Bab al-Mandab at the Heart of the Crisis: Will the Houthi Blockade Push Pakistan into a Confrontation with Iran?

The Middle East is witnessing a new geopolitical crisis centred on the Bab al-Mandab Strait after Yemen’s Houthi movement announced on 20 July 2026 the imposition of a naval blockade on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in application of a principle the group terms “blockade for blockade”. The measure comes as a direct response to the restrictions Saudi Arabia has placed on the airports and ports lying under Houthi control, most notably Sanaa Airport and the ports of Hodeidah, and the decision followed a military escalation that included strikes on Sanaa Airport and the launching of missiles and drones towards Saudi airports.

Through this closure the Houthis seek to transfer the cost of the blockade from the Yemeni interior to a corridor vital to Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, by closing the strait to vessels flying the Saudi flag or bound for the Kingdom. The closure also coincides with the disruption affecting the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the ongoing Iranian–American war, where the Revolutionary Guard’s interception rate of vessels transiting the strait has reached some 89 per cent. This has driven the Kingdom over the past four months to reroute its oil exports westwards, moving 4.5 million barrels of oil a day through a pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea in order to provide an alternative passage, an increase of close to fivefold on the period before the war began.

On another front, Pakistan faces a complex strategic position as a result of these developments, since Islamabad is bound by a mutual strategic defence agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed in September 2025, alongside the presence of Pakistani forces stationed in the Kingdom. The agreement stipulates that any aggression against either state is deemed an aggression against the other, while Islamabad simultaneously performs the role of diplomatic mediator between the United States and Iran, having sponsored the signing of a ceasefire memorandum of understanding between the two parties in June 2026. In this context, Pakistani officials regard attacks on Saudi Arabia as a red line, which makes the naval blockade not merely a problem touching Saudi security but a direct test of Pakistan’s ability to balance its role as mediator with Tehran against its military commitments towards Riyadh. This tension places the Pakistani leadership before a clear challenge and raises an important question as to whether it will persist in its neutral position, or move towards a firmer stance should the crisis develop into a regional confrontation affecting the interests of its Saudi partner.

Pakistan reached the position of principal mediator between the United States and Iran after an intensive political and negotiating effort, crowned by the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding on 17 June 2026 between US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The memorandum set out fourteen clauses and fixed a sixty-day period for negotiations aimed at reaching a final peace agreement, and it also contributed to halting the wide military escalation the region had witnessed since February 2026. Pakistan drew on its standing as a nuclear state with a Sunni majority, bound by strong military ties to the Gulf states and to Western countries while sharing a long land border with Iran, to perform a diplomatic role intended to support regional stability.

This role arose from clear domestic and regional security considerations, since Pakistan sought above all to secure its western frontier with Iran, which extends for 909 kilometers and is known as the Goldsmid Line. That border, particularly in the Sistan and Baluchestan region, has seen continuous unrest, smuggling operations, and the activity of armed groups, while Pakistan has faced repeated attacks from factions such as the Baluchistan Liberation Army and the Baluchistan Liberation Front. Iran, for its part, has accused Pakistan of harbouring the Sunni group Jaish al-Adl, which has carried out attacks against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, among them a suicide bombing in February 2019 and a further attack in December 2023 in the Rask district.

Through this mediation Pakistan sought to achieve stability along its border and to strengthen security cooperation with the Iranian side in confronting these armed threats. The Pakistani leadership, both civilian and military, judged this course to be the best option for avoiding being dragged into a wider regional confrontation and for averting a situation in which it would be forced to choose, politically or militarily, between Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia as an economic and religious partner on the other. The mediating role was therefore not merely a diplomatic manoeuvre, but part of a broader policy to protect internal security and reduce regional risk.

Iran, in return, secured clear economic and strategic gains from this mediation. The draft memorandum provided for the immediate commencement of lifting the naval blockade imposed on Iran, with its complete termination within thirty days, and included a plan for Iran’s reconstruction and economic development worth no less than 300 billion dollars, alongside a gradual ending of sanctions, immediate exemption from restrictions on exports of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products, and the release of frozen or restricted Iranian funds and assets. The memorandum also acknowledged Iran’s role in the resumption of commercial navigation and in future discussions with Oman and other littoral states concerning the management of the Strait of Hormuz and its services. Tehran thereby obtained de-escalation, a lightening of its economic burdens and recognition of its maritime role, without the more complex issues being settled definitively.

These factors explain, to a large degree, Pakistan’s acceptance of the burden of mediation. Islamabad feared the extension of the Iranian war to its western front, which could aggravate an already tense security situation and affect fuel supplies. Pakistan also possesses direct channels of communication with Washington and Tehran, and is at the same time seeking to restore its diplomatic standing after years of decline in its image in the West. Alongside this, domestic calculations were tied to the need to preserve sectarian stability, since Pakistan contains one of the largest Shia populations in the world and had already witnessed widespread protests after the outbreak of the war. The mediation was therefore not a symbolic act, but a defensive choice intended to stabilise the border, ease economic pressures and strengthen Pakistan’s political and diplomatic position.

The defence relationship between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rests on an interlocking legal, military and financial framework, and not on a passing political understanding. The two states signed the mutual strategic defence agreement on 17 September 2025 in Riyadh, and the official statement declared that any aggression against either state is deemed an aggression against the other, and that the agreement aims to develop defence cooperation and strengthen joint deterrence. According to subsequent coverage, Riyadh and Islamabad affirmed that the agreement falls within a historical partnership extending over some eight decades, a formulation reflecting that the relationship did not begin in 2025, but moved on that date to a clearer level of commitment.

This commitment has translated into an actual military presence on the ground. In April 2026 the Saudi Ministry of Defence announced the arrival of a Pakistani force at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Sector under the agreement, comprising fighter aircraft and support units, while later reports indicated that Pakistan had deployed some 8,000 troops and a squadron of 16 fighter aircraft, most of them of the JF-17 type, alongside drones and an HQ-9 air defence system. These figures show that the cooperation is no longer training or symbolic support, but has become a military deployment that can be used in deterrence and direct protection missions, which makes any threat to Saudi territory practically bound up with Pakistan’s position.

This relationship also rests on long precedents of security cooperation between the two countries. Reports published around 2026 indicate that the Pakistani presence in Saudi Arabia predated that point, and at some stages ranged between 1,500 and 2,000 troops providing operational, technical and training support, before expanding later under the new agreement. The official Saudi statement further clarified that the agreement came to develop aspects of defence cooperation and strengthen joint deterrence, which means that the obligations of the two parties are not confined to political defence, but encompass wider military coordination and practical readiness to confront any aggression.

This cooperation extends to the financial dimension, since the defence relationship between the two countries is also linked to successive Saudi support and investment packages for Pakistan. In April 2026 reports indicated that Saudi Arabia and Qatar had pledged 5 billion dollars to Pakistan, while other reports stated that Riyadh had pledged a further 3 billion dollars and extended a deposit refinancing arrangement worth 5 billion dollars. These figures reveal a clear exchange of interests: economic and financial support from Riyadh in return for a security and military commitment from Islamabad, which gives the agreement greater weight than a mere defence text.

This alliance derives its most important dimension from the historical and political background on which the relationship between the two countries was built. Pakistan has not treated Saudi security as a situational choice, but as a fixed part of its strategic calculations, particularly given the presence of the Two Holy Mosques and the religious and political sensitivity attached to them within Pakistani society and the military establishment. The Houthi blockade of Saudi Arabia therefore represents not only a maritime crisis, but places this entire defence framework under direct test, since any Pakistani retreat from the new commitments would collide with the core article of the agreement and with the military presence already established inside the Kingdom.

The Houthi move is understood as more than a local escalation against Saudi Arabia, and rather as an escalation by the Iranian axis, because it simultaneously reveals a direct overlap between the group’s behaviour and broader Iranian calculations in the region. Even if it cannot be proven that Tehran issued a direct order covering every field detail, the available indicators suggest that this move did not fall outside the general Iranian framework, whether in terms of political direction, the granting of a green light, or the provision of cover allowing the group to escalate. The naval blockade therefore does not appear to be a separate decision, but a step within a wider pattern in which Iran uses its affiliated instruments to increase pressure on its adversaries without engaging directly in confrontation itself.

It is here that the gravity of the situation for Pakistan emerges. Islamabad no longer faces a crisis that can be treated as a matter concerning Saudi Arabia alone, because the presence of Pakistani forces in the Kingdom, alongside the mutual defence agreement signed in September 2025, makes any direct threat to Saudi Arabia a practical test of the credibility of the Pakistani commitment. At the same time, Pakistan cannot disregard its relationship with Iran, since it still deals with it as an immediate neighbour and a political partner with which it needs to keep channels of communication open, especially after playing a part in de-escalation between Washington and Tehran. The Houthi blockade thus becomes a double source of pressure on Islamabad: it places it before Riyadh as an ally required to act rather than to issue statements, and before Tehran as a mediator that may lose its value if Iran’s arms turn into a source of direct threat to its interests and those of its Saudi ally.

The deeper problem lies in the fact that this development dispels the notion that Pakistan can separate its roles indefinitely. The position it had previously succeeded in formulating rested on combining diplomacy with Iran and a security commitment to Saudi Arabia, but the naval blockade makes this balance far more difficult, because every step will be read as a tilt towards one of the two sides. If Pakistan chooses to hold to its role as mediator and to exert political pressure on Iran alone, it may be seen in Riyadh as having failed to rise to the level of its defence obligations. If it chooses instead to activate the security agreement and engage in direct or indirect deterrence, it will in practice lose its position as a channel of communication with Tehran, and may enter open confrontation with the Iranian axis as a whole.

The Houthi blockade therefore represents not only a threat to Saudi navigation, but exposes the limits of Pakistan’s ability to persist in a policy of equal distance from both parties. It also places its agreement with Riyadh before its first real test at a moment of actual crisis, rather than in the context of theoretical understandings. The question is no longer whether Pakistan will be affected by the crisis, but how it will act when it has to choose between its defence commitment to Saudi Arabia and the preservation of its mediating role with Iran. This is precisely what prepares the ground for the section that follows, namely the possible scenarios before Islamabad, since the crisis can no longer tolerate a prolonged grey position, and instead imposes clearer and costlier decisions

Pakistan no longer enjoys wide room for manoeuvre, because the Houthi blockade of Saudi Arabia will place the decision-maker in Islamabad at a sensitive point of intersection between its defence obligations to Riyadh, its political role with Iran, and its domestic calculations, which always incline towards avoiding direct involvement. The current crisis therefore tests not only Islamabad’s reaction to a maritime threat, but also the ability of the Pakistani state to continue combining two contradictory positions: that of security partner to Riyadh, and that of an open diplomatic channel with Tehran. Within this framework, three paths appear before Pakistan, none of which carries a low cost, but each of which will determine the shape of its regional standing in the coming period.

• The First Path: Diplomatic Pressure on Tehran

Along this path Islamabad attempts to use its diplomatic capital to exert direct pressure on Tehran in order to ease the escalation and prevent the Houthis from continuing the blockade. Islamabad here acts on the basis that it remains capable of influencing Iran through its diplomatic channels, and ties the continuation of its role as mediator to Tehran’s readiness to restrain its allies on the ground. Should Pakistan choose this direction, it would send a clear message to the Iranian leadership that continued pressure on Saudi Arabia will make it difficult for Islamabad to maintain its present position as a trusted negotiating party.

This step is the least costly militarily for Pakistan, since it allows it to avoid direct involvement in armed confrontation while preserving a minimum of balance between Riyadh and Tehran. It nevertheless remains limited in effectiveness and fragile as an option, because its success depends on two things that are far from guaranteed: first, that Iran is genuinely able to control Houthi behaviour, and second, that Tehran chooses to safeguard its political and economic gains from the existing understandings rather than widen the space of regional pressure. The problem is not that Pakistan lacks channels of communication, but the extent of its ability to convert those channels into real influence over Tehran’s conduct. If Iran does not respond, Pakistan will appear to hold greater diplomatic weight than its actual capacity to compel, which weakens its credibility before Riyadh even before it weakens it before Tehran.

• The Second Path: Activating the Defence Commitment with Saudi Arabia

If the Houthi escalation continues and Tehran refuses to intervene to curb it, Pakistan may find itself compelled to move from the position of mediator to that of a participant in defence. Here the mutual defence agreement with Saudi Arabia becomes the decisive reference, because any retreat from it would be read in Riyadh as a direct breach of a political and military undertaking. Along this path Pakistan is not taking a tactical decision, but determining whether it regards the alliance with Saudi Arabia as a practical commitment or merely a symbolic formula.

Engaging in this option means that Pakistan would treat the crisis as a direct threat to the security of its ally, rather than a regional dispute that can be contained through statements. In return, however, it places Pakistan in indirect confrontation with Iran, because any military or defensive participation against the Houthis would be understood in Tehran as an alignment against its regional influence. At that point Pakistan loses the character of mediator and becomes a clear party to the equation of conflict, opening before it a new range of risks along its western border and in its relationship with Iran.

• The Third Path: Adherence to Passive Neutrality

The third path remains the most comfortable in the short term and the most dangerous politically over the long term. Along this path Pakistan confines itself to balanced rhetoric calling for restraint, and avoids any direct military commitment, under the pressure of domestic division and fear of internal security repercussions, particularly in a society highly sensitive to any conflict with a sectarian or regional dimension. This option may appear practical from the angle of avoiding confrontation, but it does not resolve the problem; it merely postpones it.

Saudi Arabia will not view this position as neutrality, but as a retreat from a commitment already in force, because the defence agreement and the presence of Pakistani forces on Saudi territory make silence a position of clear political significance. Should Riyadh conclude that Pakistan has not stood at the level of its undertaking, the level of trust in the alliance as a whole may decline, with all that this implies for security, economic and investment cooperation. At the same time, Tehran will not grant Pakistan any real compensating gain, because it will regard such neutrality as evidence of weak will or limited capacity, rather than as a position deserving of trust.

In conclusion, Pakistan today enters a highly sensitive phase in its foreign policy. Islamabad is attempting to preserve channels of diplomatic communication with Tehran and Washington, while working at the same time to fulfil its military and economic obligations towards Riyadh. The Houthi blockade imposes a direct challenge that merges diplomatic and security commitments within a single crisis. This situation prevents the Pakistani leadership from separating mediation efforts from military obligations. Pakistan cannot continue to declare neutrality while its military forces and interests are present on Saudi territory. The principal challenge before Islamabad thus shifts from managing regional tensions to addressing the direct contradiction between its role as a mediating state and its role as an allied state.

This strategic picture reveals that the naval blockade constitutes a genuine test of the foundations of Pakistani foreign policy, and is not confined to being a threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Pakistan can preserve its role as a mediating party by exercising diplomatic pressure on Tehran and the Houthis, should the blockade remain confined to political declarations without inflicting actual damage on navigation or on Saudi energy security. Islamabad’s options narrow considerably if the blockade turns into a practical measure inflicting clear losses on the Kingdom or disrupting the movement of trade in the Red Sea. Defence obligations, the Pakistani military presence in Saudi Arabia and mutual economic dependence all push Islamabad to abandon its neutral position, and Pakistan consequently adopts a firm military stance against the Iranian alliance.

The present question goes beyond Pakistan’s desire to relinquish the role of mediator, extending to Islamabad’s capacity to continue performing both roles together amid the developments of the regional conflict. Pakistan loses its ability to avoid a decisive choice the longer the blockade endures and the higher its economic and security cost rises. The Pakistani leadership finds itself compelled to make a final choice between continuing its diplomatic work and fulfilling its military obligations. This anticipated choice will determine Pakistan’s regional standing and its strategic role in the coming phase.

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