Since Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali left office as UN Secretary-General in 1996, after a US veto blocked his bid for a second term, no Arab has held the organisation's highest office for nearly three decades. This prolonged absence is neither a matter of chance nor, as some suggest, the result of a lack of Arab diplomatic expertise or competence. Rather, it stems from the interplay between the UN's complex selection process and the calculations of global powers, which together create a barrier to the emergence of new Arab candidates for the organisation's leadership.
The roots of this problem lie in the UN's regional group structure and the rules governing geographic rotation. The selection process does not treat Arab states as a single geographic bloc, but divides them between the "African Group" and the "Asia-Pacific Group". This division dilutes Arab voting strength. When it is Africa's or Asia's turn to put forward candidates for the post, Arab contenders must compete with major states that wield considerable political influence and demographic weight within their respective regions, making it difficult to secure the regional backing and consensus required for a successful candidacy.
Alongside this internal division, divisions among the major powers on the Security Council play a decisive role. The Middle East and North Africa is a key arena of great-power competition, subjecting any Arab candidate to intense political scrutiny by the five permanent members. Since securing the post necessarily requires avoiding a veto from any one of them, identifying a candidate acceptable to all the competing powers becomes exceptionally difficult, particularly as each contender is assessed in light of their country's international relationships and global alignments.
This analysis therefore seeks to unravel the reasons behind this prolonged absence. Does the reluctance of Arab capitals to enter the race in recent decades reflect a retreat and an acknowledgement of diplomatic limitations, or does it instead represent a tactical withdrawal and a calculated strategic decision to avoid electoral contests whose rules are structured in ways that effectively exclude candidates from regions at the fault lines of intense geopolitical rivalry?
The Arab Bloc: Between the Geographic Trap and the Veto
At first glance, the League of Arab States, comprising 22 countries, may appear to constitute a significant diplomatic force capable of backing an Arab candidate and exerting influence in international forums. Yet within the UN’s institutional structure, this influence is considerably diminished. The problem lies in the way the organisation divides its member states, for representation and coordination, into five principal regional groups: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and Others.
Although the UN Charter does not legally mandate the rotation of senior posts among these regions, the General Assembly has consistently encouraged adherence to geographic rotation as a political convention and a principle of equitable representation, in accordance with paragraph 59 of Resolution 77/335. This helps explain, for example, the growing calls for the Latin American and Caribbean Group to be given greater consideration in the 2026 selection process, given its historically limited representation.
Under this political convention, the UN selection process does not treat Arab states as a distinct regional bloc, but divides them between the “African Group” and the “Asia-Pacific Group”. This division dilutes Arab voting strength and deprives them of the advantages of acting collectively. When it is Africa’s or Asia’s turn to put forward candidates, an Arab contender must compete with major states that wield considerable political influence and demographic weight within those regions. As a result, Arab candidates must first navigate a difficult contest within their own regional group to establish their claim to the nomination, weakening their prospects of securing the early regional backing that constitutes the first step towards leading the United Nations.
If the regional group system constitutes the first obstacle, overcoming it brings an Arab candidate face to face with the greater and ultimately decisive challenge: the UN Security Council. However strong the political case for regional rotation may be, it cannot override the requirement for consensus within the Council. Under Article 97 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. This makes securing the consent of the five permanent members, and avoiding a veto by any one of them, the most consequential requirement in the selection process, both legally and in practice.
At this decisive stage, candidates are assessed not only on their credentials and competence, but also on their ability to reassure the major powers that their tenure would not threaten their interests. It is here that the Arab region’s strategic location becomes a diplomatic liability. The Middle East is a key arena of competition among major powers such as the United States, Russia and China. This complex interplay makes it extremely difficult to put forward an Arab candidate who would be regarded as entirely “neutral”, as candidates are inevitably associated with their country’s external alliances. A candidate from a state with close ties to the West could face an outright veto from the opposing camp, while the reverse could equally apply to a candidate from a country closely aligned with Russia or China.
These complexities, in turn, lead the permanent members to question the independence of Arab candidates and view them through the prism of their own rivalries, prompting them to favour compromise candidates acceptable to all sides. This approach tends to exclude figures from conflict-prone regions in favour of diplomats from more stable states that are relatively removed from major global disputes. The aim is to ensure that the organisation can be led without upsetting the delicate balance of power, which helps explain why Arab candidates have remained outside the final calculations for the UN’s top post.
The Challenge of Institutional Consensus and the Absence of a Unified Candidate
While the veto and the influence of the major powers on the Security Council constitute a formidable barrier to Arab ambitions, overcoming this hurdle brings another, internal obstacle to the fore: the absence of regional consensus. Countering pressure from the five permanent members necessarily requires strong diplomatic backing underpinned by a cohesive Arab consensus. This is where the problem becomes particularly acute. Weak coordination among Arab states provides the major powers with a ready justification for excluding Arab candidates on the grounds that they lack the support and consensus of their own region even before seeking the confidence of the wider international community.
This weakness is evident in the absence of any binding coordination mechanism within the League of Arab States, in contrast to other regional blocs that have succeeded in coordinating their positions. The European Union, for example, follows clearly defined processes for supporting its candidates within international organisations. Similarly, the African Union has developed practical mechanisms for resolving internal differences and selecting a “single continental candidate” backed by all its member states. The Arab system, by contrast, lacks comparable mechanisms. The Arab League’s decision-making often leaves individual states to pursue their own positions, preventing the region’s demographic, political and economic weight from being translated into a unified voting bloc capable of mobilising support for a “single Arab candidate”.
This lack of prior coordination produces two possible outcomes, neither of which serves Arab interests. The first is the emergence of multiple Arab candidates in the same contest, inevitably fragmenting the vote and weakening the collective Arab position. This division also gives rival candidates, whether from Asia or non-Arab African states, an easier path to securing the votes needed to win the post by capitalising on Arab disunity.
The second, which has become an increasingly common approach among Arab states over the past three decades, is to refrain from fielding candidates altogether. This does not reflect a lack of Arab diplomatic expertise or capability, but rather a calculated political decision aimed primarily at avoiding diplomatic embarrassment and expending time and effort on contests whose prospects of success are limited from the outset, whether because of the lack of internal Arab cohesion or the difficulty of overcoming the constraints of geographic representation and opposition from the major powers.
The Myth of an Arab Competence Deficit
This retreat from putting forward Arab candidates for the post, which, as noted earlier, stems from weak coordination among Arab states, has inadvertently given rise to one of the most persistent misconceptions in diplomatic circles: the notion of an Arab “competence deficit”. With no Arab candidates mounting serious campaigns for the post of Secretary-General, some analyses have attributed this absence to a shortage of diplomatic and administrative expertise in the Arab world capable of leading a complex organisation such as the United Nations. This conclusion is not only inaccurate, but directly contradicted by the historical record, which demonstrates the significant role Arabs have played in leading institutions across the UN system.
The evidence shows that Arab diplomats have long led and managed some of the most complex and sensitive agencies within the UN system, institutions that demand administrative expertise and negotiating skills that may exceed those required of the Secretary-General. Arab officials have, for example, successfully led organisations with highly sensitive security and strategic mandates, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, during some of the most challenging periods of global tension. This prominent presence has also extended to the management of major development funds, the leadership of peacekeeping missions, and the direction of organisations specialising in development and environmental affairs. The success of Arab officials in managing crises and leading complex international technical institutions decisively dispels the notion of a deficit in Arab diplomatic expertise or capability.
In conclusion, the absence of an Arab voice from the leadership of the United Nations since Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali left office in 1996 is neither a historical coincidence nor indicative of a shortage of Arab diplomatic expertise or capability. Rather, it is the product of complex political calculations, not a deficit of competence. The Arab world possesses individuals fully qualified to lead international organisations, but their prospects are constrained by formidable structural barriers. The problem is fundamentally political, rooted in the voting system, the vetoes and objections of the major powers, and the absence of a unified Arab front capable of rallying behind a single candidate. In other words, the issue is not whether an Arab candidate is capable of leading, but whether the structure of the UN system allows figures from regions at the centre of major geopolitical conflicts to reach the organisation’s highest office.
Moreover, the UN voting system divides Arab states between two regional groups, diluting their collective weight and influence. When this structural disadvantage is compounded by the veto power wielded by the five permanent members of the Security Council, the prospects of an Arab candidate securing the post become exceedingly limited, given the complex international rivalries and divisions surrounding the Middle East.
Against this backdrop, the underlying reasons for Arab states’ reluctance to put forward new candidates over recent decades become clearer. This retreat is not evidence of incapacity, but rather a “calculated political decision”. Arab leaders recognise that entering an uneven contest, without unified Arab backing and amid deep international divisions, would amount to a wasted diplomatic effort. Staying out of the race has therefore been a means of shielding qualified Arab figures from becoming entangled in the bargaining and strategic calculations of the major powers.
Nevertheless, this situation is not immutable, particularly as the world undergoes rapid shifts towards a new international order in which multiple powers are seeking to reshape the rules governing international affairs. Amid these changes, putting forward candidates with outstanding credentials and extensive experience will not be enough. Arab states will also need to overcome their fragmentation and build a cohesive diplomatic front. Any path back to the highest levels of UN leadership must therefore involve establishing a mechanism capable of forging genuine Arab consensus. This would make support for a “unified Arab candidate” a necessary means of ensuring international balance and place such a candidacy firmly on the Security Council’s agenda as a legitimate and deserved claim, rather than merely a transient political compromise.
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