Does a Perceived U.S. Strategic Advantage in Iran Shift Focus to Cuba?

Mounting doubts regarding U.S. strategic success in the 2026 Iran war have made Washington eager to project strength by reasserting pressure in other contested regions, including the Caribbean. Cuba is re-emerging as a focal point of great power competition involving the United States, China, and Russia. Most prominently, the country stands out to the U.S. President Donald Trump administration as a “failing state.” The administration believes such a state requires intervention.

The growing U.S. presence in the Western Hemisphere and its drive to expand its influence over the region align with the long-standing tradition of U.S. regional dominance rooted in the Monroe Doctrine. Despite outward claims of victory, do the underlying doubts surrounding U.S. strategic success in the 2026 Iran war increase the likelihood of direct military intervention in Cuba, or do they instead reinforce a model of coercive pressure?

The United States has maintained a continuous strategic interest in Cuba since the 1890s. In 1898, the U.S. army helped Cuba gain its independence from Spain, but instead, the country has fallen into a U.S. control until 1902. The following periods witnessed American direct and indirect intervention in Cuba, aiming to ensure its hegemony in the Hemisphere. The foundation for U.S. intervention in Latin America in general lies in the Monroe Doctrine, developed in 1823, which originally aimed to deter European interference, but evolved into a justification for U.S. intervention in the hemisphere.

Over time, this doctrine has been repeatedly reinterpreted to legitimize intervention, especially during the Cold War in the 1960s, when Cuba aligned with the Soviet Union and the socialist government nationalised American assets, leading to a total U.S. embargo. Throughout the years, the American tools of pressure have shifted from military intervention to economic embargo, sanctions, excessive tariffs, and diplomatic isolation.

Currently, Trump seeks to isolate Cuba by blocking the main source of its oil – Venezuela – through control of the country and imposing tariffs on any country that supplies Cuba. Further blockading the Island from fuel and expanding sanctions in energy, finance, and business. The administration believes that causing severe engineered crises would pressure the Cuban government and ease American control over the Island. As a result, the country suffers from the shutdown of core public services, like hospitals, and cripple aviation, food shortage, and political pressure.

Trump has worked to assert American dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as seen in military action in Venezuela and statements about the acquisition of Greenland. Trump has expressed his interest in acquiring Greenland, citing national security and mineral wealth. While he authorised military action to capture President Nicolás Maduro.

These movements are described as the “Donroe Doctrine” or “Trump Corollary,” which refers to Trump’s second administration’s foreign policy towards the Americas and his desire to reassert U.S. dominance over the Western Hemisphere and limit external actors’ influence, such as China, Russia, and Iran. This includes expanding military and naval presence, applying economic pressure on adversarial governments, and targeting regimes perceived as aligned with U.S. rivals.

Trump invokes security-based reasoning to justify U.S. dominance in the region. He portrays certain countries as sources of transnational threats, notably migration and drugs, that undermine U.S. security. This framing is then used to justify intervention, presenting U.S. involvement as necessary to mitigate these threats and prevent them from reaching the country.

Earlier this year, Trump set his ambitions on Cuba on many occasions. On January 29, 2026, the U.S. administration stated that the Cuban government poses an “extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and foreign policy, and in response, the U.S. will impose tariffs on any country that supplies or sells oil to Cuba. On March 5, 2026, Trump said that it was next on his administration’s agenda after the war with Iran.

Then, on April 13, 2026, the President hinted that the U.S. may “stop by Cuba” when finished with Iran. Since then, he has been intensifying pressure on the Cuban government to push them to the negations table. The U.S. created a severe economic crisis through an oil blockade and other forms of embargo prior to taking military action.

Recent developments suggest a shift from strict containment toward more aggressive posturing. As the Western Hemisphere is increasingly treated as a sphere of U.S. dominance, the key question is whether the Trump administration would resort to a full-scale invasion of Cuba, or whether there are alternative strategies instead.

A perceived strategic success over Iran could influence U.S. behaviour toward Cuba in key ways, contrary to what is expected. The Trump administration wants to redirect focus from the Middle East’s high costs towards the Western Hemisphere. Although the political dynamic in Iran differs from that of Cuba, both countries have a military institution that controls the economy and is deeply embedded in the political system. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran and the Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) in Cuba are considered an integral part of the regime that is difficult to dismantle.

This risk Trump administration misinterprets the situation as they did in Iran. The administration has undermined the proximity of the IRGC and the clerical system. They believed that by targeting the former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, people would revolt against the Islamic Revolution regime, the IRGC’s power would collapse, leading to the dismantling of the whole regime. The misinterpretation occurred in confusing the real ground situation with the aspirations of the Iranian opposition who fled after the Islamic Revolution, hence, misreading the dynamic inside the Iranian society and the complex political dynamics. As a result, the administration failed to overthrow the regime and achieve the initial perceived goals.

Similarly, the GAESA stands as the dominant institution at the core of Cuba’s financial and political system. Backed by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, it is estimated to control over 70% of the economy and 95% of the nation’s financial system, positioning it at the centre of the national decision-making. Accordingly, dismantling the GAESA would represent a complex and challenging objective for the U.S. administration.

Also, people who fled Cuba before the revolution, including the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s parents, to Florida, U.S., are from the business owner class who feared losing their assets and opposed Fidel Castro’s communist government. While the situation on the ground is different with a limited opposition and one-party rule, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) leaves very little space for a unified political force as an alternative option. While citizens residing within the country, wanting the hardships to end, oppose any U.S. military intervention and seek to defend their country’s sovereignty.

Furthermore, the military action was proven to be not the only effective option as the Iran war witnessed strategic response from Tehran targeting the U.S. military bases and ships in the Strait of Hormuz, which caused devastating humanitarian and economic consequences. Evidence suggests that other coercive alternatives could be more effective and less costly.

Additionally, the asymmetric costs of a military action in Cuba differ from those in the Iranian situation. Unlike Iran, Cuba’s proximity increases the risks of mass migration crises due to geographical closeness to the United States, which would lead to regional instability and financial burden on the administration. Moreover, Trump would likely prefer to contain the growing criticism towards the administration as a result of conducting three wars in one term.

A direct U.S. military involvement in Cuba is unlikely due to high military, economic, and diplomatic costs, lack of a clear post-regime alternative, and current military and political engagement with Iran. Rather than direct military action, the U.S. might prefer an economic deal that could define the future of American-Cuban relations.

There is no immediate strategic necessity for a military action, as Cuba doesn’t constitute an immediate or urgent military threat to the United States’ security, unlike its role during the Cold War. Moreover, Havana lacks the broader strategic weight that would justify the substantial financial and political costs of a military intervention. This imbalance between limited potential gains and high projected costs is likely to shape and constrain the trajectory of future U.S. policy toward Cuba.

In addition, the escalating situation in the Strait of Hormuz highlights that military operations are not always a controlled option, nor does it constitute a guaranteed outcome. On the contrary, it could trigger broader geopolitical instability or economic downturns. Furthermore, the apparent “quick win” in Venezuela shouldn’t be treated as a general model. Unlike Caracas, Cuba lacks a unified political opposition capable of governing in a post-regime scenario.

Besides, Cuba’s leadership is willing to negotiate economic and social reforms, including foreign investment from Cuban nationals, increasing tourism, releasing political prisoners, and migration. Nevertheless, they are unwilling to concede on core sovereignty, which is stepping down from power. In such a case, the U.S. administration has a higher probability of reaching a concession agreement than using military force.

Trump will be more likely to pursue an intensified economic strangulation, such as sanctions and trade restrictions, rather than a conventional military invasion. Seeking indirect diabatization efforts for a regime change, instead of direct confrontation, is due to his need for a “quick win” without the military risk. This is relevant particularly after the fallout of the Iran war, pushing the administration to search for a quick win to rehabilitate its image. Moreover, a military invasion would lead to a huge migration flux towards the U.S., something that the administration seeks to avoid, particularly with its strict anti-migration policies.

The situation could be defined by an economic agreement between the two governments, in which Washington could ease sanctions and foster investment in exchange for Cuba privatising state-owned enterprises to attract foreign investment, particularly American investment, notably in oil and mining. At the same time, the U.S. will allow Havana to buy its energy and technology, while fostering a cooperation framework on the prevention of migration to the United States.

This agreement would make the Cuban economy more dependent on the U.S. than what Trump perceives as “foreign influence” of China and Russia. The Trump administration may seek to replace the Russian and Chinese investments in Cuba with American and European investments in core areas such as energy, telecoms, tourism, and ports.

This potential trajectory would come in conflict with Rubio, who is currently leading negotiations with Cuban officials, advocates for Communist regime change in Cuba, conditioning economic development and investments with such change. It also has drawbacks on Trump’s approval rate with Cuban-American voters who believe that a U.S. military action for regime change is the only option, disregarding an economic pathway.

In sum, although a direct military intervention in Cuba appears unlikely in the meantime, the situation raises broader concerns about the future of state sovereignty. The consequential shift lies in whether such actions would become more justifiable within U.S. strategic discourse under Trump, potentially normalising coercive approaches in relations between powerful states and those perceived as a “failing state.” Targeting states that diverge from U.S. interests and policy agenda risks eroding the principle of sovereignty as a foundational norm of the international system.

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