Silent Elite Fragmentation: Trajectory of Putin’s Regime in Russia

Ukraine’s shift from a battlefield conflict to a multidimensional strategy of systematically exhausting Russian war efforts appears to be causing divisions and tensions among the elites in Moscow. This has triggered expectations of elite defections from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime and even the possibility of his removal. According to this view, the prolonged war is likely to undermine Russia’s internal stability and elite confidence, which eventually would translate to broader political restructuring and potentially a complete regime change.

However, the complex structure of the Russian regime suggests a different scenario regarding how elite dissatisfaction could influence the course of events and the relationship between elite fragmentation and regime stability. Hence, the strategic question is no longer whether Russia can survive battlefield losses but whether the Kremlin can indefinitely withstand the cumulative pressures of growing elite frustration.

Ukraine seems to be currently focusing on redirecting the war toward systematically exhausting Russia’s ability to finance its war effort rather than concentrating on territorial defensive operations. Evidence suggests that Kyiv is trying to expand Russia’s defensive perimeter faster than Moscow can adapt institutionally. Ukraine has been targeting power plants, military bases linked to arms and explosives production, oil refineries, and energy grids, as well as logistical hubs such as rail networks and airports. In addition, it has been using cheap drones to target and counter Russia’s expensive interceptors.

Ukraine developed new low-cost interceptor drones that proved to be effective and increased interception rates. As a result, Ukraine’s defence became able to intercept a single Shahed drone with one or two interceptor drones costing about $3,000 each, while the cheapest missile used by traditional air-defence systems costs roughly $30,000 per shot. For example, in March 2025, Ukrainian air-defence drones shot down 2,518 Russian reconnaissance UAVs. Furthermore, after a year of technological and tactical improvements, their capacity has increased, and they were able to destroy more than 33,000 Russian UAVs in March 2026 alone.

Kyiv’s strategy of creating long-term economic, industrial, and military exhaustion for Russia seems to be affecting the Kremlin’s inner circle and placing greater strain on the country’s internal stability, elite confidence, economic resilience, and psychological insulation from the war. Infrastructure degradation, economic strain, and psychological exhaustion are stimulating elite fragmentation within Moscow. Ukraine’s growing number of strikes deep inside Russian territory is generating fear among the population while damaging oil refineries and energy infrastructure. The latest data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) indicates a mounting financial strain in the corporate sector. About 17,200 companies reported profit loss of 8.9 trillion rubles with total losses increasing by 7.5%. The oil and gas sectors were most severely affected.

Amid such circumstances, an expectation has emerged that a Russian defeat in the war would lead to the collapse of Putin’s regime, as the war is framed as existential for Putin and closely tied to restoring Russia’s historical sphere of influence. According to this view, major setbacks in the war would trigger coordinated elite defections that could lead to regime change. However, such an outcome is unlikely to translate into an immediate regime collapse. Evidence suggests that a Russian defeat would not automatically provoke elite rebellion or state breakdown but would instead lead to a form of what can be described as “silent elite fragmentation”.

The Kremlin regime is structurally designed to withstand prolonged war, battlefield setbacks, and unfavourable political settlements, provided that four core pillars remain intact: elite cohesion, revenue flows, the loyalty of the security apparatus, and the political passivity of society. In that case, military defeat does not automatically produce regime collapse, although it could weaken one of the regime’s most important pillars: elite cohesion. This raises a prior question before exploring the rise of the elite fraction within the Kremlin: who are the elites in Russia?

Power in Russia does not rest on a single leader or a party. Instead, it is concentrated within a de facto network of security and intelligence officials embodied in the ruling elite of the Siloviki. The Siloviki are an elite faction of Russian politicians and officials with backgrounds in state security, the military, intelligence, or law enforcement. The current Siloviki consist of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya). Their entrenched doctrine is rooted in a centralized state, hierarchy, loyalty, protecting their own, and preserving the system. Since Putin took office in the 1990s, the Siloviki have expanded their authority across different sectors of the state, gaining more power and increasing their control over business and media.

When Putin launched the military operation in Ukraine in 2022, he was confident that the elite would be unlikely to challenge his leadership, even as the war intensified and hardships increased due to international isolation and severe economic and financial pressures, including the freezing of Russian elites’ foreign assets. At the time, his calculation was rationally based, as elites avoided any actions that might cast doubt on their loyalty in order to maintain their political and personal survival. Nevertheless, the prolonged war, which has produced massive losses for limited gains, has contributed to growing elite dissatisfaction.

Putin’s inner circle has begun to question the President’s management of the war, particularly regarding the deteriorating economy, limited military achievements, Ukrainian deep strikes, internet shutdowns, and growing restrictions. Indicators of mismanagement appear in rising paranoia, reflected in increased security measures for Putin and his inner circle and restrictions on their use of smartphones for fear of surveillance or targeted attacks. Alongside this are increasing repression, public reluctance to engage in mass mobilisation, the absence of clear succession mechanisms, and growing elite and public exhaustion resulting from mounting financial pressures.

Dissatisfaction within the inner circle has intensified further as Putin has placed relatives of high-ranking officials and oligarchs under investigation or in custody to pressure members of his inner circle into implementing unfavourable policies. A deeper rift has begun to emerge, with some members increasingly critical of his leadership and management of the war. For instance, the June 2023 Wagner armed rebellion, led by Putin’s former ally Yevgeny Prigozhin, openly criticised the military leadership and blamed it for failures in the war. The uprising revealed the first visible signs of deep divisions within Russia’s ruling elite. Afterwards, Putin systematically dismantled Sergei Shoigu’s inner circle following his dismissal as Defence Minister in May 2024.

By March 2026, Russian lawyer Ilya Remeslo, a former pro-Kremlin ally, was admitted to and later released from a psychiatric hospital in St. Petersburg after reversing his position on Putin and calling for his resignation and prosecution as a war criminal. In a lengthy post, Remeslo criticised the war in Ukraine and accused Putin of impoverishing the population, suppressing media freedom, and destroying political opposition. As the State Duma elections approach, evidence also indicates intensifying disagreements between the FSB and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko’s bloc regarding political management ahead of the September 2026 elections. This is particularly significant as public approval ratings decline despite the Kremlin’s tight control over the electoral process. As the parliamentary elections approach, it remains important for both Putin and the regime that the elections produce a positive image of political stability.

As dissatisfaction among the elite increases, some suggest that the situation could eventually lead to elite defections, particularly among the Siloviki, aimed at removing Putin and replacing him with another figure from the same tight-knit circle that protects the interests of the Siloviki. However, Putin’s regime remains resilient precisely because it has transformed loyalty into a mechanism of survival and linked the safeguarding of interests to power and authority. Consequently, the situation is more likely to evolve into a form of silent elite fragmentation while preserving the system, as dismantling the regime would pose greater risks to those who benefit most from it.

The Russian regime is structured around interconnected networks of patronage and interests, meaning that elites cannot act as independent actors without risking their own authority and security. As previously mentioned, members of the inner circle are increasingly dissatisfied with Putin’s management of the current situation, particularly the consequences of the prolonged war—sanctions, inflation, and restrictions—which have harmed their business interests. However, due to the entrenched doctrines of loyalty and patronage, evidence suggests that this dissatisfaction is more likely to evolve into private fragmentation within the elite rather than into an organised opposition to overthrow the regime.

Silent elite fragmentation means that dissatisfaction among elites is unlikely to evolve into coordinated opposition unless a much broader systemic crisis emerges. Russian elites remain embedded in a system defined by mutual dependence and mutual vulnerability. The prospect of overthrowing the regime is highly unlikely because there is no guaranteed post-Putin alternative capable of protecting their wealth, political influence, and physical security. Furthermore, fear of prosecution, asset seizure, political exclusion, or even assassination discourages public defection.

A possible trajectory envisions that many elites may quietly question the outlook of a decisive victory, resent the war’s economic and political costs, increasingly diffuse blame, and distance themselves from Putin’s decisions. Most importantly, they may pressure Putin to move forward with negotiations and accept a peace settlement that doesn’t fully achieve his original objectives in exchange for not risking his leadership. This trajectory stems from a complex reality in Russia. The Russian elite finds itself in a structural dilemma resulting from the evolution of Putin’s regime. It lies in the fact that both maintaining the current regime and attempting to overthrow it carry significant risks to the elite itself.

The regime has expanded repressive policies during the war, including censorship, surveillance, internet restrictions, and broader security control to preserve the authority of those in power. However, the prolonged war has undermined economic and institutional development as intensified repression and international isolation have discouraged investment, frozen foreign assets, and reduced economic opportunities. While many elites benefited from integration into global markets, stable economic growth, access to foreign assets, and predictable governance, they now find themselves in a difficult position. The system has become both a guarantee of their political survival and a source of harm to their economic interests.

In addition, divisions among the elite are becoming increasingly visible, particularly between the FSB and the civilian apparatus of the administration. At the same time, the Kremlin maintains tight control over the security apparatus. As resources became scarcer during the war, competition intensified among elite factions over the redistribution of economic influence, assets, and financial resources. As the war of attrition places additional pressure on the Kremlin, tensions over political management and strategic direction continue to grow. Furthermore, displays of loyalty remain crucial for survival within the regime, especially under the constant surveillance of the FSB.

Under such circumstances, the elite could seek to influence Putin’s approach to the prolonged war in order to halt further asset seizures of their business and prevent additional economic deterioration. Putin understands that he cannot sustain the war without the political and financial support of his inner circle. Yet another layer of complexity surrounding ending the war without a decisive victory is that the regime could face severe criticism over the deaths of thousands of Russian soldiers and the resulting economic and infrastructure damage. Nevertheless, preserving the regime is likely to remain the elite’s highest priority, and they are unlikely to remove Putin unless a suitable replacement capable of protecting their interests emerges.

Lastly, another important question arises concerning the effectiveness of silent elite fragmentation. Putin remains at the centre of authority while intra-elite divisions are emerging between the Siloviki and civilian officials over the direction of domestic policy, including economic and repressive measures, as well as competition over increasingly scarce resources. The regime’s reliance on the security apparatus makes it vulnerable to elite fragmentation, particularly amid growing rivalries among the FSB, the National Guard, and the military. These rivalries have often been encouraged by Putin himself to prevent any single institution from becoming powerful enough to threaten his authority. This dynamic could lead elite factions to compete more aggressively against one another for resources and influence, potentially creating security gaps. However, similar to the main trajectory, such developments are unlikely to result in regime overthrow because doing so would threaten the power, benefits, and security of all involved while creating the risk of one faction consolidating power.

In sum, Russia may be entering a phase of “silent elite fragmentation,” characterised by growing dissatisfaction without the organisational capacity required for revolt or regime overthrow. The real threat to Putin may not be a coup but rather the gradual erosion of elite confidence in the regime’s strategic competence. However, the political future of the Kremlin remains dependent on a complex system of interrelated actors and factors, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions.

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