Early Warning

Discussion surrounding a potential United States (U.S.) withdrawal from NATO has remained one of the defining debates since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second presidency. In recent months, particularly following the war involving the U.S. and Israel against Iran, tensions within the alliance have intensified, with President Trump openly criticising several European NATO allies and questioning their value to the alliance. As a result, the central question is no longer limited to whether Washington could formally leave NATO. Increasingly, attention should shift toward a more pressing issue: could Europe manage its security independently without substantial American support? What would be the strategic, military, and economic cost of such a shift, and would European states be capable of rebuilding or reorganising their defence capabilities quickly enough to confront emerging threats?   Importantly, despite the significant legal, political, and institutional constraints facing any U.S. president seeking to withdraw from NATO entirely, Washington could still adopt alternative approaches that stop short of formal withdrawal while substantially reducing its role within the alliance. Such measures could include lowering financial contributions, scaling back troop deployments across Europe, or withdrawing critical weapons systems and strategic capabilities currently provided by the U.S. In such a scenario, how vulnerable would Europe become, and how prepared would it be to fill the resulting gaps?

No nation, no people, and no institution has been shielded from the turmoil unleashed by the US-Israel-Iran War. Yet perhaps the most surprising upheaval has unfolded not on the battlefield, but within the ranks of the world's most powerful military. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has launched a sweeping purge of its highest ranks, ousting top officials in a manner more reminiscent of an authoritarian regime consolidating power than a democracy safeguarding its national security.   This restructuring raises unsettling questions about the road ahead. Is Hegseth reshaping the military to serve a political agenda rather than a strategic one? Is Hegseth attempting to protect his position? Is there significant internal resistance to the War? And perhaps most critically — who, ultimately, does this new military answer to?

The 2024 General Election in the United Kingdom saw history being made, as the Labour Party under the direction of Sir Keir Starmer scored a landslide victory over the Conservative Party. Despite this landslide victory and the promise of significant change following years of Conservative Party turmoil, the Premiership of Starmer has not been smooth. Prime Minister Starmer’s term has been littered with major policy U-turns, political scandal, and an increase in support for populist movements. Naturally, this has contributed to a loss in confidence in Starmer’s government and leadership abilities, with many in the House of Commons and the British public questioning the government’s judgment, confidence, and competence.   To add insult to injury, the Labour Party lost the Gorton and Denton byelection (a seat held by the Labour Party for 100 years) and is still suffering from the Mandelson scandal, which further contributed to further loss of trust in the system. As the local elections are fast approaching and Starmer’s approval continues to plummet, the question remains: will a loss in these local elections be the final nail in the coffin for the Labour Party and Starmer?

War is often fought on numerous battlefronts with state of warfare constantly evolving. In the case of the US-Israel-Iran War, drone and economic warfare are primarily tools of battle between the warring sides with the possibility extension to the seas following President Donald Trump’s proclamation of a naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. Although the primary theater of war in this conflict has been the skies with an impending theater about to open in the seas of the Gulf, there is another more unconventional theater that has been operating since the beginning of the war, the theater of social media. Since the beginning of the war both the US and Iran have used memes and social media platforms such as X and Instagram as propaganda tools to attack each other’s credibility and shift the war narrative in their favor by engaging wider audiences.   The purpose of this analysis is to explore the idea behind how social media and memes opened a new theater of war between the US and Iran since the start of hostilities in February 2026 and its consequences. This exploration is based on the idea the use of social media and memes transforms the individual from a spectator to active participant in the conflict, while also normalizing violence through humor. Moreover, by transforming social media into a theater of war, the belligerents transform the concept of war into an aesthetic, especially through the US military and White House’s use of social media and memes.    

In recent years, European perceptions of Israel have undergone a noticeable shift, driven primarily by the war on Gaza following the events of 7 October 2023. What began as growing unease has gradually translated into a marked decline in public favourability across Europe, with many viewing Israel’s military response as disproportionately severe. This transformation in public sentiment, however, has not been immediately mirrored at the political level. European leaders have largely maintained a cautious and diplomatic posture, continuing to balance expressions of concern with longstanding commitments to “Israel’s right to self-defence”. That stance has begun to erode more recently. The regional escalation involving Iran has introduced direct economic and strategic pressures on Europe, prompting a more assertive, albeit still measured, response from policymakers. At the same time, political changes within Europe, including the emergence of leaders less firmly aligned with Israel, such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Péter Magyar, signal a gradual recalibration rather than a sudden rupture in policy.   This evolving landscape became particularly visible in late April 2026, when discussions emerged within the European Union around suspending the EU–Israel Association Agreement. Although the proposal did not advance, with key member states such as Germany and Italy blocking consensus, it nonetheless highlighted the extent to which previously unthinkable measures are now part of the policy debate. While the suspension of the agreement would carry significant economic consequences for Israel, its implementation remains constrained by the European Union’s (EU) internal political dynamics. Yet the inability to pursue this option does not imply a lack of leverage. The European Union retains a range of alternative instruments that can be deployed to exert pressure on Israel.

When governments shut down the internet, the standard justification is security, and the standard assumption is that the measure is temporary. Iran has tested both of those assumptions to their breaking point. Its nationwide internet blackout is now the longest ever imposed on an entire population, and Iranian authorities have simultaneously passed legislation making possession of a satellite internet terminal a criminal offence punishable by execution. These two facts are not separate policies responding to separate pressures. They are expressions of a single, long-prepared doctrine of information sovereignty, one in which connectivity is not a public utility to be temporarily suspended but a political instrument to be permanently controlled.   What Iran has built, and what it is now operating at scale for the first time, raises a question that extends well beyond its borders: when a state decides that controlling information is worth more than the economic cost of losing it, and the international system has no answer, what happens next?

For more than five decades, the petrodollar system has served as one of the central structural pillars of American financial supremacy. Since its establishment in the 1970s, the system has anchored the United States’ monetary power by ensuring that Gulf oil exports remain overwhelmingly denominated in United States dollars. Under this arrangement, Gulf producing nations receive American security guarantees in exchange for recycling their oil revenues into US Treasury securities and dollar-denominated financial markets—a self-reinforcing cycle that has entrenched the dollar’s status as the world’s foremost reserve currency and systematically reduced American sovereign borrowing costs for decades.   The United Arab Emirates has, historically, been among the most faithful participants in this arrangement. Its national currency, the dirham, remains pegged to the USD, and its extensive sovereign wealth funds are invested predominantly in dollar-denominated assets. Nevertheless, a convergence of recent developments—an armed conflict in Iran, severe disruptions to Gulf oil exports, and an acute domestic dollar liquidity constraint—has placed the UAE at an unprecedented geopolitical and financial crossroads.

Israel’s nuclear arsenal is one of the “worst-kept secrets” in the MENA region due to the strategic ambiguity regarding its existence. Currently, Israel is not a signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and is allegedly the only state in the MENA region to possess nuclear warheads. It is estimated that Israel currently in possession of approximately 80 nuclear warheads that can be deployed through ballistic missiles or by aircraft. While this nuclear program is shrouded in ambiguity, there is a genuine fear that Israel can reveal the full extent of its nuclear capabilities in the form of the Samson Option, which can bare consequences for the nuclear taboo as well as adverse psychological effects for the MENA region and the world.

This Pulse survey, conducted in March 2026, explores perceptions of the ongoing war and its potential trajectories, focusing on expectations around its duration, outcomes, and broader regional and global implications. The findings reveal a high degree of uncertainty, with no clear consensus on how or when the conflict will end, reflecting the complexity and fluidity of the situation.

In light of the intensifying United States–Israel-Iran War, the prospect of a direct American ground operation has shifted from a remote contingency to a plausible escalation. As strikes expand beyond air and naval targets to critical infrastructure, the conflict is approaching a threshold that could fundamentally alter its trajectory, with risks extending from prolonged warfare to disruption of global energy flows and regional instability.   While Washington may aim for limited objectives through targeted ground incursions, such as seizing key assets like Kharg Island, such operations are unlikely to remain contained. President Trump has acknowledged that “we have a lot of options,” reflecting both strategic flexibility and uncertainty about the next phase.   Iranian leadership has responded in kind. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned that Iranian forces are “waiting for the arrival of American troops on the ground,” signaling that any incursion would trigger immediate and sustained retaliation. In this context, a ground invasion would not be a controlled escalation, but a turning point with far-reaching military, regional, and global consequences.

The United States–Israel–Iran war, which began with a set of vaguely defined objectives including regime change in Iran and the dismantling of its missile and nuclear capabilities, now appears to be shifting toward a different set of priorities. Iran has managed to internationalise the conflict in a way that has redirected attention toward containing the scale of global economic disruption. Put simply, the focus is increasingly on securing the flow of oil amid what is being described as one of the most severe energy crises in modern history. Much of the world’s attention has centred on the Strait of Hormuz, and rightly so. This vital shipping lane accounts for roughly 20% of global liquid petroleum consumption, as well as a significant share of global liquefied natural gas trade (LNG). However, with the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthis now entering the conflict, the risks facing regional oil exports and maritime routes have intensified further. As the de facto controllers of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Houthis are in a position to disrupt shipping through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.   This raises several critical questions. Why have the Houthis chosen this moment to enter the war? Under what conditions might they escalate their involvement? And what would be the consequences of a closure of the strait?

The U.S.-Israel-Iran War is well underway, and the risks of spillover and enlargement is becoming more of a reality as the war goes on. As the conflict continues to expand, several actors are seeking out opportunities to challenge the existing balance of power in the region and aim to exploit the war to expand their influence. In the past decade, Russia has been working to court the United States’ MENA allies into its sphere of influence through the concept of regime stability, while China is taking on a soft power approach through economic and diplomatic cooperation. A prolonged war between the U.S.-Israel and Iran can result in global powers such as Russia and China getting more involved in the region to diminish American influence globally, which can result in a great power competition. The potential of Iran serving as an arena for great power competition will be explored through the American strategic overstretch and the economic shock caused by energy crisis.