The Gulf

The landscape of modern air warfare has undergone a profound and structural transformation over the past decade. Air superiority is no longer the exclusive domain of those possessing the most expensive and technologically advanced platforms; rather, it has become accessible to actors capable of effectively leveraging scale and repetition against sophistication and complexity. This new equation has been clearly manifested in the widespread deployment of one-way attack drones, particularly the Iranian “Shahed” series, which has significantly altered established strategic calculations. In their early iterations, these drones operated on relatively simple logic: they were pre-programmed with target coordinates and then launched to navigate their trajectories using conventional satellite navigation systems such as the American GPS and its Russian counterpart, GLONASS. However, this reliance on such systems simultaneously made them the most exploitable vulnerability, as defenders rapidly developed electronic warfare capabilities, including jamming and spoofing tools, to disrupt their guidance and neutralise their missions.   However, this reality did not endure for long. As the intensity of conflicts involving these systems escalated, Iranian drones transitioned into a fundamentally different phase with the integration of communication modules operating via the commercial satellite network Iridium. This was not merely a technical upgrade but a calculated and direct response to GPS vulnerabilities, reflecting a strategic exploitation of civilian infrastructure for military purposes. While GPS satellites struggle to withstand ground-based jamming due to the weakness of their signals transmitted from altitudes exceeding 20,000 kilometres, Iridium satellites operate in low Earth orbit at altitudes of no more than 800 kilometres, emitting signals up to a thousand times stronger. These signals are further protected by layers of encryption that make spoofing or manipulation extremely difficult.   Shahed drones have thus evolved from inert projectiles following a fixed, unalterable path into connected platforms linked to their operators in real time, capable of receiving updates, changing course, sharing data with other airborne units, and even conducting precise strikes against moving targets such as ships at sea. This report therefore offers an in-depth technical and strategic examination of this transformation and its battlefield implications, beginning with the structure and operating logic of the Iridium network, moving through an analysis of the Shahed-131 platform and the integration of these communications into it, and culminating in an assessment of the operational impact this has had on some of the world’s most complex and densely layered air defence systems, namely Israel’s multi-layered architecture, which faced its most severe tests between 2024 and 2026.

Since late February 2026, the regional and international geopolitical landscape has entered a phase of accelerating military escalation following the outbreak of direct confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other. That conflict has triggered successive waves of missile and drone attacks, generating recurrent spillover effects that have directly affected the airspace of Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates.   Although the United Arab Emirates’ defence and institutional infrastructure, particularly in Dubai, demonstrated exceptional resilience and an immediate operational response to these threats through the activation of advanced air defence systems and the careful, precautionary management of brief airspace closures to safeguard air navigation and civilian safety, the real crisis did not lie solely in the direct military dimension. It also extended into a highly complex information war.   These developments coincided with the strict enforcement of domestic cybercrime laws, which restricted the circulation of unauthorised images and video footage in an effort to prevent panic and protect national security. Yet this also created an opening that the Western media machine exploited strategically and systematically to dominate the flow of information and construct a distorted account of events.   Against this backdrop of stark divergence between the coherent reality on the ground and the remote narrative constructed around it, international media outlets, particularly the British tabloid press, turned into vehicles for an extraordinary degree of dramatization. What were, in reality, limited regional spillovers were presented as evidence of an imminent and inevitable collapse of Dubai’s entire economic and social model.   By adopting provocative and polarising headlines that flatly declared Dubai “finished”, and casting the crisis as the tragic collapse of the safe tax haven dream, these outlets embraced a line of analysis wholly detached from realities on the ground. Verified evidence of business continuity and the strength of the UAE’s security architecture was sidelined in favour of a pre-packaged disaster narrative. This shift demands a deeper analytical and historical examination of the mechanisms and the economic and political incentives that can drive media institutions away from their role as objective conveyors of fact and turn them into instruments for shaping global public opinion.

Iran has blocked maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz since the first week of March, following the attacks it sustained during Operation Epic Fury. This disruption has hindered the movement of nearly 20 million barrels of crude oil per day. It has trapped shipments of liquefied natural gas, accounting for around 20% of global consumption, within the waters of the Arabian Gulf. As a result, international energy markets are experiencing sharp price volatility affecting Brent crude futures and European gas contracts.   At the same time, maritime shipping lines have been compelled to reroute their commercial fleets, forcing them to navigate around the historic Cape of Good Hope route at the southern tip of Africa. This enforced geographic diversion adds approximately 19 days to maritime transit times to and from Asia, generating weekly losses for global supply chains estimated at between $2 billion and $3 billion in additional operating and fuel costs.   This operational disruption directly affects the technological infrastructure of East Asia, where advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities in Taiwan and South Korea require vast, continuous electricity supplies to operate lithography systems around the clock. These critical facilities, which account for approximately 68% of global semiconductor production, rely on imported liquefied natural gas to ensure the stability of their power networks and prevent disruptions.   In parallel, the precision manufacturing processes involved depend on highly specialised raw materials whose primary sources are concentrated in regions currently affected by the crisis. In particular, production lines require ultra-high-purity helium gas, extracted as a by-product from Gulf LNG liquefaction facilities, which represent roughly 35% of global supply, as well as bromine, which Korean factories import at a rate of 97.5% from the Dead Sea coast for chemical etching processes. Accordingly, technology firms are accelerating efforts to assess their exposure to the dual energy and critical chemical input shortages. At the same time, economic stakeholders monitor the crisis's trajectory with heightened caution to safeguard supply chain continuity.   Accordingly, this analysis examines the strategic and operational implications arising from the closure, focusing on three principal dimensions. First, it addresses the disruption of liquefied natural gas supplies and their direct impact on the security of power grids that sustain major Asian semiconductor manufacturing hubs. Second, it examines the sharp interruption in the supply of critical raw materials, particularly specialised gases and petrochemical inputs required for precision manufacturing processes. Finally, it explores the logistical repercussions of the forced rerouting of maritime shipping routes, as well as the strategic measures states are considering to mitigate future geopolitical risks.

The U.S.-Israel-Iran war and Recent events that followed in Gulf countries have provided one of the clearest real-world demonstrations of modern air and missile defence under sustained pressure. Modern air warfare is increasingly defined by the ability of states to withstand large-scale saturation attacks involving drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The proliferation of relatively inexpensive unmanned systems and precision-guided weapons has altered the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities, allowing even modest actors to launch high volumes of aerial threats. In this environment, the success of air and missile defence no longer depends solely on technological sophistication but also on defence density, the concentration of defensive systems relative to territory and population. Dense, layered air-defence networks provide multiple interception opportunities and reduce the likelihood that incoming salvos can overwhelm defensive systems. As recent conflicts have demonstrated, resilience against saturation attacks increasingly depends on whether states can deploy sufficient numbers of interceptors, overlapping defensive layers, and integrated detection networks.

The United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury in late February 2026, targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure and seeking to remove its political leadership. Although the operation achieved its initial tactical objectives with high precision, it provoked an asymmetric retaliatory response from the remaining Iranian forces. This response took the form of a comprehensive blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical maritime artery for energy transport, triggering a severe global economic shock. Such disruption could propel the international system towards reducing its reliance on fossil fuels and accelerating the adoption of alternative domestic energy solutions, most notably nuclear power.   At the same time, global electricity demand is rising sharply, driven by the rapid expansion of advanced artificial intelligence infrastructure and high-performance computing facilities. This sudden disruption of fuel supplies places policymakers in major industrial economies under immediate economic and security pressures, while simultaneously exposing the profound consequences of closing the Strait. In this context, the present analysis examines the repercussions of the Strait of Hormuz's closure on global supply chains. It then develops a historical comparison with the oil price shocks of the 1970s, illustrating how those crises redirected states towards nuclear technology. The study concludes by analysing emerging regulatory and financial measures, as well as new geopolitical alignments, that are accelerating the global drive to construct nuclear reactors in 2026.

The structural foundations of the global video game economy are undergoing a profound transformation that extends well beyond the traditional triad of dominance in North America, Japan, and China. Strategic gravity is increasingly shifting toward the Gulf region, propelled by unprecedented capital inflows led by sovereign wealth funds across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This momentum marks a pivotal inflexion point in the investment doctrine of these institutions, most notably Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), alongside Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and ADQ, and the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). Collectively, they have moved beyond passive portfolio management focused on the accumulation of safe-haven assets such as US Treasury securities and real estate, toward active, operational ownership in high-growth technology sectors.   Within this context, the gaming industry, currently valued at over $200 billion and projected to surpass $300 billion by 2028, has emerged as a central pillar of this strategic shift. Its distinctive convergence with media ecosystems and artificial intelligence positions it as an ideal vehicle for advancing the economic diversification objectives embedded in national development visions.   Gulf engagement in this domain extends well beyond purely financial considerations into the realm of geopolitics. Through the acquisition of intellectual property, distribution networks, and digital infrastructure, these states are seeking to establish a form of “digital sovereignty” as an alternative to the historical dominance of hydrocarbons within their economic models. This objective is being pursued through differentiated strategies, ranging from Saudi Arabia’s vertically integrated approach to the United Arab Emirates’ ecosystem-building model and Qatar’s strategy of strategic linkage and connectivity.   Accordingly, understanding this investment domain requires situating it within the context of broader macroeconomic transformations. Successive price shocks in global oil markets, most notably in 2014 and during the 2020 pandemic and its aftermath, have exposed the limitations of the traditional petrodollar-based model in ensuring long-term wealth sustainability. By contrast, the gaming sector offers a structural response to pressing demographic challenges: it generates a jobs multiplier that exceeds that of many other sectors and absorbs the “youth bulge” that constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population, transforming it from a consumer base of foreign content into a national productive base that consolidates the principles of a new economic nationalism

Since Brexit, the United Kingdom (UK) has been experiencing a governance issue, as the Conservative Party suffered from instability due to numerous leadership changes, while the recently elected Labour Party lacks the ambition and confidence needed to effectively govern. Combined with the shocks stemming from Brexit, COVID-19, and the Russia-Ukraine War, the UK has experienced economic stagnation and the deterioration of public services, which has resulted in British nationals migrating abroad.   One of these locations is the UAE, more specifically, Dubai. There are approximately 240,000 British nationals currently living in Dubai, with more to join as there was a 420% increase in internet searches in the UK centered on moving to Dubai. Those are staggering statistics, and the number is only going to grow as more British nationals across the socio-economic spectrum continue to migrate to Dubai. However, the reasons explaining British migration to Dubai are not as simple as lower taxes, security, and great weather. One can argue the rise of British migration to Dubai can be attributed to a desire to break from a ridged class system, declinism, and emotional turmoil brought on by the cost-of-living crisis.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) defines the guiding vision of American power and provides a window into how the United States understands the international environment, identifies its priorities, and determines the political, military, and economic tools it will rely on to protect national interests. Accordingly, the NSS shapes defence planning, informs foreign policy doctrine, guides inter-agency action, and signals to allies and adversaries the direction of U.S. engagement in an evolving global landscape.   The 2025 NSS, issued by the Trump administration in November 2025, is a clear articulation of how this administration intends to position itself in a world marked by rising geopolitical fragmentation, sharpening competition, and growing domestic constraints. Its core purpose is to translate the administration’s worldview into a coherent framework that defines what the United States will prioritise, what it will deprioritise, and under what conditions it will expend political capital, economic leverage, or military force.   For the Middle East, understanding the 2025 NSS is essential because it captures the principles shaping America’s evolving posture toward the region. The strategy’s emphasis on burden-sharing, reduced military exposure, and transactional partnerships signals a shift in expectations for regional actors, while its focus on energy security, counterterrorism, and strategic competition with external powers continues to define the contours of U.S. interests. As a formal expression of how the administration interprets threats and opportunities, the NSS provides the clearest available roadmap of Washington’s intentions—and the framework within which its decisions toward the Middle East will be made in the years ahead.

China has a long-term goal to be a global leader in technology. To achieve such ambition, the country has taken serious steps widening its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) traditional infrastructure projects to incorporate digital infrastructure projects embodied in the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR was initially launched in 2015 by the government as an idea on paper and during the opening ceremony of the First Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, China’s President Xi Jinping, adopted the DSR term officially and it was incorporated in the government’s BRI strategy as the digital dimension.   The DSR initiative focuses on building digital infrastructure and exporting its technology to the beneficiary countries, it includes telecommunications infrastructure, like 5G networks, overland fibre-optic cables, data centres, cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), as well as applications that support e-commerce and mobile payments, along with smart cities and surveillance technology.  Additionally, the DSR provides support to Chinese tech companies, like ZTE, Huawei, and Alibaba, to carry on the work with the beneficiaries.   The DSR aims to enhance Beijing's global digital influence as it creates opportunities for a wide range of cooperation and partnerships between Chinses tech companies and other beneficiaries around the world in areas of digitalization and AI. China’s DSR encompass a variety of projects in 5G deployment, e-commerce platforms, and AI applications, such as DeepSeek which is an alternative model to ChatGPT.   China signed DSR cooperation agreements with several countries in Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. The cooperation takes place between scientists and engineers from the recipient country and Beijing, like opening a training centre or in research and development (R&D). The areas of cooperation are wide, including smart cities, AI and robotics, clean energy, and surveillance capabilities, like data localization. GCC countries are considered one of the important partners to China’s DSR, where it is closely integrating in the GCC digitalization goals.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is intending to establish a new trade bloc, a strategic and interconnected initiative aimed at achieving multiple goals on both the national and the international level. This trade block should not be interpreted in isolation, rather as part of the UAE’s wider economic and geopolitical strategy, which reflects the changing and evolving dynamics of the global trade landscape.     In a fragmented globalization era, where competition and integration attempt significantly increase between the regional trade networks and the multilateral systems, the UAE is poised to maintain its influence and relevance by positioning itself at the forefront of the global landscape. This approach will benefit the UAE on different levels, including advancing domestic priorities while simultaneously enhancing its leverage within the evolving global economic power. Nevertheless, the bloc’s success is not completely guaranteed, as it will need to navigate significant regulatory, infrastructural, and political barriers to translate its potentiality into tangible outcomes.

Netanyahu’s ambitions are no longer confined to diplomacy or the pursuit of normalisation agreements. The Abraham Accords, once seen as his utlimate goal of his contemporary regional strategy, now appear irrelevant, cast aside in favor of a far more aggressive vision. What is unfolding is not the politics of peace but the politics of expansion, where no Arab country can assume immunity. The question of which state will be targeted next is impossible to predict, precisely because Netanyahu’s actions are driven less by rational calculation than by the confidence that comes with unconditional American support. Few could have imagined that Doha, with its U.S. military base and status as a close Washington ally, would be struck, yet it happened. This unpredictability signals a dangerous reality: the scale of war is set to widen, and any country in the region could find itself Israel’s next target.

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the potential economic, political, and security outcomes should the Arab and Islamic worlds enact a coordinated airspace blockade against Israel. The specified catalyst for this action is the Israeli airstrike on Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, 2025, an event that has already precipitated a significant realignment of regional diplomatic postures.   The central thesis of this analysis is that a coordinated airspace blockade would represent a strategic shock to Israel, not merely a logistical inconvenience. It would function as a form of asymmetric economic warfare, inflicting severe, multi-sector damage on Israel's globally integrated economy by targeting its core vulnerabilities in aviation, high-value trade, and tourism. The direct economic impact is estimated to be a contraction of 4.8% to 5.7% of Israel's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a shock sufficient to trigger a deep recession.   Politically, the blockade would fundamentally re-order the regional geopolitical landscape, shattering the post-2020 status quo established by the Abraham Accords and rendering further normalization efforts untenable. It would accelerate a strategic pivot by Gulf Arab states away from a singular reliance on the United States as a security guarantor, fostering a new, region-driven security architecture. For the United States, such a development would present an acute diplomatic crisis, forcing a choice between its ironclad alliance with Israel and its vital strategic partnerships with Arab nations, thereby undermining a cornerstone of its Middle East policy.   From a security perspective, the blockade would act as a "gray zone" challenge, a highly coercive act that exists in the ambiguous space between peace and declared war. It would degrade the operational reach of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and place the onus of military escalation squarely on Israel. A decision by Israel to forcibly challenge the blockade would create a high-probability pathway to a wider regional military conflict, potentially drawing in the Gulf states, Iran and its proxies, and the United States. The airspace blockade, therefore, represents a plausible and potent instrument of collective action that could irrevocably alter the strategic balance in the Middle East.