it comes to its rivalry with China. While the DRC is expected to gain in the short-term leveraging the “conflict minerals” narrative, the long-term consequences are not necessarily desirable. The EU is left with the undesirable situation. The bloc will either adjust its policies toward the DRC’s minerals or remain in a situation where a clash with the Trump administration is possible. While a direct military confrontation between the two powers remains improbable, a proxy war in which M23 rebels are a main actor is possible. Additionally, with minerals gaining increasing geoeconomic relevance, Trump has eyed several countries including Ukraine, and the DRC, who could be his next target?

In today’s volatile political landscape, ceasefires are becoming increasingly relevant. While they are not designed to bring an immediate end to conflicts, they aim to provide a temporary respite in which opposing parties can engage in dialogue and work toward a resolution. Ideally, ceasefires function as transitional phases within ongoing wars, offering the opportunity for negotiation and compromise. However, as a political tool, ceasefires often fail to meet their objectives. Their effectiveness is not simply determined by military action, but by the political will and complex considerations of the parties involved. Ceasefires are heavily influenced by the intentions of the signatories, as not all parties are genuinely committed to ending hostilities. This raises important questions about how we define the success or failure of a ceasefire. If the stated goal is to end the war, yet political agendas remain hidden, the resumption of conflict may not necessarily mean that the ceasefire has failed—it could indicate that one party's objectives were unfulfilled, while the other may have achieved its goals.    Additionally, each ceasefire agreement is unique, shaped by the specific political dynamics at play, including the roles of mediators, guarantees, and the structure of the agreement itself. The Israel-Hamas ceasefire is a striking example of this complexity. While it may appear to be a failure from a broader, collective perspective, it could represent a significant political and military opportunity for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The influence of external actors, such as U.S. President Donald Trump, must also be considered as part of the equation. Ultimately, the fragile truce between Hamas and Israel raises a critical question: Is it merely a political process, or does it reflect a deeper, more strategic calculation that extends beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities?

The latest wave of escalations in Lebanon is not a coincidence but part of a broader pattern of escalation. The U.S. strikes on the Houthis in Yemen were quickly followed by the collapse of the ceasefire in Gaza, and now, as anticipated, a rocket fire from Lebanon has provided Israel with the justification to escalate further. This strongly suggests that Israel is laying the groundwork for a wider regional conflict.   This escalation is not only shaped by international dynamics but also by internal Israeli politics. Netanyahu's government, under pressure from far-right factions, is actively pushing for expanded military action. The reappointment of Itamar Ben-Gvir as police minister is not an isolated decision but a signal that Israel is preparing for prolonged conflict. With these developments unfolding in quick succession, it is becoming clear that unless a major concession is reached, the region is heading toward another cycle of war.

In recent months, the West Bank has witnessed rising violence. The timing in which the West Bank is witnessing escalation is not a coincidence, it is connected to the ceasefire in Gaza. While right-wing elements refuse the ceasefire deal, it is generally argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has to appease those elements in his coalition. Netanyahu who is believed to have been pressured to accept the deal, does not find any alternative to satisfy right wingers in his coalition other than shifting the war to the West Bank. While this understanding is not entirely false, it is suggested that recent events in the West Bank are part of Israel’s expansionist plan aiming at imposing Israeli sovereignty on the territory. Using legal and political manoeuvres, Israel aims to turn the West Bank into another Gaza which results in broader regional implications.

Recent decisions by U.S. President Donald Trump cutting aid to foreign countries and dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have sparked global backlash. While the impact of cutting aid is substantial, the broader significance of this move cannot be overlooked. It reflects a deeper shift in the Trump administration’s foreign policy strategy. But what are the implications for the U.S. and its adversaries?

President-elect Donald Trump has pledged to bring an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, though he has yet to specify how. A negotiated settlement appears to be the only viable path forward, as a decisive military victory for either side seems unlikely. Western nations, particularly those in Europe, are struggling with internal challenges, leaving them in a weak position with limited leverage at the negotiating table. Meanwhile, Russia also finds itself in an unenviable situation, creating a potential opening for Trump to encourage both parties toward a resolution. However, for any agreement to lead to lasting peace, security guarantees for Ukraine must be a central component. These guarantees are likely to be the key trade-off for any concessions that Europe would likely offer.

More than a decade after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the unexpected fall of the Assad regime shocked many commentators and world leaders who believed that President Bashar Al-Assad had firmly consolidated his power. This development demonstrated that despite enduring years of civil war, Syria continues to hold strategic relevance at both regional and international levels. The conflict has provided an opportunity for regional and global powers to establish a presence in the country, amplifying the impact of the regime's collapse far beyond Syria's borders. Notably, the fallout has produced clear winners, with Turkey and Israel at the forefront, and losers, including Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, some European countries have discreetly benefited from the situation without openly acknowledging their gains.

France's political crisis is moving toward uncharted territory. Since June, President Emmanuel Macron has thrown the nation into turmoil by calling for snap elections. This decision set off a cascade of crises, culminating in the resignation of Michel Barnier, the shortest-serving prime minister in France’s modern history. The fallout isn’t confined to France alone; its ripple effects are being felt across the European continent. Considered the culprit of all this, the question looms: will Macron soon be ousted?

The Israeli military has reportedly launched a recruitment campaign offering asylum seekers residency in exchange for their service in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The Israeli government already struggling with a shortage in manpower needed for its war on multiple fronts including in Gaza and Lebanon. While this policy is not totally pioneered by Israelis, it faces serious legal and humanitarian repercussions. Additionally, it adds a layer of uncertainty to the fate of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe who might face the same fate as asylum seekers in Israel given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War and problems with conscription.

A strategic mineral agreement between the European Union (EU) and Rwanda has sparked controversy. This deal is aimed at securing a supply of essential minerals required for the production of clean technologies, such as solar panels and electric vehicles, by importing these resources from Rwanda to the EU. Months later, the EU signed another agreement with Serbia to import lithium, focusing on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains, and electric vehicles. These agreements are part of the EU's broader raw materials diplomacy, aimed at ensuring the supply of critical raw materials. To date, the EU has formed partnerships with 14 countries to support its transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy and clean technology. While the text-book definition of diplomacy is traditionally understood as a tool for preventing conflict, the EU's approach to raw materials “diplomacy” would create more issues than it should resolve.

Since the eruption of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, several countries have cut diplomatic relations with Syria turning Damascus into a pariah state. 13 years later, the shifting regional geopolitical landscape appears to be ushering in a new reality. Today, both regional and global powers are moving toward rapprochement with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. In a significant U-turn, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, once a staunch opponent of Al-Assad, is now seeking normalization with Syria. While, Turkey is not alone in this effort, Syria's potential reintegration could have far-reaching implications.

On July 29, 2024, three little girls were stabbed to death during a festival in Southport in which 10 others were injured. The attacker, a 17-year-old male, was arrested. Given his age, the British police did not reveal his name which gave way for rumours to take place. Within hours, some far-right social media users claimed that the attacker was a Muslim migrant which pushed authorities to reveal the latter’s identity falsifying rumours regarding his origins and background.   Despite falsification, the day after the Southport incident, violent protesters gathered in London outside Downing Street for some minor fights with police. In the days after that, violent far-right demonstrations took place in other towns and cities across the country. Violent protests, described by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer as “far-right thuggery” targeted mainly Muslims and migrant communities. For instance, hotels housing asylum seekers waiting for their asylum applications’ processing were targeted by rioters. In Rotherham, rioters broke into the hotel, tried to set it on fire and blocked the exits while asylum seekers were inside, another hotel in Tamworth was also set alight.   Some high-profile figures are believed to be behind igniting the riots. Tommy Robinson who is a far-right activist is believed to be helping fuel England's worst riots in over a decade. While rioters have been chanting his name over the past week, Robinson has been commenting on the protests from abroad through social media posts. "As disorder spreads... don't say I didn't warn you," said Robinson on X to his 900,000 followers, the second night of rioting. Nigel Farage, leader of Reform U.K., a far-right populist party, has distanced himself from current riots and vocally condemned them. However, Farage was criticized for spreading “conspiracy theories” about the attacker’s identity. He has also previously drawn attention to and criticized hotels that house migrants which are being now targeted by violent protesters.   It seems that far-right activists, who have recently lost impact on the electoral level, are finding in social media an alternative channel to exert some influence. WhatsApp and Telegram have been used to organize gatherings and flyers organizing protests have been shared on Facebook.

The Paris 2024 Olympics edition is undoubtedly unique. While the Olympics have always been political, this time they are taking place amid significant uncertainty and instability in the host country, as well as on a global stage already heated by two ongoing wars which makes it a particularly distinctive Olympics. This highly anticipated event is expected to be leveraged by President Emmanuel Macron as he seeks to restore some of his lost prestige following his party's defeat in the snap elections he called for. Nevertheless, France is likely to encounter numerous internal and external challenges leaving political events overshadowing athletic performances.

  Political assassinations have been a constant occurrence in world politics. Assassination as a political tool is, however, not exclusive to states nor state leaders; anyone who has fired a gun against a political figure claims the title of an assassin. Additionally, involvement in politics in any capacity can leave you vulnerable to such acts of retaliation. While gunmen and fanatics still impose a threat, states themselves are considered to be leading the pack. During the Cold War, the business of assassination was largely monopolized by superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union directed operations targeting high-profile figures such as Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Chile’s Salvador Allende, and Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito. Some "hits" gained more fame than others such as the assassination of dissident Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky in Mexico City using an ice pick by Stalin’s secret police.   Russia and the United States, once the dominant global poles, continue to hold on to their old love for eliminating those they deem adversaries. The Kremlin has a long tradition, stretching back a century, of eliminating political dissidents both at home and abroad to send chilling messages to other opponents. In February 2024, a Russian pilot who had defected to Ukraine was assassinated in Spain. He was shot six times and then run over by a car, with Russian-made bullet casings left at the scene—a crude warning to others. Recently, U.S. intelligence uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate the chief executive of a powerful German arms manufacturer producing artillery shells and military vehicles for Ukraine. The United States has also continued its practice of carrying out high-profile assassinations with its most recent target being Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in Baghdad in a strike that showed little regard for international law.   States vary in their levels of expertise in assassination, with Israel often considered the maestro of this practice. Assassination has been a foundational principle of the Israeli state. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has targeted Nazi leaders, Palestinians, Arabs, and scientists serving its enemies, such as German scientists working on the then Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s advanced weapons program. Currently, the pool of targets has expanded, with Iranians becoming significant targets of Israeli operations. One of the latest operations against Iranians involved the assassination of Hassan Sayyad Khodaei. Known only to intelligence personnel as a key figure at the tactical level in the Quds Force, Khodaei's primary focus was on attempting (mostly unsuccessfully) to attack Jewish and Israeli targets abroad.   Nevertheless, the pool of nations engaged in assassination attempts appears to be expanding with new entrants. A notable incident occurred in Canada last June, where Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar was shot 34 times. Additionally, in January of the same year, British Sikhs were warned by police about increased risks to their lives. This incident marks India’s grand entrance into the stage of those countries using assassination as a tool for advancing both international and domestic agendas. It highlights how political assassinations have resurfaced as a widespread tactic, no longer monopolized by a handful of states.

While most electoral debates focus on domestic politics, foreign policy remains a crucial aspect. It seems, however, that Prime Minister Rishi Sunak was aware of this when he appointed David Cameron as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Regardless of who wins, most likely the Labour Party, there will definitely be changes to the current situation. Issues ranging from relations with European neighbours to migration and defence are ready for the upcoming prime minister.

In a surprising move, and after the far-right National Rally (RN) party dominated in the European elections in France, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the dissolving of parliament and called for snap elections. The move is seen as very risky, with many believing that it will further embolden the far-right whose chances of winning a parliamentary absolute majority exceeds that of Macron’s coalition. Nevertheless, Macron’s decision is not without some strategic planning. Nonetheless, whether the French president succeeds in his plan or not, watching French politics for the upcoming three years will be definitely be interesting.

In May 2024, The Institute of International Economic Relations (IDOS) organised a workshop on Security and Stability in the Mediterranean. The workshop focused on critical issues of security and stability in the Mediterranean, which continue to dominate regional and international agendas. Topics included the conflict between Israel and Hamas, tensions in the Greater Middle East, recent developments in Turkey and Iran, ongoing violence in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the migration and refugee crises. Additionally, the role of global powers such as the United States, Russia, and China was examined. The Mediterranean region, remains a crucial area for the future of the European Union's relationship with Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. The workshop's objective was to discuss and analyse ongoing political conflicts in the Euro-Mediterranean region and explore possible ways to achieve peace and stability.   In this workshop, AHRC researcher Habiba Diaaeldin presented a paper on European policies, the rise of the far right, and their impact on migration, geopolitics, and the humanitarian situation in the Mediterranean. The paper aimed to evaluate European migration policies, specifically the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, using "policy success" criteria developed for this purpose. These criteria include assessments based on values, economic cost, objective attainment, and political cost.   Throughout the three-day workshop, participants engaged in discussions on various topics related to the workshop’s main theme.

This article was originally published on Ahram Online on June 11, 2024.   In April 2022, then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a plan to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda under the newly enacted "Safety of Rwanda Bill." This bill generated significant controversy and was described as incompatible with the U.K.'s legal obligations. Both the British Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the bill violated legal obligations and was incompatible with international conventions to which the U.K. is a signatory. In June 2022, the first flight carrying asylum seekers from the U.K. to Rwanda was cancelled minutes before take-off after the European Court of Human Rights issued last-minute commands to stop it. Two years later, with a new Prime Minister in office and despite international legal pressure, Parliament has finally passed the bill. However, the controversy has not ended. The high economic costs and concerns over human rights continue to render the Safety of Rwanda Bill contentious and problematic.

This June, citizens of the European Union will head to the ballot boxes for the highly anticipated parliamentary elections. Migration has always been a significant issue for both voters and candidates. However, several commentators, citing opinion polls, argue that migration may no longer be a top concern, overshadowed by issues such as economic turmoil, COVID-19, and climate change. Despite this, further analysis suggests that migration continues to be an important issue. While respondents might not explicitly mention migration when asked about their concerns, it remains significant, as evidenced by the attitudes of candidates and their emphasis on the topic. This underscores the continuing importance of migration in the upcoming elections and its significance to the results.

Several indicators point out to the rise of far-right wing within the European bloc including polls for the upcoming European elections and the migration deal which was passed by the French parliament last December. Far right sentiments are reflected on many issues especially Migration which holds second place in the list of most pressing issues for European voters. The New European Migration Pact, which exempts Ukrainians from the new measures, reflects European leanings towards the right adding more restrictions on Migrants, refugees and Asylum seekers especially those arriving from the Middle East and Africa. The far-right leanings do not only hold significance for the European Union (EU) but they will definitely impact neighboring countries especially countries of North Africa who act as a transit for refugees and asylum seekers aiming at reaching European shores. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers will face catastrophic humanitarian situation due the Pact’s measures such as the screening procedure which will lead to diminished safeguards and a risk of mass detention at the borders, including for children, in countries of first arrival, the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation which regulates what happens if there is a “crisis” at the EU’s external border. European countries themselves will be put in an unenviable position due to transit countries’ levering their geopolitical positions. Using a multi-faceted criterion, the paper argues that the new pact is just a “rebranding” of ongoing European migration policies which are found to be unsuccessful. The paper uses the EU-Turkey migration deal showcasing shortcomings of European migration policies. Findings suggest that, among other losses, far-right measures taken by EU states tend to embolden transit countries vis-a-vis European states who will lose on the political as well as the economic side. Politically, they will have to make concessions in face of transit states while economically they will have to pay huge amounts of aid for the sake of borders’ externalization and keeping migrants away.

It appears that Russian influence has been steadily spreading across Europe, stretching from the eastern regions of the continent to its central and western borders. Moscow's reach isn't confined solely to nations within its sphere of influence; it also affects broader European foreign policy and the trajectory of the bloc's future.

“Nothing should be ruled out” said French President Emmanuel Macron when asked about possibilities of sending troops to Ukraine. By speaking about going to war, Macron may have aimed to dispel a long-standing joke about the French always surrendering. However, both French and NATO leaders have publicly rejected the idea of sending European or alliance troops to Ukraine. Prominent figures such as U.S. President Joseph Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, and others have asserted that such action is not on the table. The widespread domestic and regional opposition implies that even if Macron was genuinely considering sending troops to Ukraine, he would not receive the necessary support for such a radical decision.

Since the 16th century, the Black Sea has always been a lake of tensions. Contrary to the Wars of The Holy League, in which the Ottoman Empire witnessed its first territorial loss, the contemporary situation signals Turkish gains in the region. The ongoing war in Ukraine has revived the Montreux Convention which gives Ankara the higher hand in the Black Sea and led other NATO members to appreciate the indispensable Turkish role. Recently, developments in the Black Sea ranging from decaying Russian power to Western apprehension are offering Ankara some Turkish delights.

This article was originally published on Ahram Online on Jan. 31, 2024.   The attack on the Santa Maria church in Istanbul is the first attack on Turkey claimed by IS since 2017. According to the Islamic State's statement, the attack was a response to one of its leaders instructing for the attack on "Jews and Christians". However, the end goal of the attack remains unclear and that raises questions about the legitimacy of IS’s claim. Over the last decade, the world has witnessed a sharp rise in terrorist attacks often claimed by terrorist groups striving to establish their relevance and influence over international politics. In fact, between 1998 and 2016, an estimated 16% of attacks were falsely claimed.

As of the 13th of Jan. 2024, Taiwan has elected a new president, Lai Ching-te, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nationalist party. Despite Taiwan being a relatively small country, who is only recognized as an independent state by 13 countries, its elections will have global ramifications. Chinese claims over the strait of Taiwan are nothing new, however, having a new president who has been dubbed as a “trouble maker” by Xi Jinping could act as the initial spark of a new war in 2024.

Ramifications of the Israeli-Hamas War have not been confined within Gaza or the Middle East’s borders. Polarisation over the Palestinian cause has reached a new character especially in the Western world where such a trend has never been as deep. Cracks within governments and societies can be traced to a volatility of values, exposure to social media, and demographic changes. With such an unprecedented divide over Western governments tolerating Israeli impunity in Gaza, the West is faced with a moral dilemma which might cost it it’s claimed “moral superiority”.

While hosting approximately four million Syrian refugees, Ankara no longer maintains its previous reputation as a warm and welcoming host. A series of events have indicated a growing trend that can be described as "Anti-Arabism," while simultaneously, the historical animosity towards Jews is waning. It is suggested that the former trend may be feeding into the latter. Due to a substantial influx of migrants and a challenging economic situation, refugees of Arabic descent appear to have become scapegoats, surpassing Jews as the primary target for hate speech and hostility in the country. These two trends might be interconnected, and understanding their underlying factors and the evolution of this phenomenon demands careful consideration.

Many analysts argue that Washington is losing its position as the only global hegemon with the rise of other Great Powers in the international arena. The relative demise of the American superpower paves the way for the end of an exceptional era of a Uni-Polar system and the rise of either a Bi-Polar or a Multi-Polar one. Arguments usually revolve around the rise of Russia and China as the main rivals to the United States. However, in this analysis, we argue that the Russian side is better to avoid being considered for such a competition for being involved in a hectic war which requires a sweeping victory for Moscow to compensate for heavy economic losses. China, on the other hand, is gaining momentum on the diplomatic and, to a lesser extent, the security front as new territories for Beijing ever to set foot on. Nevertheless, it is also the case that Washington is still maintaining its supremacy in major arms sales. The Middle East proved to be of paramount importance in the competition among great powers. With Beijing, Washington, and even Moscow trying to gain some influence, countries of the region have been shifting their foreign policies to be more independent to maximise benefits from the newly established world order. Accordingly, they are playing the rebalancing game which stipulates balancing powers mainly between the United States and China.

With the date of Turkish elections coming soon, Turkish president and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) are facing one of the most serious challenges since the year they came to power. Namely, inflation exceeded 80% in September 2022 and Turkish Lira plummeted in the face of American Dollar. These economic hardships are leading the prospects of a political change to peak. According to polls, Erdogan is in real trouble with the AKP receiving barely 29.5% of votes. Accordingly, Erdogan and his allies resorted to the Nationalist rhetoric knowing that it is an important card when it comes to attracting Turkish citizens’ votes. Turkish Nationalism is believed to be nurtured by Kurdish uprisings and the belief in the “revival” of the Ottoman empire. Next May, general elections are to be held in the middle of the aforementioned atmosphere which threatens Erdogan's legacy. Using the same nationalist tactic as he used in 2018, will the Turkish President succeed again or it is a burned card not useful anymore?

Migration is becoming an important area of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations. Examples include intergovernmental agreements to limit, or encourage migratory flow, the preferential treatment to certain foreign nationals, the creation of temporary labor migration laws, and so on. However, the term migration diplomacy can go beyond agreements between states to include diplomatic tools states use in order to extract benefits from other states. It is linked to how cross-border populations’ flow is linked to states’ diplomatic goals. Accordingly, states can leverage their position in the migratory process. In this regard, states can either be considered a Sending state, a Receiving state “also known as destination countries” or a Transit state. Sending countries are usually under-developed ones from which people tend to migrate from due to a myriad of “push factors” such as social, cultural, economic and even climate change reasons; diplomacy in this case is to be called Emigration diplomacy. Receiving countries are the more developed ones to be targeted as destination for immigrants wishing to find better living condition; hence, Immigration diplomacy. Finally, Transit countries are considered an intermediary solution to those who flee their countries of origin aiming to reach another country. However, for some reasons, mainly geographical ones, they tend to settle in a ‘third state’ for temporarily as a transit for their final destination.   In this analysis, it will be discussed how migration diplomacy can be useful especially for transit states who can always leverage on their geographical positions by obtaining concessions from receiving states who which to stop migratory flows from reaching either their shores or their borders. At the first part, it will be demonstrated how have some transit states benefitted from their position. At the second part, the Tunisian case will be discussed. Tunisia, as a vital corridor for Sub-Saharan emigrants aiming for reaching European borders through the Italian shores, falls under the umbrella of a transit state. Given its current severe economic situation, Tunisia can grab the opportunity and use migration flows as a source of income rather than scapegoating them for the country’s problems.

China has been considered as the main threat to the current world order maintained by Western powers. It became clear when the U.S. for the first time identified Beijing as its “number one challenge” and NATO members included the same country in its “strategic concept”. China has long advertised for itself as a trading partner for many countries with no political interests. For years, world leaders have accepted this propaganda created by the Chinese and perceived the Asian giant as only an economic competitor. However, it seems that Beijing has decided to break up with its old strategy of “hiding our capabilities”, known as taoguang yanghui (韬光养晦).   Lately, China has been engaging in diplomatic initiatives such as the peace plan aimed at ending the war in Ukraine as well as brokering the process of normalizing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, leading to Western apprehension from rising Chinese diplomatic power as they understand that altruism has no space in politics. Analysts have been trying to identify the new role to be played by Beijing relying on the concepts coined by William T.R. Fox which concludes that China is not a superpower but it is only a regional power for not being able to deploy military forces overseas. Nevertheless, we argue, contesting prevalent IR theories, that in the new world order, economic might could be enough weapons to extract global political influence. In other words, the contemporary definition of a superpower is different from the one coined by Fox.

Securitizing an issue means simply, designating an issue as of an extreme danger to be dealt with urgently. The theory of securitization stipulates that national security policies are not given but are formulated by policy makers mainly through their uttered words. Accordingly, narratives given by policy makers frame issues as either a security threat, a mere challenge or even an opportunity. The same issue can be mentioned by the same political leader once as a security threat that the nation should mitigate at some point and an asset at another. Migration is one of those issues which governments either give a securitizing polish or none at all. In this analysis, the argument goes that “national interests” made-up from economic and political conditions are the main factors in deciding the given frame.

The earthquake which hit the southern Turkish territories in February 2023 proved that natural disasters taking place in the 21st century do not only result in piles of deaths and injuries but also political ramifications take place. When the earthquake hit Turkey, politicians understood that it is an opportunity to capitalize on for achieving delayed political aims. On the domestic level, opposition parties started to accuse the current president and his government with poor crisis management while trying to tilt the playing field in their favor before the general elections scheduled in May. On the international front, issues such as NATO enlargement, bilateral relations with Greece and the delayed F-16 deal have taken the larger space in the discussions which came after the earthquake. Accordingly, the natural disaster proved to be a political tool that should not be missed by contemporary politicians.

After the so-called Arab spring, different narratives have come out about the reformation and the rebuilding of the Arab states in the aftermath of changing their political systems. However, different narratives coming from global powers such as the European Union endorse the importance of prioritizing democracy for the process of reformation while on the other hand in-depth observation of the current policies of those states reveals that they are prioritizing Economic and military stability over democracy and here comes the paradox; “what should come first in the process of reforming Arab states”. Importantly, if reform necessitates popular satisfaction in order to be sustainable, would democracy still constitute the goal policy makers, supposedly, should work to achieve?

The bilateral relations between Türkiye and Iran have always been one of the most unique in the world of international relations. Although pigmented with a number of clashes over several issues, ad-hoc points of cooperation intervene to stand in the face of building an animosity between the two states. With geopolitical changes taking place recently, it deserves to study whether the “marriage of inconvenience” between the two states will continue or it will at some point be disrupted. In this analysis, both points of contention and cooperation will be discussed showing the shape the relations between the two states have been taking paving the way for understanding the persistence of the current pattern.

June 2022, the European Commission announced granting Ukraine the status of a candidate country to the European Union. Nevertheless, problems concerning Ukraine such as their struggle with their economy and political system, are still on the agenda. Giving the candidacy status to Ukraine has been criticized since Ukraine is still regarded as a weak country and not yet eligible for such a status especially when compared with other European candidates. European accession is granted after an assessment process based on what is known as Copenhagen criteria. European officials have announced that the accession process will be done by the book and merit based. In the same vein, the commission has granted Moldova the same status which is, the same as Ukraine, considered part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Keeping all this in mind, in the light of Russian war in Ukraine, it is a valid question to ask whether Ukraine candidacy is merit based or politicized. Is the fifth enlargement scenario of the accession of incompetent Bulgaria and Romania as a reward for their role in Kosovo war is being repeated with Ukraine? Considering this, the analysis is going to examine why Ukraine was accepted as a candidate. Drawing on European Commission’s reports, it will be discovered which of Copenhagen criteria are fulfilled by Ukraine. Copenhagen Criteria are:   Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (Political Criteria) A functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU (Economic Criteria) The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the ‘acquis’), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

Nuclear cooperation attracts international and regional attention, many Arab countries have aspired to produce clean nuclear energy and have either begun or are seeking to join the nuclear energy club. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) , Egypt, and Jordan, are the frontrunners in the Middle East and therefore will be the focus of this paper. Nuclear power is an international industry in terms of operation, supply chains, and vendors, as well as nuclear safety, non-proliferation and waste management, therefore, there is an ongoing need for cooperation and collaboration between states. This cooperation can include sharing technical expertise and nuclear technology, establishing agreements that facilitate nuclear exports, agreements on nuclear safety and standards, and collaboration with regulatory frameworks.   The paper employs horizontal or environmental scanning to analyse the current position of nuclear energy in each country and their preparedness for nuclear cooperation, as well as existing models of nuclear cooperation in other regions. Thereafter, the paper explores the different incentives countries may have for engaging in nuclear cooperation, including the potential benefits to be gained. A SWOT analysis is used to structure the environmental scanning, evaluating the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats within each country with regards to their potential role and contribution to nuclear cooperation in addition to an overall SWOT analysis of the countries as a whole with regards to the prospect of ongoing collaboration.   The paper is divided into three chapters; the first chapter provides an overview of nuclear energy in each of the selected countries, the second chapter examines existing models of nuclear cooperation and analyses the different enabling factors which will later be used to identify opportunities for Arab nuclear collaboration, and the third chapter analyses the various economic, political, and security incentives that would drive countries to seek cooperation or that can be used to advocate for greater collaboration among policymakers.   A cooperation model is produced as a result of this analysis, highlighting key characteristics of the ideal regional partnership. Three scenarios for Arab nuclear cooperation are evaluated to demonstrate what could occur if this proposed cooperation occurs, how it would happen, and the scenarios of no collaboration or limited cooperation.