World

On Feb. 4, 2026, the New START Treaty ended without any incentive for renewal. On February 28, 2026, the U.S. and Israel initiated strikes on Iran, citing a lack of progress in the nuclear talks. This year has witnessed prominent incidents related to nuclear security, where states become more incentivised to develop their own nuclear capabilities and other nuclear states resist such direction. Additionally, global developments prove that traditional nuclear frameworks appear to be losing significance, with some states going further by resorting to violence to ensure their nuclear hegemony.   This development raises questions about the possibility of global shifts from traditional arms control treaties to a new nuclear arms control regime. A new phase of informal signalling and strategic forecasting could emerge, raising concerns about whether this form is sufficient to verify compliance. Such a potential new nuclear arms control regime could be unpredictable in terms of its application, effectiveness, the number of states willing to follow through, and more broadly, the path forward to ensure the world is not dragged into a nuclear war.

The Feb. 28, 2026 United States–Israeli offensive against Iran represents the most consequential escalation in Gulf security dynamics in over a decade and introduces immediate, medium-term, and long-term risks to global energy stability. The strikes targeting senior leadership and strategic military infrastructure triggered Iranian retaliation across the Gulf region and sharply increased the probability of disruption to maritime energy flows, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz.   While physical supply outages remain limited at the time of writing, markets have responded by repricing geopolitical risk. Crude benchmarks surged on reopening, freight and insurance costs rose materially, and volatility spiked across commodities and currency markets. The core economic question is not whether prices react, they already have, but whether the conflict transitions from a risk-premium shock to a sustained supply disruption.   The Strait of Hormuz remains the central transmission channel. Roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil and more than one-third of seaborne liquefied natural gas pass through this chokepoint. Even temporary interference has outsized macroeconomic implications. Assessing the implications of the crisis requires examining immediate market reactions, potential disruption scenarios, medium-term supply responses, and the longer-term structural consequences for global energy security and macroeconomic stability.

Food commodities are becoming strategic resources, increasingly viewed as important as oil and gas. Food is used as a tool of political control, where food export control or bans influence countries' behaviour and policy outcomes. For instance, Russia's actions in the Black Sea’s exports caused price spikes and forced strategic changes to the Black Sea Grain Initiative in favour of Moscow. The Russia-Ukraine ًar has showcased how food can be used as a weapon and how major food importers, like Egypt, have faced direct vulnerabilities impacting their food supply.   As governments continue to weaponise food supply to leverage their position in warfare and as climate change worsens, countries will increasingly treat food as a national security issue and reshape alliance-building. Countries could be more likely to depend on food weaponisation tools, as they appear to be effective in ongoing conflicts. Hence, the Global South and food importers are in danger of being exposed to increased starvation and political control from food exporters and wealthier nations that control food systems. The forecasts incite these countries to re-evaluate their strategies to curb the risk of food insecurity.

China is a dominant player in the rare earths and critical minerals industry. As of 2025, China is in control of “…about 61% of rare earth production and 92% of their processing”, meaning China monopolized the rare earths and critical minerals industry. While China dominates this industry, countries have been aiming to bolster their own rare earth and critical mineral ambitions to reduce their reliance on China as a supplier of raw materials and processed products. For example, GCC countries, in line with their 2030 visions, have increased their investments in the mining and processing of these elements to diversify their economies and become suppliers in an industry dominated by China. This analysis aims to assess the emergence of the GCC as a rare earths and critical minerals supplier, which will be done by analyzing the reasons and feasibility for GCC involvement in this industry as well as understanding the challenges these countries face in their entry into the market.

The global space economy is currently undergoing a profound structural transformation. Whereas the sector has historically been characterised by its heavy reliance on rocket propulsion capabilities and the vast capital investments required to deploy physical hardware into orbit, the focus is now shifting toward an economic model in which value creation is increasingly decoupled from material mass.   In this context, the contours of what may be described as a “software-defined space economy” are becoming increasingly evident. This shift is driven by the convergence of two core digital infrastructures: digital twins and space-based edge computing. At the same time, declining launch costs, resulting from advances in reusable launch vehicles, have shifted the primary determinant of economic efficiency. Rather than centring on mere access to space, value is now anchored in the operational efficiency of on-orbit assets, their embedded intelligence, and the length of their functional lifespan.   This paper argues that the sector’s future economic value—estimated to reach USD 1.8 trillion by 2035—will not be realised solely through an increase in the number of satellites launched, but rather through the digitisation of their life cycles and the processing of data at the source.   This analysis provides a comprehensive economic deconstruction of these technologies. It examines how “virtual modelling” is reshaping cost structures in space manufacturing, enabling companies such as Varda Space Industries and SpaceX to accelerate development cycles at software speed. It also highlights the roles of artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things (IoT) in establishing space systems capable of autonomous fault processing, thereby maximising returns by extending assets’ operational lifetimes. The analysis concludes by linking gains in operational efficiency to the sector’s overall growth, demonstrating how digital infrastructure forms the material foundation for emerging in-space manufacturing (ISM) markets and next-generation Earth observation services.  

Since 2023, the uranium enrichment market has undergone its most profound structural transformation since the advent of the civilian nuclear era. After three decades characterised by persistent oversupply and the integration of Russian inventories with Western reactor fleets, the sector, valued at approximately $15.5 billion in 2025, now confronts a fundamentally altered geopolitical landscape. stems primarily from the fact that nearly 95% of global enrichment capacity is controlled by just four entities, placing Western supply chains under complex logistical and political pressures.     Central to this transformation is the evolution of what is known as the Separative Work Unit (SWU) from a readily available commodity into a strategic bottleneck capable of redrawing global energy maps. The market has shifted rapidly from a buyer-dominated structure to one characterised by seller leverage, amid an intensifying race to secure fuel for both conventional reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), which require advanced uranium grades for which Western markets lack adequate commercial infrastructure.     Accordingly, this analysis explores the contours of the new enrichment landscape, examining the principal actors and evolving pricing dynamics, while projecting the profound implications of this transformation for global energy security.

The global security landscape is undergoing a fundamental transformation driven by the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence technologies, which have evolved from purely technical tools into strategic forces reshaping patterns of power and conflict. Artificial intelligence has emerged as a transformative capability offering substantial societal benefits, yet its inherently dual-use nature renders it a double-edged instrument.     A careful examination of historical precedents reveals a recurring pattern in which terrorist organisations demonstrate a high degree of adaptability in exploiting emerging technologies to advance their radical agendas. Just as these groups previously leveraged online forums and encrypted communication platforms, they are now actively exploring and adopting artificial intelligence capabilities. This shift is no longer confined to speculative concern or theoretical risk. Rather, AI-enabled terrorism has moved from conceptual discussion into an experimental phase characterised by repetition and rapid diffusion, raising acute concern among security institutions and governments that the technology may become a strategic enabler of unprecedented operational capability.     The convergence between artificial intelligence and the logic of asymmetric warfare is fundamentally altering the balance of power between states and non-state actors, significantly lowering the barriers to entry that were historically imposed by advanced military technologies. Emerging fields and intelligence evidence indicate the development of a multi-domain adoption strategy spanning informational, physical, and cyber spheres, necessitating a deeper analytical examination of how terrorism is being re-engineered in the age of intelligent systems.

December 2025 marked a structural shift in the global technological balance of power, as a state-backed Chinese industrial consortium, coordinated by Huawei, approved the operation of a functional prototype of an extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography system at a facility in Shenzhen. This announcement dismantles a core assumption that has dominated geopolitical thinking in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo over the past decade, namely that the extreme engineering complexity of EUV technology would permanently confine China behind a technological barrier, preventing it from advancing beyond the 7-nanometre threshold in leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing.   Western containment strategies were grounded in a firm conviction that the Dutch firm ASML’s monopoly over highly complex supply chains would guarantee the exclusion of the world’s second-largest economy from producing the advanced semiconductors required for artificial intelligence applications. The new Chinese prototype, however, has invalidated this assumption, not by replicating Western engineering paradigms, but by pursuing an alternative physical and engineering pathway, shaped by imperatives of national sovereignty and enabled by effectively unconstrained state capital.   This prototype, based on laser-driven plasma (LDP) technology, demonstrates that Chinese engineering teams have mastered the core physical principles of optical control at 13.5 nanometres. In doing so, they have moved beyond a phase long framed as one of "scientific impossibility", shifting the contest decisively into a new stage defined by engineering scale-up and operational viability. This development signals the end of an era of unipolar technological dominance. It inaugurates a new phase of dual ecosystems within the semiconductor industry. This transformation will require a comprehensive reassessment of the economic and security assumptions that have governed the sector for decades.

The structural foundations of the global video game economy are undergoing a profound transformation that extends well beyond the traditional triad of dominance in North America, Japan, and China. Strategic gravity is increasingly shifting toward the Gulf region, propelled by unprecedented capital inflows led by sovereign wealth funds across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This momentum marks a pivotal inflexion point in the investment doctrine of these institutions, most notably Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), alongside Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and ADQ, and the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). Collectively, they have moved beyond passive portfolio management focused on the accumulation of safe-haven assets such as US Treasury securities and real estate, toward active, operational ownership in high-growth technology sectors.   Within this context, the gaming industry, currently valued at over $200 billion and projected to surpass $300 billion by 2028, has emerged as a central pillar of this strategic shift. Its distinctive convergence with media ecosystems and artificial intelligence positions it as an ideal vehicle for advancing the economic diversification objectives embedded in national development visions.   Gulf engagement in this domain extends well beyond purely financial considerations into the realm of geopolitics. Through the acquisition of intellectual property, distribution networks, and digital infrastructure, these states are seeking to establish a form of “digital sovereignty” as an alternative to the historical dominance of hydrocarbons within their economic models. This objective is being pursued through differentiated strategies, ranging from Saudi Arabia’s vertically integrated approach to the United Arab Emirates’ ecosystem-building model and Qatar’s strategy of strategic linkage and connectivity.   Accordingly, understanding this investment domain requires situating it within the context of broader macroeconomic transformations. Successive price shocks in global oil markets, most notably in 2014 and during the 2020 pandemic and its aftermath, have exposed the limitations of the traditional petrodollar-based model in ensuring long-term wealth sustainability. By contrast, the gaming sector offers a structural response to pressing demographic challenges: it generates a jobs multiplier that exceeds that of many other sectors and absorbs the “youth bulge” that constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population, transforming it from a consumer base of foreign content into a national productive base that consolidates the principles of a new economic nationalism

In 2025, the rapid acceleration of artificial intelligence (AI) is no longer just expanding digital capabilities, it is reshaping the physical infrastructure that underpins the global economy. Data centres are becoming “AI factories,” designed for unprecedented computational intensity and continuous, large-scale workloads. Nearly 11,800 facilities were operating worldwide by 2024, with an increasing share built or retrofitted to power AI-grade computing. This shift has triggered a structural rise in energy consumption, placing extraordinary pressure on land, water, electricity systems, and financially straining grids and supply chains worldwide.   The defining constraint on the future of AI is no longer hardware or algorithms, it is energy. Without a rapid global shift to renewable and clean power, AI data centres will collide with resource shortages, grid instability, and economic risk, threatening the very growth they are meant to enable. As AI becomes foundational across industries, the challenge is no longer whether data centres will expand, but whether the world can generate enough clean power to sustain them. With demand already outpacing conventional grid capacity in major regions, energy availability not technological innovation will determine global competitiveness in the AI era.  

For most of modern history, political systems have been built around the assumption that human beings, rather than territory, rulers, or abstract notions of progress, are the central subjects of governance. Laws, economies, and institutions have been justified, at least in theory, by their obligation to protect human life, manage conflict, and improve collective wellbeing over time. Even when unevenly applied, this principle imposed an ethical constraint on power, requiring political authority to answer, however imperfectly, to human needs and consent.   Today, that assumption is rapidly eroding. A small group of technology elites increasingly speak and act as if humanity itself is provisional, a stage to be surpassed rather than a condition to be preserved. This belief is no longer confined to speculative philosophy. It is shaping how AI is built, how labour is governed, how inequality is rationalised, and how long-term political authority is imagined. The result is not merely a clash of ideas, but an emerging institutional crisis, in which decisions affecting billions are guided by a worldview that has never been democratically endorsed.

During the past decade, artificial intelligence (AI) has shifted from being an academic curiosity, becoming a driving force for reshaping economies worldwide. What once felt like speculative capabilities including machines generating code and automating complex workflows as well as optimizing global logistics and producing creative content, now became deployable tools on a larger scale across industries. AI’s rapid adoption raises several key questions among policymakers, economists and business leaders, most notably whether AI can contribute to the growth of national economic growth, and under what conditions do these gains materialize?   Macroeconomic models and strong empirical evidence suggest a positive outcome, however with notable limitations. AI, as a general-purpose technology, has more to offer than just efficiency improvements, it also functions as a key driver of innovation, productivity enhancement and transformation tool of economic structures. AI visibility and adoption have grown substantially, especially with the emergence of generative AI technologies such as exemplified ChatGPT, GitHub Copilot. This growth establishes AI as a valuable source of information and data, benefiting both firms and the border national economy, provided that this widespread adoption is backed and supported by a strong infrastructure and an adequate human capital, prepared to complement these technologies.