European Union (EU)

Opinion polls influence the political environment they seek to measure. By shaping perceptions of electability, they affect voters’ choices, media attention, campaign funding and access to electoral competition. The paper examines how these interactions can transform polling from a means of observing electoral sentiment into an instrument for shaping it. Its central finding is that influence does not require fabricated figures: selective publication, concealed sponsorship and the presentation of uncertain forecasts as assured outcomes can turn genuine data into a misleading account of public opinion.   Evidence across several countries illustrates how this influence operates. In the 2018 US General Social Survey, 23.6% of respondents considered spending on ‘welfare’ insufficient, compared with 73.2% when the question referred to ‘assistance to the poor’, demonstrating the significance of wording. During the 2023 Republican presidential debates, the minimum polling threshold rose from 1% to 6%, illustrating how measured support can become a condition for gaining the visibility needed to attract further support. The paper also examines how electoral expectations affect financial markets, drawing on India’s 2024 election and the controversy surrounding privately commissioned polling during the Brexit referendum.   The consequences extend beyond inaccurate predictions. Favourable polling narratives can distort campaign decisions, concentrate resources and narrow the alternatives visible to voters, while disappointed expectations can be exploited to undermine confidence in elections. Artificial intelligence introduces further risks through fabricated responses and synthetic substitutes for human participants. Nevertheless, the paper distinguishes methodological error from deliberate deception and argues that effective safeguards must preserve independent polling. Disclosure of funding, questions, sampling methods and weighting assumptions, alongside responsible reporting and independent scrutiny, can help ensure that polls inform electoral choice without presenting the outcome as predetermined.

Europe is seeking to strengthen its defence capabilities and reduce its long-standing reliance on the United States. This has encouraged European states to increase defence spending, expand domestic production and diversify their procurement partnerships beyond traditional suppliers. Yet diversification does not necessarily amount to strategic independence. Replacing reliance on one external supplier with reliance on several others may reduce concentration risk without giving European states full control over the technologies on which their defence capabilities depend.   This distinction is becoming increasingly important as modern military systems become more dependent on software, data and interconnected command-and-control architectures. A country may possess the physical hardware of a weapons system while remaining dependent on a foreign supplier for critical software, upgrades, maintenance or technological integration. The question of who controls these underlying technologies can therefore be as important as who manufactures or owns the weapon itself.   The recent Achilles Shield agreement between Greece and Israel provides a useful illustration of this dilemma. The €3 billion agreement will establish a multilayered Greek air and missile defence network incorporating Israeli systems alongside a Greek-controlled command-and-control architecture. However, a dispute over access to the systems' source code has raised questions over the extent of Greece's technological control. The case highlights a broader issue for European defence: can greater diversification deliver genuine independence if critical elements of military capabilities remain technologically dependent on external powers?

In recent years, the Eastern Mediterranean has witnessed growing attention to air defence, maritime security and infrastructure protection. Against this backdrop, on 31 August 2026, Greece and Israel signed an agreement to develop an integrated air and missile defence network, known as ‘Achilles Shield’, at a cost of approximately €3 billion. The project aims to strengthen Greece’s capacity to detect and intercept aerial and missile threats through a unified early warning, command and control system.   The project forms part of the comprehensive modernisation of the Greek armed forces and does not replace Athens’ commitments within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or its alliances with the United States and the European Union. The decision to establish this system reflects the changing character of regional military threats, particularly the growing reliance on unmanned aircraft and precision missiles, alongside the continuing development of Turkey’s defence industries in reconnaissance and unmanned maritime and aerial systems.   This analysis therefore examines the implications of the Greek–Israeli agreement and its place within military modernisation programmes. It assesses its potential impact on the deterrence balance between Greece and Turkey, as well as its implications for security cooperation and managing regional tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean in the period ahead.

The United Nations General Assembly’s resolution on ‘Correct the Map’ extends beyond the technical debate over map projections. It reveals a new arena of symbolic contestation in which countries of the Global South are seeking to renegotiate how the world is represented. The resolution encourages the use of equal-area projections, particularly Equal Earth. It neither prescribes a single map nor alters national borders but confers explicit UN legitimacy on a longstanding African demand: that the continent should not be depicted in education, the media or international institutions in ways that diminish its spatial weight relative to northern regions. Viewed in this light, the vote represents more than a geographical correction. It marks a political breakthrough in ‘visual governance’, where knowledge intersects with power and the image of the world presented to the public becomes a matter for negotiation within the multilateral system.   This initiative comes at a time when countries of the Global South are increasingly able to place questions of identity and representation on the international agenda. The resolution’s adoption demonstrates that soft power operates not only through culture and discourse but also through the standards that shape public knowledge. Changing a map projection will not, in itself, redirect investment or reconfigure supply chains. It does, however, provide a narrative instrument through which countries in Africa, Latin America and South Asia can highlight the scale of their markets, the reach of their corridors and their position within global resource and trade networks. ‘Visual emancipation’ thus offers a means of presenting the South’s geoeconomic weight anew: a framework that helps make its material sources of power more visible and encourages them to be taken more seriously.   Throughout history, maps have been among the most influential instruments of epistemic authority. They serve practical purposes in navigation and administration, while also determining what occupies the centre, what appears at the margins, how borders are drawn and how places are named. Cartography has therefore been inseparable from the state and empire. Maps have been used in surveying, taxation, military campaigns and the delineation of spheres of influence, helping to turn geographical space into a domain that can be administered and controlled. Every map carry, alongside its data, assumptions about purpose, scale, projection and the viewer’s standpoint. Reading a map consequently requires more than asking whether it is accurate. It demands a more political set of questions: accurate for what purpose, who chose this way of depicting the world, and what perceptions does that choice entrench when it becomes a widely accepted standard?   Since the sixteenth century, the Mercator projection has occupied an exceptional position in world cartography. Designed primarily for navigation, it preserves angles and represents constant bearings as straight lines but increasingly exaggerates area towards the poles. The problem lies in its adoption as a general image of the world in classrooms, the media and digital platforms, including settings where comparing areas is the principal objective, rather than in its use for the task for which it was designed. The consequences are particularly clear in the comparison between Africa and Greenland. On many Mercator maps, they appear similar in size, whereas Africa covers approximately 30.37 million square kilometres, nearly fourteen times Greenland’s roughly 2.17 million square kilometres. Repeated across generations, this image does not create political marginalisation on its own but supplies it with a visual language consistent with the North’s centrality in the global imagination.   The Correct the Map resolution, led by Togo on behalf of the African Group and supported by the African Union, brings this objection into an international institutional framework. The General Assembly adopted the text contained in document A/80/L.104 with 164 countries voting in favour, the United States alone voting against, and six abstentions. The political significance of this outcome lies in the breadth of support beyond Africa and the countries traditionally associated with the Global South, encompassing European states and international powers with divergent interests. The resolution is not legally binding and does not affect sovereignty, borders or the legal status of disputed territories. It does, however, call on educational institutions, the media, international organisations and digital platforms to give serious consideration to projections better suited to depicting relative areas. Its principal strength therefore lies in transforming ‘visual justice’ from an African advocacy campaign into an international norm capable of wider adoption.

Europe in 2026 stands at an inflection point. The convergence of six structural crises — economic divergence, technological dependence, strategic vulnerability, institutional paralysis, demographic decline, and energy insecurity — means that the trajectory of the continent over the next fifteen years is genuinely uncertain. There is no default path. The future will be made by a series of choices, shocks, and compounding interactions that no single actor fully controls.   Yet uncertainty should not be understood as decline. Rather, it reflects the fact that Europe is entering a period in which multiple futures remain possible. The decisions taken today by governments, institutions, businesses, and societies will determine whether Europe emerges stronger, more fragmented, more autonomous, or increasingly dependent on external powers. In many ways, Europe is being asked to redefine itself at a time when the rules that shaped the post-Cold War era are rapidly being rewritten. This study adopts a scenario-led approach to explore how Europe may evolve by 2040. Instead of attempting to decide on a single future, it examines several plausible pathways that could emerge from the interaction of political, economic, technological, demographic, and geopolitical forces. The scenarios presented in the first chapter are not forecasts; they are tools designed to challenge assumptions, identify risks, and illuminate opportunities.   Building upon these scenarios, the subsequent chapters examine the key drivers that are expected to shape Europe's future, including economic competitiveness, technological sovereignty, energy security, demographic transformations, geopolitical shifts, defence and strategic autonomy, and the evolution of Europe's role in an increasingly multipolar international system. Together, these chapters seek to answer a broader question: not simply what Europe's future will look like, but what kind of Europe will emerge from the choices being made today.   Ultimately, this study is built around a simple premise: Europe's future is not predetermined. It will be negotiated, contested, and continuously reshaped by events both within and beyond its borders. The continent's greatest challenge over the coming years may therefore be learning how to navigate uncertainty itself.

For decades, the automotive sector has been the industrial backbone of the European Union, employing roughly 13.8 million people—8.1% of the bloc’s manufacturing jobs—generating close to 7% of its GDP and a trade surplus exceeding €79.5 billion. Yet this entrenched primacy is now exposed. The legislated phase-out of the internal combustion engine (ICE) by 2035, structurally elevated energy costs, and China’s state-backed scaling of new energy vehicles (NEVs) have converged to erode advantages built over a century. Within a single decade, China has vaulted from an assembler of imported technology to the global pacesetter in battery chemistry, critical-mineral refining, and software-defined vehicle production.   Accordingly, this analysis aims to provide a rigorous quantitative assessment of Europe’s eroding automotive competitiveness against China’s ascent, across three interlocking axes: the empirical evidence of the market shift, the financial and economic root causes, and the strategic outlook for a continent now forced onto the defensive.

In recent years, European perceptions of Israel have undergone a noticeable shift, driven primarily by the war on Gaza following the events of 7 October 2023. What began as growing unease has gradually translated into a marked decline in public favourability across Europe, with many viewing Israel’s military response as disproportionately severe. This transformation in public sentiment, however, has not been immediately mirrored at the political level. European leaders have largely maintained a cautious and diplomatic posture, continuing to balance expressions of concern with longstanding commitments to “Israel’s right to self-defence”. That stance has begun to erode more recently. The regional escalation involving Iran has introduced direct economic and strategic pressures on Europe, prompting a more assertive, albeit still measured, response from policymakers. At the same time, political changes within Europe, including the emergence of leaders less firmly aligned with Israel, such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Péter Magyar, signal a gradual recalibration rather than a sudden rupture in policy.   This evolving landscape became particularly visible in late April 2026, when discussions emerged within the European Union around suspending the EU–Israel Association Agreement. Although the proposal did not advance, with key member states such as Germany and Italy blocking consensus, it nonetheless highlighted the extent to which previously unthinkable measures are now part of the policy debate. While the suspension of the agreement would carry significant economic consequences for Israel, its implementation remains constrained by the European Union’s (EU) internal political dynamics. Yet the inability to pursue this option does not imply a lack of leverage. The European Union retains a range of alternative instruments that can be deployed to exert pressure on Israel.

The global political and economic landscape is undergoing structural shifts following the outbreak of US and Israeli military operations against Iran in late February 2026. In response to this escalation, the Iranian leadership adopted a strategic decision to close the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping and oil tankers, leveraging its asymmetric capabilities, including naval mines, advanced missile systems, and drones, to transform the strait into an active military theatre.   The Strait of Hormuz constitutes a critical artery for global energy supplies, with approximately 20 million barrels of oil transiting through it daily, accounting for around 20% of global consumption, as well as shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The closure has produced immediate economic repercussions, including the suspension of maritime traffic, the withdrawal of insurance coverage by shipping insurers, and a sharp surge in oil prices, which have exceeded $120 per barrel. In an effort to contain the crisis, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, proposed a diplomatic initiative to establish a secure maritime corridor in the Strait of Hormuz under United Nations supervision to ensure the safe flow of energy supplies.   Kallas’s initiative draws on the “Black Sea Initiative” model, which enabled the export of Ukrainian grain under international guarantees. European efforts are driven by concerns that disruptions to gas supplies could undermine global food production, given their direct linkage to fertiliser manufacturing. The initiative, therefore, seeks to insulate energy vessels from military targeting to preserve global economic stability. Against this backdrop, the central question arises: to what extent can this initiative help de-escalate the current crisis, and what alternatives remain should the Black Sea model prove unviable?

The U.S.-Israel-Iran war and Recent events that followed in Gulf countries have provided one of the clearest real-world demonstrations of modern air and missile defence under sustained pressure. Modern air warfare is increasingly defined by the ability of states to withstand large-scale saturation attacks involving drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The proliferation of relatively inexpensive unmanned systems and precision-guided weapons has altered the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities, allowing even modest actors to launch high volumes of aerial threats. In this environment, the success of air and missile defence no longer depends solely on technological sophistication but also on defence density, the concentration of defensive systems relative to territory and population. Dense, layered air-defence networks provide multiple interception opportunities and reduce the likelihood that incoming salvos can overwhelm defensive systems. As recent conflicts have demonstrated, resilience against saturation attacks increasingly depends on whether states can deploy sufficient numbers of interceptors, overlapping defensive layers, and integrated detection networks.

December 2025 marked a structural shift in the global technological balance of power, as a state-backed Chinese industrial consortium, coordinated by Huawei, approved the operation of a functional prototype of an extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography system at a facility in Shenzhen. This announcement dismantles a core assumption that has dominated geopolitical thinking in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo over the past decade, namely that the extreme engineering complexity of EUV technology would permanently confine China behind a technological barrier, preventing it from advancing beyond the 7-nanometre threshold in leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing.   Western containment strategies were grounded in a firm conviction that the Dutch firm ASML’s monopoly over highly complex supply chains would guarantee the exclusion of the world’s second-largest economy from producing the advanced semiconductors required for artificial intelligence applications. The new Chinese prototype, however, has invalidated this assumption, not by replicating Western engineering paradigms, but by pursuing an alternative physical and engineering pathway, shaped by imperatives of national sovereignty and enabled by effectively unconstrained state capital.   This prototype, based on laser-driven plasma (LDP) technology, demonstrates that Chinese engineering teams have mastered the core physical principles of optical control at 13.5 nanometres. In doing so, they have moved beyond a phase long framed as one of "scientific impossibility", shifting the contest decisively into a new stage defined by engineering scale-up and operational viability. This development signals the end of an era of unipolar technological dominance. It inaugurates a new phase of dual ecosystems within the semiconductor industry. This transformation will require a comprehensive reassessment of the economic and security assumptions that have governed the sector for decades.

Recently, U.S. President Donald Trump issued sharp criticism of Europe, and while migration policies were not his only focus, his remarks on the topic were particularly striking. His criticism came shortly after he announced a policy to “permanently pause migration from what he called ‘third world countries’” following a National Guard shooting in Washington, highlighting his framing of migration as both a domestic security and international issue. The latest U.S. National Security Strategy under the Trump administration closely links European security to its migration policies, warning of what it describes as "civilisational erasure" from uncontrolled immigration and EU policies, and calling on Europe to enforce stricter border controls, support "patriotic" parties, and become more self-reliant. This approach is widely seen as critical of mainstream European leadership and supportive of far-right movements.   At the same time, far-right sentiment is gaining traction across Europe, visible in the electoral successes of parties such as France's National Rally, Italy's Lega, and Germany's Alternative for Germany. While public discourse often frames migration as a threat to security and civilisation, Western countries overlook a crucial point, which is that migration can be a dividend, contributing to economic growth. With populations ageing faster than the global average and shortages of labour in highly skilled professions, the West is increasingly dependent on migrants. The question is what might happen if far-right agendas succeed in curbing migration, and whether Western economies and security could sustain themselves without it.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) defines the guiding vision of American power and provides a window into how the United States understands the international environment, identifies its priorities, and determines the political, military, and economic tools it will rely on to protect national interests. Accordingly, the NSS shapes defence planning, informs foreign policy doctrine, guides inter-agency action, and signals to allies and adversaries the direction of U.S. engagement in an evolving global landscape.   The 2025 NSS, issued by the Trump administration in November 2025, is a clear articulation of how this administration intends to position itself in a world marked by rising geopolitical fragmentation, sharpening competition, and growing domestic constraints. Its core purpose is to translate the administration’s worldview into a coherent framework that defines what the United States will prioritise, what it will deprioritise, and under what conditions it will expend political capital, economic leverage, or military force.   For the Middle East, understanding the 2025 NSS is essential because it captures the principles shaping America’s evolving posture toward the region. The strategy’s emphasis on burden-sharing, reduced military exposure, and transactional partnerships signals a shift in expectations for regional actors, while its focus on energy security, counterterrorism, and strategic competition with external powers continues to define the contours of U.S. interests. As a formal expression of how the administration interprets threats and opportunities, the NSS provides the clearest available roadmap of Washington’s intentions—and the framework within which its decisions toward the Middle East will be made in the years ahead.