Divisions in Tehran: How the War Is Reshaping Internal Power Centres

Divisions among Iranian officials became increasingly evident in late April 2026. The hardline faction opposes making any concessions in the ongoing negotiations with the United States and insists that the nuclear programme be excluded entirely from the negotiating agenda. Another, even harder-line faction rejects entering negotiations altogether. By contrast, the moderate faction advocates engagement in nuclear negotiations while remaining committed to the principles of the Islamic Revolution. This camp recognises that negotiations could contribute to the partial lifting of sanctions and help alleviate the economic hardships facing citizens amid the country's continuing economic decline. It also views an end to the war as a strategic necessity, particularly given the strain placed on Iran's military capabilities and the loss of senior leadership figures.

These divisions have also become increasingly visible within the Iranian regime’s diplomatic apparatus. Contradictory statements were issued by members of the same Iranian delegation during a visit to Islamabad on 23–24 April 2026. These disagreements raise direct questions about the future trajectory of both the negotiations and the war, while highlighting the potential scenarios that could emerge from the growing divisions within the Iranian regime itself.

The roots of this divide among Iran’s political elite can be traced to the period following the Twelve-Day War launched against Iran in June 2025, when the country’s two principal factions diverged over domestic policy management. The hardline camp, which includes members of parliament and officials within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), advocated a more confrontational foreign policy and a further tightening of internal controls. By contrast, the reformist and moderate factions sought to ease internal tensions and activate channels of dialogue to contain opposition movements, particularly as economic pressures on various segments of society continued to mount. The moderate camp viewed a degree of political opening as a necessary step to alleviate economic hardship and address the growing public discontent directed at the regime.

As a result, this period witnessed growing internal tensions within both the IRGC and Iran’s broader political elite. Younger military cadres, alongside prominent reformist opposition figures such as former Prime Minister and leader of the 2009 Green Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, increasingly criticised ideological rigidity and its impact on Iran’s foreign policy and national security. They called for constitutional reform and a reassessment of Iranian foreign policy, including the possibility of reaching a compromise on uranium enrichment and securing relief from international sanctions. These proposals were met with strong resistance from the hardline camp. Against this backdrop of mounting tensions, questions emerged over whether the centre of power was gradually shifting from the Supreme Leader to the IRGC, raising concerns across political circles.

Tensions between the two camps escalated when President Masoud Pezeshkian and a group of reform-minded conservatives called for a policy of consensus-building and domestic dialogue. The IRGC and the hardline faction rejected this approach, exerting pressure on the president and accusing him of seeking to normalise relations with the West and undermine the foundations of the regime. At the time, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei intervened to contain the dispute, calling for unity and rejecting attacks directed against the president. This intervention underscored Khamenei’s pivotal role in maintaining the internal balance of power. It reflected his awareness of the risks posed by widespread public unrest to the regime’s legitimacy and survival. Khamenei’s death in the aftermath of the US-Israeli attack in February 2026 subsequently created a significant vacuum in the Iranian regime’s internal balance of power.

The consequences of these escalating tensions became evident in several instances during the war. In early March 2026, as Iranian strikes intensified, President Masoud Pezeshkian issued a statement expressing apologies over the attacks. The statement drew widespread criticism from IRGC commanders, prompting him to retract it shortly thereafter. Similarly, conflicting positions regarding the Strait of Hormuz highlighted the growing fragmentation within the elite. In April 2026, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that the Strait of Hormuz would remain fully open to all commercial vessels throughout the ceasefire period via a coordinated maritime corridor designated by the Iranian authorities. Shortly thereafter, however, the IRGC announced the reclosure of the strait and warned that any vessel passing through it could be targeted. These developments suggest that divisions within the elite extend beyond disagreements over negotiations and encompass internal fault lines that affect decision-making processes and shape Tehran’s actions beyond its borders.

As noted above, the Supreme Leader serves as the state’s ultimate decision-maker. The failure of the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, to assume this role effectively has generated considerable concern, depriving the regime of the ability to maintain balance among its institutions. This imbalance has become increasingly evident in the escalation of tensions and growing mistrust between President Masoud Pezeshkian and the military leadership, particularly the IRGC, over control of strategic decision-making, foremost among them negotiations with Washington. Iranian leaders, and the IRGC in particular, maintained a unified front throughout the war and in the aftermath of Ali Khamenei’s death. That unity has since eroded due to the absence of a central authority, following the targeting of senior moderate figures and the subsequent shift of influence toward hardline factions.

Divisions within Iran’s elite have become increasingly pronounced as a result of the leadership vacuum created by the absence of the Supreme Leader as the regime’s principal unifying authority. Despite the announcement of his appointment, Mojtaba Khamenei’s limited public presence, coupled with his close ties to the IRGC, has further deepened these divisions. The growing influence of the IRGC can be attributed to two principal factors:

• • First, its strong relationship with the current Supreme Leader has resulted in preferential policies that favour the IRGC, particularly in terms of military funding and economic influence, often at the expense of other institutions such as the regular armed forces.

• Second, the IRGC has emerged as the regime’s principal security institution and assumed responsibility for managing state affairs during the war. These developments have given rise to sharp disagreements between the IRGC and the civilian political leadership, represented by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

These divisions have also extended to the management of negotiations and the determination of negotiating demands. The IRGC opposes making any concessions, particularly on the nuclear file and the missile programme. By contrast, senior moderate government officials are seeking an end to the war, the easing of sanctions, and the lifting of the maritime blockade. Official statements have also diverged over the Strait of Hormuz, with conflicting positions emerging on whether the waterway should remain open or be closed to commercial shipping. This divergence has created internal tensions that weaken the coherence of the decision-making process and make it more difficult to reach a comprehensive settlement with the United States.

The IRGC exerts intense pressure on President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to prevent them from making any concessions during the negotiations, particularly on the nuclear programme. This constitutes a central point of contention between Washington and Tehran and continues to obstruct progress towards a comprehensive settlement. Outstanding issues, foremost among them uranium enrichment, carry considerable political sensitivity within Iran. The IRGC regards any concession on this matter as a form of strategic capitulation. Consequently, Iranian negotiators are wary of provoking a severe backlash from the IRGC if they offer concessions not agreed upon in advance.

The hardline faction’s ability to obstruct diplomatic engagement stems from its strong organisational capacity, extensive ties to pressure groups, and broad media network. These tools enable it to exert significant influence over the decision-making process despite its limited popular support. Driven by an ideology centred on safeguarding the regime and preserving the principles of the Islamic Revolution, this faction rejects any form of diplomatic opening. This rejection has generated noticeable confusion within Iran’s negotiating team in its dealings with the United States. The roots of this position can be traced to the principles of the 1979 Revolution, which regard engagement with the West, particularly the United States, as a betrayal of revolutionary ideals and a challenge to the regime’s foundations. This perspective helps explain the intense pressure and criticism directed at those involved in the negotiations, including Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and Ghalibaf, despite Ghalibaf’s military background as a former IRGC commander.

These disagreements have surfaced openly and in an unusually public manner within the Iranian political system, calling into question the regime’s legitimacy and weakening its negotiating position. Internal divisions have translated directly into ineffective diplomacy, producing conflicting negotiating tracks and stalled talks with little meaningful progress. Iranian positions throughout the negotiations have been marked by ambiguity, with the delegation avoiding the presentation of tangible concessions. This ambiguity reflects the intensification of internal disputes more than a deliberate negotiating strategy. The principal obstacle is no longer confined to disagreements between Washington and Tehran; it now extends to Iran’s own inability to define its objectives decisively. As a result, the negotiations are likely to become increasingly protracted, inconsistent, and vulnerable to collapse in the absence of a strong central authority capable of imposing compromise solutions, regardless of the nature of external diplomatic efforts.

Should these dynamics persist, several scenarios may emerge. Iran is likely to witness further fragmentation among its political elite, alongside the growing influence of hardline forces, particularly the IRGC, and mounting challenges in managing the country’s economic crisis. With regard to US-Iran negotiations, escalation is expected to continue, accompanied by intermittent rounds of diplomacy. Alternatively, the process may produce a limited and vaguely defined agreement focused primarily on ending mutual military strikes. Against this backdrop, three potential trajectories for the future of Iran’s domestic political landscape can be identified.

Scenario One: The Fragmentation of Centralised Decision-Making and Escalating Institutional Divisions

The Iranian regime faces a leadership vacuum resulting from the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei. As a result, the state has lost the authority of the Velayat-e Faqih institution, which has historically served as the ultimate arbiter of sensitive decisions, particularly those concerning nuclear policy and relations with the United States. In this environment, decision-making centres have become increasingly fragmented, while the rivalry between the hardline and moderate camps continues unresolved. Divergent positions and decisions have emerged among religious, military, and civilian leaders, with each institution seeking to expand its influence and assert its authority in an effort to compensate for the absence of the Supreme Leader. This institutional competition continues to hinder progress in the negotiating process, preventing both the conclusion of a comprehensive settlement and the formal collapse of the talks.

Over the medium- to long-term, the regime may move closer to a broad political split. Such a development threatens to push the state towards collapse amid a deepening economic crisis and growing difficulties in managing domestic affairs. These indicators raise direct questions regarding the extent to which the US-Israeli strike that resulted in the death of the former Supreme Leader succeeded in weakening the regime’s institutional structure and fragmenting its centres of power.

Scenario Two: The Rise of the IRGC and Its Monopolisation of Power

The influence of the Supreme Leader’s institution and its religious symbolism gradually receded in favour of the growing power of the IRGC. Under this scenario, the state gradually transforms into a militarised entity subject to the IRGC’s overwhelming dominance. The IRGC’s position in this trajectory rests on its extensive control over vital military and economic sectors, as well as its ability to adapt to and overcome crises, as demonstrated by the rapid appointment of new commanders to replace those killed during the war. The IRGC also possesses considerable capacity to steer the course of negotiations with Washington and benefits from the absence of any domestic actor capable of matching its influence or organisational strength at the present stage.

As a consequence, the regime intensifies domestic repression while tensions with Washington and Tel Aviv continue to escalate. Iran adopts an increasingly hardline foreign policy, and the IRGC exploits external confrontation as a justification for tightening its security grip over the domestic arena. Under this trajectory, negotiations collapse entirely, while the scope of military conflict expands to encompass additional regional actors.

Scenario Three: Regime Collapse Following Escalating Confrontation Between the IRGC and the Army

Under this scenario, the internal balance of power is gradually reordered in favour of the IRGC and the hardline camp, while the role of civilian institutions and moderate conservatives steadily diminishes. This shift is likely to face resistance from the Iranian Army, as such an arrangement conflicts with its traditional mission to safeguard national security. This mission differs fundamentally from the IRGC’s doctrine, which prioritises the survival of the Islamic Revolutionary regime, even when doing so conflicts with broader national security interests.

The IRGC remains committed to a strategy of military escalation against Washington and Tel Aviv and rejects negotiated solutions. As a result, the state and its institutions become subject to sustained attrition and continued external targeting. The growing divide and potential confrontation between the Army and the IRGC could pose a long-term threat to the stability of the Iranian regime, creating conditions that may ultimately weaken or even bring about its collapse. The likelihood of such an outcome would increase significantly in the event of widespread public protests driven by the consequences of war and deteriorating economic and security conditions. In such a scenario, the Army may align itself with the population against the IRGC, depriving the latter of the capacity to contain or suppress the protests on its own.

In conclusion, the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel has provided the IRGC with a direct opportunity to strengthen its power and expand its influence. The IRGC links its continued survival to the persistence of security tensions and the escalation of conflicts with neighbouring states. At the same time, the internal divisions between IRGC leaders and those opposed to its monopolisation of the political sphere pose major strategic challenges. These challenges could reshape Iran’s political system and alter the course of the ongoing negotiations with Washington aimed at ending the war.

——. “صراع السلطة في إيران يكشف هشاشة النظام.. وعزلة المرشد.” سكاي نيوز عربية. 6 مايو، 2026. https://www.skynewsarabia.com/world/1868040-%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AF

——. “صراع خفي على الحكم.. إيران في أخطر مراحلها.” سكاي نيوز عربية. 5 مايو، 2026. https://www.skynewsarabia.com/program/newsroom/1867973-%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AE%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7

——. ” هل تكشف التصريحات “المتضاربة” للمسؤولين الإيرانيين عن انقسام بعد مقتل خامنئي؟.” CNN بالعربية. 8 مارس، 2026. https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2026/03/08/mixed-signals-from-iranian-officials-expose-possible-rift-after-khamenei-death

عبد الحميد، شيماء. “انقساماتٌ وزيادةٌ في نُفُوذ الحرس الثوري.. قراءةٌ في انعكاسات الحرب على الداخل الإيراني.” شاف. 28 أبريل، 2026. https://shafcenter.org/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%82/

سهرابي، آرش. ” بعد خروج الانقسام إلى العلن.. مَنْ صاحب القرار في إيران؟.” إيران إنترناشيونال. 2 مايو، 2026. https://www.iranintl.com/ar/202605024629

Brumberg, Daniel. “Political Divisions in Iran and the Uncertain Path to a New Nuclear Deal.” Arab Center Washington DC. September 4, 2025. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/political-divisions-in-iran-and-the-uncertain-path-to-a-new-nuclear-deal/

Farzam, Rahim. “Misreading Tehran: The Myth of Iran’s Divided Elite.” IRAM. April 29, 2026. https://www.iramcenter.org/en/misreading-tehran-the-myth-of-irans-divided-elite-2800

Faucon, Benoit, et al. “Iran’s Leadership Divisions Frustrate Efforts to Make Progress in Talks.” The Wall Street Journal. April 24, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-leadership-divisions-frustrate-efforts-to-make-progress-in-talks-f87fac3a

Hakamian, Mahmoud. “Power Struggles Intensify Inside Iran’s Leadership as War and Diplomacy Divide the Regime.” NCRI. April 29, 2026. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/terrorism-a-fundamentalism/power-struggles-intensify-inside-irans-leadership-as-war-and-diplomacy-divide-the-regime/

Lob, Eric et al. (2025). Iran in the Aftermath of the Twelve-Day War. GIGA Focus Middle East, 5. Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA). https://doi.org/10.57671/gfme-25052

Sukri, Azhar et al. “Iran says Strait of Hormuz is closed again as vessels attempting to cross come under fire.” CNBC. April 18, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/18/trump-says-us-has-good-news-on-iran-talks-to-continue.html

Vatanka, Alex. “Real Iran splits and the myth of division.” Al Majalla. May 4, 2026. https://en.majalla.com/node/330892/politics/real-iran-splits-and-myth-division