Truce and Tactic: The Political Calculus of Ceasefires

In George Orwell's classic 1984, his world was held together by unending war: In the book, messages of hate and reasons to fear were broadcast each day to encourage fearful, slavish masses to rail against an imaginary enemy rather than their actual masters.   US and British geo-strategists have historically been masters of manipulation, redrawing the map of the world to suit Western economic, geopolitical, and military interests, particularly in the MENA region. Their detractors are convinced that their broad goal is Western domination of the area via surrogates and partners such as Israel and Iran (via the back door) to retain control over natural resources and waterways while ensuring those resources do not fall into the hands of competitors such as China and Russia. A school of thought contends that they manufacture sectarian conflicts on the principle of “divide and rule,” creating tensions that justify the installation of military bases and fuel the military-industrial complex through arms sales.   A 2008 paper titled America’s Divide and Rule Strategies in the Middle East by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya highlights US efforts to create divisions within Middle Eastern and Central Asian populations through ethno-cultural, religious, sectarian, national, and political differences. According to this perspective, sectarian divides—particularly between Sunni and Shia Muslims—have been deliberately cultivated to weaken regional unity and facilitate geopolitical control.   The Iraq War (2003) and its aftermath further exacerbated these sectarian tensions. The dismantling of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated Ba'athist regime and the empowerment of Shia and Kurdish groups created a power vacuum, fueling sectarian violence. Groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq (later ISIS) thrived under these conditions, exploiting sectarian grievances. The redrawing of Iraq’s internal boundaries, particularly the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government, further solidified ethnic divisions. Toby Dodge, in Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a Road to Peace, argues that the US approach to state-building in Iraq inadvertently deepened these fault lines.   Similarly, US involvement in the Syrian Civil War (2011–2024), through support for various opposition groups, contributed to the country’s fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines. The conflict saw the rise of numerous factions, many of which received US backing. The emergence and territorial control of Kurdish-dominated forces in northeastern Syria, supported by the US in the fight against ISIS, created tensions with Arab populations and neighboring Turkey. The conflict has been widely analyzed as having a significant sectarian dimension, with regional powers backing different factions along Sunni-Shia lines.   Middle East expert and author Fred Reed states: “One might be forgiven for surmising that the current thrust of US policy in the Middle East and through the Muslim world is to exacerbate Sunni-Shiite divisions.”   US foreign policy in the region has often been perceived as favoring certain regional powers over others, sometimes along sectarian lines, exacerbating existing tensions. The complex relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia (a Sunni-majority state) and its rivalry with Iran (a Shia-majority state) has frequently been interpreted through this lens, even if US interests are primarily geopolitical. Support for different factions in conflicts like the Yemeni Civil War has similarly been framed within the context of regional sectarian rivalries.   Certain think tanks and policy circles in the US have promoted ideas that emphasize sectarian and ethnic divisions in the Middle East as a way to understand and potentially manage the region. Foreign Policy in Focus columnist Conn Hallinan argues that a major US concern in the Middle East is oil. With two-thirds of US oil expected to be imported by 2020, and 65% of the world's remaining oil reserves located in the Middle East, he suggests that a strategy of “divide and conquer” is aimed at keeping strategic control of these resources. Hallinan also highlights the lucrative nature of ongoing Middle Eastern tensions for the US arms industry, citing that countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman have spent over $150 billion on arms purchases.   While the significance of oil in US foreign policy has arguably shifted due to increased domestic production and diversification of energy sources, the Middle East remains strategically important for global energy security. A 2024 report from the Council for a Secure America notes that US oil imports from the Middle East have reached a record low, falling below 11% of total imports. However, this shift does not negate the region’s role in global energy markets.   The US continues to maintain strong relationships with key Gulf oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While policy priorities have expanded beyond securing oil supplies to include counterterrorism, regional stability, and containing rival powers, access to stable energy markets remains a key consideration. Events like the war in Ukraine have further underscored the interconnectedness of global energy markets and the importance of stable Middle Eastern oil production in preventing global price shocks. In fiscal year 2024, US military sales surged, with direct commercial sales rising to $200.8 billion from $157.5 billion in 2023. Government-facilitated arms sales also increased to $117.9 billion. The Middle East remains a significant market for US arms exports, with over $5.5 billion in approved arms sales to Egypt and Morocco alone in December 2024.   The underlying argument of this paper is that beyond the apparent hostilities and rivalries in the region, there exists a covert strategic alliance between Iran, Israel, and the United States. This cooperation manifests in various ways, including indirect coordination in conflict zones, intelligence-sharing, and economic transactions that defy public rhetoric. Despite Iran’s portrayal as a staunch adversary of both the US and Israel, instances of tacit collaboration—such as Iranian oil exports finding their way to markets through indirect channels, US tolerance of Iranian-backed militias in specific contexts, and shared interests in counterbalancing regional actors like Turkey and the Gulf states—suggest a more complex dynamic. This hidden alliance reflects a pragmatic approach to maintaining regional equilibrium, securing strategic interests, and preventing the emergence of truly independent powers that could challenge the existing order.

The Gaza Strip, tragically marked by recurring cycles of conflict and destruction, faces a complex and deeply entrenched crisis that extends far beyond the visible damage to its buildings and infrastructure. The repeated devastation has crippled its economy, fractured its social fabric, and left its population in a state of perpetual vulnerability, demanding a comprehensive and transformative approach to recovery. Traditional reconstruction efforts, while necessary, have often fallen short by primarily focusing on the immediate task of rebuilding damaged structures. These efforts, though well-intentioned, have frequently failed to address the fundamental underlying economic and governance challenges that perpetuate instability and hinder long-term progress. This report, therefore, proposes a fundamentally different approach: a three-pillar framework that integrates immediate humanitarian relief with long-term strategies for economic sustainability and the establishment of durable peace. This holistic approach recognizes that true recovery requires not only rebuilding physical infrastructure but also fostering economic opportunity, strengthening governance, and promoting social cohesion, ultimately breaking the cycle of conflict and paving the way for a more stable and prosperous future for the people of Gaza. This three-pillar approach addresses the problem from a broader perspective.

In a significant escalatory move, Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, has notified the UN Secretary-General in writing that UNRWA must cease its operations and vacate its premises by January 30, 2025. This ultimatum follows Israel’s enactment of a law last October banning the agency’s activities within its territory, including occupied East Jerusalem. The decision is rooted in Israel’s allegations that UNRWA has been infiltrated by Hamas, with claims that some of its employees were involved in the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks.   This paper examines the evolving and contentious relationship between Israel and UNRWA. It also explores potential U.S. intentions to dismantle the agency, particularly in light of Donald Trump’s return to power and his recent remarks regarding the displacement of Gaza’s population and the repercussions of this ban.

Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian Civil War has significantly bolstered its military capabilities and strategic positioning against Israel. The war served as an invaluable training ground, providing Hezbollah fighters with extensive combat experience and allowing them to test and refine their tactics in real-world scenarios. This experience proved crucial in enhancing their proficiency in asymmetric warfare, a critical aspect of their confrontations with the technologically superior Israeli military.   Furthermore, the Syrian conflict solidified Hezbollah's alliance with Iran, which provided vital military support and resources. This included advanced weaponry, training, and logistical assistance, significantly enhancing Hezbollah's operational readiness.  Iran's backing also enabled Hezbollah to establish a stronger presence in the region, providing strategic depth and allowing it to operate more effectively against Israel while countering Israeli influence in Lebanon and the broader Levant.   The war also forced Hezbollah to adapt and evolve its military doctrine.  The group adopted more sophisticated tactics, incorporating urban warfare strategies and integrating advanced technologies like drones and precision-guided munitions. These innovations, born out of necessity on the Syrian battlefield, have better equipped Hezbollah to counter Israel's military advantages.  Moreover, the prolonged conflict forced Hezbollah to develop sophisticated logistical and operational planning capabilities, including a robust supply chain that can withstand Israeli disruptions.   On the other hand, this intervention led to the exposure of the party and made it vulnerable to infiltration, which caused the party to lose its hard power against Israel and its soft power within Lebanon.

The world has been on edge since July 31,2024, awaiting Iran’s response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, in Tehran by an Israeli attack. Haniyeh was targeted while attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Masoud Pezekshian, marking a direct challenge to Iranian sovereignty and its role as a regional leader of resistance movements. This event underscores the broader confrontation between Iran, which opposes what it perceives as the United States and Israeli dominance in the region. Given the assassination's symbolic and strategic significance, many see Iran’s retaliation as inevitable, particularly amid escalations between Israel and Iran. Notably, this incident is part of a broader series of high-profile killings targeting figures within the so-called resistance axis. Just hours before the explosion in Tehran, Israel launched a missile strike in Beirut's southern suburbs, killing Fouad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military official, while also claiming—without confirmation—the assassination of Mohammed Deif, a leading Hamas military commander.   While consensus exists regarding the certainty of an Iranian response, there is sharp debate within political and military circles over the nature of this retaliation. The targeted nature of the Israeli strikes suggests that a direct and immediate Iranian response may be needed to restore its deterrent credibility. However, Iran’s extensive network of regional proxies presents an alternative, allowing Tehran to retaliate indirectly while avoiding the military and economic costs of direct confrontation. This calculation has become more critical following the U.S.’s declaration that it would militarily defend Israel against any Iranian attack, reaffirming its earlier stance on Iranian missile strikes against Israel in April.   Predicting the nature of Iran’s response can be facilitated by examining the pattern of its previous reactions to similar attacks, particularly given Iran’s long history of confrontations following the 1979 revolution and its enduring hostility toward the U.S. Among these conflicts, the one most analogous to the current situation is the so-called Tanker War, which took place between Iran and Iraq from 1984 to 1988. Iran successfully drew the U.S. into a large-scale military engagement in the Arabian Gulf during this period. This scenario holds significant parallels to today’s tensions, as will be detailed later.   This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the similarities and differences between Iran’s current posture and its stance during the Tanker War from multiple perspectives—military, political, and economic—both internally externally. By comparing the dynamics at play, including the role of the U.S. in both scenarios, this analysis seeks to clarify what can be expected from Iran in light of these combined variables.

A recent statement from the European Union Foreign Policy Commissioner, Josep Borrell, urging Israel's allies, notably Washington, to cease supplying weapons to Israel has ignited widespread controversy. This call comes amid heightened concerns over the significant civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip. Coinciding with this plea, a Dutch appeals court decision has prohibited the export of all spare parts for F-35 fighter jets destined for Israel. These developments unfold against the backdrop of Israel's plans to initiate an expanded military operation in Rafah. Such an operation raises the spectre of a potential humanitarian catastrophe, particularly concerning the over 1.3 million displaced individuals from the Gaza Strip who have sought refuge in Rafah since the commencement of military activities in the enclave.   The United States provides Israel with annual military aid worth $3.8 billion, which stands as one of the most substantial military aid packages supplied by the U.S. to any country globally. This commitment was reaffirmed by U.S. officials, including President Joseph Biden, who, during his tenure as Vice President under Barack Obama, emphasised the enduring strategic alliance between the two countries. Then Vice President Biden said the U.S. commitment to Israel transcends moral obligations and is a deeply rooted strategic obligation. During a visit to Tel Aviv amid the events of Oct. 7, he underscored that “the existence of an independent and secure Israel within globally recognised borders aligns with the practical strategic interests of the United States.” He further emphasised, “I have long said: If Israel didn't exist, we would have to invent it.” Evidence of the depth of relations and continued support is further demonstrated by Congress' approval of an additional $14.1 billion in military aid to Israel. This aid is intended to bolster Israel's capabilities in its conflict with the Hamas movement, specifically by providing air and missile defence support and replenishing U.S. military stock granted to Israel. This level of support echoes the assistance provided by the United States to Israel during the October 1973 War with the Egyptian Army.   The generous and unconditional support provided by the U.S. to Israel prompts numerous inquiries, particularly in the context of the U.S.'s inability to exert pressure on Israel to stop its war on Gaza. Additionally, its loss of control over the right-wing government's decision-making process regarding the potential expansion of the war to include Rafah, portending an imminent conflict with Egypt. Hence, this analysis endeavours to address a pivotal question: Will these developments prompt a shift in the U.S. stance toward Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing government, potentially leading to a withdrawal from the notion of an expanded operation in Rafah? Furthermore, can the United States feasibly cease its military aid to this strategic ally in the Middle East?

At this pivotal juncture, the MENA region stands at a critical crossroads. The region is experiencing a decisive moment that will shape the future dynamics of inter-country relations and regional security, which has faced significant threats in recent years. This publication, prepared by a team of experienced researchers at the renowned Al Habtoor Research Centre, endeavours to forecast the Middle East's impending challenges. It aims to delineate the region's comprehensive political, economic, and security landscape over the past years.   Through a series of incisive analyses, we address the geo-economic challenges and their profound impact on the future of the Middle East and North Africa. These analyses are situated within the context of the sweeping transformations occurring in the global system, a system characterised by economic conflicts that both influence and are influenced by ongoing security and military escalations. These conflicts have altered the global power map and are anticipated to significantly reshape the current world order, making our research all the more pertinent.   Moreover, we examine the risks engendered by the prevailing state of uncertainty, which threatens nations' economic prospects and disrupts critical and vital trade corridors and routes such as the Suez Canal, Bab El Mandab, and the Strait of Hormuz. These corridors are indispensable to global energy security and international trade. The manifestation of these threats is evident in the tensions and conflicts we have observed in the Red Sea, which have heightened fears of potential disruptions escalating into broader military confrontations.   The publication further delves into the new frontiers of warfare, particularly the transformations imposed by cyberspace on the nature and strategies of conflicts. These changes have redefined armament and deterrence methods, yet the region remains significantly unprepared for these evolving threats. At a time when the Middle East is increasingly becoming an attractive target for cyber-attacks and unconventional warfare, there is an urgent and pressing need to enhance preparedness for such confrontations.   In the region’s prevailing instability and escalating political and security tensions, which have precipitated severe humanitarian crises, the migration challenge has surfaced as a critical determinant of the region’s future. Prominent among these tensions are the civil war in Sudan, the ongoing instability in Lebanon, and the conflict in Gaza. Additionally, the continuous deterioration of internal situations in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen has posed significant challenges for neighbouring countries. These conflicts have profoundly affected migration dynamics in the region, resulting in substantial security and political ramifications that are expected to unfold in the coming period. The migration issues also present vulnerabilities and potential entry points for external agendas to influence aid-receiving nations.   In this context, the region's climate change challenges also invite external actors to impose their agendas. These actors often condition their support and assistance for addressing climate change on political and security changes, thereby imposing different priorities on the region's countries and threatening its stability.   Ultimately, this publication represents the culmination of extensive brainstorming and research conducted over an extended period by our dedicated team alongside numerous experts and specialists. Our goal has been to produce a structured forecast for the future of a region mired in chaos, which inherently complicates the creation of definitive predictive models for the coming years. At Al Habtoor Research Centre, we are committed to illuminating the often-overlooked areas, especially those pertaining to anticipated crises and potential risks. This publication is part of a series of research outputs aimed at contributing to a more stable and prosperous future for a region beset by threats.

In April 2025, the Trump administration stunned global markets by announcing a sweeping tariff expansion under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), introducing a flat 10% universal tariff on all imports. This move, framed as a national economic emergency response, immediately triggered global trade uncertainty and diplomatic friction. The policy marked a significant escalation of Trump’s protectionist agenda, signalling a break with multilateralism and targeting long-standing trade imbalances with strategic rivals and allies alike. We found that the United States (U.S.) trade structure is deeply imbalanced, with persistent deficits concentrated in sectors essential to industrial production, such as machinery, electronics, and vehicles. These deficits have exposed the U.S. to retaliatory measures from key trade partners—particularly China, Canada, and the EU—who have calibrated their responses to hit politically and economically sensitive export categories. Tariffs have initiated a multi-channel inflationary shock: direct consumer price increases, rising intermediate input costs, and cascading pressures on logistics and wages. The compounded effect has resulted in a net consumer price index (CPI) increase of approximately 1.2%, with higher spikes in key durable goods. Global supply chains are beginning to reconfigure.   The automotive sector, in particular, has seen disruption in bilateral flows with traditional partners, creating openings for new logistical nodes. The UAE stands out as a beneficiary, attracting redirected FDI and becoming a strategic re-export and final assembly hub. Collectively, these findings underscore a paradox: while the policy aims to reduce dependency and correct trade imbalances, it simultaneously accelerates external retaliation, domestic cost pressures, and global fragmentation in trade infrastructure.

Populism has recently risen in different regions, including Europe and the United States, constituting a challenge to local and global politics. While this phenomenon existed in Europe before the Second World War (WII), the rise of the Soviet Union as a principal threat to Europe after WII prompted them to neglect populism’s negatives and emphasise confronting the Soviet challenge. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe began an institutionalised process of identifying new internal and external threats, attempting to keep its capabilities mobilised for confronting challenges that might suddenly arise. This process led to identifying several internal threats, such as migration, lack of skilled employment, and populism as serious threats. Moreover, European integration began a new phase with the conclusion of the Maastricht agreement in 1992, creating the EU in its current form, which prompted Europeans to identify populism as a threat that might impede European integration.