Economic Risk

The economic architecture of the Islamic Republic of Iran is defined by a persistent paradox. While decades of international sanctions have systematically reduced its formal integration into global energy markets, the state remains structurally tethered to a remarkably narrow set of export channels. At the absolute centre of this system lies Kharg Island, a strategic node that handles the overwhelming majority of the nation’s crude oil exports. To date, Western policy has focused on regulatory friction, using sanctions to increase transaction costs and discount prices. However, a transition from regulatory friction to kinetic disruption, specifically a scenario where the U.S. or allied strikes disable Kharg Island, would represent a fundamental phase shift.   Such an event would not merely be a temporary supply disruption; it would constitute a systemic rupture in Iran’s primary revenue-generation mechanism. It necessitates the consideration of a critical counterfactual: what occurs when oil ceases to function as the core economic pillar of the state, not through gradual policy shifts, but through an abrupt, physical termination of export capacity? The resulting post-oil environment would trigger a reconfiguration of the Iranian state, moving it from a centralized rentier model to a decentralized, network-based economy of scarcity.

One of the most structurally fragile economies in the Middle East serves as the backdrop to Iran’s current military confrontation. Extensive international sanctions have, for more than a decade, restricted Iran’s access to global financial markets, constrained its energy exports, and limited foreign investment. Gradually, the Iranian economy came to evolve as a sanctions-adaptation economy, surviving persistent external pressure through informal trade networks, shadow energy exports, and alternative financial channels instead of collapsing outright.   Yet unlike sanctions, which create gradual economic constraints, war introduces a fundamentally different kind of shock by disrupting logistics networks, causing unprecedented damage to national infrastructure and compelling the state to reallocate its resources toward defense spending amid military escalation. Such shocks, for an already fragile economy operating at the limits of macroeconomic stability, can generate disproportionate consequences. The current conflict therefore brings into focus a central economic question: can Iran’s sanctions-adapted economy withstand the pressures of war, or will military escalation reveal structural weaknesses previously concealed by the sanction’s system?

During the past decade, artificial intelligence (AI) has shifted from being an academic curiosity, becoming a driving force for reshaping economies worldwide. What once felt like speculative capabilities including machines generating code and automating complex workflows as well as optimizing global logistics and producing creative content, now became deployable tools on a larger scale across industries. AI’s rapid adoption raises several key questions among policymakers, economists and business leaders, most notably whether AI can contribute to the growth of national economic growth, and under what conditions do these gains materialize?   Macroeconomic models and strong empirical evidence suggest a positive outcome, however with notable limitations. AI, as a general-purpose technology, has more to offer than just efficiency improvements, it also functions as a key driver of innovation, productivity enhancement and transformation tool of economic structures. AI visibility and adoption have grown substantially, especially with the emergence of generative AI technologies such as exemplified ChatGPT, GitHub Copilot. This growth establishes AI as a valuable source of information and data, benefiting both firms and the border national economy, provided that this widespread adoption is backed and supported by a strong infrastructure and an adequate human capital, prepared to complement these technologies.

The United States dollar (USD) prominence as the main global reserve currency can be attributed to the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, which created a new international monetary order and directly linked major world currencies to the USD, which was itself pegged to gold at $35 per ounce. The USD quickly emerged as the primary medium of exchange for most commodity trades and international financial transactions as a result of this agreement, which concentrated trust and liquidity around the currency. In 1971, the Nixon Shock occurred when the United States (U.S.) ended direct USD–gold convertibility, weakening the USD. However, the scope and depth of U.S. financial markets and the petrodollar system - which mandated that oil exports be invoiced and paid in USD- made it incontrovertible, giving the U.S. “the exorbitant privilege”, as economist Valéry Giscard d’Estaing described it, of having substantial control over global monetary policy while financing trade and budget deficits.   It’s crucial to weigh this against factors that continue to uphold the USD’s hegemony though. The unmatched stability liquidity and depth of U.S. financial markets continue to attract global investors worldwide, preserving the USD’s position as the favored reserve asset. Since international trade, finance, and investment infrastructures are still heavily USD-centric, it is also challenging for alternative currencies to quickly replace the USD due to the vast global network effect that has been developed over decades. Moreover, the USD’s status as a “safe-haven” asset persists, particularly during periods of global uncertainty, sustaining demand.   Yet, this hegemonic status is now challenged structurally in ways increasingly understood as de-dollarization- that is, the deliberate reduction of the share of the USD in global trade invoicing, reserve holdings, and payment systems. Debates on the durability of U.S. monetary leadership have been ongoing for decades, but a number of forces have turned de-dollarization from an abstract concept into a global trend since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. That crisis exposed systemic vulnerabilities within USD-dependent financial networks, underscoring how U.S. monetary policy and financial shocks can transmit worldwide in destabilizing ways—especially across Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs).   This postwar order is increasingly under structural pressure from geopolitical fragmentation, rising U.S. debt, sanctions overreach, and the emergence of alternative payment systems. These pressures could lead to two different scenarios for the U.S. economy in a post-dollar world: a sudden collapse due to financial instability and inflation, or a gradual decline with persistently higher borrowing costs and the steady erosion of fiscal and geopolitical leverage. The latter is more likely but still represents a structural shift that redefines the balance of global economic power.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) labour market is at a pivotal crossroads. The high ratio of expatriate workers, which accounts for almost 78% of the total workforce in this region as of Q2 2024, according to a recent statement from GCC Assistant Secretary General for Economic and Development Affairs, underscores its heavy reliance on foreign labour. While this dependence has greatly fuelled rapid economic growth, it now imposes significant challenges to the ambitious diversification agendas. Across the region, and in an attempt at reducing reliance on foreign labour, governments throughout the GCC are intensifying the adaptation and implementation of nationalization strategies to rebalance the labour market in favour of nationals.   This situation offers a mix of opportunities and risks—on one hand, the potential for more inclusive and sustainable growth, and on the other, the risk that reforms misaligned with market realities could undermine competitiveness. Hence, amid this tension, the challenge of nationalization becomes increasingly urgent.

The stock market dropped significantly on Aug. 5, 2024, following a period of high volatility. Concerning economic indicators from the United States (U.S.) and an unexpected interest rate hike by the Bank of Japan were major factors in this collapse. Major world indexes experienced a severe drop, but they recovered within 24 hours. Even with this rapid recovery, the incident may be a hint that the world economy is about to slow down.

With GDP of more than $1 trillion USD, Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East. A country well-known for its enormous oil reserves has been making significant steps to alter its position in the global economy. These reforms are part of a bigger plan to diversify the country’s economy and lessen its dependency on oil revenues. Consequently, the evolving economic landscape of Saudi Arabia will be explored, with a focus on its diversification efforts, investment strategies, and the obstacles it must overcome to emerge as a global leading economy.

China, despite being the second-largest economy globally, encounters challenges such as a distressed real estate sector, reduced domestic consumption, and high debt levels. In response to these obstacles, the government is enacting policies aimed at encouraging domestic spending, mitigating the real estate downturn, and cultivating innovation to ensure sustainable development. The way these measures are implemented will not only impact the economic trajectory of China, but also that of the entire world.

The world economy is at a turning point, with a visible tendency to reverse the integration that was seen in the last decades of the 20th century. Growing scepticism about the benefits of globalisation, particularly in developed countries, accompanied the sluggish recovery after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This uncertainty led to a purposeful policy change away from integration known as geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF). A variety of policies impacting capital flows, worker mobility, and trade are included in GEF. GEF policies are motivated by a variety of factors, such as correcting internal economic inequities, economic competition, and national security concerns. Foreign direct investment (FDI), which has been declining recently, particularly in emerging countries, is another indication of how this trend toward GEF has affected FDI and the need for quick action to reverse it.

The conflict between Hamas and Israel has been ongoing for the past four weeks, resulting in a devastating loss of life. Over 9,056 Palestinian casualties have been reported, while the Israeli side has suffered approximately 1,728 casualties. In addition to the profound human casualties, the conflict has negatively impacted the Israeli economy and is testing its resilience.

According to a report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the state of food security and nutrition in the world in 2022, it is estimated that between 702 and 828 million people were affected by hunger in 2021, consisting of 278 million people in Africa, 425 million in Asia, and 56.5 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. The number has grown by about 150 million since the outbreak of Covid-19. The Russia-Ukraine War, involving two of the biggest producers in agriculture and staple cereals globally, is disrupting supply chains and further affecting global grain, fertilizer, and energy prices, leading to shortages and fuelling even higher food price inflation. Additionally, food security is a significant challenge in the Arab region, which is facing rising economic, socio-political, and environmental challenges impacting the food security of its growing population.   Hence, our study has examined the factors that affect food security, and our analysis allowed us to determine the top five factors affecting food security: climate change, conflict, overpopulation, inflation, and scarce resources. The study will analyze each factor separately and their effect on food security globally and in many regions, with a focus on the Arab region. Secondly, the study will analyze factors of food insecurity separately and its impact on four significant countries: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.   We found that the factors we examined have mainly negative effects on food security, with the exception of climate change, which will positively affect some regions for the time being, and natural resources, which has some aspects that effect food security positively. Additionally, we found that the factors are interconnected since for example, conflict negatively affects food security, and it could increase food prices, as in the current Russia-Ukraine War. Likewise, the adverse impacts of climate change are expected to raise food prices further and dampen the region’s food demand translating into direct increases in malnutrition levels.   Finally, after reviewing the effects of factors on food security, we elaborated some recommendations in order to deal with the adverse effects.