Early Warning

In light of the intensifying United States–Israel-Iran War, the prospect of a direct American ground operation has shifted from a remote contingency to a plausible escalation. As strikes expand beyond air and naval targets to critical infrastructure, the conflict is approaching a threshold that could fundamentally alter its trajectory, with risks extending from prolonged warfare to disruption of global energy flows and regional instability.   While Washington may aim for limited objectives through targeted ground incursions, such as seizing key assets like Kharg Island, such operations are unlikely to remain contained. President Trump has acknowledged that “we have a lot of options,” reflecting both strategic flexibility and uncertainty about the next phase.   Iranian leadership has responded in kind. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned that Iranian forces are “waiting for the arrival of American troops on the ground,” signaling that any incursion would trigger immediate and sustained retaliation. In this context, a ground invasion would not be a controlled escalation, but a turning point with far-reaching military, regional, and global consequences.

The United States–Israel–Iran war, which began with a set of vaguely defined objectives including regime change in Iran and the dismantling of its missile and nuclear capabilities, now appears to be shifting toward a different set of priorities. Iran has managed to internationalise the conflict in a way that has redirected attention toward containing the scale of global economic disruption. Put simply, the focus is increasingly on securing the flow of oil amid what is being described as one of the most severe energy crises in modern history. Much of the world’s attention has centred on the Strait of Hormuz, and rightly so. This vital shipping lane accounts for roughly 20% of global liquid petroleum consumption, as well as a significant share of global liquefied natural gas trade (LNG). However, with the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthis now entering the conflict, the risks facing regional oil exports and maritime routes have intensified further. As the de facto controllers of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Houthis are in a position to disrupt shipping through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.   This raises several critical questions. Why have the Houthis chosen this moment to enter the war? Under what conditions might they escalate their involvement? And what would be the consequences of a closure of the strait?

The U.S.-Israel-Iran War is well underway, and the risks of spillover and enlargement is becoming more of a reality as the war goes on. As the conflict continues to expand, several actors are seeking out opportunities to challenge the existing balance of power in the region and aim to exploit the war to expand their influence. In the past decade, Russia has been working to court the United States’ MENA allies into its sphere of influence through the concept of regime stability, while China is taking on a soft power approach through economic and diplomatic cooperation. A prolonged war between the U.S.-Israel and Iran can result in global powers such as Russia and China getting more involved in the region to diminish American influence globally, which can result in a great power competition. The potential of Iran serving as an arena for great power competition will be explored through the American strategic overstretch and the economic shock caused by energy crisis.

The United States and Israel's joint military campaign against Iran is upending the strategic order of the Middle East in ways that extend far beyond Tehran. The strikes have killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, targeted Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure, and triggered retaliatory Iranian attacks across the region. As the war enters its second week, a second and potentially more consequential shift is taking shape. With Iran's role as the dominant pole of regional opposition to Israel now in question, a new rivalry is hardening between Israel and Turkey, one that carries different stakes, different risks, and a far more unpredictable trajectory than the confrontation the current war was designed to resolve. Understanding this emerging fault line requires examining both the structural forces pushing the two states apart and the domestic political dynamics that risk turning competitive rhetoric into irreversible confrontation.

The United States entered the second week of its joint military campaign against Iran on March 7, 2026, having launched Operation Epic Fury alongside Israel on February 28. Within days, the conflict had killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, triggered Iranian retaliatory strikes across the Gulf, and drawn in regional powers from Bahrain to Lebanon. For the Republican Party, the war arrived at what was already an exceptionally precarious moment — one in which the historical forces of midterm politics, falling presidential approval, and a restless voter coalition had already conspired against them. The onset of a major, unpopular war has only deepened those vulnerabilities, and the question facing the GOP heading into November is no longer simply whether they will lose seats, but how many.

The concept of “America First” is not a new one in the realm of US foreign policy. The term was first made popular during World War 2 when the America First Committee was formed by Yale student Robert Douglas Stuart Jr. and US Veteran General Robert E. Wood which advocated for American neutrality and building up strength through the American people, military, and economy. The idea of reducing the US active engagement in conflict to focus on its own interests caught the attention of Donald Trump, who pursued his own version of “America First” with varying results over the course of his two nonconsecutive terms as US President.   President Trump’s application of “America First” has been inconsistent since resuming office in 2025. This past year saw a series of deviations from the concept of “America First” including assisting Israel in the 12-day war with Iran, the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, and threats towards Iran regarding regime change amid protests. These threats became realized when the US and Israel carried out an unprovoked aerial offensive against Iran, which resulted in the deaths of the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several Iranian military officials. With the conflict still ongoing and regime change seeming to be the desired outcome, the conclusion can be made that this conflict signals a shift in President Trump’s “America First” policy. This shift will be explored through redefining “America First”, the Israel factor, and domestic support to get involved in a confrontation with Iran during a consequential election year.

On Feb. 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a military campaign against Iran, striking more than 900 targets in the first 12 hours and killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The conflict is still raging, with strikes continuing across the country and the region destabilising by the day. Yet behind the missiles and fighter jets lies another revolution in how this war is being fought.   AI, the same technology that millions use daily to draft emails or summarise documents, has become a central instrument of lethal military power. Anthropic’s Claude AI model is embedded inside the Pentagon’s targeting and intelligence apparatus, processing satellite imagery, intercepted communications, and operational data to help commanders decide who to strike, where, and when.   What once required days of human analysis is now compressed into hours or minutes, enabling a pace of warfare that no prior generation of military planners could have executed. AI has been present on battlefields before, from drone guidance systems to satellite image analysis, but the Iran conflict represents its most expansive and consequential deployment to date, and the full implications of that scale are still unfolding.

In remarks on 2 March 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump did not rule out the possibility of sending American ground troops into Iran if it became necessary. However, he didn’t acknowledge that such a move would carry serious risks given Iran’s size and military capability. Any U.S. ground invasion would likely involve significant casualties and could fail to achieve its goals.  Trump has generally shown reluctance to engage in large-scale ground wars. While he has authorized military actions, including airstrikes, against Iran and other states in recent months, his preference historically has been for limited use of force, such as air power and specialized units, rather than deploying tens of thousands of troops.   Part of this approach stems from his broader view that prolonged, chaotic conflicts are unpredictable and often produce uncertain outcomes. Major ground combat operations can create widespread instability and make strategic consequences hard to forecast. Throughout both his first term and the early part of his second term, Trump has shown no strong inclination to commit large numbers of U.S. ground forces abroad.   Trump and Bibi (also known as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) recognize that forcing a full regime change in Tehran would be one of the toughest strategic tasks imaginable. Iran’s political and military structure is robust and not solely driven by personalist rule; it is anchored in a religiously grounded system that has endured since 1979. With the challenges of a successful ground invasion in mind, their current strategy relies on a combination of military pressure and other techniques intended to weaken the regime over time, though there is no guarantee this will bring about its collapse.

China is a dominant player in the rare earths and critical minerals industry. As of 2025, China is in control of “…about 61% of rare earth production and 92% of their processing”, meaning China monopolized the rare earths and critical minerals industry. While China dominates this industry, countries have been aiming to bolster their own rare earth and critical mineral ambitions to reduce their reliance on China as a supplier of raw materials and processed products. For example, GCC countries, in line with their 2030 visions, have increased their investments in the mining and processing of these elements to diversify their economies and become suppliers in an industry dominated by China. This analysis aims to assess the emergence of the GCC as a rare earths and critical minerals supplier, which will be done by analyzing the reasons and feasibility for GCC involvement in this industry as well as understanding the challenges these countries face in their entry into the market.

“We need it for defence.” With these words, U.S. President Donald Trump sought to frame Greenland as a question of national security. The island’s vast reserves of critical minerals and its strategic position in the Arctic have long made it geopolitically significant, yet Trump’s rhetoric elevated it into a symbol of broader American ambitions. This move prompted a rare joint statement by the leaders of seven NATO member states, who rejected any attempt to annex Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of Denmark. Coming alongside U.S. actions elsewhere, including the removal of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and threats of intervention in other regions, these developments have fuelled growing concern within NATO that Washington is advancing a new international order driven primarily by its own interests. The prospect of Greenland’s annexation therefore raises serious questions not only about the future of the alliance, but also reveals Europe’s weakened position in the international system and its limited capacity to resist American pressure.

Tensions between the United States and Venezuela have exploded into a forceful attack that has resulted in the capture and detention of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. The U.S. President Donald Trump has accused President Maduro of instigating a mass migration of Venezuelan citizens, being involved in the fentanyl drug trade, and stealing oil wealth to fund drug operations. Consequently, President Trump authorized attacks on Venezuelan vessels, which he claimed to be transporting drugs to the U.S. while also increasing the number of troops stationed in the Caribbean Sea. Now that President Maduro has been captured after months of U.S. escalation, there is an uncertainty regarding the future of Venezuela, the region, and the world.   The attack as part of Operation Absolute Resolve can be seen as an attempt by President Trump to force regime change in Venezuela. The capture of President Maduro could have serious ramifications not only for the warring factions but the regions of South America and the Caribbean as well as the world. This may come in the form of collapsing institutions and industrial sectors such as energy, a loss of credibility for the U.S., regional destabilization brought on by a devastating refugee crisis, while also having a negative impact on the global economy.

For most of modern history, political systems have been built around the assumption that human beings, rather than territory, rulers, or abstract notions of progress, are the central subjects of governance. Laws, economies, and institutions have been justified, at least in theory, by their obligation to protect human life, manage conflict, and improve collective wellbeing over time. Even when unevenly applied, this principle imposed an ethical constraint on power, requiring political authority to answer, however imperfectly, to human needs and consent.   Today, that assumption is rapidly eroding. A small group of technology elites increasingly speak and act as if humanity itself is provisional, a stage to be surpassed rather than a condition to be preserved. This belief is no longer confined to speculative philosophy. It is shaping how AI is built, how labour is governed, how inequality is rationalised, and how long-term political authority is imagined. The result is not merely a clash of ideas, but an emerging institutional crisis, in which decisions affecting billions are guided by a worldview that has never been democratically endorsed.