Iran’s Enrichment Dilemma: Between Nuclear Sovereignty and Global Proliferation Anxiety

In George Orwell's classic 1984, his world was held together by unending war: In the book, messages of hate and reasons to fear were broadcast each day to encourage fearful, slavish masses to rail against an imaginary enemy rather than their actual masters.   US and British geo-strategists have historically been masters of manipulation, redrawing the map of the world to suit Western economic, geopolitical, and military interests, particularly in the MENA region. Their detractors are convinced that their broad goal is Western domination of the area via surrogates and partners such as Israel and Iran (via the back door) to retain control over natural resources and waterways while ensuring those resources do not fall into the hands of competitors such as China and Russia. A school of thought contends that they manufacture sectarian conflicts on the principle of “divide and rule,” creating tensions that justify the installation of military bases and fuel the military-industrial complex through arms sales.   A 2008 paper titled America’s Divide and Rule Strategies in the Middle East by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya highlights US efforts to create divisions within Middle Eastern and Central Asian populations through ethno-cultural, religious, sectarian, national, and political differences. According to this perspective, sectarian divides—particularly between Sunni and Shia Muslims—have been deliberately cultivated to weaken regional unity and facilitate geopolitical control.   The Iraq War (2003) and its aftermath further exacerbated these sectarian tensions. The dismantling of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated Ba'athist regime and the empowerment of Shia and Kurdish groups created a power vacuum, fueling sectarian violence. Groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq (later ISIS) thrived under these conditions, exploiting sectarian grievances. The redrawing of Iraq’s internal boundaries, particularly the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government, further solidified ethnic divisions. Toby Dodge, in Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a Road to Peace, argues that the US approach to state-building in Iraq inadvertently deepened these fault lines.   Similarly, US involvement in the Syrian Civil War (2011–2024), through support for various opposition groups, contributed to the country’s fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines. The conflict saw the rise of numerous factions, many of which received US backing. The emergence and territorial control of Kurdish-dominated forces in northeastern Syria, supported by the US in the fight against ISIS, created tensions with Arab populations and neighboring Turkey. The conflict has been widely analyzed as having a significant sectarian dimension, with regional powers backing different factions along Sunni-Shia lines.   Middle East expert and author Fred Reed states: “One might be forgiven for surmising that the current thrust of US policy in the Middle East and through the Muslim world is to exacerbate Sunni-Shiite divisions.”   US foreign policy in the region has often been perceived as favoring certain regional powers over others, sometimes along sectarian lines, exacerbating existing tensions. The complex relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia (a Sunni-majority state) and its rivalry with Iran (a Shia-majority state) has frequently been interpreted through this lens, even if US interests are primarily geopolitical. Support for different factions in conflicts like the Yemeni Civil War has similarly been framed within the context of regional sectarian rivalries.   Certain think tanks and policy circles in the US have promoted ideas that emphasize sectarian and ethnic divisions in the Middle East as a way to understand and potentially manage the region. Foreign Policy in Focus columnist Conn Hallinan argues that a major US concern in the Middle East is oil. With two-thirds of US oil expected to be imported by 2020, and 65% of the world's remaining oil reserves located in the Middle East, he suggests that a strategy of “divide and conquer” is aimed at keeping strategic control of these resources. Hallinan also highlights the lucrative nature of ongoing Middle Eastern tensions for the US arms industry, citing that countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman have spent over $150 billion on arms purchases.   While the significance of oil in US foreign policy has arguably shifted due to increased domestic production and diversification of energy sources, the Middle East remains strategically important for global energy security. A 2024 report from the Council for a Secure America notes that US oil imports from the Middle East have reached a record low, falling below 11% of total imports. However, this shift does not negate the region’s role in global energy markets.   The US continues to maintain strong relationships with key Gulf oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While policy priorities have expanded beyond securing oil supplies to include counterterrorism, regional stability, and containing rival powers, access to stable energy markets remains a key consideration. Events like the war in Ukraine have further underscored the interconnectedness of global energy markets and the importance of stable Middle Eastern oil production in preventing global price shocks. In fiscal year 2024, US military sales surged, with direct commercial sales rising to $200.8 billion from $157.5 billion in 2023. Government-facilitated arms sales also increased to $117.9 billion. The Middle East remains a significant market for US arms exports, with over $5.5 billion in approved arms sales to Egypt and Morocco alone in December 2024.   The underlying argument of this paper is that beyond the apparent hostilities and rivalries in the region, there exists a covert strategic alliance between Iran, Israel, and the United States. This cooperation manifests in various ways, including indirect coordination in conflict zones, intelligence-sharing, and economic transactions that defy public rhetoric. Despite Iran’s portrayal as a staunch adversary of both the US and Israel, instances of tacit collaboration—such as Iranian oil exports finding their way to markets through indirect channels, US tolerance of Iranian-backed militias in specific contexts, and shared interests in counterbalancing regional actors like Turkey and the Gulf states—suggest a more complex dynamic. This hidden alliance reflects a pragmatic approach to maintaining regional equilibrium, securing strategic interests, and preventing the emergence of truly independent powers that could challenge the existing order.

The United States started putting sanctions on Syria as early as 1979, mostly because Syria was labelled as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). The first designation was based on Syria's military occupation of Lebanon and its support for groups like Hezbollah that the government paid for. This early policy took a harsh and threatening stance against a government that was seen as hostile and supportive of non-state actors that were seen as a threat to U.S. interests.   After the Syrian conflict started in 2011, the U.S. greatly increased its sanctions against the Assad government. The goal of these more extensive measures was to stop the Syrian government from using violence against its people and to encourage political changes that could get to the bottom of the conflict. This was a big change from only focussing on counter-terrorism to a wider agenda that included human rights and changing the behaviour of the regime, with some elements of coercive diplomacy.   The end of Bashar al-Assad's rule in early December 2024 marks a major change in Syria's politics. This event changed the main goal of the long-standing U.S. sanctions, which were mostly aimed at the now-deposed government.   In May 2025, during a trip to Saudi Arabia, U.S. President Donald Trump made a big announcement: he would lift sanctions on Syria. He said this would "give them a chance at greatness." Many people see this announcement as a "historic development" that has "major potential to improve living conditions" and "support the Syrian political transition." The goal is to make the area more stable and improve Syria's economic prospects after years of being held back by harsh international sanctions. This paper looks at the United States' sanctions against Syria in depth, putting the recent change in policy in the context of its history and the law.

In today’s volatile political landscape, ceasefires are becoming increasingly relevant. While they are not designed to bring an immediate end to conflicts, they aim to provide a temporary respite in which opposing parties can engage in dialogue and work toward a resolution. Ideally, ceasefires function as transitional phases within ongoing wars, offering the opportunity for negotiation and compromise. However, as a political tool, ceasefires often fail to meet their objectives. Their effectiveness is not simply determined by military action, but by the political will and complex considerations of the parties involved. Ceasefires are heavily influenced by the intentions of the signatories, as not all parties are genuinely committed to ending hostilities. This raises important questions about how we define the success or failure of a ceasefire. If the stated goal is to end the war, yet political agendas remain hidden, the resumption of conflict may not necessarily mean that the ceasefire has failed—it could indicate that one party's objectives were unfulfilled, while the other may have achieved its goals.    Additionally, each ceasefire agreement is unique, shaped by the specific political dynamics at play, including the roles of mediators, guarantees, and the structure of the agreement itself. The Israel-Hamas ceasefire is a striking example of this complexity. While it may appear to be a failure from a broader, collective perspective, it could represent a significant political and military opportunity for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The influence of external actors, such as U.S. President Donald Trump, must also be considered as part of the equation. Ultimately, the fragile truce between Hamas and Israel raises a critical question: Is it merely a political process, or does it reflect a deeper, more strategic calculation that extends beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities?

In a significant escalatory move, Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, has notified the UN Secretary-General in writing that UNRWA must cease its operations and vacate its premises by January 30, 2025. This ultimatum follows Israel’s enactment of a law last October banning the agency’s activities within its territory, including occupied East Jerusalem. The decision is rooted in Israel’s allegations that UNRWA has been infiltrated by Hamas, with claims that some of its employees were involved in the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks.   This paper examines the evolving and contentious relationship between Israel and UNRWA. It also explores potential U.S. intentions to dismantle the agency, particularly in light of Donald Trump’s return to power and his recent remarks regarding the displacement of Gaza’s population and the repercussions of this ban.

Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian Civil War has significantly bolstered its military capabilities and strategic positioning against Israel. The war served as an invaluable training ground, providing Hezbollah fighters with extensive combat experience and allowing them to test and refine their tactics in real-world scenarios. This experience proved crucial in enhancing their proficiency in asymmetric warfare, a critical aspect of their confrontations with the technologically superior Israeli military.   Furthermore, the Syrian conflict solidified Hezbollah's alliance with Iran, which provided vital military support and resources. This included advanced weaponry, training, and logistical assistance, significantly enhancing Hezbollah's operational readiness.  Iran's backing also enabled Hezbollah to establish a stronger presence in the region, providing strategic depth and allowing it to operate more effectively against Israel while countering Israeli influence in Lebanon and the broader Levant.   The war also forced Hezbollah to adapt and evolve its military doctrine.  The group adopted more sophisticated tactics, incorporating urban warfare strategies and integrating advanced technologies like drones and precision-guided munitions. These innovations, born out of necessity on the Syrian battlefield, have better equipped Hezbollah to counter Israel's military advantages.  Moreover, the prolonged conflict forced Hezbollah to develop sophisticated logistical and operational planning capabilities, including a robust supply chain that can withstand Israeli disruptions.   On the other hand, this intervention led to the exposure of the party and made it vulnerable to infiltration, which caused the party to lose its hard power against Israel and its soft power within Lebanon.

The Kurdish dream of establishing an independent state was on the verge of realisation after centuries of demands in Jan. 1946. This came when “Qazi Mohammad,” the Iranian Kurdish leader, declared the establishment of the Mahabad Republic in the province of the same name, now part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, this dream quickly dissipated when the Soviet Union withdrew its financial support for the nascent state. The intensification of the economic blockade on the region further compounded the situation, preventing the entry of food supplies and reducing agricultural production. These pressures led to dramatic shifts in the loyalties of Kurdish tribal leaders who had initially allied with “Qazi” during the state's formation, hoping to secure a share of Soviet financial and food aid.   The food situation worsened over time, pushing some leaders of the Mahabad army to leave the capital, especially as Iranian forces were nearing its entrance, leaving the Kurdish leader and a small Kurdish group behind to face an unequal battle with the Iranian army. Therefore, to spare Kurdish blood, it was decided to surrender on December 15 of the same year, leading to the Iranian army's occupation of Mahabad and the declaration of the state's fall. In the end, “Qazi” was executed in March 1947, marking the end of the closest attempt to establish a Kurdish state.   About a quarter of a century later, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a series of rulings regarding Iraqi oil exported by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The latest ruling, issued in Feb. 2024, mandated the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers to hand over all oil and non-oil revenues to the central government in Baghdad. This could have a dual impact similar to that caused by the cessation of financial support and the Iranian blockade on the Mahabad army, but this time it affects the Peshmerga forces that represent the hope for preserving the “autonomy” of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq considered the second closest Kurdish attempt at establishing a national homeland for the Kurds.   Therefore, the First Part of this paper addresses the political situation of the Kurds, focusing on the status of the region in the Iraqi Constitution, the contentious issues between the region and the federal government, and the impact of these disputes on the continuity and existence of the Peshmerga. The Second Part reviews the economic situation, examining the effects of the series of judicial rulings on the conditions that undermine the autonomy of the regional government in selling oil and the repercussions of this on the Peshmerga as a Kurdish defence force that protects the “autonomy” of the region, forming the last line of defence against its collapse.

China has mediated a Palestinian reconciliation dialogue in Beijing, and has succeeded in bridging the rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These steps indicate a change in China's approach to the Middle East, as it has become an active player in the region by expanding its policies to include political and strategic considerations, in addition to its energy interests. Its "non-interventionist" policy has attracted many countries in the region, which see their growing relations with Beijing as a means of diversification. However, China's increasing involvement may pose a threat to US interests in the region. As Washington has increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region, China has emerged as an active player in the Middle East, reshaping regional security dynamics, signing strategic partnerships and memoranda of understanding for its economic activities with most Middle Eastern countries, and strengthening its ties with various regional organizations over the past two decades. Recent Chinese diplomatic initiatives demonstrate Beijing’s deep investment in further developing relations with Middle Eastern countries, with Beijing hosting the Arab-Chinese Summit and the Gulf-China Summit, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening strategic partnerships among the region’s countries and promoting economic development beyond its traditional energy interests. China’s growing engagement in the Middle East is seen as a significant factor shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and has significant implications for global politics. This raises the question: how China’s methods diverge from those of the United States (U.S.) in the region?

The world has been on edge since July 31,2024, awaiting Iran’s response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, in Tehran by an Israeli attack. Haniyeh was targeted while attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Masoud Pezekshian, marking a direct challenge to Iranian sovereignty and its role as a regional leader of resistance movements. This event underscores the broader confrontation between Iran, which opposes what it perceives as the United States and Israeli dominance in the region. Given the assassination's symbolic and strategic significance, many see Iran’s retaliation as inevitable, particularly amid escalations between Israel and Iran. Notably, this incident is part of a broader series of high-profile killings targeting figures within the so-called resistance axis. Just hours before the explosion in Tehran, Israel launched a missile strike in Beirut's southern suburbs, killing Fouad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military official, while also claiming—without confirmation—the assassination of Mohammed Deif, a leading Hamas military commander.   While consensus exists regarding the certainty of an Iranian response, there is sharp debate within political and military circles over the nature of this retaliation. The targeted nature of the Israeli strikes suggests that a direct and immediate Iranian response may be needed to restore its deterrent credibility. However, Iran’s extensive network of regional proxies presents an alternative, allowing Tehran to retaliate indirectly while avoiding the military and economic costs of direct confrontation. This calculation has become more critical following the U.S.’s declaration that it would militarily defend Israel against any Iranian attack, reaffirming its earlier stance on Iranian missile strikes against Israel in April.   Predicting the nature of Iran’s response can be facilitated by examining the pattern of its previous reactions to similar attacks, particularly given Iran’s long history of confrontations following the 1979 revolution and its enduring hostility toward the U.S. Among these conflicts, the one most analogous to the current situation is the so-called Tanker War, which took place between Iran and Iraq from 1984 to 1988. Iran successfully drew the U.S. into a large-scale military engagement in the Arabian Gulf during this period. This scenario holds significant parallels to today’s tensions, as will be detailed later.   This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the similarities and differences between Iran’s current posture and its stance during the Tanker War from multiple perspectives—military, political, and economic—both internally externally. By comparing the dynamics at play, including the role of the U.S. in both scenarios, this analysis seeks to clarify what can be expected from Iran in light of these combined variables.

A recent statement from the European Union Foreign Policy Commissioner, Josep Borrell, urging Israel's allies, notably Washington, to cease supplying weapons to Israel has ignited widespread controversy. This call comes amid heightened concerns over the significant civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip. Coinciding with this plea, a Dutch appeals court decision has prohibited the export of all spare parts for F-35 fighter jets destined for Israel. These developments unfold against the backdrop of Israel's plans to initiate an expanded military operation in Rafah. Such an operation raises the spectre of a potential humanitarian catastrophe, particularly concerning the over 1.3 million displaced individuals from the Gaza Strip who have sought refuge in Rafah since the commencement of military activities in the enclave.   The United States provides Israel with annual military aid worth $3.8 billion, which stands as one of the most substantial military aid packages supplied by the U.S. to any country globally. This commitment was reaffirmed by U.S. officials, including President Joseph Biden, who, during his tenure as Vice President under Barack Obama, emphasised the enduring strategic alliance between the two countries. Then Vice President Biden said the U.S. commitment to Israel transcends moral obligations and is a deeply rooted strategic obligation. During a visit to Tel Aviv amid the events of Oct. 7, he underscored that “the existence of an independent and secure Israel within globally recognised borders aligns with the practical strategic interests of the United States.” He further emphasised, “I have long said: If Israel didn't exist, we would have to invent it.” Evidence of the depth of relations and continued support is further demonstrated by Congress' approval of an additional $14.1 billion in military aid to Israel. This aid is intended to bolster Israel's capabilities in its conflict with the Hamas movement, specifically by providing air and missile defence support and replenishing U.S. military stock granted to Israel. This level of support echoes the assistance provided by the United States to Israel during the October 1973 War with the Egyptian Army.   The generous and unconditional support provided by the U.S. to Israel prompts numerous inquiries, particularly in the context of the U.S.'s inability to exert pressure on Israel to stop its war on Gaza. Additionally, its loss of control over the right-wing government's decision-making process regarding the potential expansion of the war to include Rafah, portending an imminent conflict with Egypt. Hence, this analysis endeavours to address a pivotal question: Will these developments prompt a shift in the U.S. stance toward Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing government, potentially leading to a withdrawal from the notion of an expanded operation in Rafah? Furthermore, can the United States feasibly cease its military aid to this strategic ally in the Middle East?