What If: The Next Power Race Is for Data, Not Land?

The race for global dominance is no longer fought over land, oil, or military might, it is rapidly unfolding in the realm of data. Across the world, governments are fortifying their digital borders, investing in surveillance technologies, and rewriting laws to claim ownership over the information flowing through their networks.

What emerges is a contest not for territory but for control over the data that defines modern life, who produces it, who stores it, and who decides how it is used. This silent power race is redrawing the global order, creating new hierarchies of influence built on algorithms and infrastructure rather than armies. As states weaponise information, the battle for sovereignty is shifting from physical borders to the digital terrain of human behaviour.

As the global contest for digital control intensifies, a rapidly evolving power struggle is taking shape, one no longer measured by armies or borders, but by who commands the vast networks of information underpinning modern life. In this shifting order, data has become a strategic resource that shapes economies, influences elections, and redefines how states engage with their citizens. Every online action, from a purchase to a message, feeds into an immense current of information that governments and corporations compete to capture, store, and interpret. The balance of power now depends less on physical strength and more on who governs this flow of data and determines how it is used.

This struggle has become visible through national surveillance programmes and governments’ growing reliance on private technology firms. In the United States, the reactivation of a two-million-dollar contract between Homeland Security Investigations and the Israeli spyware company Paragon Solutions illustrates this dynamic. The deal, originally suspended by the Biden administration in 2024, was reinstated once Paragon was acquired by the U.S.-based AE Industrial Partners and merged with the Virginia cyber-intelligence firm REDLattice. Officials justified the move as a way to enhance digital investigative capacity against organised crime and cross-border smuggling. Yet the same technology that can infiltrate criminal networks can also penetrate citizens’ devices, dissolving the distinction between legitimate security measures and domestic surveillance.

Paragon’s spyware, Graphite, enables full device compromise, accessing encrypted messages, photos, and microphones without user awareness. Officials claim such tools are indispensable in an era of encrypted communications, but their record shows persistent overreach. The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto documented how journalists in Italy were targeted through “zero-click” iMessage exploits. Apple later confirmed the flaw and linked it to Paragon’s software. WhatsApp likewise notified 90 journalists and civil society members that they had been targeted and sent Paragon a cease-and-desist letter. These incidents demonstrate how tools designed for law enforcement can easily be repurposed for political surveillance, quietly normalising intrusion into civil life under the guise of national security.

Across the Atlantic, the United Kingdom is advancing its own project of digital control through the proposed BritCards national digital identity system. Officials describe it as a measure to simplify access to public services and reduce fraud, but it has ignited public concern. Civil-rights groups warn that it risks creating a “database state” where every aspect of daily life, from healthcare appointments to job applications, is logged in a government-controlled system. Previous UK identity initiatives collapsed under public pressure, and repeated data breaches in healthcare and welfare systems have already weakened public confidence.

The issue extends beyond potential misuse to structural vulnerability. Centralised databases attract cyberattacks and magnify the consequences of technical failure. A single glitch could lock people out of essential services, while a policy change could restrict access for targeted groups. When every citizen’s identity and activity are tied to one digital system, the balance of power shifts decisively towards the state. What begins as administrative efficiency can evolve into a system of control where rights and access depend on digital compliance.

Despite public resistance, the political appeal of such systems remains strong. They promise convenience and control at a time when governments are under pressure to deliver secure, efficient services. Yet beneath this narrative lies a deeper strategic motive, the global race for data sovereignty. Around the world, countries are rewriting laws to ensure that data generated within their borders remains under domestic jurisdiction and beyond foreign influence.

The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the most prominent example. While presented as a measure to safeguard citizens’ privacy, it also asserts Europe’s jurisdictional authority in the digital sphere by restricting how data can move across borders. This principle was reinforced by the 2020 Schrems II ruling, a landmark decision by the European Court of Justice that struck down the EU–US Privacy Shield agreement over concerns about U.S. surveillance practices. Building on this precedent, other powers have since adopted similar strategies. China’s Data Security Law treats information as a strategic resource equivalent to oil, requiring local storage and state oversight, while India, Brazil, and Nigeria have enacted their own localisation laws to tighten control over citizens’ digital assets.

This trend marks a significant reconfiguration of global power. Information that once flowed freely across borders is increasingly subject to state control, reflecting a shift from open connectivity to regulated sovereignty. Yet these same systems designed to defend nations from external surveillance can be redirected inward. Democratic and authoritarian governments alike are expanding their monitoring capabilities, blurring the line between governance and surveillance.

The paradox of digital sovereignty lies precisely in this convergence, as attempts to defend privacy and strengthen national security often end up constructing an infrastructure of surveillance. As governments accumulate more information in the name of protection, individuals become more visible, traceable, and predictable. Control merges with care, and surveillance becomes embedded in the routine operations of modern governance. The critical question is no longer whether data should be protected, but who controls it and to what end.

If this trajectory continues, the main arena of geopolitical competition will shift from territory to data. The world may divide into information blocs, where influence is measured by control over digital infrastructure rather than military capability. In such a scenario, the alliances of the future will be formed through data-sharing corridors linking trusted partners while excluding rivals. Nations will trade information as they once traded natural resources, securing access to data flows that underpin both security and economic power.

Data itself will become a resource mined, stored, and weaponised. Citizens’ personal information, behavioural records, and biometric identifiers will represent a form of national wealth, jointly managed by governments and corporate actors. States may negotiate cross-border access through “trusted digital corridors,” while adversaries build digital walls to block each other’s influence, accelerating the fragmentation of the internet into what analysts already call the “splinternet.”

For individuals, this environment would mean constant verification. Each transaction and movement would feed a permanent digital profile, defining access to rights and opportunities. The presumption of innocence could yield to algorithmic suspicion, as predictive systems assign risk scores that quietly shape how people are treated by employers, banks, and border authorities.

The technologies enabling this world already exist. Spyware such as Graphite, predictive policing platforms, facial-recognition networks, and national digital-ID systems together form a pervasive architecture of surveillance. Governments no longer need to suppress dissent overtly; they can monitor conversations, map social connections, and act pre-emptively. The power to anticipate and influence behaviour has become a key instrument of political control.

At the geopolitical level, alliances are beginning to reorganise around data infrastructure. The long-standing Five Eyes partnership, comprising the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, illustrates how intelligence cooperation is evolving into a shared digital ecosystem. Future “data blocs” could extend this model, integrating AI and cloud systems to coordinate both security and governance. Meanwhile, Europe is pursuing autonomy through GAIA-X, a sovereign cloud project designed to keep European data within European borders. Regional initiatives in Africa and Southeast Asia are taking shape along similar lines, seeking to protect local data economies from dominance by foreign technology firms.

However, the consolidation of data control brings serious costs. As states impose localisation requirements and limit cross-border data flows, innovation slows and operational costs rise. Smaller nations without the capacity to build sovereign digital infrastructures risk dependency on larger powers, effectively surrendering digital independence in exchange for technological support. The vision of an open global internet is giving way to fragmented digital territories, each governed by its own regulations and values.

For citizens, the transformation will be both pervasive and personal. Smart-city systems, facial-recognition networks, and connected devices will continuously monitor movement and behaviour. The convenience of automation will obscure the extent of data extraction. A single error could exclude individuals from essential services; a breach could expose entire populations. Privacy will become a privilege for those able to afford digital protection, through encryption tools, paid anonymity services, or legal exemptions, while others live fully exposed within systems they cannot opt out of.

AI further intensifies this dilemma by embedding political and cultural assumptions into automated decision-making systems. By processing vast quantities of personal data, AI embeds political assumptions and social biases into decision-making systems that govern daily life. Algorithms trained on domestic datasets will determine creditworthiness, border eligibility, and even perceived trust. Ideology, once debated in parliaments, will be encoded in software, regulating citizens silently but powerfully.

Over time, these dynamics may deepen global inequality. Those with the resources to secure their data will maintain autonomy, while marginalised groups remain subject to continuous monitoring. Societies could divide not only by wealth but by control over information, those who manage data and those who are managed by it.

Ultimately, the race for data sovereignty reveals a transformation in global power. The United States’ use of foreign spyware, Britain’s pursuit of digital identity systems, and the worldwide proliferation of data control laws all reflect a single trend: the modern state is evolving from a protector of borders into a manager of information. This shift promises greater efficiency and security, but it also redefines freedom and accountability.

The challenge for the coming decade is to ensure that systems built to protect do not become tools of control. The next power race will not be fought with armies but with algorithms, and the true measure of national strength may lie in how responsibly a country governs its digital domain. In a world where data has replaced territory as the ultimate prize, sovereignty itself will depend on the capacity to wield information without sacrificing the privacy and autonomy of those it claims to protect.

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