Political Studies

In March 2025, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq agreed to create a joint committee to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While this committee reflects the desire of regional countries to take lead in deterring regional security threats, it also motivates the United States to withdraw its forces from Syria, giving more space to the new formed committee to fight ISIS. Moreover, the newly formed committee could serve as an alternative to the U.S.-led international coalition that was established in September 2014 to counter ISIS and curb its spread in Syria and Iraq.   While the coalition was instrumental in weakening the group, mainly through airstrikes and by supporting Kurdish armed factions on the ground, it now appears that regional actors are stepping in to lead the next phase of counterterrorism efforts.

Hezbollah stands at a pivotal crossroads, navigating the turbulent aftermath of a devastating conflict with Israel and grappling with profound shifts in its domestic politics and the regional strategic map. The cessation of hostilities, marked by a U.S.-brokered ceasefire effective Nov. 27, 2024, brought an end to intense fighting that inflicted immense human suffering and infrastructural damage across the country. This fragile peace coincided with, and was significantly influenced by two seismic events: the sudden collapse of the al-Assad regime in Syria, severing Hezbollah’s critical land bridge to Iran, and the end of a paralyzing two-year presidential vacuum in Lebanon with the election of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Joseph Aoun, who has promised to dismantle Hezbollah’s military structure and restrict access to weapons, these promises were likely possible to make because of Hezbollah's significantly weakened state.   The 2024 conflict dealt an unprecedented blow to Hezbollah, resulting in the decapitation of its leadership, including longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah and his designated successor; the death of thousands of its fighters; the depletion of its arsenal; and the destruction of vital military infrastructure. This military degradation precipitated a tangible decline in its political influence. Regionally isolated by the fall of its Syrian ally and unable to dictate terms domestically, facing the state signaling a potential shift in Lebanon's internal power dynamics.   Faced with military exhaustion, regional isolation, domestic political setbacks, and a core narrative of "resistance" severely challenged by the reality of defeat, Hezbollah confronts an existential crisis. The organization that emerged from the 2024 conflict is fundamentally different from the one that entered it. This analysis, probes the future trajectory of Hezbollah in this drastically altered landscape to understand how Hezbollah might adapt, survive, or transform in the face of these compounding pressures, and the constraints facing the Lebanese state and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in asserting sovereignty, the divergent perspectives shaping the political discourse, and the plausible future pathways for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The strategically significant Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, southern Iran, was rocked by a massive explosion during the third round of Iranian-US talks in Oman on Saturday, April 26 2025, marking a pivotal moment that warrants in-depth analysis. Located near the Strait of Hormuz, the port serves as a critical nexus for Iran's container traffic and plays a crucial role in the country’s foreign trade, especially amid the sanctions imposed on it. Initial reports point to two primary hypotheses regarding the cause of the incident: the first suggests an accidental explosion resulting from mishandling hundreds of tons of a vital chemical substance, likely used to fuel Iran’s ballistic missile programme, reminiscent of the 2020 Beirut explosion; the second, however, raises the possibility of deliberate sabotage, potentially orchestrated by Israel with the intent to disrupt the Iranian-American diplomatic track. The timing of the explosion, coinciding with intense diplomatic efforts, adds further weight to its potential ramifications.   Regardless of the final cause, an explosion of such magnitude exposes significant vulnerabilities in Iran's security and management systems, reverberating across the entire region. It casts a shadow over diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing nuclear tensions and other unresolved issues. This commentary explores the potential post-incident scenarios, the implications of each hypothesis

The Syrian Civil War transformed Syria into a battleground for regional powers seeking to advance their strategic interests. Among these powers, Turkey and Israel have emerged as pivotal actors, each pursuing distinct objectives that often clash, exacerbating instability in Syria. While Turkey’s ambitions in Syria are driven by consolidating the authority of the new regime in Syria to dissolve and disarm Kurdish armed groups, Israel emphasises supporting the Druze in the south of Syria and the Kurdish groups in the east of Syria to limit the functionality of the new Syrian government. Israel has also other strategic interests in Syria, such as countering Iranian influence and establishing buffer zones in southern Syria to separate Syrian forces from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Caught in the crosscurrents of escalating regional and international rivalries, and witnessing an increasingly assertive Israeli presence, Southern Syria stands at a critical juncture. Ambiguity hangs heavy in the air, obscuring the long-term trajectory of a land grappling with fractured governance, demographic shifts, and the looming threat of further fragmentation. As international and regional actors jostle for influence and advantage, Israel's expansionist ambitions in the south proceed with a disconcerting sense of ease, guided by a methodical strategy and far-reaching objectives. This expansion, however, is not merely territorial; it is reshaping the very fabric of Southern Syria, impacting its social and demographic tapestry, and transforming it into a volatile arena for regional proxy conflicts. Meanwhile, the Syrian state, nominally in Damascus, grapples with deep-seated internal divisions and a diminished capacity to exert meaningful control, potentially paving the way for negative scenarios that threaten the nation's already fragile unity and sovereignty. This analysis aims to dissect these complex transformations, illuminating Israel’s calculated strategy, assessing the internal vulnerabilities of Syria, and anticipating the potential risks that lie ahead for this strategically vital, yet increasingly precarious, region.

The appointment of Major General Eyal Zamir to the helm of the Israeli Army, will take office on March 6, transcends a routine leadership transition. It portends a potential strategic recalibration in Israeli military thinking, responding to evolving threats and perceived doctrinal vulnerabilities. Lauded across Israel's political spectrum as the right leader for these turbulent times, Zamir inherits a complex and precarious landscape. He is tasked with revitalizing an army perceived as "faltering," navigating a potentially obstructive political environment, and addressing a volatile region simmering with unresolved conflicts. Adding to the weight on his shoulders is the historical baggage he carries in the eyes of Palestinians, for whom his name evokes memories of harsh measures during past uprisings and operations. This analysis delves into the implications of Zamir's appointment, the delicate dance between political leadership and military autonomy in Israel, the anticipated doctrinal shifts under his command, and the spectre of looming confrontations on multiple fronts.

Following the Arab Spring, Turkey and Iran started expanding their influence in the region, utilising the state of instability. While both countries compete over expanding influence in Syria, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, they managed to maintain strong mutual relations. The analysis examines foreign policy tools employed by both countries to maximise their benefits along with analysing the commonalities and differentiation of interests between them in the Middle East.

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri reiterated his call for a general session of Parliament on Jan. 9, 2025, to elect a new president as Lebanon’s presidential vacuum stretches into its third year. This call comes amid an ongoing crisis that began on October 31, 2022, following the end of former President General Michel Aoun's term. Aoun’s departure marked the conclusion of a previous presidential vacuum that lasted for 29 months, during which 45 attempts to reach a quorum for his election were unsuccessful. In the current vacuum, Parliament has failed to elect a president after twelve sessions, the most recent of which was held on June 14, 2024. This series of unsuccessful attempts highlights the profound complexities of Lebanon’s political process.   Recent domestic initiatives aimed at resolving the presidential vacancy and reaching a consensus on a candidate have also faltered. Meanwhile, representatives from five key countries, the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar, continue their efforts to mediate and navigate the obstacles hindering Lebanon’s political forces from agreeing on a mechanism to address the protracted vacancy crisis.   Amid persistent uncertainty surrounding the identity of Lebanon’s next president, political circles have been actively circulating the names of potential candidates. Among these, Commander of the Lebanese Army General Joseph Aoun, has emerged as a strong contender and is widely viewed as a likely consensus candidate.   The upcoming parliamentary session has ignited significant hopes that it may produce tangible results and lead to the selection of a new occupant for Baabda Palace. However, this optimism is tempered by pressing questions about whether Lebanon’s political forces can overcome their divisions, resolve the presidential vacuum, and converge on a candidate amidst the shifting political dynamics within Lebanon and across the region.

On Wednesday, Nov. 27, 2024, Syrian armed factions launched a coordinated offensive targeting regime-controlled sites and militia positions in the western countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria. This operation marks the most significant joint military action since 2016, involving key groups such as “Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham” (formerly Jabhat Al-Nusra). In a video statement, the Joint Operations Room declared the initiation of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. The announcement emphasised that the offensive was necessitated by recent regime movements threatening civilian areas, framing the operation as a defensive imperative rather than a strategic choice. The statement underscored that this action was in direct retaliation for the Syrian regime's bombardment of north-western regions, signalling a potential escalation in the conflict dynamics of the region.

Turkey has been working on developing its locally-manufactured military capabilities, including drones, for decades, attempting to present itself as a new rising regional power that can affect global politics. Turkey also recognised the importance of drones in supporting ground forces through providing air monitoring services and collecting intelligence about the Kurdistan Working Party (PKK), maximising its motivation to develop locally-made drones. Moreover, due to lack limitations on importing technology from Western powers that share contradictive perspectives with Turkey over issues of refugees, and the Syrian and Libyan Civil Wars. Ankara has paid deep attention to developing its Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which are publicly known as drones, trying to fill the void of not possessing advanced aircraft such as F-22 or F-35. This analysis explores the different reasons that motivated Turkey to develop UAVs along with the benefits and challenges the Turkish diplomacy experienced.

China is known for using its economic power to infiltrate developing countries, especially those experiencing economic shocks, through providing unconditional loans and increasing its investments in infrastructure. Moreover, China avoids the risk of investing in fragile countries or countries torn out by civil wars, as it might not be a safe environment for long-term investments. In Libya, China has maintained the same policy and avoided playing a crucial role in affecting the outcomes of the Libyan conflict. It, however, preferred to maintain a strong connection with the different local parties engaged in this conflict to preserve its interests and ensure having an economic role in the future of the country. This analysis is going to deeply explore the Chinese role in Libya along with future prospects.

As the U.S. election looms, former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris are both working to mobilise their supporters, ensuring strong voter engagement by Election Day on November 5. While both campaigns employ similar tactics, the Harris campaign has followed recent Democratic strategy by leveraging celebrity endorsements to inspire younger voters, who historically have lower turnout rates but tend to lean Democratic. This challenge with young voters, contrasts with the Trump campaign’s stronger base among White Evangelicals, who, despite not making up a majority of the population, reliably vote in large numbers across the United States (U.S.). The Harris campaign’s reliance on Hollywood celebrities highlights the industry’s alignment with liberal causes and the need to mobilise young voters, compared to the consistent support Trump receives from conservative religious groups, who form a reliable voter base. The divide between Harris’s Hollywood and Trump’s Evangelicals is another representation of another dividing line in the U.S. and raises questions.