Middle East

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently acknowledged that Israel is entering a phase of economic and political isolation internationally, largely due to its ongoing military actions in Gaza. He warned that this isolation may last for years and insisted that Israel must adapt by becoming more self-sufficient, especially in its weapons manufacturing capabilities. Netanyahu described this shift as moving toward an economy with "autarkic characteristics," a term he said he despises since he has long supported free-market policies. Nonetheless, given potential export bans and economic sanctions, he emphasized Israel's need to be both "Athens and super-Sparta," implying a combination of intellectual and military self-reliance to withstand these challenges.   His comments are a rare admission that Israel faces significant global backlash and diplomatic estrangement due to the nearly two-year war in Gaza. Several Western countries, such as Spain, have cancelled arms deals with Israel over the war, with a U.N. Independent International Commission finding that Israel is committing genocide, and a slew of other countries have officially recognized a Palestinian State.   Netanyahu's remarks mark a rare acknowledgment of the changing international environment around Israel. This mounting isolation not only underscores Israel’s diplomatic challenges but also highlights the growing vulnerabilities within its economy, as sanctions, boycotts, and the loss of arms contracts emerge as direct consequences of its genocide in Gaza.

Since the launch of the first satellite in 1957, the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) has undergone a profound transformation from a near-empty frontier into a congested and polluted environment shaped by decades of human activity. Non-functional satellites, spent rocket stages, and fragmentation debris from collisions and explosions have accumulated to a mass exceeding 14,700 tons. Critical events have amplified the scale of the problem, most notably China’s Anti-Satellite Test (ASAT) in 2007 and the 2009 collision between the U.S. Iridium-33 and Russia’s Kosmos-2251, which together generated nearly one-third of all catalogued debris in LEO.   This material is unevenly distributed but highly concentrated between 750 and 1,000 kilometres, an orbital belt central to Earth Observation and communications. Objects in this altitude range can persist for centuries, while in the Geostationary Orbit (GEO) debris may remain indefinitely, underscoring the long-term persistence of the hazard. Consequently, orbital space has shifted from an open frontier to a finite and polluted resource requiring collective governance.   This study examines the economic and political dimensions of space debris. It assesses the direct costs borne by operators, the cascading risks to terrestrial infrastructure such as Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and weather forecasting, and the disproportionate challenges facing developing nations. It concludes by analysing potential responses, ranging from mitigation strategies to Active Debris Removal (ADR), within the broader framework of international governance and global equity.

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) managed to achieve a noticeable electoral victory against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the latest local elections that were held on 31 March 2024. However, the joy of victory did not last long, as the Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, was arrested for corruption charges before being ousted from his position as the Mayor of Istanbul. The investigation into corruption charges revealed that the CHP leadership elections held on 4–5 November 2023, which resulted in the election of Özgür Özel as the party’s leader, might have involved illegal activities that could have jeopardised the transparency of the outcome. As a result, the Turkish judiciary is investigating this issue at the moment. On Monday, Sept. 15 2025, a Turkish court in Ankara held a hearing in a case questioning the legitimacy of the CHP’s 2023 leadership election (the 38th Congress), alleging irregularities like vote-buying, meaning that the outcome of the CHP leadership elections may be invalidated. If it happens, the impact on the CHP and electoral map in Turkey could be massive.

In recent years, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations have emerged as a transformative layer within the global digital infrastructure, marking a departure from their original role as connectivity solutions for remote regions. These systems are now embedded within the operational cores of critical sectors such as civil aviation, maritime logistics, financial markets, and defence. The clearest manifestation of this structural shift is Starlink, operated by SpaceX, which by mid-2025 had exceeded 7 million users across more than 150 countries, with exponential growth rates in high-value, latency-sensitive industries.   This rapid technological and geographical expansion has positioned Starlink as a globally integrated utility—yet one that operates outside conventional regulatory regimes. It represents a structural concentration of control over global data flows in a single, privately held entity. The dual outages that occurred in July and September 2025 exposed deep systemic vulnerabilities within the Starlink network, including software architecture fragilities and environmental sensitivities to space weather events. These incidents prompted urgent questions about the stability of a critical infrastructure layer that now underpins sectors central to national sovereignty and global economic coordination.   This report interrogates the systemic risks embedded in the global economy’s growing dependence on LEO constellations through two interlinked analytical lenses. The first is a technical-political economy perspective, which examines the underlying architecture of the Starlink network and the typology of its failure modes—both endogenous and exogenous. The second is a forward-looking, scenario-based assessment that models the potential global economic consequences of a 24-hour Starlink outage in 2032. Through this dual approach, the analysis traces the contours of a new strategic dilemma: how to govern an emergent, transnational infrastructure whose failure could trigger multi-sectoral crises at planetary scale, yet whose design and control remain entirely privatized.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is intending to establish a new trade bloc, a strategic and interconnected initiative aimed at achieving multiple goals on both the national and the international level. This trade block should not be interpreted in isolation, rather as part of the UAE’s wider economic and geopolitical strategy, which reflects the changing and evolving dynamics of the global trade landscape.     In a fragmented globalization era, where competition and integration attempt significantly increase between the regional trade networks and the multilateral systems, the UAE is poised to maintain its influence and relevance by positioning itself at the forefront of the global landscape. This approach will benefit the UAE on different levels, including advancing domestic priorities while simultaneously enhancing its leverage within the evolving global economic power. Nevertheless, the bloc’s success is not completely guaranteed, as it will need to navigate significant regulatory, infrastructural, and political barriers to translate its potentiality into tangible outcomes.

The global aviation industry is undergoing a historic realignment, as the center of gravity shifts decisively from West to East—a transformation that reflects deeper dynamics in the redistribution of economic and geopolitical power within the international system. For decades, Western carriers dominated the skies, leveraging superior infrastructure, extensive fleets, and mature consumer markets. Today, however, airlines based in the Middle East and Asia are emerging as the new engines of growth and connectivity, assuming a central role in redrawing the global map of intercontinental air travel. While the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this trajectory, it did not initiate it; rather, it exposed the structural vulnerabilities of legacy Western airlines and underscored the strategic foresight of their Eastern counterparts, whose recovery was bolstered by extensive state support and institutionally anchored expansion strategies.   One of the most visible manifestations of this shift is an intense race to modernize fleets with next-generation, long-range, fuel-efficient aircraft—an investment wave that exceeds $200 billion in the Middle East alone. This is not merely a technical upgrade; it constitutes a deliberate, long-term vision to project aerial influence, enhance global market competitiveness, and entrench these airlines as sovereign instruments of statecraft.   Accordingly, this study analyzes the contours of this transformation through an integrated framework that examines operational strength, capital investment in fleets, network architectures, and the adaptability of business models. It further explores the growing convergence between national economic visions—such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and China’s Belt and Road Initiative—and the strategic deployment of national carriers as tools of geopolitical influence. Rather than forecasting definitive outcomes, the paper seeks to situate this aviation shift within a broader, more volatile global context—one where profitability and efficiency increasingly intersect with sovereignty and strategic positioning, and where the skies themselves become arenas for shaping the balance of power in the decades ahead.

Netanyahu’s ambitions are no longer confined to diplomacy or the pursuit of normalisation agreements. The Abraham Accords, once seen as his utlimate goal of his contemporary regional strategy, now appear irrelevant, cast aside in favor of a far more aggressive vision. What is unfolding is not the politics of peace but the politics of expansion, where no Arab country can assume immunity. The question of which state will be targeted next is impossible to predict, precisely because Netanyahu’s actions are driven less by rational calculation than by the confidence that comes with unconditional American support. Few could have imagined that Doha, with its U.S. military base and status as a close Washington ally, would be struck, yet it happened. This unpredictability signals a dangerous reality: the scale of war is set to widen, and any country in the region could find itself Israel’s next target.

As many regional and global powers rush to reshape the Middle East to serve their strategic interests, the past two years have been marked by a cascade of transformative and often tumultuous events. These include the Israeli army’s large-scale invasion of the Gaza Strip following October 7, efforts to diminish Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, intensifying Israeli military operations against Iran, and most recently, a wave of Western countries intending to formally recognise a Palestinian state alongside Israel’s announcement of plans for the annexation of the West Bank and a comprehensive occupation of the Gaza Strip.   Together, these rapid developments not only underscore deepening conflict and instability but also actively fuel the emerging discourse about the "New Middle East", a strategic framework envisioned by key actors outside of the region that seeks to redefine the geopolitical, security, economic, and diplomatic order of the region. The intertwining of hard power manoeuvres, shifting alliances, and economic realignments signals a significant recalibration rather than a mere continuation of the status quo.   In 2025, the potential rise in Western recognition of Palestinian statehood reflects growing international dissatisfaction with existing diplomatic frameworks and a push to rethink longstanding regional issues, directly challenging Israel’s traditional security and diplomatic calculus. Concurrently, Israel’s authorised military plan to take full control of Gaza exemplifies a decisive shift toward hardening its territorial and security posture, marking an unprecedented phase in Israeli-Palestinian relations and regional politics.   The confluence of these developments amplifies the narratives and policies underpinning the New Middle East: a vision premised on assertive state-centric realignments, expanded normalisation efforts, a recalibrated balance of power, and an economy-driven model of regional transactions. This evolving order encompasses ambitions to diminish Iranian influence, redefine Palestinian sovereignty on new terms, and facilitate deeper economic and security integration among select regional actors.   Ultimately, these events serve both as catalysts and manifestations of the "New Middle East" discourse. They reflect a region in flux where entrenched conflicts and new diplomatic initiatives are simultaneously eroding old paradigms and opening pathways for a fundamentally restructured Middle Eastern landscape.   This paper critically explores how the recent rapid developments in the Middle East contribute to shaping competing visions of the region’s future. It assesses whether the ongoing transformations reflect a deeper realignment driven by strategic state interests, expanding economic interdependence, and a recalibrated regional order that transcends historical cycles of conflict. Specifically, the analysis considers if these changes primarily illustrate Samuel Huntington’s "Clash of Civilisations" thesis—attributing post-Cold War regional conflicts to cultural and religious identity divisions—or if they instead represent a deliberate and calculated strategic effort to "reshape the Middle East" through redefined state priorities, shifting power dynamics, and newly forged regional and international alliances.

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the potential economic, political, and security outcomes should the Arab and Islamic worlds enact a coordinated airspace blockade against Israel. The specified catalyst for this action is the Israeli airstrike on Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, 2025, an event that has already precipitated a significant realignment of regional diplomatic postures.   The central thesis of this analysis is that a coordinated airspace blockade would represent a strategic shock to Israel, not merely a logistical inconvenience. It would function as a form of asymmetric economic warfare, inflicting severe, multi-sector damage on Israel's globally integrated economy by targeting its core vulnerabilities in aviation, high-value trade, and tourism. The direct economic impact is estimated to be a contraction of 4.8% to 5.7% of Israel's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a shock sufficient to trigger a deep recession.   Politically, the blockade would fundamentally re-order the regional geopolitical landscape, shattering the post-2020 status quo established by the Abraham Accords and rendering further normalization efforts untenable. It would accelerate a strategic pivot by Gulf Arab states away from a singular reliance on the United States as a security guarantor, fostering a new, region-driven security architecture. For the United States, such a development would present an acute diplomatic crisis, forcing a choice between its ironclad alliance with Israel and its vital strategic partnerships with Arab nations, thereby undermining a cornerstone of its Middle East policy.   From a security perspective, the blockade would act as a "gray zone" challenge, a highly coercive act that exists in the ambiguous space between peace and declared war. It would degrade the operational reach of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and place the onus of military escalation squarely on Israel. A decision by Israel to forcibly challenge the blockade would create a high-probability pathway to a wider regional military conflict, potentially drawing in the Gulf states, Iran and its proxies, and the United States. The airspace blockade, therefore, represents a plausible and potent instrument of collective action that could irrevocably alter the strategic balance in the Middle East.

Wars are no longer confined to missiles, drones, or soldiers on the battlefield; increasingly decisive struggles are taking place in the invisible realm of signals that quietly guide planes through the sky, ships across narrow straits, and even the timing of financial markets. At the heart of this new contest lies the Global Positioning System (GPS), once praised as a scientific triumph and gifted to the world as a free public good, increasingly repurposed into a weapon that is inexpensive to disrupt, difficult to trace, and capable of inflicting consequences far beyond the battlefield.   The recent jamming of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s aircraft served as a stark reminder that even the highest levels of leadership are not immune, but what may appear to be isolated incidents in Europe are in fact part of a broader pattern that has taken deep root in the Middle East. In a region where the world’s most critical energy chokepoints converge, navigation interference is no longer a rare abnormality but an increasingly routine feature of conflict, carrying implications that stretch from military readiness to economic stability and, ultimately, to the daily lives of millions.

The 2025 Arab–Islamic extraordinary summit, held in Doha, Qatar, on September 14–15, marked a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Convened in direct response to an unprecedented Israeli airstrike on the Qatari capital, the meeting served as a forum for Arab and Islamic nations to formalise a collective security and diplomatic response. The paper finds that this Israeli action, intended to undermine ongoing negotiations, inadvertently solidified a unified front among regional powers. The incident also exposed a profound erosion of trust in the United States as a reliable security partner, compelling Gulf states to actively consider alternative defence and diplomatic alignments. The summit's outcomes signal a new phase of regional foreign policy, moving beyond rhetorical condemnation to a framework for coordinated legal and economic measures, with significant implications for Israel, the United States, and the prospects for a lasting ceasefire in Gaza.   The final communiqué went far beyond rhetoric, demanding concrete punitive and legal measures against Israel. These included a call for sanctions, a review of diplomatic relations, and the use of international legal bodies to hold Israel accountable. The activation of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Joint Defence Council signalled a tangible move toward a new, collective regional security paradigm. The summit’s outcomes collectively demonstrate a strategic pivot away from American-led diplomacy and security frameworks toward a more independent and potentially confrontational regional posture, signalling a new, more volatile era in Middle East geopolitics.

The labour market is undergoing a profound transformation as millions worldwide move away from traditional payroll jobs toward flexible, independent work enabled by digital platforms. This shift has accelerated the growth of the gig economy, which is reshaping employment patterns, stimulating entrepreneurship, and driving innovation. At the same time, it raises new challenges related to income volatility, worker protections, and regulatory oversight.   The term “gig,” once used by musicians to describe short-term performances, now refers to a wide range of freelance, contract, or temporary jobs that prioritize flexibility over permanence. Today’s gig economy is powered by digital platforms that link workers with clients, including ride-hailing services, delivery apps, freelance marketplaces, and online teaching platforms. While this model provides economic benefits such as greater productivity, adaptability, and entrepreneurial opportunities, it also exposes workers to risks concerning rights, job security, and fair treatment. Achieving a balance between innovation and equitable protections remains key.   In the Middle East, the gig economy is expanding rapidly, fuelled by a young, digitally skilled population, unemployment pressures, and government-led diversification strategies. By 2024, the region contributed more than 7% of the global gig market, with freelancing, delivery services, and digital platforms becoming central to local economies. Policymakers are responding through freelance visas, skills programmes, and targeted regulations; countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are aligning gig work with ambitious visions of transformation, while Egypt demonstrates both the sector’s strong growth and the persistent challenges of informality and regulation. While the gig economy has thrived in the Middle East, its full potential can only be realized through a new generation of governmental reforms that go beyond just supporting growth and actively build a stable and protected freelance workforce.