Israel

In recent years, European perceptions of Israel have undergone a noticeable shift, driven primarily by the war on Gaza following the events of 7 October 2023. What began as growing unease has gradually translated into a marked decline in public favourability across Europe, with many viewing Israel’s military response as disproportionately severe. This transformation in public sentiment, however, has not been immediately mirrored at the political level. European leaders have largely maintained a cautious and diplomatic posture, continuing to balance expressions of concern with longstanding commitments to “Israel’s right to self-defence”. That stance has begun to erode more recently. The regional escalation involving Iran has introduced direct economic and strategic pressures on Europe, prompting a more assertive, albeit still measured, response from policymakers. At the same time, political changes within Europe, including the emergence of leaders less firmly aligned with Israel, such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Péter Magyar, signal a gradual recalibration rather than a sudden rupture in policy.   This evolving landscape became particularly visible in late April 2026, when discussions emerged within the European Union around suspending the EU–Israel Association Agreement. Although the proposal did not advance, with key member states such as Germany and Italy blocking consensus, it nonetheless highlighted the extent to which previously unthinkable measures are now part of the policy debate. While the suspension of the agreement would carry significant economic consequences for Israel, its implementation remains constrained by the European Union’s (EU) internal political dynamics. Yet the inability to pursue this option does not imply a lack of leverage. The European Union retains a range of alternative instruments that can be deployed to exert pressure on Israel.

The Israeli political system has undergone profound structural shifts following the launch of Operation Roaring Lion between Israel and Iran in late February 2026. This conflict marks a transition from traditional deterrence policies and proxy warfare to a doctrine of comprehensive confrontation and pre-emptive strikes targeting nuclear and military infrastructure deep inside Iran. These military developments have coincided with the approaching constitutional deadline for the twenty-sixth Knesset elections, due no later than October 2026, amid a politically fragile environment for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his governing coalition. The confrontation has unfolded at a time when the executive leadership is experiencing a decline in political support, shaped by the continuing repercussions of intelligence and security failures linked to the events of 7 October 2023.   These challenges are compounded by declining domestic economic indicators, sharp societal divisions over legislation mandating military conscription for ultra-Orthodox Jews, and the ongoing trajectory of judicial proceedings. In this context, analytical evidence suggests that the executive leadership is seeking to leverage the state of national emergency to consolidate cohesion within its right-wing electoral base and to affirm the centrality of the current leadership in managing security threats within a complex parliamentary system. The intersection of protracted military conflicts with democratic electoral cycles imposes complex structural pressures on voting behaviour and the prospects of incumbent leadership. The demands of national mobilisation increasingly intersect with deeply rooted crises of institutional trust in the public consciousness. This analysis examines electoral calculations before and after the outbreak of the confrontation, reviews historical precedents in which extended wars have shaped successive Israeli governments, and analyses the strategic and personal drivers of decision-making, culminating in an assessment of potential trajectories for the reconfiguration of the electoral landscape ahead of the 2026 vote.

A defence economy comprises the fiscal, industrial, and budgetary systems through which a state finances, maintains, and adjusts its military capacity. During peacetime, these systems tend to remain stable; in wartime, they become the main mechanism through which conflict transforms a nation’s economic structure. The escalation of Israeli military operations since October 2023 and the broader confrontation with Iran and its regional proxies have caused a defence-economy shift, leading to significant realignments in how the conflicting sides allocate public resources, incur debt, and prioritise expenditure.   This analysis examines how sustained military escalation has reshaped the defence economies of its three key actors: Israel, Iran and the United States. It assesses both short-term fiscal responses and longer-term budget trajectories, arguing that the conflict has not produced a temporary spending spike but a structural transformation, one that has widened deficits, crowded out civilian services, mobilised domestic defence industries, accelerated sovereign credit deterioration, and embedded elevated military spending into national budgets in ways that will persist well beyond any ceasefire. Across the Middle East, the boundaries between battlefield expenditure and national economic health have become increasingly difficult to separate.

Israel’s nuclear arsenal is one of the “worst-kept secrets” in the MENA region due to the strategic ambiguity regarding its existence. Currently, Israel is not a signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and is allegedly the only state in the MENA region to possess nuclear warheads. It is estimated that Israel currently in possession of approximately 80 nuclear warheads that can be deployed through ballistic missiles or by aircraft. While this nuclear program is shrouded in ambiguity, there is a genuine fear that Israel can reveal the full extent of its nuclear capabilities in the form of the Samson Option, which can bare consequences for the nuclear taboo as well as adverse psychological effects for the MENA region and the world.

The landscape of modern air warfare has undergone a profound and structural transformation over the past decade. Air superiority is no longer the exclusive domain of those possessing the most expensive and technologically advanced platforms; rather, it has become accessible to actors capable of effectively leveraging scale and repetition against sophistication and complexity. This new equation has been clearly manifested in the widespread deployment of one-way attack drones, particularly the Iranian “Shahed” series, which has significantly altered established strategic calculations. In their early iterations, these drones operated on relatively simple logic: they were pre-programmed with target coordinates and then launched to navigate their trajectories using conventional satellite navigation systems such as the American GPS and its Russian counterpart, GLONASS. However, this reliance on such systems simultaneously made them the most exploitable vulnerability, as defenders rapidly developed electronic warfare capabilities, including jamming and spoofing tools, to disrupt their guidance and neutralise their missions.   However, this reality did not endure for long. As the intensity of conflicts involving these systems escalated, Iranian drones transitioned into a fundamentally different phase with the integration of communication modules operating via the commercial satellite network Iridium. This was not merely a technical upgrade but a calculated and direct response to GPS vulnerabilities, reflecting a strategic exploitation of civilian infrastructure for military purposes. While GPS satellites struggle to withstand ground-based jamming due to the weakness of their signals transmitted from altitudes exceeding 20,000 kilometres, Iridium satellites operate in low Earth orbit at altitudes of no more than 800 kilometres, emitting signals up to a thousand times stronger. These signals are further protected by layers of encryption that make spoofing or manipulation extremely difficult.   Shahed drones have thus evolved from inert projectiles following a fixed, unalterable path into connected platforms linked to their operators in real time, capable of receiving updates, changing course, sharing data with other airborne units, and even conducting precise strikes against moving targets such as ships at sea. This report therefore offers an in-depth technical and strategic examination of this transformation and its battlefield implications, beginning with the structure and operating logic of the Iridium network, moving through an analysis of the Shahed-131 platform and the integration of these communications into it, and culminating in an assessment of the operational impact this has had on some of the world’s most complex and densely layered air defence systems, namely Israel’s multi-layered architecture, which faced its most severe tests between 2024 and 2026.

This Pulse survey, conducted in March 2026, explores perceptions of the ongoing war and its potential trajectories, focusing on expectations around its duration, outcomes, and broader regional and global implications. The findings reveal a high degree of uncertainty, with no clear consensus on how or when the conflict will end, reflecting the complexity and fluidity of the situation.

The United States–Israel–Iran war, which began with a set of vaguely defined objectives including regime change in Iran and the dismantling of its missile and nuclear capabilities, now appears to be shifting toward a different set of priorities. Iran has managed to internationalise the conflict in a way that has redirected attention toward containing the scale of global economic disruption. Put simply, the focus is increasingly on securing the flow of oil amid what is being described as one of the most severe energy crises in modern history. Much of the world’s attention has centred on the Strait of Hormuz, and rightly so. This vital shipping lane accounts for roughly 20% of global liquid petroleum consumption, as well as a significant share of global liquefied natural gas trade (LNG). However, with the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthis now entering the conflict, the risks facing regional oil exports and maritime routes have intensified further. As the de facto controllers of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Houthis are in a position to disrupt shipping through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.   This raises several critical questions. Why have the Houthis chosen this moment to enter the war? Under what conditions might they escalate their involvement? And what would be the consequences of a closure of the strait?

Economic and geopolitical relations between China and Israel have undergone significant changes following the War on Gaza. Chinese regulatory authorities moved to classify certain areas within Israel under what is known as the Red Category, an official administrative designation that identifies these locations as high-risk investment zones. This classification imposes legal restrictions that prevent the injection of new financial investments into these areas.   As a result, a legal environment has emerged in which Chinese companies rely on security warning protocols and personnel safety considerations as a formal justification for controlling capital flows and suspending the implementation of certain financial obligations under previously signed contracts. This development necessitates a careful examination to understand how these risk assessment mechanisms operate and their tangible impact on the economic relationship between the two countries.

The strategic partnership between the United States (U.S.) and Israel has long demonstrated an exceptional ability to absorb and manage tactical divergences. Yet the developments accompanying the launch of the U.S. operation "Epic Fury," conducted in parallel with Israel’s "Visiting Lion" operation in late February 2026, have placed this alliance under an unprecedented test in the modern Middle East. Although this coordinated campaign initially achieved decisive operational successes, most notably the elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader and the dismantling of the command structure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the image of complete alignment projected by President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conceals fundamental divergences in visions and objectives.   A careful reading of the historical trajectory of this relationship, alongside its current political constraints, suggests that a prolonged conflict will expose the sharp divergence in the strategic interests of the two capitals. As the confrontation shifts from rapid strikes to a complex regional war of attrition whose consequences extend beyond Washington and Tel Aviv, these differences are likely to evolve into deep structural fractures. This paper offers a strategic analysis of this emerging dynamic, arguing that the fundamental differences in the capacity to absorb economic repercussions, manage human losses, and navigate rigid electoral timelines will transform muted tactical disagreements into an overt strategic rift that will be increasingly difficult to contain or deny.

The United States and Israel's joint military campaign against Iran is upending the strategic order of the Middle East in ways that extend far beyond Tehran. The strikes have killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, targeted Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure, and triggered retaliatory Iranian attacks across the region. As the war enters its second week, a second and potentially more consequential shift is taking shape. With Iran's role as the dominant pole of regional opposition to Israel now in question, a new rivalry is hardening between Israel and Turkey, one that carries different stakes, different risks, and a far more unpredictable trajectory than the confrontation the current war was designed to resolve. Understanding this emerging fault line requires examining both the structural forces pushing the two states apart and the domestic political dynamics that risk turning competitive rhetoric into irreversible confrontation.

The United States entered the second week of its joint military campaign against Iran on March 7, 2026, having launched Operation Epic Fury alongside Israel on February 28. Within days, the conflict had killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, triggered Iranian retaliatory strikes across the Gulf, and drawn in regional powers from Bahrain to Lebanon. For the Republican Party, the war arrived at what was already an exceptionally precarious moment — one in which the historical forces of midterm politics, falling presidential approval, and a restless voter coalition had already conspired against them. The onset of a major, unpopular war has only deepened those vulnerabilities, and the question facing the GOP heading into November is no longer simply whether they will lose seats, but how many.

The U.S.-Israel and Iran War has affected the interests of many countries. In the last few days, China emerged as a significant player in these events. Beijing called for an immediate halt to the attacks by both sides and the protection of vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, culminating with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledging to send a special envoy to the Middle East for mediation.   Beijing has interconnected interests in the Middle East that are significantly affected by the war and will most likely reshape its strategic opportunities in the region, particularly in terms of energy security, trade routes, and diplomatic relations with key regional players. Beijing’s pragmatic foreign policy approach toward the region relies on protecting its economic interests and maintaining a strategic balance. So, the war could provide an opportunity for China to navigate new opportunities in the region and, consequently, expand its influence, particularly by strengthening ties with other oil-producing nations and increasing its investments in reconstruction efforts.   Likewise, China’s strategic partnership with Iran mainly revolves around oil supply and large-scale investments. The consequences of the war raise questions about the future of this relationship and the possibility that China may reshape its foreign policy toward Tehran if it faces a potential decline in Iran’s ability to sustain such interests as a result of the strain on its power after the war.