Israel

The tools of twenty-first-century warfare are no longer confined to conventional weapons such as missiles, tanks, and aircraft. They have expanded to encompass cloud-computing platforms, artificial-intelligence systems, and data-processing capabilities developed and managed by major U.S.-based technology corporations, including Microsoft, Google, and Amazon. These companies have become central pillars in the conduct of modern digital warfare, with their decisions and policies exerting profound geopolitical influence and forming an integral component of contemporary global power dynamics.   In this context, the relationship between commercial technology corporations and the Israeli military has undergone a profound transformation, moving beyond the traditional model of supplying hardware and software to establish digital infrastructure as a central instrument in the management of modern conflict, most notably during the war on Gaza. A new paradigm of integration between the military and the private sector has emerged, in which commercial digital systems have become an inseparable component of military capability, blurring the boundaries between market-driven services and state security architectures.   The management of the global narrative surrounding humanitarian catastrophes, including the confirmed famine and persistent reports of atrocities, has become inseparable from the content-governance policies imposed by major digital platforms controlled by technology conglomerates. These platforms frequently amplify official narratives while minimising or obscuring the magnitude of famine and conflict. At the same time, they enable advanced surveillance mechanisms that restrict or silence independent media operating within conflict zones.   The war in Gaza has underscored the dual and increasingly intricate role of major technology corporations, particularly Google (Alphabet Inc.) and Microsoft Corporation, in both modern warfare and global information control. These entities operate within a mutually reinforcing dynamic, providing specialised cloud-computing and artificial-intelligence infrastructure that enables unprecedented levels of lethal military operations and mass surveillance across Gaza and the occupied territories. Concurrently, they deploy advanced mechanisms of information control, encompassing internal content moderation, algorithmic bias, and data suppression, to recalibrate public narratives and shield corporate power from accountability.   This analysis, therefore, examines the role of technology corporations in shaping the dynamics and repercussions of the conflict in Gaza, exploring how they contribute to the engineering of the informational, political, and humanitarian landscape within the framework of contemporary warfare. In this process, these corporations are transformed from ostensibly neutral service providers into active participants within the conflict’s infrastructural ecosystem.

Iran’s nuclear file is witnessing a rapidly escalating trajectory, underscored by its potential decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This move could redefine the very architecture of global nuclear governance. Should this course of action materialise, it would mark the first precedent of its kind since North Korea’s withdrawal from the same treaty in 2003, transforming what might initially appear as a mere negotiating stance into a profound strategic turning point with far-reaching implications for the policies of the Middle East and the wider international order.   These Iranian threats, which began escalating in June 2025, did not emerge in a vacuum; instead, they were a direct reaction to a series of successive strategic developments. The U.S.–Israeli military strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 significantly deepened the complexity of the situation, while the crisis further intensified when the European troika (E3) announced in September 2025 the activation of the “snapback mechanism,” thereby reimposing UN sanctions on Tehran. Taken together, these measures led Iran to conclude that the economic and political value of adhering to international treaties had effectively evaporated.   The gravity of the situation extends beyond political dimensions to encompass highly sensitive technical and legal aspects. Technically, Iran possesses between 400 and 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to roughly 60%; a stockpile that places it only weeks away from producing weapons-usable fissile material if enrichment were elevated to about 90%. Legally, Iran’s invocation of Article X of the NPT would trigger an immediate cessation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) oversight and remove the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement from the equation, paving the way for near-total diplomatic isolation. Consequently, the fallout from withdrawal would transcend the confines of Tehran’s nuclear programme and create a broad regional security dilemma.

As many regional and global powers rush to reshape the Middle East to serve their strategic interests, the past two years have been marked by a cascade of transformative and often tumultuous events. These include the Israeli army’s large-scale invasion of the Gaza Strip following October 7, efforts to diminish Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, intensifying Israeli military operations against Iran, and most recently, a wave of Western countries intending to formally recognise a Palestinian state alongside Israel’s announcement of plans for the annexation of the West Bank and a comprehensive occupation of the Gaza Strip.   Together, these rapid developments not only underscore deepening conflict and instability but also actively fuel the emerging discourse about the "New Middle East", a strategic framework envisioned by key actors outside of the region that seeks to redefine the geopolitical, security, economic, and diplomatic order of the region. The intertwining of hard power manoeuvres, shifting alliances, and economic realignments signals a significant recalibration rather than a mere continuation of the status quo.   In 2025, the potential rise in Western recognition of Palestinian statehood reflects growing international dissatisfaction with existing diplomatic frameworks and a push to rethink longstanding regional issues, directly challenging Israel’s traditional security and diplomatic calculus. Concurrently, Israel’s authorised military plan to take full control of Gaza exemplifies a decisive shift toward hardening its territorial and security posture, marking an unprecedented phase in Israeli-Palestinian relations and regional politics.   The confluence of these developments amplifies the narratives and policies underpinning the New Middle East: a vision premised on assertive state-centric realignments, expanded normalisation efforts, a recalibrated balance of power, and an economy-driven model of regional transactions. This evolving order encompasses ambitions to diminish Iranian influence, redefine Palestinian sovereignty on new terms, and facilitate deeper economic and security integration among select regional actors.   Ultimately, these events serve both as catalysts and manifestations of the "New Middle East" discourse. They reflect a region in flux where entrenched conflicts and new diplomatic initiatives are simultaneously eroding old paradigms and opening pathways for a fundamentally restructured Middle Eastern landscape.   This paper critically explores how the recent rapid developments in the Middle East contribute to shaping competing visions of the region’s future. It assesses whether the ongoing transformations reflect a deeper realignment driven by strategic state interests, expanding economic interdependence, and a recalibrated regional order that transcends historical cycles of conflict. Specifically, the analysis considers if these changes primarily illustrate Samuel Huntington’s "Clash of Civilisations" thesis—attributing post-Cold War regional conflicts to cultural and religious identity divisions—or if they instead represent a deliberate and calculated strategic effort to "reshape the Middle East" through redefined state priorities, shifting power dynamics, and newly forged regional and international alliances.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently acknowledged that Israel is entering a phase of economic and political isolation internationally, largely due to its ongoing military actions in Gaza. He warned that this isolation may last for years and insisted that Israel must adapt by becoming more self-sufficient, especially in its weapons manufacturing capabilities. Netanyahu described this shift as moving toward an economy with "autarkic characteristics," a term he said he despises since he has long supported free-market policies. Nonetheless, given potential export bans and economic sanctions, he emphasized Israel's need to be both "Athens and super-Sparta," implying a combination of intellectual and military self-reliance to withstand these challenges.   His comments are a rare admission that Israel faces significant global backlash and diplomatic estrangement due to the nearly two-year war in Gaza. Several Western countries, such as Spain, have cancelled arms deals with Israel over the war, with a U.N. Independent International Commission finding that Israel is committing genocide, and a slew of other countries have officially recognized a Palestinian State.   Netanyahu's remarks mark a rare acknowledgment of the changing international environment around Israel. This mounting isolation not only underscores Israel’s diplomatic challenges but also highlights the growing vulnerabilities within its economy, as sanctions, boycotts, and the loss of arms contracts emerge as direct consequences of its genocide in Gaza.

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the potential economic, political, and security outcomes should the Arab and Islamic worlds enact a coordinated airspace blockade against Israel. The specified catalyst for this action is the Israeli airstrike on Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, 2025, an event that has already precipitated a significant realignment of regional diplomatic postures.   The central thesis of this analysis is that a coordinated airspace blockade would represent a strategic shock to Israel, not merely a logistical inconvenience. It would function as a form of asymmetric economic warfare, inflicting severe, multi-sector damage on Israel's globally integrated economy by targeting its core vulnerabilities in aviation, high-value trade, and tourism. The direct economic impact is estimated to be a contraction of 4.8% to 5.7% of Israel's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a shock sufficient to trigger a deep recession.   Politically, the blockade would fundamentally re-order the regional geopolitical landscape, shattering the post-2020 status quo established by the Abraham Accords and rendering further normalization efforts untenable. It would accelerate a strategic pivot by Gulf Arab states away from a singular reliance on the United States as a security guarantor, fostering a new, region-driven security architecture. For the United States, such a development would present an acute diplomatic crisis, forcing a choice between its ironclad alliance with Israel and its vital strategic partnerships with Arab nations, thereby undermining a cornerstone of its Middle East policy.   From a security perspective, the blockade would act as a "gray zone" challenge, a highly coercive act that exists in the ambiguous space between peace and declared war. It would degrade the operational reach of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and place the onus of military escalation squarely on Israel. A decision by Israel to forcibly challenge the blockade would create a high-probability pathway to a wider regional military conflict, potentially drawing in the Gulf states, Iran and its proxies, and the United States. The airspace blockade, therefore, represents a plausible and potent instrument of collective action that could irrevocably alter the strategic balance in the Middle East.

The 2025 Arab–Islamic extraordinary summit, held in Doha, Qatar, on September 14–15, marked a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Convened in direct response to an unprecedented Israeli airstrike on the Qatari capital, the meeting served as a forum for Arab and Islamic nations to formalise a collective security and diplomatic response. The paper finds that this Israeli action, intended to undermine ongoing negotiations, inadvertently solidified a unified front among regional powers. The incident also exposed a profound erosion of trust in the United States as a reliable security partner, compelling Gulf states to actively consider alternative defence and diplomatic alignments. The summit's outcomes signal a new phase of regional foreign policy, moving beyond rhetorical condemnation to a framework for coordinated legal and economic measures, with significant implications for Israel, the United States, and the prospects for a lasting ceasefire in Gaza.   The final communiqué went far beyond rhetoric, demanding concrete punitive and legal measures against Israel. These included a call for sanctions, a review of diplomatic relations, and the use of international legal bodies to hold Israel accountable. The activation of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Joint Defence Council signalled a tangible move toward a new, collective regional security paradigm. The summit’s outcomes collectively demonstrate a strategic pivot away from American-led diplomacy and security frameworks toward a more independent and potentially confrontational regional posture, signalling a new, more volatile era in Middle East geopolitics.

In a further escalation of the nearly two-year war, Israel on Tuesday ordered the full evacuation of Gaza City, home to roughly a million Palestinians, ahead of what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described as the “beginning” of an intensified ground manoeuvre.   The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) dropped thousands of leaflets instructing residents to flee south toward the overcrowded al-Mawasi “humanitarian zone,” while airstrikes targeted high-rise towers and urban neighbourhoods. The decision marks a turning point in Israel’s campaign, signalling a shift from partial military control of Gaza City to full occupation.

Lebanon today faces a critical crossroads that directly threatens its national sovereignty, and this challenge is reflected in the issue of confiscating Hezbollah’s weapons. On Aug. 5, 2025, the Lebanese government issued an important decision entrusting the armed forces with the task of developing a plan to establish the state's monopoly on weapons, restricting the possession of arms exclusively to state institutions, in implementation of the ceasefire agreement with Israel, with the plan to be executed before the end of the current year. This decision represents a strategic turning point that places Hezbollah before complex choices: voluntary disarmament, moving towards political transformation, or direct military confrontation with the Lebanese army.   Hezbollah, for its part, rejects this decision, describing it as a major sin, threatening to ignore it and considering disarmament a direct threat to Lebanon’s resistance against external aggression. The decision faces significant challenges due to the strong popular and political support Hezbollah enjoys, in addition to political maneuvers aimed at obstructing any measures targeting its weapons. Given the fragility of Lebanon’s political and sectarian system, there are significant risks of a confrontation breaking out that could escalate internal tensions and undermine security stability, making any direct military clash between the army and Hezbollah fraught with danger, with the likelihood of intensifying sectarian divisions and expanding the circle of violence. Will the Lebanese army be able to confront Hezbollah?

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will convene Israel's Security Cabinet on Aug. 05, 2025 to approve plans for a full military takeover of the Gaza Strip, marking a critical escalation in the conflict with Hamas. The proposal, however, faced strong opposition from within the Israeli military and from hostage families, who raised serious concerns about the humanitarian impact and operational risks. While the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) already controls around 75% of Gaza, Netanyahu pushed to expand military operations to cover the entire territory, including densely populated areas believed to harbour hostages—a plan opposed by IDF Chief of Staff Lt Gen. Eyal Zamir. This decision came after ceasefire and hostage negotiations collapsed, with Netanyahu stressing the objectives of defeating Hamas, securing the release of hostages, and neutralising Gaza as a future threat to Israel.   In a dramatic development, Netanyahu cancelled a planned visit by Lt Gen. Zamir to Washington upon briefing him on the new direction and accelerating strategic shifts. Zamir explicitly rejected the proposed plan, threatening resignation if it were approved. The military’s reservations centred on fears for the hostages’ lives, particularly in areas such as Deir al-Balah that had not been fully “cleansed” of Hamas fighters. Additionally, IDF leadership expressed concerns about the erosion of the army’s combat capabilities, citing manpower shortages after nearly two years of continuous conflict, thereby urging a more cautious containment strategy that would exert pressure on Hamas without engaging in a protracted and expansive occupation.

As-Suwayda has emerged as a profoundly complex arena amid the sweeping transformations reshaping Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and the formation of a new centralized transitional government. Within this volatile context, calls for self-determination from segments of the local Druze community have gained traction.   There are four critical fault lines worth exploring: the acute internal fragmentation of the Druze polity; the ideological and constitutional dissonance between local autonomy demands and the centralized architecture of the new Syrian state; the near-total economic collapse of the province; and the intensity of regional entanglement that constrains meaningful sovereignty.

Recent military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have reignited global concerns over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Over 12 days, the region witnessed a direct military confrontation between Iran and Israel, accompanied by U.S. airstrikes on critical sites in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Iran responded by launching retaliatory attacks on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.   While Washington declared the “complete destruction” of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, subsequent assessments suggest these operations fell short of their strategic goals. Key elements of the Fordow facility, including vital centrifuge systems, remained partially operational, preserving a significant portion of Iran’s nuclear capability.   Growing uncertainty surrounds the fate of Iran’s highly enriched uranium, particularly after the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that approximately 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% are unaccounted for—a volume theoretically sufficient to produce multiple nuclear warheads. Iranian authorities acknowledged relocating this material to “secure locations” ahead of the strikes. However, Western intelligence sources indicate that locating and neutralising these hidden stockpiles through military means remains exceedingly difficult.   This ambiguity intensifies the risks of nuclear proliferation and grants Tehran a potent strategic asset in any future diplomatic negotiations, while keeping the spectre of renewed military escalation ever-present.   Given these circumstances, Iran’s nuclear programme appears to have endured only a temporary disruption. Tehran retains the technical expertise and human infrastructure necessary to reconstruct its facilities and resume enrichment efforts. As such, the unknown status of the enriched uranium now emerges as a critical variable that could shape the region’s security landscape. Should Iran revive its nuclear activities—or should external actors attempt to strike these undisclosed caches—the result could be a new flashpoint in the ongoing confrontation between Iran and Israel.   This analysis examines the disparity between political declarations proclaiming the end of Iran’s nuclear threat and the ground realities that suggest its persistence. It explores the strategic implications of enriched uranium remaining outside international oversight, as well as the broader consequences for regional stability and the evolution of conflict in the Middle East.

Iran’s uranium enrichment dilemma constitutes the central axis of the ongoing nuclear dispute, where technical considerations intersect with imperatives of national sovereignty, and where international legal frameworks collide with the strategic logic of deterrence. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic, the possession of a full nuclear fuel cycle—including domestic enrichment—is not merely a technical aspiration but an inherent sovereign right enshrined in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet, within Iran’s political consciousness, this “right” transcends legalistic interpretation; it has become a symbolic pillar of national autonomy and a manifestation of defiance against what is perceived as Western hegemony.   Conversely, the U.S. and its allies view the same enrichment capability as a direct gateway to weaponization. The centrifuge-based architecture of Iran’s program enables, with little more than a political decision, a rapid transition from low-enriched uranium to weapons-grade fissile material within a matter of weeks. These concerns escalated significantly following the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) May 2025 report confirming that Iran had amassed over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%—an amount theoretically sufficient to produce three to five nuclear weapons, should the enrichment level be increased to 90%, without requiring any additional infrastructure.   Iran’s historical experience—from its exclusion from the Eurodif consortium in 1979 to the collapse of the Tehran Research Reactor fuel deal in 2009—has deeply entrenched the belief among Iran’s ruling elite that reliance on external fuel guarantees is neither secure nor sustainable. As such, any negotiated settlement that requires Tehran to abandon domestic enrichment is perceived as a fundamental affront to its sovereign dignity and strategic autonomy.   Thus, the essence of the conflict lies not in centrifuge counts or enrichment levels per se, but in the deeply embedded political architecture of mutual distrust. A sustainable resolution cannot be achieved without a broader security framework that redefines Iran’s position within both the regional and global order.   This study adopts a multi-layered approach to the enrichment dilemma, treating it not as a narrowly technical issue but as a strategic contest between sovereign entitlement and non-proliferation imperatives. It proceeds along four main analytical axes: the technical properties of enrichment, the political and strategic motivations driving Iran’s position, the security calculus of Western powers, and the viability of proposed diplomatic frameworks. The study ultimately affirms that any lasting agreement must emerge from a comprehensive reconfiguration of Iran’s relationship with the international system.