Fragmented by Design Israel’s October 2026 Election and the Politics of Coalition

The Memorandum of Understanding did not constitute a comprehensive or definitive settlement of the nuclear issue. Rather, it served as a temporary truce to freeze military strikes and maritime and nuclear threats, buying time to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that would address the enrichment crisis at its roots. These developments come in the wake of the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement following the United States' withdrawal in 2018, which gave Tehran considerable room to expand uranium enrichment, restrict international inspections and accumulate large quantities of uranium enriched to levels approaching those required for the production of a nuclear weapon.   Against this backdrop, the nuclear programme stands out as the Iranian leadership's principal bargaining chip. Although Tehran does not currently possess a nuclear weapon, it has accumulated the technical expertise, established the necessary infrastructure and secured the enriched uranium needed to produce one within a relatively short period should the political decision be taken to do so. This reality underscores that Iran's leverage at the negotiating table is no longer merely theoretical. It is tangible leverage, rooted in Tehran's ability to move rapidly towards weaponisation.   On the operational front, despite US and Israeli strikes targeting nuclear facilities inside Iran, assessments have confirmed only limited damage. Tehran is still strongly believed to retain substantial capacity to continue uranium enrichment. However, experts remain divided over the true extent to which the attacks have set back its nuclear programme. These assessments indicate that military action alone has failed to resolve the nuclear issue, naturally increasing the likelihood of an eventual resumption of negotiations and a return to the diplomatic track.   Against this complex backdrop, a fundamental question remains: will the terms governing the nuclear issue be revised in any future memorandum, or will they remain unchanged from those set out in the "Islamabad Memorandum"? If the parties move towards introducing new amendments, how far can each side go in making concessions to negotiate an end to this chapter?

Negotiations between Washington and Tehran are entering an increasingly complex strategic juncture, with most of the 60-day timeframe established under the "Islamabad Truce" having elapsed without a decisive agreement. This has been accompanied by renewed hostilities and the Strait of Hormuz once again closing to international shipping.   These developments on the ground coincide with intensive international diplomatic efforts to contain the repercussions of an open military conflict that has clearly weighed on regional and global economic growth.   At the heart of this negotiating landscape is the conspicuous absence of the regional proxy issue from both the draft preliminary agreement and the current talks. Rather than signalling that the issue has been sidelined, this absence raises fundamental questions about the future of the complex network that has for decades formed a central pillar of Iran's deterrence doctrine.   Current political dynamics suggest the proxy issue is no longer a secondary matter that can be deferred or ignored. Instead, it has become a structural fault line that cuts across each side's conception of security and stability, as well as the limits of any viable settlement.   Its exclusion from the initial formulations reflects a clear recognition of how difficult it would be to incorporate the issue without directly confronting red lines at the intersection of Iran's deterrence doctrine, the US vision of regional security, and Israel's efforts to translate military pressure into irreversible negotiating gains.   The dilemma takes on even greater significance in light of recent macroeconomic analyses indicating that the costs of proxy involvement have extended well beyond direct military losses, striking at the heart of the global economy. Proxy-related operations along critical maritime corridors, particularly in the Red Sea, have severely disrupted supply chains and inflicted tens of billions of dollars in losses on international trade through unprecedented surges in shipping and insurance costs. They have also created unconventional threats to the security of digital infrastructure, most notably subsea fibre-optic cable networks.   Security experts emphasise that the structural attrition the Axis of Resistance suffered during the intense confrontations of 2024 and 2025 prompted Tehran's leadership to reassess its tactics and instruments, but not to abandon them.   The crisis stems from a fundamental divergence in the actors' perspectives. Iran regards its network of proxies as a forward line of defence and an integral component of its national security, integrating these groups with its missile and drone capabilities. Washington and Tel Aviv, backed by regional powers, by contrast, view dismantling and disarming these groups as a mandatory precondition for any new regional security architecture.   This reality places the proxy issue at a critical intersection between three complex levels: Iran's pursuit of strategic depth for its defence; US efforts to neutralise sources of asymmetric threat; and regional and international concerns that link market stability and freedom of navigation to ending the activities of these groups around maritime chokepoints and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Any settlement that fails to define the place and functions of these proxies would therefore amount to little more than a fragile truce vulnerable to rapid erosion.   This section examines the divergent perspectives of the key actors on the regional proxy crisis. It assesses how these competing positions may clash or converge behind closed doors at the negotiating table. The paper asks a central question: will these discussions translate into strategic trade-offs that underpin a comprehensive and sustainable settlement, or will divergence between the parties' red lines reduce the anticipated agreement to little more than a temporary tactical freeze before an even more violent round of conflict?   This issue was written on August 2, 2026

The Al Habtoor Research Centre (AHRC) presents a groundbreaking, equation-based assessment analysing the direct and indirect social and economic resource costs of the 110-day conflict that began on February 28, 2026. Utilising an advanced conflict economics framework—including the Stiglitz-Bilmes convention and counterfactual synthetic controls—this research delivers an unprecedented, exclusive analysis of the financial burdens borne by the belligerents and the wider global economy. The headline finding is one of profound asymmetry, proving that recovery capacity, rather than the size of the initial kinetic blow, dictates the medium-term cost of modern warfare. The largest financial burden fell on the global economy, specifically non-belligerent, bystander oil-importing nations, totalling an estimated $1.41 trillion by 2030. Triggered by the 110-day closure of the Strait of Hormuz, this true burden lies in unproduced global output rather than the temporary oil-price spike, which ultimately nets to zero globally. Among the combatants, Iran absorbed an existential, structural blow equivalent to roughly 81% of its pre-war output, costing $305 billion by 2030, or $720 billion on a purchasing-power parity (PPP) basis. Locked out of international capital markets, its output gap fails to close by the end of the decade, triggering a step down to a permanently lower economic path. In contrast, the United States faces a heavily back-loaded bill ranging from $200 billion to $1.1 trillion by 2030. While structurally insulated from the immediate oil shock due to its net energy exporter status, this massive range in projections depends on whether standard cash-budgeting or full multi-decade liabilities—such as veteran care, war-debt interest, and budget ratchets—are present-valued. Meanwhile, Israel sustained a sharp but recoverable macroeconomic shock of $135 billion by 2030, equal to roughly a quarter of a single year's GDP. Advanced air defense mitigated physical destruction, concentrating the cost instead on reserve mobilisation, interception economics, and a transient output gap. Ultimately, this exclusive analysis details how the poorest bystander nations subsidised the conflict's macro cost, marking the 2026 war as one of the most economically disruptive events of the century.

The Middle East has undergone profound shifts in its security and geopolitical landscape following the major events that began on 7 October 2023 and continued to unfold through 2026. At the heart of these shifts lies a fundamental transformation in Israeli military doctrine. For many years, Israel relied on rapid pre-emptive strikes and advanced technologies to sustain remote defence without requiring permanent control over new territory. However, the unprecedented breaches of its borders have fundamentally altered this strategy. Israel has now moved towards direct physical control over parts of Arab territory and has begun constructing a broad, contiguous belt of buffer zones extending from the Gaza Strip in the south and southern Lebanon in the north to the Syrian Golan Heights.   Historically, buffer zones were understood as demilitarised and relatively calm spaces designed to separate conflicting parties and prevent direct friction. Israel, however, has fundamentally redefined this concept, transforming such zones into instruments of absolute security control. Through this approach, it seeks to create fortified military spaces that provide strategic depth, eliminate cross-border threats and tunnels, and push the battlefield entirely away from its cities and population centres.   Despite the clarity of these objectives, this approach places Israeli military planners in a genuine dilemma. The permanent deployment of large infantry and armoured forces within hostile and volatile areas threatens to turn these belts—intended to serve as secure zones—into arenas of sustained and costly military attrition. Against this backdrop, this analysis raises a central and fundamental question: do these border strips constitute a genuine security buffer capable of ensuring Israel’s long-term survival and security, or have they already become a trap that steadily drains its capabilities day after day?

The Israeli political system has undergone profound structural shifts following the launch of Operation Roaring Lion between Israel and Iran in late February 2026. This conflict marks a transition from traditional deterrence policies and proxy warfare to a doctrine of comprehensive confrontation and pre-emptive strikes targeting nuclear and military infrastructure deep inside Iran. These military developments have coincided with the approaching constitutional deadline for the twenty-sixth Knesset elections, due no later than October 2026, amid a politically fragile environment for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his governing coalition. The confrontation has unfolded at a time when the executive leadership is experiencing a decline in political support, shaped by the continuing repercussions of intelligence and security failures linked to the events of 7 October 2023.   These challenges are compounded by declining domestic economic indicators, sharp societal divisions over legislation mandating military conscription for ultra-Orthodox Jews, and the ongoing trajectory of judicial proceedings. In this context, analytical evidence suggests that the executive leadership is seeking to leverage the state of national emergency to consolidate cohesion within its right-wing electoral base and to affirm the centrality of the current leadership in managing security threats within a complex parliamentary system. The intersection of protracted military conflicts with democratic electoral cycles imposes complex structural pressures on voting behaviour and the prospects of incumbent leadership. The demands of national mobilisation increasingly intersect with deeply rooted crises of institutional trust in the public consciousness. This analysis examines electoral calculations before and after the outbreak of the confrontation, reviews historical precedents in which extended wars have shaped successive Israeli governments, and analyses the strategic and personal drivers of decision-making, culminating in an assessment of potential trajectories for the reconfiguration of the electoral landscape ahead of the 2026 vote.

The military operations that unfolded over twelve days in June 2025 between Iran and Israel marked a sharp breakpoint in the trajectory of regional military balance. The confrontation resulted in a substantial erosion of Tehran’s military infrastructure and inflicted significant material losses. The depth of this operational failure was most evident in the near-total collapse of Iran’s integrated air-defence system, with confirmed intelligence assessments indicating that Israel succeeded in neutralising more than 80 surface-to-air missile batteries and destroying over 120 launch platforms. This effectively stripped Iranian airspace of its protective shield and imposed a state of absolute Israeli air superiority.   Amid this collapse, Tehran effectively lost its entire arsenal of the Russian-made S-300PMU2 (“S-300 PMU-2”) systems, which it had acquired in 2016 after protracted negotiations and at considerable financial cost. These systems were systematically destroyed between 2024 and 2025. Iran’s domestic air-defence industries, represented by the Bavar-373 and Khordad-15 systems, also demonstrated clear operational inadequacy when tested in a real combat environment.   This exposed a wide technological gap between Israel’s offensive capabilities and Iran’s defensive assets. The Iranian air-defence network failed to record the downing of a single manned Israeli fighter jet, and Iran’s ageing air force, reliant on pre-revolution legacy aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat, the Phantom, and the Tiger, supplemented by 1990s-era MiG-29s, stood incapable of competing or deterring effectively.   This total inability to contest the battlespace not only underscored tactical failure but delivered a decisive blow to the strategic assumptions underpinning Iran’s defence doctrine for decades, particularly its reliance on “asymmetric missile deterrence” and hybrid layered-defence networks.   Confronted with a reality in which its missile capabilities were neutralised and its aerial shield dismantled, the Iranian leadership was compelled to adopt a “post-war reset” strategy, launching an urgent acquisition campaign aimed at closing the technological gap by turning eastward towards Russia and China to rebuild its lost deterrence.   The fundamental question that will shape the next phase in the Middle East remains: Can this “hybrid deterrence”, comprising domestic missiles alongside imported, only partially integrated weapon systems, endure against an adversary that has already demonstrated both the willingness and the capability to deliver devastating strikes deep inside Iran?