Iran's missile programme and drone arsenal constitute one of the Middle East's principal security determinants. Before the outbreak of military hostilities in February 2026, Iran possessed the region's largest stockpile of ballistic missiles. Estimates varied, placing its inventory at between 2,500 and 6,000 long-range missiles capable of striking deep inside Israel at speeds approaching 17,000 kilometres per hour. This coincided with Tehran consolidating its position as a leading developer of drones, particularly the various Shahed models, the Karrar series, and the latest Kaman variant unveiled in January 2026.

 

The strategic significance of these capabilities became evident during the war, when they became a top priority for U.S. and Israeli strikes. Production facilities, storage sites, and launch platforms were targeted in an effort to degrade Iran's deterrent capabilities and neutralise the threat they posed to Israel. This military escalation was consistent with the pre-war U.S. position, which had signalled its intention to prevent Tehran from acquiring ballistic missiles and stressed the need to incorporate this issue into the nuclear negotiations. In practice, this was reflected in the simultaneous targeting of the infrastructure underpinning both the missile and nuclear programmes.

 

However, the launch of the negotiation process introduced a new strategic dimension to the issue through the Islamabad Memorandum. Contrary to expectations that Iran's military capabilities would be incorporated into the initial agreement, both the missile and drone programmes were excluded from the preliminary understanding.

 

The Trump administration subsequently announced a departure from its previous position, stating that it was not seeking to prevent Tehran from rebuilding its missile capabilities, citing Iran's sovereign right to self-defence. This shift reflects a strategic trade-off based on temporarily overlooking the missile programme in exchange for containing the nuclear programme and restricting the funding of armed groups across the region.

 

This exclusion is not merely a procedural feature of the negotiations. Rather, it raises fundamental questions about the trajectory of the sixty-day transitional period and the strategy each party is likely to pursue thereafter. This situation requires an assessment that goes beyond measuring battlefield losses to understand how these capabilities have evolved from mere weapons systems into a fundamental pillar of the regional balance of power, imposing themselves on regional strategic calculations.

This issue was written on July 2, 2026

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