Iran Nuclear Program

Iran’s uranium enrichment dilemma constitutes the central axis of the ongoing nuclear dispute, where technical considerations intersect with imperatives of national sovereignty, and where international legal frameworks collide with the strategic logic of deterrence. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic, the possession of a full nuclear fuel cycle—including domestic enrichment—is not merely a technical aspiration but an inherent sovereign right enshrined in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet, within Iran’s political consciousness, this “right” transcends legalistic interpretation; it has become a symbolic pillar of national autonomy and a manifestation of defiance against what is perceived as Western hegemony.   Conversely, the U.S. and its allies view the same enrichment capability as a direct gateway to weaponization. The centrifuge-based architecture of Iran’s program enables, with little more than a political decision, a rapid transition from low-enriched uranium to weapons-grade fissile material within a matter of weeks. These concerns escalated significantly following the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) May 2025 report confirming that Iran had amassed over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%—an amount theoretically sufficient to produce three to five nuclear weapons, should the enrichment level be increased to 90%, without requiring any additional infrastructure.   Iran’s historical experience—from its exclusion from the Eurodif consortium in 1979 to the collapse of the Tehran Research Reactor fuel deal in 2009—has deeply entrenched the belief among Iran’s ruling elite that reliance on external fuel guarantees is neither secure nor sustainable. As such, any negotiated settlement that requires Tehran to abandon domestic enrichment is perceived as a fundamental affront to its sovereign dignity and strategic autonomy.   Thus, the essence of the conflict lies not in centrifuge counts or enrichment levels per se, but in the deeply embedded political architecture of mutual distrust. A sustainable resolution cannot be achieved without a broader security framework that redefines Iran’s position within both the regional and global order.   This study adopts a multi-layered approach to the enrichment dilemma, treating it not as a narrowly technical issue but as a strategic contest between sovereign entitlement and non-proliferation imperatives. It proceeds along four main analytical axes: the technical properties of enrichment, the political and strategic motivations driving Iran’s position, the security calculus of Western powers, and the viability of proposed diplomatic frameworks. The study ultimately affirms that any lasting agreement must emerge from a comprehensive reconfiguration of Iran’s relationship with the international system.

Iranians are voting in a snap presidential election on June 28, following the sudden death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May. This situation is not unprecedented for the Iranian regime, which has faced similar scenarios. In 1981, Iran’s first president following the Islamic Revolution Abolhassan Banisadr, was removed from office by the Islamic Consultative Assembly for political incompetence. Later that year, his successor, President Mohammad-Ali Rajai, was killed in a suitcase bombing. Thus, the current political and constitutional vacuum is not new to Iran. This pattern of instability has occurred twice before during significant periods of political upheaval.   Ebrahim Raisi was one of the few figures who enjoyed the trust of the security establishment and the regime's cleric guards. He was expected to oversee the rise of a new supreme leader after the death of Ali Khamenei or perhaps become the supreme leader himself. Therefore, Raisi's death poses a significant challenge to the mullahs' regime, especially given the internal and external challenges that Iran has faced recently.   On the other hand, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei paved the way for the presidential elections by selecting only six candidates who passed the examination conducted by the Guardian Council. This council, comprising 12 clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader, nominated by the judiciary chief, and approved by parliament, filtered the candidates based on loose criteria that it interprets and explains. Out of 80 candidates who applied for the position, only these six were allowed to run, with the Guardian Council having the final say in choosing or excluding candidates.   For instance, while the Iranian Constitution does not explicitly bar women from running for president, the Guardian Council effectively prevents them from doing so. Despite four women registering candidacies in the current and past 13 presidential elections, none have been approved.   Article 115 of Iran’s Constitution requires the president to be “a politician and cleric of Iranian origin, an Iranian citizen, a director and a wise man, who enjoys a good reputation, honesty, and piety, and believes in the foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the country.” Additionally, criteria related to administrative capabilities are considered. Beyond these criteria, it is widely believed that Khamenei favours a loyal and conservative president who aligns with his views and adheres to the principles of the regime, including obedience to the Supreme Leader.   Therefore, this analysis aims to clarify the significance of these elections, the management process, and the priorities that voters and the regime seek in the next president.