Countries are increasingly shifting toward making themselves indispensable in a specific area. China controls rare-earth minerals, Taiwan pioneers in semiconductor manufacturing, the United States leads in artificial intelligence and advanced technologies, and the Gulf, particularly the UAE, positions itself as a global logistics hub.
This new era introduces the concept of “strategic irreplaceability or indispensability”, in which countries no longer focus solely on maximizing their national power but instead become experts in a specific field, making them an indispensable bottleneck in the global system.
A Shift from Great Power to Essential Powers
The traditional model of the international order measured power through robust economic growth, military strength, and territorial size. The world was categorized into multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity based on these indicators. The country that maximized its national power occupied the top position in the global hierarchy.
However, unprecedented crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, regional conflicts, and disruptions to global supply chains, have challenged this model. The Russia-Ukraine war exposed the vulnerability of food-importing countries. The U.S.-Iran conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of one of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints. Beyond its impact on energy markets, this chokepoint threatens the movement of global trade, including critical minerals, semiconductors, electronic components, and high-tech supply chains that are integrated in all modern economies. This demonstrates that the emerging competition over strategic indispensability still fundamentally depends on securing physical trade routes, showing how traditional geography continues to hold the new “indispensable” tech economy hostage.
Many emerging economies have sought to mitigate these risks by diversifying supply chains, strengthening regional cooperation, and increasing control over raw materials and logistical infrastructure. This increasingly includes maritime ports, which are not merely gateways to global trade but strategic assets through which states can project geo-economics influence. Port control does not necessarily require direct state ownership; foreign state-owned enterprises or private companies may control terminal operations, cargo handling, logistics, and the digital systems that coordinate them, creating forms of influence that extend beyond the territorial sovereignty of a state.
At the same time, the increasing digitalisation of ports, including automated cargo handling, vessel scheduling, data management, and communication systems, creates new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Any disruption to these systems embedded within these global logistics networks can hinder the physical movement of goods without requiring the closure of the maritime route itself. Hence, strategic indispensability isn’t just about controlling a water routes; it’s also about controlling the technologies that make that chokepoint economically operative.
As a result, a new model of power is emerging; one centred on rare-earth minerals, supply chains, technology, logistics, and finance. No country can dominate all these sectors simultaneously. Instead, countries are leveraging their strongest comparative advantage to become the primary exporter of a critical product, technology, or service, making other countries increasingly dependent on them.
The Power of Dependence
Power is understood as a state’s ability to acquire the resources and capabilities needed by other states. This creates a relationship of dependency that enables the state to exercise its authority, advance its interests, and potentially impose costs on those lacking alternatives. In this sense, dependency becomes a source of power: the greater the concentration of a vital resource/capability and the fewer the available alternatives, the greater the ability of the state that controls it to exert influence.
The semiconductor industry illustrates this interdependence. This relationship does not arise from the semiconductor technology itself, but rather from the dependence created by the need for that technology. Similarly, AI computing capacity is geographically concentrated in a few regions, creating potential dependencies on electricity, data centre infrastructure, semiconductor supply chains, and technology companies based in these regions. AI data centres are heavily concentrated in North America (U.S.), Western Europe (the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, UK), and the Asia-Pacific region (Singapore, Taipei, Malaysia, and Japan). These regions collectively account for over 90% of the projected global AI computing capacity among leading companies. While the Middle East is emerging into a promising new region, with countries offering financial incentives and state-led digital economic initiatives.
The critical minerals processing industry is also one of the most evident indispensability examples. For 15 out of 39 mineral commodities, China constituted 65% of global production in 2023. It included rare earth minerals which accounted for 68% of global production. Accordingly, China’s dominance extends beyond mining to processing and refining, making it difficult for other countries to quickly replace Chinese supplies.
Therefore, the level of dependence is determined by two key factors: the need for the resource and the availability of alternative sources. These two factors determine whether dependence increases or decreases, and thus shape shifts in power dynamics. In other words, strategic indispensability is determined by the extent to which a state controls scarce, vital, and difficult-to-replace resources or capabilities upon which other states depend.
Traditionally, strategic indispensability was linked to military power and economic growth. However, changes in the global economy and the emergence of new technological needs have shifted the foundations of strategic indispensability toward advanced technologies, critical minerals, digital infrastructure, and other essential inputs that exist in modern manufacturing processes.
Consequently, states increasingly seek to manufacture, protect, and maintain forms of strategic indispensability by controlling vital technologies, supply chains, and essential resources that other states cannot easily replace.
What Makes a Country Indispensable?
Today’s global economy depends on access to critical minerals and its processing capabilities, energy resources, low-cost manufacturing, logistics infrastructure, advanced technologies, and financial capabilities. Countries that lead in one of these strategic sectors are becoming increasingly indispensable.
These pillars represent future power because they are integral to nations’ vital industries. Critical minerals are necessary for batteries, electronics, and the clean energy transition. Energy resources integrate into power industrial production, transportation, and global power grids. Low-cost manufacturing supports supply chains and ensures affordable prices.
In addition, logistics infrastructure enables the efficient movement of goods through global shipping lanes and ports, while digital infrastructure, including submarine fibre-optic cables, cloud networks, and data centres, facilitates the secure transfer of the data that supports internet services, AI, financial systems, and military communications.
Furthermore, advanced technologies drive automation and high-value production, while financial capabilities facilitate international trade and investment and serve as an instrument of strategic influence. Control over global payment systems and global financial messaging networks, such as SWIFT, enables countries to control international economic activity and impose financial constraints on their competitors.
Hence, power becomes concentrated in the hands of the countries that control either a product, such as electronics, smart chips, and crude oil, or a service, such as transport and logistics, telecommunication networks, cloud platforms, and investments.
China is emerging as the leading supplier of key components used in modern military systems and high-tech manufacturing. Taiwan has established itself as the world’s leader in semiconductor manufacturing and microchips used in both civilian and military technologies. The United States remains the global leader in artificial intelligence through its investments in AI infrastructure, data centres, and strategic trade policies that allow it to maintain control over the core knowledge and technologies required for AI development. Meanwhile, the UAE is positioning itself as a global logistics hub through its free zones, smart trade infrastructure, advanced ports, and international operations.
Beyond the major powers, middle powers are also working to enhance their strategic global position by specializing in sectors where they have a competitive advantage. For instance, Türkiye has developed an independent military manufacturing hub and expanded its military exports, transforming its defence-industrial sector into a significant tool for regional influence and strategic partnerships. Besides reducing its reliance on traditional Western suppliers, Ankara made its own military trade an indispensable tool for its regional foreign policy. This demonstrates that strategic indispensability is no longer limited to global superpowers but is increasingly being shaped by countries that dominate a certain competitive advantage.
This dynamic creates strategic dependence. Countries become increasingly reliant on these specialized powers for essential products, technologies, and services. Policies such as the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, the UAE’s economic diversification strategy, and the Made in China 2025 strategy are not simply national industrial policies; they are long-term strategies designed to make these countries indispensable to the global economy.
The Next Competition
Current trends suggest that future geopolitical competition will revolve around countries’ increasing competition to secure indispensable positions within emerging strategic industries, most notably AI computing power, critical minerals, defence supply chains, biotechnology, and industrial software.
Access to AI computing infrastructure is becoming an indispensable strategic capability, with the United States leading through companies such as NVIDIA, Google, and Amazon, Taiwan through TSMC’s semiconductor manufacturing, and the UAE through its sovereign AI investments. China already dominates critical mineral processing and has the potential to further expand its strategic leverage, as sustainable alternatives remain limited. Meanwhile, middle powers are also likely to strengthen their power-dependence relationships by specialising in defence supply chains, most notably Türkiye.
Moreover, gene editing and synthetic biology are increasingly emerging as geopolitical capabilities. Future dependence may pivot on countries capable of rapidly developing medicines and producing biological products at scale. The United States, the United Kingdom, and China are among the leading countries, due to their advanced technologies and scientific infrastructure. Finally, industries are becoming increasingly dependent on software and automation rather than traditional machinery, making industrial software another likely source of strategic indispensability in future global competition.
In parallel with the lessons learned from conflicts and global disturbances, countries will likely focus on maintaining market access against unforeseen disruptions, sustaining their industries by ensuring access to the products and services that support them, and developing national security strategies to address a new challenge: the potential loss of access to the resources that sustain essential services and vital industries.
This competition also creates significant risks. Excessive dependence on a limited number of suppliers generates strategic vulnerabilities for importing countries. When a country specialises in producing a specific resource based on comparative advantage, this resource becomes concentrated in a limited number of supplier countries or a single one. This creates what is called an “interdependence trap,” where countries become structurally dependent on a small number of suppliers of strategic products, creating significant strategic vulnerabilities to external disruptions.
Supplier countries may face wars, sanctions, political crises, or natural disasters that disrupt production and create spill-over effects across the global economy. Moreover, when supplier countries deliberately “weaponize” this interdependence trap by restricting exports or imposing export controls, they exploit the high economic costs that dependent countries may incur to reduce or replace their reliance on such a product. Consequently, countries’ resilience becomes increasingly dependent on the decisions and stability of countries that control one critical stage of a broader production process.
As a result, future global competition will likely revolve around two parallel strategies: countries will seek to increase their own strategic indispensability while enhancing their strategic independence by reducing excessive dependence on indispensable suppliers.
In sum, the future suggests that power will increasingly stem from controlling indispensable capabilities rather than simply possessing the largest military or the highest GDP. This raises important questions about how countries can navigate these two parallel strategies. In one way, how can they reduce excessive dependence on indispensable suppliers, particularly when sustainable alternatives do not exist, the high costs of diversifying suppliers, and if bringing production back to the home country is economically or technologically unfeasible? At the same time, how can countries increase their own strategic indispensability? Doing so requires identifying sectors in which they have a competitive advantage, investing in the development and processing of these strategic resources or capabilities in order to raise their value to reach the stage of exporting and become indispensable suppliers in global markets.
References
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Chung, Jaewon, et al. “Production of Mineral Commodities and Geospatial Map of the Mineral Industries and Related Infrastructure of China.” (USGS, June 12, 2026). https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20261018
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Weber, Gesine. “Europe’s Strategic Indispensability and How to Leverage It.” Internationale Politik Quarterly. February 10, 2026. https://ip-quarterly.com/en/europes-strategic-indispensability-and-how-leverage-it
World Economic Forum. “Top 10 Emerging Technologies of 2026.” (Insight Report, June 2026). https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Top_10_Emerging_Technologies_Report_2026.pdf
Zhang, Lawrence. “Strategic Indispensability or Strategic Irrelevance.” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation. February 3, 2026. https://itif.org/publications/2026/02/03/strategic-indispensability-or-strategic-irrelevance/
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