Europe’s Next Battle: The Coming Food Crisis

The last few years in European history can be described as “one battle after another”. From the start of the Russia-Ukraine war to the return of U.S. President Donald Trump for a second term and all of the headache that followed, Europe has found itself dealing with one challenge after another. Now, after years of geopolitical tensions and uncertainty, Europe may be heading towards another battle, one that could hit much closer to home: food. The continent is facing the prospect of a food shortage, and the problem has already begun to take shape.

The reasons behind it span from extreme heatwaves that are having a negative impact on crops and agriculture at large, to war-related disruptions that are affecting key trade routes and food supplies. While all of the above is already bad news for Europe, the worse possibility is that the problem might not stop at European doors and could extend into a global food crisis. Accordingly, what comes next for Europe, and can Europeans secure enough food for their people?

Europe’s food system is entering a difficult period as extreme weather increasingly threatens agricultural production across the continent. The summer of 2026 has been among the most intense on record, with temperatures exceeding 40°C (104°F) in parts of Spain, France and Italy. Successive heatwaves, combined with an increasingly severe continent-wide drought, have placed crops and livestock under severe stress, while also fuelling some of the most destructive wildfires in years and claiming lives. For farmers, however, the most consequential impact may be the damage to this year’s harvest and the growing uncertainty over the food supply that follows.

The combination of human-driven global heating, a supersized El Niño, prolonged lack of rainfall and hot winds has scorched agricultural land across Europe. Temperatures routinely exceeded 30°C and often reached above 35°C, disrupting plant development at critical stages of the growing cycle. Vegetable producers have been particularly affected. In France, growers report that production has fallen by a “very significant extent” compared with previous years, with estimated shortfalls of 25% for courgettes, 35% for lettuces, 40% for peas, 60% for broccoli and between 50% and 100% for artichokes. The scale of the losses has led farmers to describe the current situation as an “unprecedented” crisis, with vegetable and grain growers warning of potentially “catastrophic” harvests.

The damage extends to Europe’s major cereal producers. France’s agriculture ministry estimates that the country’s maize harvest will fall by 35% from 2025 levels to around 9 million tonnes, a volume not seen since 1980. Some of this decline reflects farmers switching from maize to other crops, including sunflowers, but the effects of the heatwaves are also significant. Maize has been particularly vulnerable because the extreme temperatures struck during crucial stages of its development.

The consequences extend beyond crops to livestock. Dairy cows typically begin experiencing heat stress at temperatures above 25°C, and French producers have already reported milk yields falling by 10–15%. Farmers are also increasingly concerned about securing sufficient feed for the winter as maize and other crops suffer. Poultry production has similarly been affected: the June heatwave caused catastrophic mortality rates in some poultry houses, leaving France’s egg production around 1 million eggs a day below its normal level, according to the country’s national egg promotion board.

Italy is facing a similarly severe situation. Around 60% of the country’s farmland is now affected by drought ranging from mild to severe, according to Coldiretti, Italy’s largest farmers’ organisation. Corn, rice and soya bean production, alongside fruit and vegetables, has been badly affected, while milk production has fallen by 20%. The broader economic damage to agriculture, including losses from wildfires and heavy storms, is estimated at more than €3 billion. Spain has also recorded substantial losses. Cereal harvests are estimated to be 35% below the previous year in Castilla y León, 49% lower in the Madrid region and 24% lower in Andalucía. Livestock production has suffered as well, with sheep’s milk production falling by 6.5% and goat’s milk by 10.8%.

These national losses are increasingly reflected in the European Union’s wider agricultural outlook. The European Commission has revised downward its production forecasts for most major grain and oilseed crops for the 2026/27 marketing year, with maize facing the sharpest downgrade. Production is now forecast at 51.9 million tonnes, down sharply from the 59.9 million tonnes projected in June and nearly 14% below the previous year’s harvest. The deterioration in domestic production has already translated into a higher import requirement: the EU’s maize import forecast has risen to 24 million tonnes from 19.1 million tonnes a month earlier.

Other major crops have also been revised downward. The forecast for soft wheat production has been reduced from 126.3 million tonnes to 124.4 million tonnes. Although this would still represent an increase of around 8% from 2025/26, the EU’s soft wheat export forecast has simultaneously been lowered from 30 million to 29 million tonnes, while projected ending stocks have fallen from 13.8 million to 12.9 million tonnes. Barley production is now expected to reach 51.05 million tonnes, compared with 51.7 million tonnes previously forecast and 55.6 million tonnes harvested in 2025/26. Sunflower seed production has likewise been revised down from 10.1 million to 9.5 million tonnes, although it remains above the 8.7 million tonnes harvested in the previous season.

Taken together, these revisions point to a difficult agricultural season shaped by adverse weather and high production costs. While Europe is not facing an across-the-board collapse in food production, declining output in several major crops is likely to tighten markets, increase import dependence and reduce the bloc’s room to absorb further external shocks. This is particularly significant for maize, where the deterioration in domestic production is already translating into a substantially higher import requirement. The problem, therefore, is not simply that Europe is producing less food; it is that its need to compensate through imports is growing precisely as geopolitical tensions are threatening some of the most important sources of those imports.

Europe’s worsening agricultural outlook is unfolding alongside a second and potentially reinforcing shock. The Russia-Ukraine war is threatening the region’s access to global grain supplies. The combination is particularly concerning because the deterioration in Europe’s domestic harvest is increasing its dependence on imports at a time when conflict is disrupting one of the world’s most important grain-exporting regions.

Wheat prices have already begun reflecting these concerns. Earlier this week, wheat futures for December delivery on Euronext exceeded €255, reaching a level not seen in years. Unlike the weather-driven losses affecting European agriculture, the latest price surge is primarily linked to geopolitical tensions and growing uncertainty over Black Sea exports. Russia and Ukraine together account for roughly one-third of global wheat exports, much of which moves through ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The vulnerability of these routes became clear in 2022, when Russia’s invasion and attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure caused wheat and other grain prices to spike worldwide. Prices subsequently eased following a Turkish-brokered agreement and the establishment of a protected Ukrainian shipping corridor.

That relative stability is now under renewed pressure. Fighting has increasingly disrupted exports, with Russia repeatedly targeting infrastructure in Odesa and other Ukrainian ports. Since July, attacks have also extended to merchant ships travelling to these ports, increasing the risks faced by crews and discouraging commercial shipping. The escalation is partly a response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets. Ukrainian drones have effectively closed the Sea of Azov to Russian shipping, while a recent Ukrainian strike badly damaged grain terminals at Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The port is the world’s largest wheat-exporting port, handling more than 30% of Russia’s wheat exports.

The consequences for trade flows are already becoming visible. Last year, Russia and Ukraine exported a combined 6.3 million tonnes of wheat in a single month, accounting for a substantial share of the roughly 16 million tonnes of wheat traded across international borders that month. In August this year, their combined exports may reach only around 2.5 million tonnes, with the possibility of further declines if hostilities continue. Wheat prices have consequently been rising for weeks, reaching two-year highs and standing around 25% above their level at the beginning of the year.

The disruption is particularly significant for the EU because the bloc is already becoming more dependent on external supplies. The EU is expected to import around 25 million metric tonnes of maize between July 2026 and June 2027, up from 19.3 million tonnes during the previous 12 months. The increase follows a roughly 10-million-tonne decline in domestic production, according to European Commission agriculture spokesperson Louise Bogey. Yet one of the EU’s traditional sources of maize imports is itself being constrained by the war. Ukraine normally supplies around half of the bloc’s imported maize, but the conflict has severely restricted its ability to export.

The impact is not limited to current exports. Ukrainian agricultural production itself is under growing pressure, with farmers potentially leaving as many as 7 million hectares unplanted next season if the war continues to disrupt agricultural activity. This creates the prospect of a second-order effect in which today’s conflict does not merely interrupt grain shipments but reduces the volume available for international markets in future seasons.

As a result, European buyers are increasingly looking towards North and South America to compensate for the expected shortfall. That shift may help prevent an immediate supply crisis, but it also highlights a growing vulnerability. Europe is being forced to rely more heavily on distant markets to compensate simultaneously for weaker domestic production and disrupted supplies from its traditional regional suppliers.

The key thing to watch now is prices. Oxford Economics forecasts global food prices to rise by 11.8% in 2026 and a further 4.8% in 2027. In the eurozone, its base case sees food inflation accelerating from around 1.5% in June 2026 to roughly 3% in 2027, although other estimates put next year’s increase closer to 4%. At that level, food inflation could add around 0.3 percentage points to overall eurozone inflation and cost households an additional €120–150 billion if consumption patterns remain unchanged, with lower-income households bearing the greatest burden. The impact will also unfold unevenly over time. Fresh produce prices are likely to respond within two to three months, while the effects on processed foods such as bread, pasta and cereals are expected to peak six to nine months later, roughly between February and May 2027. A further second-round effect will come through livestock. Grain is a major input cost for pork, poultry, eggs, milk and beef, meaning elevated grain prices today will translate into higher feed costs next winter. Even if grain prices subsequently stabilise, consumers could therefore continue to feel the effects in meat and dairy prices with a significant lag. Europe’s buffer against further shocks is consequently becoming thinner.

Europe, however, is not the only region exposed to the disruption, and arguably not the most vulnerable in absolute terms. Russia and Ukraine together accounted for 27.4% of global wheat exports in 2025/26, as well as 15.8% of barley, 12.5% of corn and 61.5% of sunflower-oil shipments. Disruption to this corridor therefore places roughly 86 million tonnes of annual grain-export capacity at risk, close to 17% of global cereal exports. The pressure is already visible in global food markets, with the FAO Food Price Index reaching a three-and-a-half-year high in July. But the consequences are far more severe for import-dependent lower-income countries. What Europeans experience primarily as higher food inflation is, in countries where households already spend half or more of their income on food, experienced in terms of fewer meals and reduced access to basic staples. Kenya, for example, is already projected to lose roughly a fifth of its maize crop in Trans Nzoia, one of the country’s key grain-producing regions. The same global shock therefore has profoundly different consequences depending on a country’s ability to absorb higher prices or replace disrupted imports.

Yet the disruption also creates winners. Countries with the capacity to expand exports can capture market share and additional revenue as buyers search for alternatives to Russian and Ukrainian supplies. Argentina is particularly well positioned, with record wheat and corn crops and an active effort to fill the emerging gap. The USDA’s March 2026 outlook projected Argentine wheat exports to increase by 8.6 million tonnes year-on-year, the largest increase among major exporters. Buenos Aires has also reduced wheat and barley export taxes from 7.5% to 5.5% from June 2026, explicitly seeking to capture a greater share of global trade. Brazil, although itself a wheat importer, continues to expand its role as a maize and soybean exporter; its 2026/27 paddy rice exports are projected at 1.5 million tonnes, up 7% year-on-year, while record South American soybean harvests are strengthening global stocks and expanding available export supplies. The U.S. could also benefit. It remains the world’s leading maize exporter and is projected to reach record maize exports of around 80 million tonnes annually by late 2026, even as its own wheat production declines.

But substitution is not the same as resolution. Argentina, Brazil, the U.S. and Australia can absorb a meaningful share of the volume that Russia and Ukraine can no longer reliably supply, but replacing Black Sea shipments comes at a higher cost. Grain travelling from the Americas or Australia to European, Middle Eastern and African markets generally has to cover substantially longer distances, while the cost of moving even Black Sea cargoes has risen because of the war. U.S. wheat export prices, for example, have reached around $321 per tonne, up from $235 a year earlier, reflecting both tighter U.S. supply and the premium buyers are paying for supplies originating outside the Black Sea. Ukrainian freight rates have also risen from $42 to $54 per tonne within weeks, while war-risk insurance for Black Sea shipments has climbed to roughly 2% of a vessel’s value. Russian cargoes now cost as much as $10,000 more per day to insure and charter than comparable shipments from nearby Bulgarian or Romanian ports.

The result is a more expensive and fragmented global grain market. Alternative exporters can replace some of the lost volume and benefit from higher revenues, but they cannot provide a genuinely cheap substitute. Additional freight, insurance and delivery risks are incorporated into the landed cost long before the grain reaches the futures market, meaning that diversification away from the Black Sea itself carries an inflationary price. This is particularly significant for the same import-dependent countries already facing weaker harvests and higher energy costs. New suppliers may prevent a deeper shortage, but they cannot eliminate the price shock. The emerging food crisis is therefore not simply a question of whether there will be enough grain; it is increasingly a question of who can afford the grain that remains available.

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