The Samson Option: Implications for the Nuclear Taboo and Fatalism

Israel’s nuclear arsenal is one of the “worst-kept secrets” in the MENA region due to the strategic ambiguity regarding its existence. Currently, Israel is not a signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and is allegedly the only state in the MENA region to possess nuclear warheads. It is estimated that Israel currently in possession of approximately 80 nuclear warheads that can be deployed through ballistic missiles or by aircraft. While this nuclear program is shrouded in ambiguity, there is a genuine fear that Israel can reveal the full extent of its nuclear capabilities in the form of the Samson Option, which can bare consequences for the nuclear taboo as well as adverse psychological effects for the MENA region and the world.

Before exploring the consequences of the Samson Option being used, it is important to understand what exactly the Samson Option is. The Samson Option is Israel’s alleged nuclear doctrine, which carries level of ambiguity regarding its existence. The purpose of this nuclear doctrine is to serve as a deterrence strategy if the state of Israel is completely threatened by its adversaries. This strategy is considered an escalation of last resort, as it takes inspiration from the biblical tale of Samson “…who killed himself and his enemies by collapsing the pillars of the temple in which they all stood”. The symbolism behind this name carries weight when applied to the Israeli nuclear doctrine, as it shows that Israel can potentially go down the path of unleashing the full force of its nuclear arsenal against its enemies in the face of impending defeat in battle, which it can do if its existence is threatened.

It is important to note the powering force behind this doctrine is Israel’s survival, and this strategy will not be used as a part of any conventional means of warfare. This can only happen if there is a significant shift in hostilities, resulting in a mass casualty attack against Israel, which according to the Times of Israel has been “war-gamed” by the US, Israeli, and Iranian governments. Despite this being a policy of last resort, as well as being strategically secretive, there have been times in the past when Israel has deliberately hinted at a potential desire to use their nuclear capabilities. These instances included an alleged plot by Israel to detonate a nuclear weapon during the 1967 Six Day War to prevent an Egyptian attack from Sinai, while the Israeli politicians have openly expressed a desire to nuke the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of October 7th. Even though it is not a full admission, this strategic ambiguity is slowly slipping and revealing a dangerous doctrine that can have ramifications across not only the MENA region, but the world as well.

The concept of the nuclear taboo has been a universally accepted norm since the US attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War and the possession of nuclear weapons have primarily been for deterrence. However, with conflicts such as the US-Israel-Iran War as well as the Russo-Ukraine War, nuclear taboo is beginning to show signs of cracking. This is clearly shown by the rise of nuclear rhetoric in such conflict zones, as President Vladimir Putin vowed to expand Russia’s nuclear doctrine to include the use of a nuclear weapon if a non-nuclear state allied to a nuclear is attacked. Moreover, Ali Larjani warned in 2025 that Iran will re-evaluate its nuclear stance if western nations were to behave aggressively towards Iran, which shows a clear shift away from the nuclear taboo as well as a dangerous use of rhetoric that undermines non-proliferation efforts. The nuclear taboo is further eroded through the US-Russia rivalry stemming from the Russo-Ukraine War, leading to an arms race focused on modernizing nuclear arsenals worldwide. It is through these vectors the concept of the nuclear taboo is slowly disintegrating and can shatter if Israel were to implement the Samson Option.

If Israel deploys the Samson Option successfully, the norm behind the nuclear taboo can completely collapse. One can attribute this potential collapse to the idea that if a nuclear weapon is used an against conventional military targets, “…the unique danger of nuclear weapons is blurred, and the taboo is weakened.” Regarding Israel, their missile arsenal is stocked with tactical weapons, such as ballistic missiles which can be fitted with nuclear warheads. If Israel use such a weapon, it can force the countries of the MENA region to pursue their own nuclear doctrines and engage in a nuclear arms race as a means of defense, which will no doubt completely collapse the nuclear taboo. This can be theorized as a nuclear attack on Iran by Israel will only push Iran towards pursuing a nuclear weapon, which in turn can force the MENA states (such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE) to pursue their own nuclear doctrines. As a result, the nuclear taboo will completely disintegrate as not only a nuclear weapon will be used by Israel, but the use of such a weapon will trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, consequentially replacing the nuclear taboo with the new norm of nuclear weapons being the new method of conventional warfare.

While the Samson Option risks collapsing the nuclear taboo through instigating a nuclear arms race and propping up nuclear doctrines throughout the region, the argument can be made that there is also a psychological component. The use of the Samson Option can lead to a rise in nuclear fatalism among civilian populations throughout the region, which is a potential psychological consequence of a nuclear weapon being used. One can define nuclear fatalism as “…a mood of growing resignation that nuclear weapons are going to be around indefinitely, that disarmament diplomacy is feckless and nuclear war inevitable”. Basically, it is the idea individuals and governments believe nuclear weapons were used once before and can possibly be used again, with no use in pursuing diplomatic de-escalation.

While nuclear fatalism exists without the deployment of a nuclear weapon in current conflict, the actual realization of the Samson Option will only lead to an increase in the level of fatalism among the political and military leaders as well as individuals in society. Regarding political and military leaders, the use of the Samson Option contains elements of nuclear fatalism, as the deployment of this strategy will only be possible if the negative outcome of Israel’s collapse is imminent. This concept is explained as “Leaders tend to become more fatalistic when they believe that a potentially negative event (e.g., a war) is imminent”. The consequence of Israeli fatalism stemming an imminent threat of state collapse will trigger a rise of fatalist mentality across the MENA region and possibly the world. This fatalist mentality will present itself as leaders increasing their nuclear capacities while lamenting that the diplomatic option is no longer viable, which in turn can lead to nuclear accidents or even a full-scale nuclear war. Therefore, the fatalist elements of the Samson Option will only contribute to more fatalism among political and military leaders, which in turn accelerates the path to nuclear proliferation and ultimately nuclear war.

Beyond the fatalism to be experienced by political and military leaders in the event of the Samson Option is used, there is also the possibility that fatalism will be felt on an individual and societal level. Even without the use of nuclear weapons, people have a fatalist view of the world, as a 2025 Ipsos poll showed that “70% of people, on average, across 30 countries expect in the next 25 years we could see another world conflict” while some claim “…we’re now living in a golden age of fatalism”. Now if the Samson Option were to be implemented and a nuclear weapon is used, the psychological consequences for society and the individual within the region will be detrimental.

These consequences can be realized in the form of paralyzing fatalism as well as increased anxiety. To put this in perspective, these are the psychological consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, where villagers from the surrounding areas suffered from increased health anxiety from being exposed to radiation, while fatalism was present in the form of a lack of initiative to sustain income as well as increased dependency on state assistance. If the Samson Option is implemented, the psychological impact on MENA societies will be extensive and will contribute to a mental health crisis grounded in health anxiety due to nuclear contamination.

While the Israeli Samson Option focuses on a nuclear response, one can argue the asymmetric strategy implemented by Iran is a non-nuclear version of the Samson Option. The idea behind this asymmetric military strategy is to inflict as much damage to the US and Israel by engaging in a long-term conflict “…one designed to drag the region into chaos and deny its enemies a clean victory”. This is done by engaging in an escalate to de-escalate strategy which includes creating a chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz to pressure the US and Israel to end the conflict on Iran’s terms, even if it risks the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Moreover, this strategy is sustainable for a period with the use of cheap drones and missiles which Iran mass produces and can overwhelm the US forces by inflicting damage and increasing pressure to end the conflict. Through this strategy, the argument can be made Iran is using its own Samson Option aimed at prolonging the war to exact maximum pressure on the US and Israel through drone warfare and economic chokepoints, even at the risk of the regime’s own survival.

While Iran can sustain this strategy for a period, some argue that it is not sustainable in the long-term. Amir Taheri argues that this “Samson Option” is not sustainable in the long-term due to the Iranian economy being in shambles because of shortages of essential goods as well as factional feuds that have been plaguing the regime since its inception. Moreover, the “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is doomed to backfire, as the continued attacks can result in an expansion of the conflict, which will “…deepen Tehran’s strategic quandary”.

Although the argument can be made that Iran’s strategy is a non-nuclear “Samson Option”, ultimately, the implementation of the Israeli Samson Option will have dire consequences for the region and possibly the world. These consequences will materialize in the form of the collapse of the nuclear taboo, which will instigate a nuclear arms race and transform nuclear warfare into the new conventional warfare. Furthermore, the use of a nuclear weapon by Israel will result in a rise of fatalism, which can lead to nuclear warfare, as diplomatic options will no longer be viable, while also increasing health anxiety and a belief that nuclear warfare is inevitable. Conclusively, it is essential the international community works on nuclear non-proliferation so that these consequences are not realized in the future.

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