The Security Puzzle: What Will Shape Southern Lebanon’s New Order?

Southern Lebanon is undergoing a shift from a traditional peacekeeping framework to a more complex security system, where the Lebanese state, international actors, and new verification mechanisms can share responsibility for achieving and maintaining security. The June 2026 Trilateral Framework Agreement and the August 2026 Rome talks may provide the political start point for this shift, but they don’t determine its outcome. The crucial question is whether the emerging system can establish a sustainable security, or whether the region will remain involved in an externally managed deterrence system.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)/UN Security Council Resolution 1701 framework provides the institutional basis for the current transition, but its peacekeeping model was not designed to independently enforce a comprehensive disarmament process or to compel the state to dismantle deeply entrenched non-state actors. Accordingly, its limitations were structural as it couldn’t guarantee exclusive state control over weapons, prevent the rebuilding of non-state actors armed capabilities, or resolve compliance disputes. Consequently, the challenge for the new security architecture is not simply to replace UNIFIL, but to establish mechanisms capable of performing functions that the previous framework could not fully provide.

The signing of the U.S.-supported Trilateral Framework Agreement between Israel and Lebanon on 26 June 2026 appeared, at first sight, to open a path toward a comprehensive peace agreement through ending Israeli military operations in Lebanon and restoring Lebanese sovereignty. However, continued ceasefire violations, the delay in the Israeli withdrawal, and Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm have created obstacles to comprehensive peace in Lebanon. With talks in Rome between Lebanon and the United States in August, expectations have emerged that a genuine negotiation process may begin, potentially helping shape the security order in southern Lebanon.

The question of a new security order is becoming increasingly important in light of recent developments, such as discussions over the establishment of U.S.-backed “pilot zones,” the expansion of the Lebanese Army’s deployment, the future of the UNIFIL, as well as discussion of new international mechanisms to monitor and enforce security arrangements. Accordingly, the future of southern Lebanon should not be viewed as a binary choice between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. Rather, the indicators point to the emergence of three competing security models that could replace the existing security model. The question becomes whether southern Lebanon is moving toward a state-led security system, an internationally supported security framework, or a retreat from the security developments on the ground, with prolonged managed deterrence continuing to prevail.

The agreement constitutes a framework for restructuring the security environment in southern Lebanon. In other words, it is not limited to a ceasefire; rather, it points to a gradual transition from the traditional peacekeeping model represented by UNIFIL to a more complex model based on security governance, in which responsibility for producing and maintaining security is distributed among the Lebanese Army, the United States, international partners, and multiple verification and monitoring mechanisms.

In such a context, three competing security models could emerge:

Model One: State Monopoly over Security

The Lebanese Army (LAF) gradually assumes full security responsibility in southern Lebanon. Under the agreement, the LAF shifts from being a deployed force to becoming the institution on which the entire security process is built. Any Israeli withdrawal is linked to the Lebanese Army’s ability to impose exclusive control, disarm Hezbollah, and prevent the reconstitution of its military infrastructure.

This scenario is consistent with the core objective of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the extension of the authority of the Lebanese state in the south of the country and for the absence of any armed groups other than those belonging to the state, Lebanese Armed Forces, and those authorized by the Security Council, UNIFIL.

The current international approach is not based on replacing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with an international force, but rather on transforming it into the principal security actor by directing essential support toward it so that it becomes the sole and unified security authority responsible for defending the Lebanese state and controlling the possession of weapons. There are indicators of a transformation in the security system taking shape in southern Lebanon, most notably the reduction of UNIFIL’s role, which reflects the end of the traditional peacekeeping model, while the focus on building the capabilities of the Lebanese Army strengthens the state-cantered model in which the state is the principal producer of security.

To envision such a model, it requires increased military funding, expansion of army deployment, enhanced intelligence capabilities, development of border-monitoring systems, and domestic political consensus among the various political and societal factions. Hence, the army deployment does not necessarily mean a transfer of security sovereignty in the hands of the state. That’s because of the severe challenges the country face regarding government monopolization of weapons where illicit weapons enter the country and become in the hands of illegal armed groups, the need for border control, along with the huge financial requirements as well as judicial capacity to ensure the independence and authority of the LAF.

However, the main constraint is not limited to the Lebanese Army’s financial capabilities but also includes its structural cohesion and its willingness to use force against Hezbollah. The LAF operates within Lebanon’s sectarian and political balance, meaning that any decision to disarm Hezbollah by force carries risks that extend beyond the military sphere. If groups within the security establishment, the political leadership, or Lebanese society oppose the use of force against Hezbollah, attempting to impose disarmament could create internal divisions within the Army itself. Therefore, the challenge lies in ensuring the Lebanese army can function as a unified national institution, rather than being fragmented along the political and sectarian lines of the Lebanese political system.

This makes the transition to a state monopoly over security extremely difficult. A larger Lebanese Army presence in southern Lebanon might project territorial control without necessarily providing the political authority or structural cohesion required to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. For Model One to succeed, the LAF would need, not only additional funding, weapons, intelligence, and border control capabilities, but also a clear political will and structural cohesion to dismantle non-state actors from the roots.

Model Two: Internationally Supported Security System

The LAF remains the principal security force, but receives extensive international support, including international monitoring, military training, intelligence sharing, as well as financial and logistical support. This scenario signals a shift from the traditional peacekeeping model toward a more hybrid security model embodied in several coordinating bodies for security coordination.

This model envisions the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) act as the primary security provider on the ground to restore state sovereignty, deploy throughout the borders, and ensure the disarmament and dismantlement of Hezbollah while coordination bodies, notably the trilateral Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L), facilitated by the United States, oversees and manage the compliance whether the deployment of the LAF or the withdrawal of the Israeli forces.

Moreover, the Lebanese Military Technical Coordination Committee (MTC4L), which is a multinational mechanism led by Italy that was joined by the United States and other countries, would work alongside the MCG4L to oversee the security arrangements. Also, potential supporting actors may include the United States, France, the European Union, and Türkiye, as well as any international monitoring mechanism that may replace UNIFIL.

Hence, the new security order would be transitional, combining the Lebanese Army with an international multilateral support mechanism for training the forces, financing the LAF, border oversight, security coordination, and verification of implementation, rather than an immediate transition to a purely Lebanese security system.

The effectiveness of this model will mainly depend on whether these coordination mechanisms have greater operational authority than the UNIFIL’s traditional peacekeeping structure. The key difference lies between monitoring compliance and enforcing it. If the roles of both the MCG4L and MTC4L are limited to monitoring, reporting violations and coordinating between parties, the new system may duplicate the old, limited framework:  the ability to document violations without sufficient authority to enforce parties to comply. For Model Two to succeed, it requires clearly defined Rules of Engagement (RoE) that specify the powers and authority of international personnel and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) when observing unauthorized weapons, military infrastructure, or armed activity.

Accordingly, the RoE will need to establish a comprehensive response mechanism to violations, ranging from inspection, verification and reporting to the authority to seize prohibited military equipment, and stop unauthorized armed activity throughout the LAF and the support of international actors. Besides authority for enforcement, a new security model would require continuous aerial surveillance, satellite imagery, unmanned systems, and intelligence-sharing mechanisms to identify unauthorized weapons movements, armed activity, and attempts to rebuild armed capabilities. Ultimately, the authority given to these bodies, similar to the one in UNSC Chapter VII-style enforcement mandates, is essential, to ensure that they won’t become another reporting mechanism rather than a security enforcement instrument.

Model Three: Managed Deterrence

This scenario depends on pivotal conditions that determine whether one of the above models could be successfully adopted or whether the conditions necessary would collapse, resulting in an unstable model in which deterrence is managed.

The key condition is the ability of the actors in the previous models to disarm Hezbollah’s military capabilities and at the same time dismantle its power structure, including the networks, institutions, and resources that allow it to rebuild its strength.

Under the first model, the Lebanese Army can’t become the sole security guarantor if its institutions are infiltrated by Hezbollah personnel or lack the capacity to prevent Hezbollah from rearming. Under the second model, international support could gradually turn into an external interference where it may substitute for building state capacity rather than an instrument for empowering it, allowing Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to continue supporting Hezbollah’s capabilities and the LAF wouldn’t reflect the state sovereignty.

Both models failing to achieve the key condition would likely reverse the security order in progress, leading to a state of “managed deterrence.” Here, the Lebanese government and the supporting international actors would manage to disarm Hezbollah but wouldn’t be able to dismantle its financial, political, and institutional networks that enable its reconstitution. Therefore, Hezbollah continues to infiltrate the state’s institutions and retains the capacity to rebuild its capabilities. Hence, “deterrence” could become merely temporary management of a conflict structure that has not been fully dismantled, creating a fragile security order.

In this scenario, no complete strong institutional alternative would emerge; instead, the model envisions a containment of escalation through unsustainable international monitoring mechanisms. It would likely include a gradual expansion of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Israel’s partial withdrawal and continued deterrence with limited retention of military capabilities by Hezbollah. Consequently, it carries the risk of a renewed conflict in the future.

On the other hand, some argue that this model could emerge due to a completely different factor. When parties are on the verge of forming a comprehensive framework for a new security order with a strong LAF presence and international financial and logistical backing, Iran and Hezbollah may resort to limited escalation aimed at undermining the progress, which could lead the parties to adopt a model based on containing and managing escalation rather than eliminating the sources of the threat.

Tehran’s leadership views its regional proxies, including Hezbollah, as one of the main pillars of its deterrence strategy and an important bargaining card in its negotiations with Washington. Therefore, maintaining elements of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure may remain strategically important even if a formal disarmament process begins. Iran would seek to preserve the financial and logistical networks through which Hezbollah can acquire, store, and potentially preserve precision-guided munitions (PGM), which would allow it to reconstruct in the future amidst disarmament efforts.

This poses a fundamental challenge for verification. A new security arrangement may succeed in removing visible weapons from Hezbollah and expand the LAF territorial presence, but it may fail in eliminating the networks that would allow Hezbollah to rebuild its military capabilities. Hence, if Iran succeeds in re-funding or rearming Hezbollah, international parties’ efforts would be diverted towards containment rather than reinforcement.

In addition, Israel’s political and strategic calculations would play a role in the construction of this scenario. Its willingness to comply to a new security arrangement will depend largely on its confidence in the verification mechanisms’ ability to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its military capabilities. If inspections are repeatedly obstructed and can’t reach the weapons networks/storages, or intelligence indicates a rebuilding of PGM capabilities, Israel may carry out preemptive strikes as it will likely assess that this new security order has failed to address the main threat. In Model Three, international actors would be forced to contain the threats of Hezbollah’s rearmament’s threat and Israel readiness to strike.

For any sustainable new security order, Lebanon requires a gradual transition of the security architecture rather than sudden replacement. In other words, whatever form the new security system takes, it cannot replace Hezbollah all at once. In this context, pilot zones can be regarded as security laboratories that measure the success or failure of the new security arrangements. Instead of a full sudden deployment in the South, deployment could be carried out through successive sectors south of the Litani River, starting with areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are already present, where local authorities can cooperate with security arrangements, before moving to Hezbollah strongholds, which would be more challenging.

Hence, the first phase would focus on establishing clearly defined geographic roadmap where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will assume responsibility for security, arms control, border monitoring, and coordination with international mechanisms. This geographic roadmap will serve as controlled tests before expanding to more intense Hezbollah strongholds, where it maintains deeper military, political, or social networks. The expansion would occur only when measurable criteria have been met, including the LAF’s ability to maintain security independently, prevent the smuggling of unauthorized weapons, address violations, and sustain cooperation with local authorities. If a pilot area fails to meet agreed-upon security criteria, the deployment and expansion could be reassessed rather than allowing a one malfunction to destabilise the broader transition.

In addition, implementing any agreement on Lebanese territory will require several initiatives and measures to rebuild Lebanon’s economy and finance the Lebanese Army with weapons and salaries. It may also require training the Lebanese Army in the use of certain weapons and in conducting operations against Hezbollah. Such training would require international cooperation and military missions to Lebanon, potentially European ones, to help build its capabilities. Also, substantial security funding would be required to impose a blockade on arms smuggling to Hezbollah in Lebanon and across the borders. This raises some uncertainties that need to be determined in the final agreement about who will participate in financing these efforts, how the funding will be managed within the country, and how its delivery for its specified purposes will be guaranteed.

Moreover, the security system in Lebanon lies at the centre of issues on which Washington and Tel Aviv seek to coordinate alongside Iran. Accordingly, the restructuring of security arrangements in Lebanon has become linked to calculations by external actors and not merely to the implementation of Resolution 1701 that governs the situation in southern Lebanon and along the Lebanese-Israeli borders, as well as to the level of coordination to implement the Trilateral Framework Agreement. The extent of Israel’s commitment to coordination and to the conditions established within this security framework is crucial. If Israel can resume military operations under other pretexts, this would weaken the prospects for the agreement’s success.

Lastly, international support actors would need to create economic alternatives for the Shiite community to reduce dependence on Hezbollah. This is largely linked to the goal of dismantling Hezbollah as it has already begun preparing ahead of the May 2028 general elections. Without credible alternatives, it could reclaim its domination over Shiite parliamentary seats and preserve its political and financial influence. Additionally, these actors should prevent any plans to integrate Hezbollah into Lebanese state institutions or grant it greater political influence in exchange for disarmament as it would only enable it to rearm in the future.

However, the main challenge lies in how to deliver financial resources without allowing Hezbollah networks to exploit or divert them through weak state institutions. International actors could establish investment funds subject to an independent auditing mechanism and link this funding to clearly defined projects in reconstruction, employment, and locally managed initiatives, rather than channelling it directly to central ministries.

Furthermore, international actors can encourage foreign direct investment in southern Lebanon through an independent auditing mechanism that prioritises companies demonstrating financial and political independence from Hezbollah. This could support independent Shia entrepreneurs and businesses with no access to Hezbollah-linked funding. The goal is to expand the range of economic alternatives that can operate independently of Hezbollah’s financial network. Accordingly, this could likely weaken the dependency relationship through which Hezbollah leverages economic and social support to transform it into political influence.

In conclusion, UNSC Resolution 1701 already provide the basic framework for the security system currently being discussed, but the conditions under which this framework was implemented have changed. Therefore, parties could look at how the 1701 model will be reshaped after UNIFIL’s withdrawal, not be fully disregarded. The next security architecture could focus on constructing a comprehensive enforcement mechanism where the Lebanese Armed Forces become the primary security actor with international financial, verification, and technical support.

The dilemma is not merely the transition from one security model to another, but in the uncertainties that revolve around each model implementation and the threat of a deterrence model collapsing all security reconstruction efforts. Hence, the real test will be whether the international actors, that expressed their readiness to engage in a new security model, will be able to invest in a greater enforcement mechanism consolidate the LAF undisputed authority and foster enforcement powers for supporting bodies to ensure the dismantlement of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, Israel complete withdrawal, and full Lebanese sovereignty over its territory. If the first and second models aren’t adequately funded, verified, and enforced, the third model will likely to prevail, and the conflict may be even more difficult to contain than the one the current Trilateral Framework aims to end.

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