Iran

The strategically significant Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, southern Iran, was rocked by a massive explosion during the third round of Iranian-US talks in Oman on Saturday, April 26 2025, marking a pivotal moment that warrants in-depth analysis. Located near the Strait of Hormuz, the port serves as a critical nexus for Iran's container traffic and plays a crucial role in the country’s foreign trade, especially amid the sanctions imposed on it. Initial reports point to two primary hypotheses regarding the cause of the incident: the first suggests an accidental explosion resulting from mishandling hundreds of tons of a vital chemical substance, likely used to fuel Iran’s ballistic missile programme, reminiscent of the 2020 Beirut explosion; the second, however, raises the possibility of deliberate sabotage, potentially orchestrated by Israel with the intent to disrupt the Iranian-American diplomatic track. The timing of the explosion, coinciding with intense diplomatic efforts, adds further weight to its potential ramifications.   Regardless of the final cause, an explosion of such magnitude exposes significant vulnerabilities in Iran's security and management systems, reverberating across the entire region. It casts a shadow over diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing nuclear tensions and other unresolved issues. This commentary explores the potential post-incident scenarios, the implications of each hypothesis

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East is set for a potentially major shift with US President Donald Trump’s announcement of the resumption of negotiations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, scheduled to begin on April 12, 2025. Following a period marked by escalating bilateral tensions and the effective dissolution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this resumption of dialogue has generated considerable anticipation both within Iran and across the wider region. The initial, albeit potentially transient, positive reactions observed in Tehran’s financial markets, as evidenced by movements in the stock market and gold prices, underscore the profound economic implications these discussions could hold for the Iranian populace. Furthermore, the potential for these negotiations to influence broader regional stability is a matter of significant concern and interest even for the nations within the Arabian Gulf. While the precise modalities of these diplomatic engagements – specifically whether they will entail direct bilateral talks, as suggested by the U.S. administration, or proceed indirectly through intermediary channels – remain subject to clarification, the very initiation of dialogue signifies a notable departure from the recent trajectory of U.S.-Iran relations. This analysis will therefore explore a range of plausible scenarios that may unfold as delegations from the United States and Iran convene on April 12, and consider the salient internal political dynamics within both nations, the prevailing external pressures exerted by regional and international actors, and the specific contextual factors that have contributed to this renewed, albeit cautious, engagement.

For decades, Western countries, especially the United States (U.S.), used sanctions as a common tool to promote democracy and prevent certain nations from developing nuclear or chemical weapons. Iran, due to its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and other advanced technological weapons, has become a prime example, facing one of the strictest sanctions regimes in the world since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. These measures including the U.N. Security Council embargoes in 2007 and 2015, have had a major impact on Iran’s economy. However, alongside the economic hardship, sanctions have also spurred the growth of a domestic manufacturing sector, especially in defence and military industries, demonstrating the country’s capacity to adapt to hardship.

The appointment of Major General Eyal Zamir to the helm of the Israeli Army, will take office on March 6, transcends a routine leadership transition. It portends a potential strategic recalibration in Israeli military thinking, responding to evolving threats and perceived doctrinal vulnerabilities. Lauded across Israel's political spectrum as the right leader for these turbulent times, Zamir inherits a complex and precarious landscape. He is tasked with revitalizing an army perceived as "faltering," navigating a potentially obstructive political environment, and addressing a volatile region simmering with unresolved conflicts. Adding to the weight on his shoulders is the historical baggage he carries in the eyes of Palestinians, for whom his name evokes memories of harsh measures during past uprisings and operations. This analysis delves into the implications of Zamir's appointment, the delicate dance between political leadership and military autonomy in Israel, the anticipated doctrinal shifts under his command, and the spectre of looming confrontations on multiple fronts.

Following the Arab Spring, Turkey and Iran started expanding their influence in the region, utilising the state of instability. While both countries compete over expanding influence in Syria, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, they managed to maintain strong mutual relations. The analysis examines foreign policy tools employed by both countries to maximise their benefits along with analysing the commonalities and differentiation of interests between them in the Middle East.

More than a decade after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the unexpected fall of the Assad regime shocked many commentators and world leaders who believed that President Bashar Al-Assad had firmly consolidated his power. This development demonstrated that despite enduring years of civil war, Syria continues to hold strategic relevance at both regional and international levels. The conflict has provided an opportunity for regional and global powers to establish a presence in the country, amplifying the impact of the regime's collapse far beyond Syria's borders. Notably, the fallout has produced clear winners, with Turkey and Israel at the forefront, and losers, including Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, some European countries have discreetly benefited from the situation without openly acknowledging their gains.

The Kurdish dream of establishing an independent state was on the verge of realisation after centuries of demands in Jan. 1946. This came when “Qazi Mohammad,” the Iranian Kurdish leader, declared the establishment of the Mahabad Republic in the province of the same name, now part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, this dream quickly dissipated when the Soviet Union withdrew its financial support for the nascent state. The intensification of the economic blockade on the region further compounded the situation, preventing the entry of food supplies and reducing agricultural production. These pressures led to dramatic shifts in the loyalties of Kurdish tribal leaders who had initially allied with “Qazi” during the state's formation, hoping to secure a share of Soviet financial and food aid.   The food situation worsened over time, pushing some leaders of the Mahabad army to leave the capital, especially as Iranian forces were nearing its entrance, leaving the Kurdish leader and a small Kurdish group behind to face an unequal battle with the Iranian army. Therefore, to spare Kurdish blood, it was decided to surrender on December 15 of the same year, leading to the Iranian army's occupation of Mahabad and the declaration of the state's fall. In the end, “Qazi” was executed in March 1947, marking the end of the closest attempt to establish a Kurdish state.   About a quarter of a century later, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a series of rulings regarding Iraqi oil exported by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The latest ruling, issued in Feb. 2024, mandated the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers to hand over all oil and non-oil revenues to the central government in Baghdad. This could have a dual impact similar to that caused by the cessation of financial support and the Iranian blockade on the Mahabad army, but this time it affects the Peshmerga forces that represent the hope for preserving the “autonomy” of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq considered the second closest Kurdish attempt at establishing a national homeland for the Kurds.   Therefore, the First Part of this paper addresses the political situation of the Kurds, focusing on the status of the region in the Iraqi Constitution, the contentious issues between the region and the federal government, and the impact of these disputes on the continuity and existence of the Peshmerga. The Second Part reviews the economic situation, examining the effects of the series of judicial rulings on the conditions that undermine the autonomy of the regional government in selling oil and the repercussions of this on the Peshmerga as a Kurdish defence force that protects the “autonomy” of the region, forming the last line of defence against its collapse.

On Wednesday, Nov. 27, 2024, Syrian armed factions launched a coordinated offensive targeting regime-controlled sites and militia positions in the western countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria. This operation marks the most significant joint military action since 2016, involving key groups such as “Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham” (formerly Jabhat Al-Nusra). In a video statement, the Joint Operations Room declared the initiation of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. The announcement emphasised that the offensive was necessitated by recent regime movements threatening civilian areas, framing the operation as a defensive imperative rather than a strategic choice. The statement underscored that this action was in direct retaliation for the Syrian regime's bombardment of north-western regions, signalling a potential escalation in the conflict dynamics of the region.

The Israel-Hamas War has now entered its second year following the unexpected assault by Palestinian factions on Israel on October 7, 2023. This sudden attack disrupted Israel’s long-held sense of security, undermining public confidence in both the Israeli military and its intelligence apparatus. In response to the incursion, the Israeli military launched a devastating offensive on Gaza, resulting in over 41,500 fatalities and leaving 96,000 others wounded Moreover, a punitive blockade has severely cut off essential supplies of food, energy, water, and medicine, crippling Gaza’s already fragile healthcare system. The blockade, coupled with ongoing military strikes, has devastated key infrastructure, housing, the economy, agricultural lands, and fishing fleets. This has pushed nearly half a million people into a state of food insecurity.   Israel has consistently forced Gaza’s residents to relocate into increasingly confined areas, with the number of displaced individuals now reaching nearly 1.9 million. The widespread devastation has led the United Nations to issue repeated warnings, cautioning that Israel’s actions are rendering Gaza uninhabitable.   After a year of war, Israel has failed to achieve its primary objectives. Hamas remains intact, and the prisoners held by its factions have not been released. Instead, the war has widened, with violence escalating beyond Gaza and into the West Bank, while tensions between Israel and Iran, along with its regional proxies, have intensified. This escalation has pushed the Middle East to the brink of a broader confrontation, potentially setting the stage for a full-scale war between Israel, Iran, and its respective proxies. As hopes for a ceasefire and prisoner exchange dwindle, pressing questions now emerge: Who stands to lose and who will benefit from this protracted war? When and how will Israel’s war conclude, and what will be left in its wake?   This analysis highlights the gains and losses of the most important parties to the conflict as follows:

China has mediated a Palestinian reconciliation dialogue in Beijing, and has succeeded in bridging the rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These steps indicate a change in China's approach to the Middle East, as it has become an active player in the region by expanding its policies to include political and strategic considerations, in addition to its energy interests. Its "non-interventionist" policy has attracted many countries in the region, which see their growing relations with Beijing as a means of diversification. However, China's increasing involvement may pose a threat to US interests in the region. As Washington has increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region, China has emerged as an active player in the Middle East, reshaping regional security dynamics, signing strategic partnerships and memoranda of understanding for its economic activities with most Middle Eastern countries, and strengthening its ties with various regional organizations over the past two decades. Recent Chinese diplomatic initiatives demonstrate Beijing’s deep investment in further developing relations with Middle Eastern countries, with Beijing hosting the Arab-Chinese Summit and the Gulf-China Summit, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening strategic partnerships among the region’s countries and promoting economic development beyond its traditional energy interests. China’s growing engagement in the Middle East is seen as a significant factor shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and has significant implications for global politics. This raises the question: how China’s methods diverge from those of the United States (U.S.) in the region?

The world has been on edge since July 31,2024, awaiting Iran’s response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, in Tehran by an Israeli attack. Haniyeh was targeted while attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Masoud Pezekshian, marking a direct challenge to Iranian sovereignty and its role as a regional leader of resistance movements. This event underscores the broader confrontation between Iran, which opposes what it perceives as the United States and Israeli dominance in the region. Given the assassination's symbolic and strategic significance, many see Iran’s retaliation as inevitable, particularly amid escalations between Israel and Iran. Notably, this incident is part of a broader series of high-profile killings targeting figures within the so-called resistance axis. Just hours before the explosion in Tehran, Israel launched a missile strike in Beirut's southern suburbs, killing Fouad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military official, while also claiming—without confirmation—the assassination of Mohammed Deif, a leading Hamas military commander.   While consensus exists regarding the certainty of an Iranian response, there is sharp debate within political and military circles over the nature of this retaliation. The targeted nature of the Israeli strikes suggests that a direct and immediate Iranian response may be needed to restore its deterrent credibility. However, Iran’s extensive network of regional proxies presents an alternative, allowing Tehran to retaliate indirectly while avoiding the military and economic costs of direct confrontation. This calculation has become more critical following the U.S.’s declaration that it would militarily defend Israel against any Iranian attack, reaffirming its earlier stance on Iranian missile strikes against Israel in April.   Predicting the nature of Iran’s response can be facilitated by examining the pattern of its previous reactions to similar attacks, particularly given Iran’s long history of confrontations following the 1979 revolution and its enduring hostility toward the U.S. Among these conflicts, the one most analogous to the current situation is the so-called Tanker War, which took place between Iran and Iraq from 1984 to 1988. Iran successfully drew the U.S. into a large-scale military engagement in the Arabian Gulf during this period. This scenario holds significant parallels to today’s tensions, as will be detailed later.   This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the similarities and differences between Iran’s current posture and its stance during the Tanker War from multiple perspectives—military, political, and economic—both internally externally. By comparing the dynamics at play, including the role of the U.S. in both scenarios, this analysis seeks to clarify what can be expected from Iran in light of these combined variables.

Relations between Sudan and Iran have experienced a volatile history of rapprochement and estrangement over the past eight years, mainly due to the strong tensions between the two countries. The relationship was notably strained after Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016, prompting the Sudanese government to close all Iranian schools and cultural centres. However, amid escalating regional tensions between Tehran and its supporters on one side and Washington and its allies on the other, Sudan and Iran are moving quickly to open a new chapter in their relations. This development comes against the backdrop of the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since April 2023.   The current regional changes have created an opportunity for Sudan and Iran to address past differences in a calculated manner. Relations have shown noticeable growth over the past year, marked by a series of high-level official meetings between Sudanese and Iranian officials. One significant meeting took place on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Committee meeting in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, in July 2023, where former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Al-Sadiq, met with his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. This meeting signalled a rapprochement, culminating in Sudan’s announcement of the official resumption of its diplomatic relations with Iran Oct. 9, 2023.   A year after the resumption of relations, the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, received the credentials of the Iranian ambassador, Hassan Shah Hosseini, July 21, 2024, appointing him as his country’s ambassador and plenipotentiary to Sudan. This move raised many questions, particularly due to its timing, which coincided with escalating regional tensions and months of ongoing battles between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces. Additionally, it occurred in the context of the normalisation of relations between Khartoum and Tel Aviv, which began approximately four years ago.   This rapprochement raises many questions about the agreement’s sustainability, particularly given the two countries’ divergent regional priorities. While Iran focuses on the Gulf and the Arab Levant, the future of this relationship hinges on regional developments and Iran’s strategic calculations in the Red Sea region. Will the ties radically shift toward a sustainable strategic partnership or remain captive to regional tensions and political tactics?