Turkey

Germany "needs new partnerships more than ever," declared Chancellor Friedrich Merz as he opened a tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, announcing along the way that Berlin would loosen its long-standing restrictions on arms exports to the Gulf. Such words from a German chancellor would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. Yet the scene fits a wider pattern now visible across the continent: Korean tanks arriving at Polish ports, Turkish drones ordered for Baltic skies, Brazilian transport aircraft entering European fleets, and Gulf sovereign wealth courted from London to Berlin. Europe, long accustomed to a single security patron, is visibly assembling a new roster of defence partners, and officials on all sides describe it as a strategy of diversification. The pattern reaches its most symbolic setting this week, as NATO leaders convene in Ankara, the capital of the very partner Europe has never quite decided how to treat. But strategies imply choice, and choice implies a chooser. The pressing question is: is Europe actually selecting its new partners, or is something else doing the choosing?

For more than three decades, Israel maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity towards the Armenian Genocide, deliberately withholding formal recognition despite mounting domestic calls—from parliamentarians and academics alike—for a definitive official position. This reluctance was neither accidental nor driven by historical uncertainty. Rather, it reflected a carefully calibrated strategy aimed at safeguarding a complex web of vital national interests. Official silence helped preserve Israel's close strategic partnerships with both Turkey and Azerbaijan, secure the uninterrupted flow of energy supplies and critical trade routes, and protect its sensitive intelligence footprint along Iran's northern frontier.   That strategic equilibrium was abruptly overturned in June 2026, when the Israeli government formally recognised the Armenian Genocide. The decision triggered an unprecedented backlash from Azerbaijan, which swiftly denounced it as a distortion of historical facts lacking any legal or scholarly foundation, while demanding that Israel immediately reverse its position. At that moment, the contours of a profound strategic contradiction came sharply into focus. Although Israel presented the move as a moral and historical obligation, the broader geopolitical context pointed instead to predominantly political and retaliatory calculations. In a single decision, Tel Aviv opened itself to direct confrontation with Turkey and a quieter, yet strategically significant, rift with Azerbaijan, while simultaneously creating an opportunity for Iran to exploit the emerging fractures and weaken Israel's extensive strategic influence along its northern frontier.

Turkey’s rise as a defence-industrial power is no longer a peripheral subplot in NATO politics. It has become a structural development with implications for how the alliance equips itself, how regional powers diversify procurement, and how strategic influence is exercised between Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. While much of the public discussion around NATO still revolves around burden-sharing targets and the Russian threat, a more consequential transformation is unfolding in parallel: Turkey is building a defence-industrial corridor that links alliance demand, regional export markets, and domestic technological ambition.   The timing gives this argument unusual weight. Turkey is set to host NATO leaders in Ankara on 7–8 July 2026, a moment that places its political role and industrial trajectory under the same spotlight. That summit matters not simply because it will convene alliance leaders in the Turkish capital, but because it comes after a period in which Turkey’s defence sector has expanded in scale, deepened in sophistication, and broadened its customer base across Europe, the Gulf, Africa, and Asia.   What emerges from this trajectory is not a Turkish substitute for NATO, nor a coherent anti-Western bloc inside the alliance. It is something more complex and, in strategic terms, more significant: an alternative source of military capability inside NATO that others can increasingly use when Washington or Brussels appear too slow, too restrictive, or too politically encumbered. In that sense, Ankara is not building a rival alliance. It is building an alternative industrial lane within the existing one.

The global political and economic landscape is undergoing structural shifts following the outbreak of US and Israeli military operations against Iran in late February 2026. In response to this escalation, the Iranian leadership adopted a strategic decision to close the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping and oil tankers, leveraging its asymmetric capabilities, including naval mines, advanced missile systems, and drones, to transform the strait into an active military theatre.   The Strait of Hormuz constitutes a critical artery for global energy supplies, with approximately 20 million barrels of oil transiting through it daily, accounting for around 20% of global consumption, as well as shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The closure has produced immediate economic repercussions, including the suspension of maritime traffic, the withdrawal of insurance coverage by shipping insurers, and a sharp surge in oil prices, which have exceeded $120 per barrel. In an effort to contain the crisis, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, proposed a diplomatic initiative to establish a secure maritime corridor in the Strait of Hormuz under United Nations supervision to ensure the safe flow of energy supplies.   Kallas’s initiative draws on the “Black Sea Initiative” model, which enabled the export of Ukrainian grain under international guarantees. European efforts are driven by concerns that disruptions to gas supplies could undermine global food production, given their direct linkage to fertiliser manufacturing. The initiative, therefore, seeks to insulate energy vessels from military targeting to preserve global economic stability. Against this backdrop, the central question arises: to what extent can this initiative help de-escalate the current crisis, and what alternatives remain should the Black Sea model prove unviable?

The United States and Israel's joint military campaign against Iran is upending the strategic order of the Middle East in ways that extend far beyond Tehran. The strikes have killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, targeted Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure, and triggered retaliatory Iranian attacks across the region. As the war enters its second week, a second and potentially more consequential shift is taking shape. With Iran's role as the dominant pole of regional opposition to Israel now in question, a new rivalry is hardening between Israel and Turkey, one that carries different stakes, different risks, and a far more unpredictable trajectory than the confrontation the current war was designed to resolve. Understanding this emerging fault line requires examining both the structural forces pushing the two states apart and the domestic political dynamics that risk turning competitive rhetoric into irreversible confrontation.

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) managed to achieve a noticeable electoral victory against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the latest local elections that were held on 31 March 2024. However, the joy of victory did not last long, as the Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, was arrested for corruption charges before being ousted from his position as the Mayor of Istanbul. The investigation into corruption charges revealed that the CHP leadership elections held on 4–5 November 2023, which resulted in the election of Özgür Özel as the party’s leader, might have involved illegal activities that could have jeopardised the transparency of the outcome. As a result, the Turkish judiciary is investigating this issue at the moment. On Monday, Sept. 15 2025, a Turkish court in Ankara held a hearing in a case questioning the legitimacy of the CHP’s 2023 leadership election (the 38th Congress), alleging irregularities like vote-buying, meaning that the outcome of the CHP leadership elections may be invalidated. If it happens, the impact on the CHP and electoral map in Turkey could be massive.

Netanyahu’s ambitions are no longer confined to diplomacy or the pursuit of normalisation agreements. The Abraham Accords, once seen as his utlimate goal of his contemporary regional strategy, now appear irrelevant, cast aside in favor of a far more aggressive vision. What is unfolding is not the politics of peace but the politics of expansion, where no Arab country can assume immunity. The question of which state will be targeted next is impossible to predict, precisely because Netanyahu’s actions are driven less by rational calculation than by the confidence that comes with unconditional American support. Few could have imagined that Doha, with its U.S. military base and status as a close Washington ally, would be struck, yet it happened. This unpredictability signals a dangerous reality: the scale of war is set to widen, and any country in the region could find itself Israel’s next target.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently acknowledged that Israel is entering a phase of economic and political isolation internationally, largely due to its ongoing military actions in Gaza. He warned that this isolation may last for years and insisted that Israel must adapt by becoming more self-sufficient, especially in its weapons manufacturing capabilities. Netanyahu described this shift as moving toward an economy with "autarkic characteristics," a term he said he despises since he has long supported free-market policies. Nonetheless, given potential export bans and economic sanctions, he emphasized Israel's need to be both "Athens and super-Sparta," implying a combination of intellectual and military self-reliance to withstand these challenges.   His comments are a rare admission that Israel faces significant global backlash and diplomatic estrangement due to the nearly two-year war in Gaza. Several Western countries, such as Spain, have cancelled arms deals with Israel over the war, with a U.N. Independent International Commission finding that Israel is committing genocide, and a slew of other countries have officially recognized a Palestinian State.   Netanyahu's remarks mark a rare acknowledgment of the changing international environment around Israel. This mounting isolation not only underscores Israel’s diplomatic challenges but also highlights the growing vulnerabilities within its economy, as sanctions, boycotts, and the loss of arms contracts emerge as direct consequences of its genocide in Gaza.

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the potential economic, political, and security outcomes should the Arab and Islamic worlds enact a coordinated airspace blockade against Israel. The specified catalyst for this action is the Israeli airstrike on Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, 2025, an event that has already precipitated a significant realignment of regional diplomatic postures.   The central thesis of this analysis is that a coordinated airspace blockade would represent a strategic shock to Israel, not merely a logistical inconvenience. It would function as a form of asymmetric economic warfare, inflicting severe, multi-sector damage on Israel's globally integrated economy by targeting its core vulnerabilities in aviation, high-value trade, and tourism. The direct economic impact is estimated to be a contraction of 4.8% to 5.7% of Israel's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a shock sufficient to trigger a deep recession.   Politically, the blockade would fundamentally re-order the regional geopolitical landscape, shattering the post-2020 status quo established by the Abraham Accords and rendering further normalization efforts untenable. It would accelerate a strategic pivot by Gulf Arab states away from a singular reliance on the United States as a security guarantor, fostering a new, region-driven security architecture. For the United States, such a development would present an acute diplomatic crisis, forcing a choice between its ironclad alliance with Israel and its vital strategic partnerships with Arab nations, thereby undermining a cornerstone of its Middle East policy.   From a security perspective, the blockade would act as a "gray zone" challenge, a highly coercive act that exists in the ambiguous space between peace and declared war. It would degrade the operational reach of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and place the onus of military escalation squarely on Israel. A decision by Israel to forcibly challenge the blockade would create a high-probability pathway to a wider regional military conflict, potentially drawing in the Gulf states, Iran and its proxies, and the United States. The airspace blockade, therefore, represents a plausible and potent instrument of collective action that could irrevocably alter the strategic balance in the Middle East.

In March 2025, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq agreed to create a joint committee to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While this committee reflects the desire of regional countries to take lead in deterring regional security threats, it also motivates the United States to withdraw its forces from Syria, giving more space to the new formed committee to fight ISIS. Moreover, the newly formed committee could serve as an alternative to the U.S.-led international coalition that was established in September 2014 to counter ISIS and curb its spread in Syria and Iraq.   While the coalition was instrumental in weakening the group, mainly through airstrikes and by supporting Kurdish armed factions on the ground, it now appears that regional actors are stepping in to lead the next phase of counterterrorism efforts.

The Syrian Civil War transformed Syria into a battleground for regional powers seeking to advance their strategic interests. Among these powers, Turkey and Israel have emerged as pivotal actors, each pursuing distinct objectives that often clash, exacerbating instability in Syria. While Turkey’s ambitions in Syria are driven by consolidating the authority of the new regime in Syria to dissolve and disarm Kurdish armed groups, Israel emphasises supporting the Druze in the south of Syria and the Kurdish groups in the east of Syria to limit the functionality of the new Syrian government. Israel has also other strategic interests in Syria, such as countering Iranian influence and establishing buffer zones in southern Syria to separate Syrian forces from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Caught in the crosscurrents of escalating regional and international rivalries, and witnessing an increasingly assertive Israeli presence, Southern Syria stands at a critical juncture. Ambiguity hangs heavy in the air, obscuring the long-term trajectory of a land grappling with fractured governance, demographic shifts, and the looming threat of further fragmentation. As international and regional actors jostle for influence and advantage, Israel's expansionist ambitions in the south proceed with a disconcerting sense of ease, guided by a methodical strategy and far-reaching objectives. This expansion, however, is not merely territorial; it is reshaping the very fabric of Southern Syria, impacting its social and demographic tapestry, and transforming it into a volatile arena for regional proxy conflicts. Meanwhile, the Syrian state, nominally in Damascus, grapples with deep-seated internal divisions and a diminished capacity to exert meaningful control, potentially paving the way for negative scenarios that threaten the nation's already fragile unity and sovereignty. This analysis aims to dissect these complex transformations, illuminating Israel’s calculated strategy, assessing the internal vulnerabilities of Syria, and anticipating the potential risks that lie ahead for this strategically vital, yet increasingly precarious, region.