Eastern Europe

The U.S.-Israel-Iran War is well underway, and the risks of spillover and enlargement is becoming more of a reality as the war goes on. As the conflict continues to expand, several actors are seeking out opportunities to challenge the existing balance of power in the region and aim to exploit the war to expand their influence. In the past decade, Russia has been working to court the United States’ MENA allies into its sphere of influence through the concept of regime stability, while China is taking on a soft power approach through economic and diplomatic cooperation. A prolonged war between the U.S.-Israel and Iran can result in global powers such as Russia and China getting more involved in the region to diminish American influence globally, which can result in a great power competition. The potential of Iran serving as an arena for great power competition will be explored through the American strategic overstretch and the economic shock caused by energy crisis.

The long-standing efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine War were disturbed by the sudden outbreak of the U.S.-Israel-Iran War. The strikes carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran, and their broader spill-overs across the Middle East, have hindered the already difficult peace negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. This escalation raises concerns about the extent to which the U.S.-Israel-Iran War could have on the broader geopolitical dynamics. This war risks diverting global attention away from efforts to resolve the Russia-Ukraine War and, at the same time, raises concerns about the extent to which it could reshape power dynamics and influence the trajectory of this war.

The global political and economic landscape is undergoing structural shifts following the outbreak of US and Israeli military operations against Iran in late February 2026. In response to this escalation, the Iranian leadership adopted a strategic decision to close the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping and oil tankers, leveraging its asymmetric capabilities, including naval mines, advanced missile systems, and drones, to transform the strait into an active military theatre.   The Strait of Hormuz constitutes a critical artery for global energy supplies, with approximately 20 million barrels of oil transiting through it daily, accounting for around 20% of global consumption, as well as shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The closure has produced immediate economic repercussions, including the suspension of maritime traffic, the withdrawal of insurance coverage by shipping insurers, and a sharp surge in oil prices, which have exceeded $120 per barrel. In an effort to contain the crisis, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, proposed a diplomatic initiative to establish a secure maritime corridor in the Strait of Hormuz under United Nations supervision to ensure the safe flow of energy supplies.   Kallas’s initiative draws on the “Black Sea Initiative” model, which enabled the export of Ukrainian grain under international guarantees. European efforts are driven by concerns that disruptions to gas supplies could undermine global food production, given their direct linkage to fertiliser manufacturing. The initiative, therefore, seeks to insulate energy vessels from military targeting to preserve global economic stability. Against this backdrop, the central question arises: to what extent can this initiative help de-escalate the current crisis, and what alternatives remain should the Black Sea model prove unviable?

The military operations that unfolded over twelve days in June 2025 between Iran and Israel marked a sharp breakpoint in the trajectory of regional military balance. The confrontation resulted in a substantial erosion of Tehran’s military infrastructure and inflicted significant material losses. The depth of this operational failure was most evident in the near-total collapse of Iran’s integrated air-defence system, with confirmed intelligence assessments indicating that Israel succeeded in neutralising more than 80 surface-to-air missile batteries and destroying over 120 launch platforms. This effectively stripped Iranian airspace of its protective shield and imposed a state of absolute Israeli air superiority.   Amid this collapse, Tehran effectively lost its entire arsenal of the Russian-made S-300PMU2 (“S-300 PMU-2”) systems, which it had acquired in 2016 after protracted negotiations and at considerable financial cost. These systems were systematically destroyed between 2024 and 2025. Iran’s domestic air-defence industries, represented by the Bavar-373 and Khordad-15 systems, also demonstrated clear operational inadequacy when tested in a real combat environment.   This exposed a wide technological gap between Israel’s offensive capabilities and Iran’s defensive assets. The Iranian air-defence network failed to record the downing of a single manned Israeli fighter jet, and Iran’s ageing air force, reliant on pre-revolution legacy aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat, the Phantom, and the Tiger, supplemented by 1990s-era MiG-29s, stood incapable of competing or deterring effectively.   This total inability to contest the battlespace not only underscored tactical failure but delivered a decisive blow to the strategic assumptions underpinning Iran’s defence doctrine for decades, particularly its reliance on “asymmetric missile deterrence” and hybrid layered-defence networks.   Confronted with a reality in which its missile capabilities were neutralised and its aerial shield dismantled, the Iranian leadership was compelled to adopt a “post-war reset” strategy, launching an urgent acquisition campaign aimed at closing the technological gap by turning eastward towards Russia and China to rebuild its lost deterrence.   The fundamental question that will shape the next phase in the Middle East remains: Can this “hybrid deterrence”, comprising domestic missiles alongside imported, only partially integrated weapon systems, endure against an adversary that has already demonstrated both the willingness and the capability to deliver devastating strikes deep inside Iran?

Since 2023, the uranium enrichment market has undergone its most profound structural transformation since the advent of the civilian nuclear era. After three decades characterised by persistent oversupply and the integration of Russian inventories with Western reactor fleets, the sector, valued at approximately $15.5 billion in 2025, now confronts a fundamentally altered geopolitical landscape. stems primarily from the fact that nearly 95% of global enrichment capacity is controlled by just four entities, placing Western supply chains under complex logistical and political pressures.     Central to this transformation is the evolution of what is known as the Separative Work Unit (SWU) from a readily available commodity into a strategic bottleneck capable of redrawing global energy maps. The market has shifted rapidly from a buyer-dominated structure to one characterised by seller leverage, amid an intensifying race to secure fuel for both conventional reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), which require advanced uranium grades for which Western markets lack adequate commercial infrastructure.     Accordingly, this analysis explores the contours of the new enrichment landscape, examining the principal actors and evolving pricing dynamics, while projecting the profound implications of this transformation for global energy security.

Operation Absolute Resolve, which resulted in the removal of Nicolás Maduro and his spouse Cilia Flores on Jan. 3, 2026, constituted a watershed moment in the history of 21st-century geopolitical warfare. While initial indicators point to a seemingly limited regime change within Venezuela, the strategic repercussions of the operation inflicted severe damage on Iran’s forward-operating capabilities. For nearly two decades, Venezuela was not merely a diplomatic partner of Tehran; it served as an indispensable logistical bridgehead and a secure sanctuary in the Western Hemisphere. Through this platform, the Iranian regime was able to circumvent international sanctions, project asymmetric influence, and sustain a critical financial lifeline through illicit trade.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) defines the guiding vision of American power and provides a window into how the United States understands the international environment, identifies its priorities, and determines the political, military, and economic tools it will rely on to protect national interests. Accordingly, the NSS shapes defence planning, informs foreign policy doctrine, guides inter-agency action, and signals to allies and adversaries the direction of U.S. engagement in an evolving global landscape.   The 2025 NSS, issued by the Trump administration in November 2025, is a clear articulation of how this administration intends to position itself in a world marked by rising geopolitical fragmentation, sharpening competition, and growing domestic constraints. Its core purpose is to translate the administration’s worldview into a coherent framework that defines what the United States will prioritise, what it will deprioritise, and under what conditions it will expend political capital, economic leverage, or military force.   For the Middle East, understanding the 2025 NSS is essential because it captures the principles shaping America’s evolving posture toward the region. The strategy’s emphasis on burden-sharing, reduced military exposure, and transactional partnerships signals a shift in expectations for regional actors, while its focus on energy security, counterterrorism, and strategic competition with external powers continues to define the contours of U.S. interests. As a formal expression of how the administration interprets threats and opportunities, the NSS provides the clearest available roadmap of Washington’s intentions—and the framework within which its decisions toward the Middle East will be made in the years ahead.

The prolonged Russia-Ukraine War has been met with futile efforts to end it by several peace plans throughout nearly four years of war. Currently, U.S. President Donald Trump appears determined to end the war by pushing a peace plan in the last few months of 2025 and negotiating with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.   Many scenarios unfold for the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine War. Amid the ongoing peace negotiations, driven mainly by the U.S. and Russia’s push for Trump’s 28‑point plan and Ukraine’s counterproposal through the amended 19‑point plan, a settlement favouring Russia is increasingly possible, raising the question: if such a plan is adopted, how will the Eurasian scene change?

On Feb. 14 2025, a drone struck the protective shield covering Reactor No. 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Ukraine. The attack caused a fire and damaged the steel cladding. As of Dec. 6 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has formally assessed the site and reported that the New Safe Confinement has now “lost its primary safety functions, including the confinement capability,” meaning it can no longer guarantee that radioactive material remains fully contained. Ukraine has blamed Russia for the strike, which Moscow denies, while international monitors warn that the risk to global nuclear safety is rising.

“Poland is at its closest to open conflict since World War Two,” warned Prime Minister Donald Tusk, after a sudden Russian airspace violation rattled the country. On September 9, a swarm of Russian drones entered Polish skies, prompting NATO aircraft to scramble and intercept several of them. It marked the first direct encounter between NATO and Moscow since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. While the incident might have been a test by Putin to gauge NATO’s and Europe’s response, it also raises the specter of a potential war between Poland and Russia. Given Poland’s critical role within NATO and the EU, far greater than Ukraine’s, the implications of such a conflict would place the entire continent in Jeopardy. The pressing question now is: how likely is this war to erupt, and would Europeans bear the brunt?

On October 1, U.S. reports stated that President Donald Trump gave the green light to provide Ukraine with intelligence information to strike deep into Russia’s energy infrastructure sites, while studying providing Kyiv with long-range weapons that can be used in such strikes. The reports also indicated that Washington is encouraging the NATO allies to take similar actions.   The U.S. has already been providing intelligence to Ukraine since the beginning of the war; however, Trump's signalling to provide more sensitive information could hold different consequences on the outcomes of the war. Since his second-term inauguration, Trump has vowed to end the Russia-Ukraine war, so does this decision come in parallel to the American President's ambition to broker a peace deal between Moscow and Kyiv, and how this might implicate the Russian and Ukrainian sides.

The global competition over semiconductors and related military technologies has become the central axis of great-power rivalry. The United States maintains its leadership in the global semiconductor industry, with American companies securing roughly half of the global semiconductor market. However, this dominance faces a growing challenge from China, which accounted for 20% of global semiconductor sales in 2024. Beijing’s ambition to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductors is steadily advancing despite ongoing trade tensions and intellectual property restrictions imposed by Washington amidst the broader ‘tech war.’ China aims to reach 50% self-sufficiency in semiconductor production by the end of the year, reinforced by significant investments in R&D and market expansion by Chinese firms.   In contrast, Russia’s position in semiconductor-dependent military industries is increasingly constrained. Although Russia retains expertise in weapons design, its reliance on imported materials and advanced chip-making equipment from Western countries exposes critical vulnerabilities. Western sanctions, introduced in response to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, have sharply limited Moscow’s access to these essential inputs. In response, Russia has sought alternative suppliers, with China emerging as its largest source of semiconductor materials. These dynamic forms part of the broader Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral framework, underpinning Moscow’s strategic pivot toward Eastern partnerships.   Meanwhile, India is rapidly evolving as a significant player in the semiconductor sector. The country’s announcement in September of its first indigenous chip, “Vikram 32,” marks a milestone in New Delhi’s pursuit of technological self-reliance and signals India’s potential emergence as a competitor to U.S. semiconductor dominance. India’s increasing engagement with Russia and China reflects a pragmatic alignment based on mutual interests, particularly in the context of escalating policy tensions with Washington. Notably, U.S. tariffs imposed on India’s trade in Russian oil have further incentivized this trilateral collaboration.   Collectively, the China-Russia-India “troika” represents a coalition of shared interests rather than a formal ideological alliance. Should this partnership strengthen, it could significantly bolster their semiconductor manufacturing capabilities and pose a formidable challenge to the American industry. Nevertheless, lingering frictions—such as unresolved border disputes, differing economic priorities, technological gaps, and the impact of sanctions—are likely to impede seamless technological integration. The United States still wields substantial influence over India, with opportunities to attract New Delhi through increased investments, tariff reductions, and advanced technology cooperation. Ultimately, the trajectory of the RIC semiconductor partnership holds profound implications for the global order. A successful integration of this “troika” chip industry with their respective military technologies could catalyse the rise of a multipolar system, revolutionizing surveillance, air defence, drone capabilities, and the broader defence industrial base, thereby reshaping international power dynamics.