Political Studies

The U.S.-Israel and Iran War has affected the interests of many countries. In the last few days, China emerged as a significant player in these events. Beijing called for an immediate halt to the attacks by both sides and the protection of vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, culminating with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledging to send a special envoy to the Middle East for mediation.   Beijing has interconnected interests in the Middle East that are significantly affected by the war and will most likely reshape its strategic opportunities in the region, particularly in terms of energy security, trade routes, and diplomatic relations with key regional players. Beijing’s pragmatic foreign policy approach toward the region relies on protecting its economic interests and maintaining a strategic balance. So, the war could provide an opportunity for China to navigate new opportunities in the region and, consequently, expand its influence, particularly by strengthening ties with other oil-producing nations and increasing its investments in reconstruction efforts.   Likewise, China’s strategic partnership with Iran mainly revolves around oil supply and large-scale investments. The consequences of the war raise questions about the future of this relationship and the possibility that China may reshape its foreign policy toward Tehran if it faces a potential decline in Iran’s ability to sustain such interests as a result of the strain on its power after the war.

The fundamental character of modern aerospace warfare has undergone an irreversible paradigm shift, transitioning abruptly from the deployment of exquisite, highly survivable platforms to the brutal arithmetic of industrial attrition and affordable mass. This operational reality was starkly illuminated in late February 2026, with the commencement of Operation Epic Fury by the United States Armed Forces and the parallel Operation Roaring Lion executed by the Israel Defence Forces.   Following the collapse of nuclear negotiations, the allied coalition launched a massive preemptive military campaign. Deploying an overwhelming concentration of aerospace assets, the coalition struck over one thousand strategic targets deep within Iranian territory during the opening twenty-four hours. United States forces executed over nine hundred individual precision strikes in the first twelve hours alone, utilising stealth bombers, naval fighters, and cruise missiles, escalating to more than one thousand, two hundred, and fifty targeted strikes within forty-eight hours. Simultaneously, the Israeli Air Force conducted over seven hundred sorties on the first day, dropping more than one thousand two hundred munitions to achieve immediate tactical successes and air superiority.   However, the immediate and sustained retaliation by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, designated Operation True Promise IV, has placed an unprecedented and mathematically gruelling strain on the allied integrated air and missile defence architecture. Within the first forty-eight hours of the conflict, the adversary entente launched roughly four hundred and twenty medium-range ballistic missiles targeting many countries in the region. This barrage was accompanied by massive swarms of loitering munitions. The staggering depletion rates of multimillion-dollar interceptors and precision strike munitions against high-volume, low-cost adversary threats have exposed a profound mathematical vulnerability in contemporary military logistics. As the global defence industrial base proves incapable of replenishing these exquisite arsenals at the speed of combat consumption, both the allied coalition and the adversary entente are confronting a rapidly approaching logistical exhaustion horizon. To continue the war and secure a decisive strategic victory, it is an absolute strategic imperative for both sides to aggressively substitute these high-end, legacy assets with scalable, cost-asymmetric alternatives, pivoting their operational doctrines toward deployable mass and continuous attritional endurance.

The first quarter of 2026 marked a strategic turning point in the deployment of hard power and the management of geopolitical interaction. For decades, computing technologies remained largely confined to operational support roles, such as processing intelligence data or guiding precision munitions. January and February, however, witnessed a structural shift as military planning moved away from human-dependent decision cycles toward managing autonomous algorithmic kill chains. This transformation was formally articulated in the “Artificial Intelligence Acceleration Strategy” issued by the United States Department of War (DoW) on Jan. 9 2026. The directive aims to entrench American military dominance by rapidly integrating AI across warfighting, intelligence, and enterprise operations, while transforming the defence apparatus into what officials describe as an “AI-first” military structure.   This doctrine rested on strict operational parameters prioritising overwhelming lethality, rapid execution, and objective-driven systems that place mission success above all other considerations, deliberately excluding social and political variables from algorithmic decision cycles to ensure decisive superiority in battlefield decision-making. This shift was reflected in two unprecedented operations: the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro during Operation Absolute Resolve in January 2026, and the decapitation strike targeting Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during Operation Silent Holy City, conducted within Operation Epic Fury in February 2026.   These operations reflected the integration of large language models, dynamic data architectures, tactical assessment algorithms, and autonomous unmanned systems, fundamentally transforming the speed, precision, and geopolitical cost calculus of neutralising high-value targets. Together, they signal that AI has moved beyond a supporting analytical role to become a strategic architect of the battlespace and a driver of kinetic execution.

At the outset of 2026, the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape is undergoing a profound reconfiguration driven not only by the outcomes of decisive military engagements but also by the complex and protracted diplomatic process that followed the Twelve-Day War of June 2025. In this context, the return of Iranian and American negotiators to the bargaining tables in Muscat and Geneva does not represent a routine resumption of traditional diplomacy. Rather, it constitutes a tangible expression and an evolved application of a deeply rooted strategic doctrine within the Iranian political mindset, commonly referred to in strategic literature as Bazaar Diplomacy. This approach extends far beyond the superficial notion of commercial bargaining and functions as a doctrine of statecraft, carefully engineered to navigate power asymmetries and confront adversaries endowed with overwhelming military and economic superiority.   At its core, Bazaar diplomacy represents a structural departure from the linear Western models of conflict resolution, which are typically constrained by fixed timelines, electoral cycles, and an urgent drive to reach a comprehensive, final agreement that brings crises to a formal close. For the Iranian negotiator, by contrast, time is neither a neutral container nor an external constraint; it is the primary strategic commodity and the central objective of the process itself. This philosophy is grounded in the notion that sustained, circular engagement in protracted talks is not merely a means to an end but a tactical end in its own right. Such engagement provides essential political cover to absorb peak external pressure, restrains an adversary’s momentum toward military action, and creates critical temporal space to repair internal fractures.   In the current context of 2026, this strategy has assumed existential dimensions that extend beyond routine political manoeuvring. Following the extensive damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear and defensive infrastructure by U.S. and Israeli strikes in the previous year, and amid an economic collapse that has eroded the national currency and fuelled widespread protests, negotiations are no longer a matter of political discretion but a structural imperative for regime survival. Accordingly, Bazaar diplomacy functions as a refined mechanism of endurance. It deploys constructive ambiguity and offers technically reversible concessions, such as the temporary suspension of enrichment, in exchange for strategic and structural gains that are far more difficult to reverse, including sanctions relief and the entrenchment of economic interdependencies. The central question, therefore, is whether Bazaar diplomacy can ultimately deliver an agreement between Washington and Tehran.

Food commodities are becoming strategic resources, increasingly viewed as important as oil and gas. Food is used as a tool of political control, where food export control or bans influence countries' behaviour and policy outcomes. For instance, Russia's actions in the Black Sea’s exports caused price spikes and forced strategic changes to the Black Sea Grain Initiative in favour of Moscow. The Russia-Ukraine ًar has showcased how food can be used as a weapon and how major food importers, like Egypt, have faced direct vulnerabilities impacting their food supply.   As governments continue to weaponise food supply to leverage their position in warfare and as climate change worsens, countries will increasingly treat food as a national security issue and reshape alliance-building. Countries could be more likely to depend on food weaponisation tools, as they appear to be effective in ongoing conflicts. Hence, the Global South and food importers are in danger of being exposed to increased starvation and political control from food exporters and wealthier nations that control food systems. The forecasts incite these countries to re-evaluate their strategies to curb the risk of food insecurity.

The question of the West Bank has transcended its status as a mere component of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict to become a substantive test of the coherence of international law and the deterrence foundations upon which the post–Second World War international order was built.   On 9 February 2026, the Israeli Security Cabinet endorsed a package of extraordinary measures designed to consolidate Israeli control over the West Bank. The measures included rescinding the longstanding prohibition on the sale of land to Jews through the repeal of the Jordanian statute that barred the transfer of Palestinian property to Jewish purchasers; lifting the confidentiality of land registry records; transferring planning and construction powers in parts of Hebron from the Palestinian municipality to the Israeli Civil Administration; and broadening oversight and demolition authorities to extend into Areas A and B, which fall under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction in accordance with the Oslo Accords.   These decisions are likely to generate profound structural transformations in property registration and transfer regimes by permitting the public disclosure of landowners’ identities. Such disclosure opens the way for direct negotiations between Israeli purchasers and Palestinian proprietors, thereby facilitating a faster pace of acquisition and further entrenching settlement expansion throughout the West Bank.   In this context, the Israeli Settlement Council (Yesha) characterised the measures as “the most consequential in fifty-eight years,” portraying them as an effective governmental declaration of the restoration of the Land of Israel to its people. These moves do not represent an isolated incident; rather, they constitute one stage in an intensifying trajectory that, over the past two years, has fundamentally reshaped the conflict's underlying parameters, generating a transformed reality that necessitates analytical frameworks beyond traditional paradigms.

The global security landscape is undergoing a fundamental transformation driven by the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence technologies, which have evolved from purely technical tools into strategic forces reshaping patterns of power and conflict. Artificial intelligence has emerged as a transformative capability offering substantial societal benefits, yet its inherently dual-use nature renders it a double-edged instrument.     A careful examination of historical precedents reveals a recurring pattern in which terrorist organisations demonstrate a high degree of adaptability in exploiting emerging technologies to advance their radical agendas. Just as these groups previously leveraged online forums and encrypted communication platforms, they are now actively exploring and adopting artificial intelligence capabilities. This shift is no longer confined to speculative concern or theoretical risk. Rather, AI-enabled terrorism has moved from conceptual discussion into an experimental phase characterised by repetition and rapid diffusion, raising acute concern among security institutions and governments that the technology may become a strategic enabler of unprecedented operational capability.     The convergence between artificial intelligence and the logic of asymmetric warfare is fundamentally altering the balance of power between states and non-state actors, significantly lowering the barriers to entry that were historically imposed by advanced military technologies. Emerging fields and intelligence evidence indicate the development of a multi-domain adoption strategy spanning informational, physical, and cyber spheres, necessitating a deeper analytical examination of how terrorism is being re-engineered in the age of intelligent systems.

Operation Absolute Resolve, which resulted in the removal of Nicolás Maduro and his spouse Cilia Flores on Jan. 3, 2026, constituted a watershed moment in the history of 21st-century geopolitical warfare. While initial indicators point to a seemingly limited regime change within Venezuela, the strategic repercussions of the operation inflicted severe damage on Iran’s forward-operating capabilities. For nearly two decades, Venezuela was not merely a diplomatic partner of Tehran; it served as an indispensable logistical bridgehead and a secure sanctuary in the Western Hemisphere. Through this platform, the Iranian regime was able to circumvent international sanctions, project asymmetric influence, and sustain a critical financial lifeline through illicit trade.

On Dec. 4 2025, Netanyahu decided to appoint his Military Secretary, Major General Roman Gofman, as the Director of the Mossad. Gofman will replace the current Mossad head, David Barnea, whose five-year term ends in June 2026. This decision signals a key leadership change in the country’s most important intelligence agency, particularly given Gofman’s lack of intelligence experience and aggressive decision-making approach. Moreover, this movement indicates Netanyahu’s broader pattern of politicising the appointments of high-ranking officials in security agencies, where loyalty to him appears to be a decisive factor. Accordingly, the politicisation of Mossad raises serious questions about the future of Israel's intelligence.

Governments are increasingly concerned about the realistic but AI-generated images, audio, and videos. Such deepfakes cause widespread misinformation and, in some cases, harm national security by endangering public trust in institutions and elections, as well as inciting political violence. On the other hand, the general public and digital platform users can’t differentiate between AI-generated fake and real content, causing misinformation, polarisation, and the commodification of private data by large tech companies. Accordingly, the rapid movements of deepfakes drive the need to act to set the environment for the new reality.   Relying on tech companies to mitigate misinformation is highly challenging, as these companies face the problem of regulating deepfake content due to its wide accessibility through numerous companies. Therefore, regulating such content by one company will certainly decrease its profit, as users will shift to another supplier. Additionally, these companies financially benefit from publishing advertisements on misinformation websites unintentionally. Hence, there is a pressing need for an outside source to force regulations and strategies to mitigate the proliferation of online misinformation.

Simulation technology is witnessing a profound transformation with the emergence of Digital Cognitive Twins (DCTs), the next generation of Traditional Digital Twins (DTs). These advanced systems go beyond conventional monitoring functions, integrating sophisticated AI models, particularly machine learning networks and natural language processing (NLP) techniques.   This convergence grants DCTs complex capabilities, enabling them to perform autonomous decision-making, conduct real-time self-optimisation, and develop predictive and anticipatory mechanisms. As a result, this technology is reshaping key sectors across multiple domains. In Industry 4.0, it enhances the efficiency and resilience of logistical supply chains; in urban governance, it enables the intelligent management of resources with exceptional accuracy; and in the healthcare sector, it accelerates the adoption of precision medicine tailored to the individual.   The exceptional performance of these systems depends on their ability to absorb and aggregate vast datasets, comprising thousands of variables for a single individual. These datasets extend well beyond the conventional boundaries of personal information, encompassing biometric inputs, genomic data, clinical records, and continuous monitoring of behavioural and psychological patterns derived from digital interactions.   This aggregation produces human simulation models of exceptional fidelity, a defining feature that places this technology squarely within the dual-use domain. While these models promise vast societal benefits, the compromise or seizure of these composite data repositories would constitute a catastrophic national security threat: the harm arising from the exposure of citizens’ data would be strategic, permanent, and irreparable.   The gravest risk lies in the possibility that state or non-state actors might exploit these datasets. Whereas past influence operations—most notably the disinformation campaigns of the last decade—targeted broad audiences, behavioural models derived from integrated digital-transformation processes enable bespoke cognitive-warfare interventions at the level of individuals or small groups. This capability transcends conventional geopolitical forecasting, enabling real-time prediction of societal behaviour.   At the core of the threat is the capacity to selectively manipulate these datasets or even fabricate synthetic records to engineer a pretext for intervention. By corrupting cognitive models, an adversary can simulate a manufactured state of public unrest, precipitate mass psychological collapse, or stage apparent systemic institutional failure—thereby manufacturing a spurious justification for political, economic or security interventions.

China has a long-term goal to be a global leader in technology. To achieve such ambition, the country has taken serious steps widening its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) traditional infrastructure projects to incorporate digital infrastructure projects embodied in the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR was initially launched in 2015 by the government as an idea on paper and during the opening ceremony of the First Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, China’s President Xi Jinping, adopted the DSR term officially and it was incorporated in the government’s BRI strategy as the digital dimension.   The DSR initiative focuses on building digital infrastructure and exporting its technology to the beneficiary countries, it includes telecommunications infrastructure, like 5G networks, overland fibre-optic cables, data centres, cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), as well as applications that support e-commerce and mobile payments, along with smart cities and surveillance technology.  Additionally, the DSR provides support to Chinese tech companies, like ZTE, Huawei, and Alibaba, to carry on the work with the beneficiaries.   The DSR aims to enhance Beijing's global digital influence as it creates opportunities for a wide range of cooperation and partnerships between Chinses tech companies and other beneficiaries around the world in areas of digitalization and AI. China’s DSR encompass a variety of projects in 5G deployment, e-commerce platforms, and AI applications, such as DeepSeek which is an alternative model to ChatGPT.   China signed DSR cooperation agreements with several countries in Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. The cooperation takes place between scientists and engineers from the recipient country and Beijing, like opening a training centre or in research and development (R&D). The areas of cooperation are wide, including smart cities, AI and robotics, clean energy, and surveillance capabilities, like data localization. GCC countries are considered one of the important partners to China’s DSR, where it is closely integrating in the GCC digitalization goals.