Horn of Africa

Turkey has a deep interest in the Horn of Africa and considers it as the gate to the East of the continent. Since 2011, Turkey has increased its humanitarian aid to Somalia, signed military and economic agreements and contributed to the process of state-building through allowing its companies to construct infrastructure, schools, hospital, and governmental premises. In 2017, Turkey has opened the largest military base, known as TURKSOM, beyond its borders to fully qualify the Somali army to deter the threat arising from the Al-Shabab movement that has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States (U.S.) since 2008.   In February 2024, Turkey signed significant military and economic agreements with Somalia, allowing it to a key player in the politics of Horn of Africa. According to the 10-year pact, Turkey will help Somalia to defend its maritime against piracy, smuggling, and foreign intervention from Ethiopia. Turkey is also obliged by the terms of this agreement to train and rebuild the Somali naval forces. The process of rebuilding includes weaponizing the Somali naval forces with Turkish weapons manufactured locally. These weapons include frigates built mainly for the Somali navy, which means that the Turkish military exports will witness an increase of demand on its products in the forthcoming years. This would motivate other countries to buy Turkish weapons, especially if Turkish weapons proved its efficiency in securing Somali maritime. These agreements also enable Turkey to work on extracting natural resources from the Somali territorial water in return for an agreed-upon percentage for Turkey. Some reports revealed that Turkey will receive 30% of the revenues of the Somali economic zone. Somali airspace will also be fully opened for Turkish military use. This analysis explores Turkish motivations of signing this agreement and the challenges that it might confront while implementing it.

In a move with significant political and economic implications, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi embarked on an official visit to Ankara Sept. 4, 2024. This highly anticipated visit comes months after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Egypt earlier this year and his invitation to President El-Sisi to Ankara. The current visit, considered a turning point in Egyptian-Turkish relations, aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation and open new avenues for coordination on regional and international issues. After a decade of tension and estrangement in the relations between Egypt and Turkey.   The Egyptian President's visit to Turkey is of special importance, as it is the culmination of a long phase of discussions aimed at restoring relations between Egypt and Turkey to their normal course. The rounds of talks and meetings concluded with Erdogan's visit to Cairo last February, which witnessed the announcement of the revival of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council for relations between the two countries in its new form, where both leaders co-chair the first meeting of the Council. The meeting also involved a comprehensive review of the Egyptian-Turkish bilateral relations and discussions on potential steps to further enhance the Egyptian-Turkish cooperation.   This analysis highlights the motivations of this visit and its implications on regional and Turkish politics.

Relations between Sudan and Iran have experienced a volatile history of rapprochement and estrangement over the past eight years, mainly due to the strong tensions between the two countries. The relationship was notably strained after Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016, prompting the Sudanese government to close all Iranian schools and cultural centres. However, amid escalating regional tensions between Tehran and its supporters on one side and Washington and its allies on the other, Sudan and Iran are moving quickly to open a new chapter in their relations. This development comes against the backdrop of the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since April 2023.   The current regional changes have created an opportunity for Sudan and Iran to address past differences in a calculated manner. Relations have shown noticeable growth over the past year, marked by a series of high-level official meetings between Sudanese and Iranian officials. One significant meeting took place on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Committee meeting in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, in July 2023, where former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Al-Sadiq, met with his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. This meeting signalled a rapprochement, culminating in Sudan’s announcement of the official resumption of its diplomatic relations with Iran Oct. 9, 2023.   A year after the resumption of relations, the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, received the credentials of the Iranian ambassador, Hassan Shah Hosseini, July 21, 2024, appointing him as his country’s ambassador and plenipotentiary to Sudan. This move raised many questions, particularly due to its timing, which coincided with escalating regional tensions and months of ongoing battles between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces. Additionally, it occurred in the context of the normalisation of relations between Khartoum and Tel Aviv, which began approximately four years ago.   This rapprochement raises many questions about the agreement’s sustainability, particularly given the two countries’ divergent regional priorities. While Iran focuses on the Gulf and the Arab Levant, the future of this relationship hinges on regional developments and Iran’s strategic calculations in the Red Sea region. Will the ties radically shift toward a sustainable strategic partnership or remain captive to regional tensions and political tactics?

The 21st century has witnessed a resurgence of mediation as a pivotal tool for resolving international disputes. This resurgence is driven by the complexities of contemporary conflicts and the expansion of threats beyond traditional regional conflicts, civil wars, and political crises. The scope of security threats now includes issues such as climate change, cybersecurity, and transnational organised crime.   Several countries have played significant roles in mediation, leveraging their diplomatic acumen, political influence, and economic resources to facilitate dialogue and prevent escalation. Norway has consistently demonstrated its commitment to peacebuilding through active participation in resolving conflicts among the most prominent mediators. From Sri Lanka to Colombia and the facilitation of the Oslo Accords, Norway has embodied its ability to promote dialogue between seemingly irreconcilable adversaries.   Known for its multilateral approach and emphasis on consensus building, Finland initiated the Group of Friends of Mediation in September 2010, significantly contributing to peace processes in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, Switzerland, with its long-standing tradition of neutrality, has provided a safe and neutral venue for countless peace talks and negotiations, fostering an environment conducive to compromise and resolution.   Amid the resurgence of mediation in international diplomacy, the last decade has witnessed the emergence of non-Western actors in this field. At the forefront is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has become an essential player in the Middle East and beyond. Since its founding, the UAE has combined traditional Arab values with modern diplomatic practices to address the cultural complexities of regional conflicts, adopting a policy of promoting peace, security, and stability both regionally and globally.   The UAE’s commitment to mediation is evident in its numerous initiatives aimed at calming conflicts and crises, including active mediation in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, facilitating dialogue and humanitarian aid, playing a crucial role in reconciliation efforts between India and Pakistan; its pivotal role in the historic 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, marking a significant achievement in regional stability; facilitating prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, showcasing the UAE's diplomatic reach; mediation efforts between Russia and the United States (U.S.), further highlighting the UAE's influence; and hosting the COP28 Climate Conference in Dubai, underscoring the UAE's active participation in global diplomacy.   However, the path to mediation is fraught with challenges. The inherent complexities of many regional conflicts, the conflicting interests of the parties involved, and the need to balance mediation efforts with national interests can hinder the achievement of sustainable solutions. Additionally, maintaining neutrality in polarised situations, limited influence over non-state actors, and potential capacity constraints are challenges that the UAE must overcome to ensure the continued success of its mediation efforts. Hence, the UAE’s role as a rising international mediator, focusing on the factors that enabled its rise, its mediation strategies, and the impact of its efforts on regional and global conflicts will be examined.

Hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam, is a highly anticipated ritual for many Muslims. As the global Muslim population grows and financial conditions improve, the demand to perform Hajj has increased. However, pilgrims encounter numerous challenges, particularly regarding the ritual of sacrifice. After completing the stoning of the Jamarat, pilgrims perform the sacrifice—slaughtering a sheep, cow, or camel—as an act of devotion to Allah Almighty. This analysis seeks to explore the specific challenges associated with the sacrificial ritual.   To be considered valid, a sacrificial animal must meet several criteria. It must be livestock—camels, cows, sheep, or goats—and adhere to Islamic age requirements: at least six months old for camels, two years for cows, one year for sheep, and six months for goats. The animal must be free from defects, including lameness, blindness, illness, or severe emaciation. It must be slaughtered in designated holy locations and within the timeframe set by Islamic law, from after Eid al-Adha prayer until the final days of Tashreeq (the 11th, 12th and 13th of Dhul-Hijjah.)

In January of 2024, landlocked Ethiopia officially considered the formal recognition of Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and remains an unrecognised de facto state. This potential agreement, which would be in exchange for access to the Gulf of Aden through the port of Berbera, reignited tensions with neighbouring Somalia. Although the exact details of the agreement have not yet been fully disclosed, Somalia considers it to be an annexation of territory potentially. Still, its demands for an end to the agreement have seemingly been ignored by its neighbours.

A humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Somalia after flash floods have displaced over 200,000 people, exacerbating the country’s ongoing struggle with mass starvation, water scarcity and terrorism. For over a decade, jihadi organisation al-Shabaab has carried out attacks and terrorised civilians, both in Somalia and neighbouring countries including Kenya and Ethiopia, prompting extensive counterterrorism offensives by the Somali government with support from numerous international actors including the US, UK, EU, Eritrea, and Turkey. Not surprisingly, the US holds one of the largest shares in security assistance (and peacekeeping operations) funding to Somalia, amounting to around $3 billion in the last decade. Where insurgency goes, the American military follows, but to what effect? If there were ever doubts about the long-term effectiveness of American military intervention, the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan in 2021 certainly solidified their validity. Though the intervention in Somalia can be considered low profile relative to other American adventures, that might be a cause for more concern. In the wake of recent developments, the question of if Somalia will be the next Afghanistan emerges once again.