United States (U.S.)

In April 2025, the Trump administration stunned global markets by announcing a sweeping tariff expansion under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), introducing a flat 10% universal tariff on all imports. This move, framed as a national economic emergency response, immediately triggered global trade uncertainty and diplomatic friction. The policy marked a significant escalation of Trump’s protectionist agenda, signalling a break with multilateralism and targeting long-standing trade imbalances with strategic rivals and allies alike. We found that the United States (U.S.) trade structure is deeply imbalanced, with persistent deficits concentrated in sectors essential to industrial production, such as machinery, electronics, and vehicles. These deficits have exposed the U.S. to retaliatory measures from key trade partners—particularly China, Canada, and the EU—who have calibrated their responses to hit politically and economically sensitive export categories. Tariffs have initiated a multi-channel inflationary shock: direct consumer price increases, rising intermediate input costs, and cascading pressures on logistics and wages. The compounded effect has resulted in a net consumer price index (CPI) increase of approximately 1.2%, with higher spikes in key durable goods. Global supply chains are beginning to reconfigure.   The automotive sector, in particular, has seen disruption in bilateral flows with traditional partners, creating openings for new logistical nodes. The UAE stands out as a beneficiary, attracting redirected FDI and becoming a strategic re-export and final assembly hub. Collectively, these findings underscore a paradox: while the policy aims to reduce dependency and correct trade imbalances, it simultaneously accelerates external retaliation, domestic cost pressures, and global fragmentation in trade infrastructure.

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East is set for a potentially major shift with US President Donald Trump’s announcement of the resumption of negotiations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, scheduled to begin on April 12, 2025. Following a period marked by escalating bilateral tensions and the effective dissolution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this resumption of dialogue has generated considerable anticipation both within Iran and across the wider region. The initial, albeit potentially transient, positive reactions observed in Tehran’s financial markets, as evidenced by movements in the stock market and gold prices, underscore the profound economic implications these discussions could hold for the Iranian populace. Furthermore, the potential for these negotiations to influence broader regional stability is a matter of significant concern and interest even for the nations within the Arabian Gulf. While the precise modalities of these diplomatic engagements – specifically whether they will entail direct bilateral talks, as suggested by the U.S. administration, or proceed indirectly through intermediary channels – remain subject to clarification, the very initiation of dialogue signifies a notable departure from the recent trajectory of U.S.-Iran relations. This analysis will therefore explore a range of plausible scenarios that may unfold as delegations from the United States and Iran convene on April 12, and consider the salient internal political dynamics within both nations, the prevailing external pressures exerted by regional and international actors, and the specific contextual factors that have contributed to this renewed, albeit cautious, engagement.

For decades, Western countries, especially the United States (U.S.), used sanctions as a common tool to promote democracy and prevent certain nations from developing nuclear or chemical weapons. Iran, due to its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and other advanced technological weapons, has become a prime example, facing one of the strictest sanctions regimes in the world since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. These measures including the U.N. Security Council embargoes in 2007 and 2015, have had a major impact on Iran’s economy. However, alongside the economic hardship, sanctions have also spurred the growth of a domestic manufacturing sector, especially in defence and military industries, demonstrating the country’s capacity to adapt to hardship.

Populism has recently risen in different regions, including Europe and the United States, constituting a challenge to local and global politics. While this phenomenon existed in Europe before the Second World War (WII), the rise of the Soviet Union as a principal threat to Europe after WII prompted them to neglect populism’s negatives and emphasise confronting the Soviet challenge. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe began an institutionalised process of identifying new internal and external threats, attempting to keep its capabilities mobilised for confronting challenges that might suddenly arise. This process led to identifying several internal threats, such as migration, lack of skilled employment, and populism as serious threats. Moreover, European integration began a new phase with the conclusion of the Maastricht agreement in 1992, creating the EU in its current form, which prompted Europeans to identify populism as a threat that might impede European integration.

Recent decisions by U.S. President Donald Trump cutting aid to foreign countries and dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have sparked global backlash. While the impact of cutting aid is substantial, the broader significance of this move cannot be overlooked. It reflects a deeper shift in the Trump administration’s foreign policy strategy. But what are the implications for the U.S. and its adversaries?

The Kurdish dream of establishing an independent state was on the verge of realisation after centuries of demands in Jan. 1946. This came when “Qazi Mohammad,” the Iranian Kurdish leader, declared the establishment of the Mahabad Republic in the province of the same name, now part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, this dream quickly dissipated when the Soviet Union withdrew its financial support for the nascent state. The intensification of the economic blockade on the region further compounded the situation, preventing the entry of food supplies and reducing agricultural production. These pressures led to dramatic shifts in the loyalties of Kurdish tribal leaders who had initially allied with “Qazi” during the state's formation, hoping to secure a share of Soviet financial and food aid.   The food situation worsened over time, pushing some leaders of the Mahabad army to leave the capital, especially as Iranian forces were nearing its entrance, leaving the Kurdish leader and a small Kurdish group behind to face an unequal battle with the Iranian army. Therefore, to spare Kurdish blood, it was decided to surrender on December 15 of the same year, leading to the Iranian army's occupation of Mahabad and the declaration of the state's fall. In the end, “Qazi” was executed in March 1947, marking the end of the closest attempt to establish a Kurdish state.   About a quarter of a century later, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a series of rulings regarding Iraqi oil exported by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The latest ruling, issued in Feb. 2024, mandated the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers to hand over all oil and non-oil revenues to the central government in Baghdad. This could have a dual impact similar to that caused by the cessation of financial support and the Iranian blockade on the Mahabad army, but this time it affects the Peshmerga forces that represent the hope for preserving the “autonomy” of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq considered the second closest Kurdish attempt at establishing a national homeland for the Kurds.   Therefore, the First Part of this paper addresses the political situation of the Kurds, focusing on the status of the region in the Iraqi Constitution, the contentious issues between the region and the federal government, and the impact of these disputes on the continuity and existence of the Peshmerga. The Second Part reviews the economic situation, examining the effects of the series of judicial rulings on the conditions that undermine the autonomy of the regional government in selling oil and the repercussions of this on the Peshmerga as a Kurdish defence force that protects the “autonomy” of the region, forming the last line of defence against its collapse.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) is a comprehensive document produced by the National Security Council in conjunction with the executive branch of the United States Government for Congress and then signed by the President. The NSS mainly outlines the U.S.’s major national security concerns and how the administration intends to address them using all instruments of national power. In this context, the 2024 NSS will be one of the most crucial concerns for the President-elect Donald Trump.

China has mediated a Palestinian reconciliation dialogue in Beijing, and has succeeded in bridging the rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These steps indicate a change in China's approach to the Middle East, as it has become an active player in the region by expanding its policies to include political and strategic considerations, in addition to its energy interests. Its "non-interventionist" policy has attracted many countries in the region, which see their growing relations with Beijing as a means of diversification. However, China's increasing involvement may pose a threat to US interests in the region. As Washington has increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region, China has emerged as an active player in the Middle East, reshaping regional security dynamics, signing strategic partnerships and memoranda of understanding for its economic activities with most Middle Eastern countries, and strengthening its ties with various regional organizations over the past two decades. Recent Chinese diplomatic initiatives demonstrate Beijing’s deep investment in further developing relations with Middle Eastern countries, with Beijing hosting the Arab-Chinese Summit and the Gulf-China Summit, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening strategic partnerships among the region’s countries and promoting economic development beyond its traditional energy interests. China’s growing engagement in the Middle East is seen as a significant factor shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and has significant implications for global politics. This raises the question: how China’s methods diverge from those of the United States (U.S.) in the region?

On August 14, the World Health Organisation (WHO) officially classified the rising cases of MPOX in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and neighbouring countries as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). This decision highlights the serious threat posed by the current MPOX outbreak, with fears that the virus could potentially escalate into a global health crisis.   This marks the second time that MPOX has been designated as a PHEIC by the WHO, following the 2022 outbreak, which was the first time the virus had spread widely outside of its endemic regions in Central and West Africa. The occurrence of two significant outbreaks within just four years has raised concerns globally, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, many are now wary of the potential for an MPOX outbreak to become a new pandemic.

It has been an extremely eventful month for the United States. In the span of just one month, we have seen a disastrous debate performance by President Joseph Biden, the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump, a coup fomenting among Democrats against Biden, Biden contracting COVID-19, and finally, Biden dropping out only 107 days before Election Day and endorsing Vice President (VP) Kamala Harris as the Democratic Party candidate.   All accounts of Biden’s decision suggest that what finally convinced the 81-year-old was not pressure from fellow Democrats to drop out — despite Biden insisting he would stay in the race a day before his announcement — but rather polling conducted by his campaign in key battleground states, which essentially showed that he had no path to the Oval Office and would additionally have to spend significantly in Virginia and New Mexico, states that were considered safely Democratic.   This isn’t the first time an incumbent president has decided to bow out of a presidential election. In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) did the same, leading to an open Democratic Convention that, coupled with the anti-war movement, resulted in rioting in the streets of Chicago. Similarly, following Biden’s decision, the Democratic Party will be having an open convention in August at a time of high political polarisation. When LBJ announced he would not seek reelection, he gave the Democratic Party 219 days to assemble and organise; they failed to do so and lost the election. Biden has only given the Democratic Party and their chosen candidate — almost certainly VP Kamala Harris — 107 days to run a campaign against Donald Trump, whom Biden has consistently described as the greatest threat to American democracy in the country’s history.   Biden’s decision raises significant questions, the most significant being does Kamala Harris have enough time to mount a serious campaign in less than four months?

The 21st century has witnessed a resurgence of mediation as a pivotal tool for resolving international disputes. This resurgence is driven by the complexities of contemporary conflicts and the expansion of threats beyond traditional regional conflicts, civil wars, and political crises. The scope of security threats now includes issues such as climate change, cybersecurity, and transnational organised crime.   Several countries have played significant roles in mediation, leveraging their diplomatic acumen, political influence, and economic resources to facilitate dialogue and prevent escalation. Norway has consistently demonstrated its commitment to peacebuilding through active participation in resolving conflicts among the most prominent mediators. From Sri Lanka to Colombia and the facilitation of the Oslo Accords, Norway has embodied its ability to promote dialogue between seemingly irreconcilable adversaries.   Known for its multilateral approach and emphasis on consensus building, Finland initiated the Group of Friends of Mediation in September 2010, significantly contributing to peace processes in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, Switzerland, with its long-standing tradition of neutrality, has provided a safe and neutral venue for countless peace talks and negotiations, fostering an environment conducive to compromise and resolution.   Amid the resurgence of mediation in international diplomacy, the last decade has witnessed the emergence of non-Western actors in this field. At the forefront is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has become an essential player in the Middle East and beyond. Since its founding, the UAE has combined traditional Arab values with modern diplomatic practices to address the cultural complexities of regional conflicts, adopting a policy of promoting peace, security, and stability both regionally and globally.   The UAE’s commitment to mediation is evident in its numerous initiatives aimed at calming conflicts and crises, including active mediation in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, facilitating dialogue and humanitarian aid, playing a crucial role in reconciliation efforts between India and Pakistan; its pivotal role in the historic 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, marking a significant achievement in regional stability; facilitating prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, showcasing the UAE's diplomatic reach; mediation efforts between Russia and the United States (U.S.), further highlighting the UAE's influence; and hosting the COP28 Climate Conference in Dubai, underscoring the UAE's active participation in global diplomacy.   However, the path to mediation is fraught with challenges. The inherent complexities of many regional conflicts, the conflicting interests of the parties involved, and the need to balance mediation efforts with national interests can hinder the achievement of sustainable solutions. Additionally, maintaining neutrality in polarised situations, limited influence over non-state actors, and potential capacity constraints are challenges that the UAE must overcome to ensure the continued success of its mediation efforts. Hence, the UAE’s role as a rising international mediator, focusing on the factors that enabled its rise, its mediation strategies, and the impact of its efforts on regional and global conflicts will be examined.

Social media has played a pivotal role in reshaping the narratives of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the outbreak of Oct. 7. The dissemination of news and information now extends far beyond traditional media outlets. Instead, social media platforms have emerged as potent influencers, surpassing the resonance of weapons and delineating a global divide between Israel and Palestine. These platforms have become arenas of contention, with users segregating into supporters and opponents, rendering them susceptible to content-related pressures amid the war. The war on Gaza has once again thrust TikTok into a heated discourse regarding the application's dangers and impact as a global forum for ordinary individuals to voice their opinions while also serving as a battleground for political factions to vie for narrative control. This debate assumes added significance as the audience of traditional news outlets continues to dwindle.   Recently, numerous TikTok videos concerning the war on Gaza garnered widespread attention, accompanied by pro-Palestinian hashtags, prompting Israeli President Isaac Herzog to engage in discussions with TikTok executives in February 2024. Expressing apprehension over the surge in antisemitic content on the platform since the onset of the Israeli war on Gaza, they assured President Herzog of their commitment to address the issue in the future. In a related context, social media companies based in the United States have already demonstrated a readiness to censor pro-Palestinian content. Human Rights Watch, in its December 2023 report, documented over 1,050 instances of content removal and suppression on Instagram and Facebook by Palestinians and their supporters between October and November 2023.   In this context, U.S. legislators, conservative activists, and technology investors have voiced calls to ban TikTok in the U.S., citing escalating concerns. These calls gained significant traction on March 13, 2024, when the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly voted in favour of a bill. The bill places ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, with two options, both fraught with implications: either sell the application to a U.S.-based company or confront a ban on distribution through significant platforms and application stores. President Joseph Biden voiced his backing for the bill and signalled his readiness to sign it into law pending Senate approval. However, the U.S. initiative this time brings forth broader concerns beyond national security, encompassing the application's ramifications on Israel's reputation. The country's standing has been damaged due to the swift dissemination of content depicting Israel's crimes against civilians in the Gaza Strip.   This analysis aims to elucidate the reasons behind the shift in the U.S. perspective on TikTok, moving from security concerns to the perception of promoting antisemitism. What repercussions would the embargo have on both the United States and Israel?