United States of America (USA)

Global trade tensions, supply chain disruptions, and skyrocketing costs are some of the unprecedented effects caused by U.S. president Donald Trump’s second term aggressive tariff policies. Tariff policies' impact goes beyond being just hypothetical, with real-time predictions and forecasts that more severe effects could follow; the global GDP is expected to slowly grow by only 2.2% in 2025, while the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has warned of a possible global recession, given that growth slips below 2.5%. Not only the UNCTAD but also the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has downgraded its outlook for the global economy to 2.8% in 2025 and made a significant revision for the U.S. economy lowering its 2025 growth projection to 1.8% in April from 2.7% in January. Adding to these concerns, the World Trade Organization has already highlighted a sharp deterioration in global trade prospects, with world merchandise trade now expected to decline by 0.2% in 2025, nearly three percentage points lower than previous forecasts.   The current instabilities go beyond the economic aspect; they also affect the U.S.’s international alliances and add additional burdens to households, many of whom are delaying major life decisions. A pressing question amid recession fears arises: What are the impacts on a global scale in the event of a U.S. economic collapse? Given the leading position the U.S. plays as the world’s largest economy and the leading issuer of primary reserve currency, such a downturn would trigger a financial disaster of unparalleled magnitude. Essentially, if the U.S.’s economy falls, the world’s economy falls with it.

The ongoing trade war between China and the United States (U.S.) has been unfolding for several years and has gained increasing public attention, largely throughout the influence of social media platforms. As awareness of the conflict spreads, social media not only informs the public but also shapes consumer behaviour, often prompting individuals to shift to alternative markets. In some cases, governments recognize this influence and strategically leverage social media influencers to guide public opinion and economic choices. This is already going on in our scenario between China and U.S.

The recent U.S.-brokered ceasefire between India and Pakistan, following four nerve-racking days of escalating military exchanges, offered a moment of reprieve from the brink of what many feared could become an all-out conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Missiles and drones crossed borders, tensions were sky-high, and the language from both capitals was increasingly aggressive. President Trump's sudden announcement of a truce, while welcomed, underscored the inherent fragility of the situation. Amid celebrations in India and Pakistan, and self-congratulations in Washington, Kashmir endured another night of violence, with both sides claiming violations. This temporary calm exists against a backdrop of deep-seated historical grievances, unresolved territorial disputes, evolving nuclear doctrines, and a complex interplay of internal and external pressures. The critical question now is not just how the ceasefire was achieved, but whether it can hold, and what the consequences would be if this fragile truce were to collapse.

Hezbollah stands at a pivotal crossroads, navigating the turbulent aftermath of a devastating conflict with Israel and grappling with profound shifts in its domestic politics and the regional strategic map. The cessation of hostilities, marked by a U.S.-brokered ceasefire effective Nov. 27, 2024, brought an end to intense fighting that inflicted immense human suffering and infrastructural damage across the country. This fragile peace coincided with, and was significantly influenced by two seismic events: the sudden collapse of the al-Assad regime in Syria, severing Hezbollah’s critical land bridge to Iran, and the end of a paralyzing two-year presidential vacuum in Lebanon with the election of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Joseph Aoun, who has promised to dismantle Hezbollah’s military structure and restrict access to weapons, these promises were likely possible to make because of Hezbollah's significantly weakened state.   The 2024 conflict dealt an unprecedented blow to Hezbollah, resulting in the decapitation of its leadership, including longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah and his designated successor; the death of thousands of its fighters; the depletion of its arsenal; and the destruction of vital military infrastructure. This military degradation precipitated a tangible decline in its political influence. Regionally isolated by the fall of its Syrian ally and unable to dictate terms domestically, facing the state signaling a potential shift in Lebanon's internal power dynamics.   Faced with military exhaustion, regional isolation, domestic political setbacks, and a core narrative of "resistance" severely challenged by the reality of defeat, Hezbollah confronts an existential crisis. The organization that emerged from the 2024 conflict is fundamentally different from the one that entered it. This analysis, probes the future trajectory of Hezbollah in this drastically altered landscape to understand how Hezbollah might adapt, survive, or transform in the face of these compounding pressures, and the constraints facing the Lebanese state and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in asserting sovereignty, the divergent perspectives shaping the political discourse, and the plausible future pathways for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In a few months, the Trump administration is expected to push Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to sign a peace deal which is supposed to be followed by a bilateral minerals’ agreement between the U.S. and the DRC. The agreement puts some parties in an advantageous position while leaves others with a less fortunate fate. The U.S. is supposed to gain economically and politically by this agreement especially when it comes to its rivalry with China. While the DRC is expected to gain in the short-term leveraging the “conflict minerals” narrative, the long-term consequences are not necessarily desirable. The EU is left with the undesirable situation. The bloc will either adjust its policies toward the DRC’s minerals or remain in a situation where a clash with the Trump administration is possible. While a direct military confrontation between the two powers remains improbable, a proxy war in which M23 rebels are a main actor is possible. Additionally, with minerals gaining increasing geoeconomic relevance, Trump has eyed several countries including Ukraine, and the DRC, who could be his next target?

In April 2025, the Trump administration stunned global markets by announcing a sweeping tariff expansion under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), introducing a flat 10% universal tariff on all imports. This move, framed as a national economic emergency response, immediately triggered global trade uncertainty and diplomatic friction. The policy marked a significant escalation of Trump’s protectionist agenda, signalling a break with multilateralism and targeting long-standing trade imbalances with strategic rivals and allies alike. We found that the United States (U.S.) trade structure is deeply imbalanced, with persistent deficits concentrated in sectors essential to industrial production, such as machinery, electronics, and vehicles. These deficits have exposed the U.S. to retaliatory measures from key trade partners—particularly China, Canada, and the EU—who have calibrated their responses to hit politically and economically sensitive export categories. Tariffs have initiated a multi-channel inflationary shock: direct consumer price increases, rising intermediate input costs, and cascading pressures on logistics and wages. The compounded effect has resulted in a net consumer price index (CPI) increase of approximately 1.2%, with higher spikes in key durable goods. Global supply chains are beginning to reconfigure.   The automotive sector, in particular, has seen disruption in bilateral flows with traditional partners, creating openings for new logistical nodes. The UAE stands out as a beneficiary, attracting redirected FDI and becoming a strategic re-export and final assembly hub. Collectively, these findings underscore a paradox: while the policy aims to reduce dependency and correct trade imbalances, it simultaneously accelerates external retaliation, domestic cost pressures, and global fragmentation in trade infrastructure.

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East is set for a potentially major shift with US President Donald Trump’s announcement of the resumption of negotiations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, scheduled to begin on April 12, 2025. Following a period marked by escalating bilateral tensions and the effective dissolution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this resumption of dialogue has generated considerable anticipation both within Iran and across the wider region. The initial, albeit potentially transient, positive reactions observed in Tehran’s financial markets, as evidenced by movements in the stock market and gold prices, underscore the profound economic implications these discussions could hold for the Iranian populace. Furthermore, the potential for these negotiations to influence broader regional stability is a matter of significant concern and interest even for the nations within the Arabian Gulf. While the precise modalities of these diplomatic engagements – specifically whether they will entail direct bilateral talks, as suggested by the U.S. administration, or proceed indirectly through intermediary channels – remain subject to clarification, the very initiation of dialogue signifies a notable departure from the recent trajectory of U.S.-Iran relations. This analysis will therefore explore a range of plausible scenarios that may unfold as delegations from the United States and Iran convene on April 12, and consider the salient internal political dynamics within both nations, the prevailing external pressures exerted by regional and international actors, and the specific contextual factors that have contributed to this renewed, albeit cautious, engagement.

For decades, Western countries, especially the United States (U.S.), used sanctions as a common tool to promote democracy and prevent certain nations from developing nuclear or chemical weapons. Iran, due to its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and other advanced technological weapons, has become a prime example, facing one of the strictest sanctions regimes in the world since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. These measures including the U.N. Security Council embargoes in 2007 and 2015, have had a major impact on Iran’s economy. However, alongside the economic hardship, sanctions have also spurred the growth of a domestic manufacturing sector, especially in defence and military industries, demonstrating the country’s capacity to adapt to hardship.

Populism has recently risen in different regions, including Europe and the United States, constituting a challenge to local and global politics. While this phenomenon existed in Europe before the Second World War (WII), the rise of the Soviet Union as a principal threat to Europe after WII prompted them to neglect populism’s negatives and emphasise confronting the Soviet challenge. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe began an institutionalised process of identifying new internal and external threats, attempting to keep its capabilities mobilised for confronting challenges that might suddenly arise. This process led to identifying several internal threats, such as migration, lack of skilled employment, and populism as serious threats. Moreover, European integration began a new phase with the conclusion of the Maastricht agreement in 1992, creating the EU in its current form, which prompted Europeans to identify populism as a threat that might impede European integration.

Recent decisions by U.S. President Donald Trump cutting aid to foreign countries and dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have sparked global backlash. While the impact of cutting aid is substantial, the broader significance of this move cannot be overlooked. It reflects a deeper shift in the Trump administration’s foreign policy strategy. But what are the implications for the U.S. and its adversaries?

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri reiterated his call for a general session of Parliament on Jan. 9, 2025, to elect a new president as Lebanon’s presidential vacuum stretches into its third year. This call comes amid an ongoing crisis that began on October 31, 2022, following the end of former President General Michel Aoun's term. Aoun’s departure marked the conclusion of a previous presidential vacuum that lasted for 29 months, during which 45 attempts to reach a quorum for his election were unsuccessful. In the current vacuum, Parliament has failed to elect a president after twelve sessions, the most recent of which was held on June 14, 2024. This series of unsuccessful attempts highlights the profound complexities of Lebanon’s political process.   Recent domestic initiatives aimed at resolving the presidential vacancy and reaching a consensus on a candidate have also faltered. Meanwhile, representatives from five key countries, the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar, continue their efforts to mediate and navigate the obstacles hindering Lebanon’s political forces from agreeing on a mechanism to address the protracted vacancy crisis.   Amid persistent uncertainty surrounding the identity of Lebanon’s next president, political circles have been actively circulating the names of potential candidates. Among these, Commander of the Lebanese Army General Joseph Aoun, has emerged as a strong contender and is widely viewed as a likely consensus candidate.   The upcoming parliamentary session has ignited significant hopes that it may produce tangible results and lead to the selection of a new occupant for Baabda Palace. However, this optimism is tempered by pressing questions about whether Lebanon’s political forces can overcome their divisions, resolve the presidential vacuum, and converge on a candidate amidst the shifting political dynamics within Lebanon and across the region.

The Kurdish dream of establishing an independent state was on the verge of realisation after centuries of demands in Jan. 1946. This came when “Qazi Mohammad,” the Iranian Kurdish leader, declared the establishment of the Mahabad Republic in the province of the same name, now part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, this dream quickly dissipated when the Soviet Union withdrew its financial support for the nascent state. The intensification of the economic blockade on the region further compounded the situation, preventing the entry of food supplies and reducing agricultural production. These pressures led to dramatic shifts in the loyalties of Kurdish tribal leaders who had initially allied with “Qazi” during the state's formation, hoping to secure a share of Soviet financial and food aid.   The food situation worsened over time, pushing some leaders of the Mahabad army to leave the capital, especially as Iranian forces were nearing its entrance, leaving the Kurdish leader and a small Kurdish group behind to face an unequal battle with the Iranian army. Therefore, to spare Kurdish blood, it was decided to surrender on December 15 of the same year, leading to the Iranian army's occupation of Mahabad and the declaration of the state's fall. In the end, “Qazi” was executed in March 1947, marking the end of the closest attempt to establish a Kurdish state.   About a quarter of a century later, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a series of rulings regarding Iraqi oil exported by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The latest ruling, issued in Feb. 2024, mandated the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers to hand over all oil and non-oil revenues to the central government in Baghdad. This could have a dual impact similar to that caused by the cessation of financial support and the Iranian blockade on the Mahabad army, but this time it affects the Peshmerga forces that represent the hope for preserving the “autonomy” of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq considered the second closest Kurdish attempt at establishing a national homeland for the Kurds.   Therefore, the First Part of this paper addresses the political situation of the Kurds, focusing on the status of the region in the Iraqi Constitution, the contentious issues between the region and the federal government, and the impact of these disputes on the continuity and existence of the Peshmerga. The Second Part reviews the economic situation, examining the effects of the series of judicial rulings on the conditions that undermine the autonomy of the regional government in selling oil and the repercussions of this on the Peshmerga as a Kurdish defence force that protects the “autonomy” of the region, forming the last line of defence against its collapse.