Food or Fuel: The Implications of Biofuels for Global Food Security

The international system faces complex geostrategic pressures that place global supply chains under unprecedented strain. Escalating military tensions, particularly disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, are putting pressure on oil and liquefied natural gas flows. In 2025, this passage carried around a quarter of seaborne oil trade and 19% of global trade in liquefied natural gas. These developments coincide with a shift in the Russia–Ukraine conflict towards attacks on energy infrastructure, alongside tighter restrictions on Black Sea shipping and disruptions to key export routes for strategically important grains. This convergence leaves the world caught between declining oil supplies and restricted access to part of the available food supply, complicating procurement and threatening the foundations of national security.

Faced with these shortages and rising shipping costs, some major powers and emerging economies are expanding biofuel production as an instrument of national policy to ease the energy crisis, alongside pursuing environmental objectives and supporting agricultural production. Agricultural producer countries are consequently choosing to redirect part of their strategic crop output, including maize, sugar cane and palm oil, towards biofuel plants to meet transport needs. This analysis advances the hypothesis that expanding biofuels derived from food crops may heighten the vulnerability of importing countries when demand growth outstrips the capacity of production and stocks to accommodate it, while trade policies restrict exportable supplies. The scale of this effect depends on the feedstocks used, the volume diverted and the responsiveness of production. It does not apply to the same extent to fuels produced from agricultural residues or used oils.

Import-dependent countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, may bear the cost of these pressures through diminished food security and domestic stability. An inability to secure food can, in this context, undermine social stability and signal the risk of political crises whose severity varies according to institutional effectiveness and the capacity to protect the most vulnerable groups. This complex situation poses an urgent question: how far can importing countries withstand the convergence of energy and food policies, and what protective mechanisms can safeguard their national security as competition intensifies between the use of crops for food and for fuel?

The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz becomes clear when examined against global dependence on energy supplies. In 2025, around 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products passed through the strait each day, equivalent to a quarter of seaborne oil trade, alongside 19% of global trade in liquefied natural gas. Most of these supplies went to Asian markets, which received around 80% of the oil and petroleum products and 90% of the liquefied natural gas. This geographical concentration helps explain why Asian governments regard substituting domestically produced fuels as a key step toward greater strategic autonomy. Flows through the strait fell to 7.6 million barrels per day in August 2026, a substantial decline of 13.1 million barrels per day relative to pre-war levels, rather than the 2025 average. This decline does not represent the net global shortfall, since alternative routes, increased production outside the Gulf and weaker demand offset part of the loss. Alternative routes were nevertheless unable to absorb the full shock: exports through Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port and the United Arab Emirates’ Fujairah port fell to 5.5 million barrels per day in August 2026, from 7.8 million in June of the same year. This underlines that the theoretical availability of alternative outlets cannot substitute for reliable shipment arrival schedules.

The Russia–Ukraine conflict adds another layer to these challenges, as Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have exacerbated shortages of refined products. Diesel and gasoil prices in the US market rose sharply in early September 2026 to exceed US$200 per barrel, 94% above pre-war levels, while Brent crude futures rose by 45%. This comparison concerns petroleum product prices and crude oil futures, rather than retail prices at filling stations. These figures indicate that abundant crude oil alone cannot ensure national resilience. Effective crisis management requires refined fuel available for immediate use to sustain grain transport, operate infrastructure, and maintain emergency services.

The consequences extend to food supply chains, with attacks on port infrastructure and ships restricting access to grain. Ukrainian agricultural exports through Odesa’s ports were disrupted by attacks that intensified in late July and early August 2026. On 4 September, Ukraine’s agriculture minister estimated that August exports had reached around one-third of the volume possible had all logistical routes been available. Alternative routes, including railways, the Danube and the EU’s Solidarity Lanes, could not compensate for lost maritime transport capacity, particularly as low water levels in the Danube constrained the diversion of shipments. On 22 September 2026, the EU ambassador to Vietnam reported that grain exports in August had fallen by 50% compared with the same month in 2025. The basis of comparison differs here from the estimate of agricultural exports relative to their potential: the two percentages measure different indicators. The combination of infrastructure destruction and restricted access creates a compound crisis in which grain quantities remain trapped in storage while importing countries bear the cost of finding alternative supplies.

Environmental arguments for biofuel production intersect with energy security considerations and support for farmers. Under geopolitical shocks, the sector is taking on a strategic role as governments use it to cushion price swings and reduce oil imports. This shift calls for a redefinition of energy security, as agricultural economies increasingly produce their own fuel to meet domestic needs, turning their fields into energy sources that support economic stability. Biofuel policies thus take on security rationales alongside environmental objectives, as production plants and distribution networks give some governments a fuel source less exposed to pressure on maritime routes. This autonomy does not extend across all energy sectors: ethanol partially substitutes for petrol, and biodiesel partially replaces conventional diesel, but neither is a direct substitute for the liquefied natural gas used in electricity generation and fertiliser production. These distinctions mean that improved petrol supplies may leave vital sectors, such as freight transport, exposed to diesel shortages. Moreover, reliance on imported feedstocks at domestic plants may alter the form of strategic dependence without eliminating it.

The policies of major agricultural producers illustrate this trend. In India, New Delhi has focused on allocating rice and sugar cane to ethanol production in support of fuel-blending programmes. The Indian government announced that the average blending rate reached 20% between November 2025 and June 2026, while limiting E85 use to flex-fuel vehicles rather than raising the standard nationwide blend to that level. Indonesia has taken similar steps by increasing the proportion of palm oil-derived biodiesel blended with petroleum diesel. The blend rose from B40 to B50, or 50% biodiesel, on 1 July 2026. By mid-September, 6,050 of the 6,412 filling stations in the network covered by the announcement were supplying this fuel. Indonesia’s energy ministry reinforced this policy by highlighting the B50 programme’s role in reducing dependence on diesel imports and meeting fuel needs domestically amid global geopolitical changes. In Brazil, the ethanol blend in regular petrol increased from E30 to E32 on 1 August 2026 for 180 days, renewable once for an equivalent period, to support domestic fuel supplies. In the United States, new Renewable Fuel Standard requirements were adopted in March 2026. The Environmental Protection Agency estimated that meeting the 2026–2027 requirements would entail more than 60% growth in biodiesel and renewable diesel production and use compared with 2025. This estimates what compliance requires, not a production increase already achieved.

The strategic risk lies in the structural character of some of these policies. Once substantial investment has been committed to biofuel plants and complex logistics infrastructure has been established, reversing course becomes politically and economically costly. Biofuels may become entrenched as a source of domestic stability, encouraging governments during crises to prioritise the continuity of domestic transport over increasing supplies to external markets. This does not preclude policy adjustments, as Brazil’s temporary measure demonstrates the scope for reviewing emergency interventions. Geopolitical tensions reinforce policy trajectories already in place: India’s E20 programme long predates the crisis. Governments therefore respond to crises through existing institutions and alliances, while the pursuit of energy independence remains inseparable from farmers’ and industry’s interests.

The scale of global supplies imposes clear strategic limits. The International Energy Agency recorded a seasonal increase of 890,000 barrels per day in biofuel supply between February and August 2026. This seasonal comparison does not isolate the increase attributable solely to the war or to emergency policies. These supplies provide support for some countries without resolving the wider disruption to oil flows. Governments may continue to expand demand for crop-based fuels as long as the energy crisis persists, creating a troubling imbalance: a response with limited effect on fuel system stability can still place tangible pressure on the crop markets it depends on. This interdependence raises the prospect of continued competition for agricultural supplies to serve the transport sector, depending on the capacity of production and stocks to respond. Importing countries consequently face challenges that require protective strategies to safeguard their food security.

The principal mechanism through which geopolitical risk spreads is the simultaneous narrowing of available alternatives. When supplies are disrupted, wheat-importing countries must seek alternative sources, just as rising fuel prices push other countries to divert maize, sugar, and vegetable oils toward energy production. Mandatory blending requirements provide regulatory protection for this demand, constraining importers’ options through interconnected supply chains. Competition gradually extends to feed ingredients, edible oil markets, processing decisions, and land allocation in subsequent growing seasons, although the scope for substitution varies across crops. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) identified this mechanism in its assessment of 26 March 2026, noting that continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could reduce crop yields through fertiliser shortages, while higher oil prices increase the biofuel sector’s demand for feedstocks. This dynamic is supported by a World Bank analysis published in June 2026, which recorded an 11% rise in the oils and oilseed meals price index over the three months following the outbreak of the conflict, partly reflecting increased demand for biodiesel alongside other price-driving factors.

India’s use of rice illustrates the complexity of balancing domestic requirements against supplies available to external markets. Around 6.35 million tonnes of publicly held rice stocks were directed to ethanol plants between June 2025 and June 2026. Indian policy gives priority to reserve requirements and domestic distribution programmes before allocating surpluses to ethanol. The quantity diverted to fuel does not necessarily represent an equivalent reduction in food exports: the net effect depends on production growth, changes in stocks, the type of feedstocks used and the processing by-products returned to the animal feed supply. India’s rice exports reached 21.55 million tonnes in 2025, an increase of 19.4%, alongside the expansion of its ethanol programme. This limits the validity of assuming that exports automatically fall whenever fuel production rises. Price data nevertheless reveal mounting pressures. According to the release published on 4 September, the FAO index reached 133.3 points in August 2026, up 1.9% month on month, although it remained 16.8% below its March 2022 level. The Vegetable Oil Price Index reached 196.9 points, its highest level since June 2022, while wheat prices were 15% higher than a year earlier. These readings reflect the interaction of demand with weather conditions, exchange rates and shipping disruptions; they do not isolate the independent effect of biofuels. The crisis has further implications. On 7 May 2026, the FAO warned that missed fertiliser application windows would adversely affect crops in the latter half of 2026 and in 2027, potentially generating a subsequent wave of supply shortages even if shipping conditions stabilised.

Withholding staple commodities from markets may give exporting countries the capacity to influence conditions in importing countries. Interpreting this as the ‘weaponisation of food’, however, requires a distinction between protecting domestic consumption and deliberately pursuing political coercion. Indonesia’s decision to ban palm oil exports between 28 April and 23 May 2022 illustrates this distinction. According to the FAO, the measure was intended to secure domestic cooking oil supplies and stabilise prices; it did not constitute evidence of an export ban designed to secure biofuel inputs. This precedent shows how access to supplies remains vulnerable to decisions taken by exporting countries, even when those decisions seek to protect domestic interests. Competition over crops may expand exporting countries’ leverage. Turning that leverage into a political bargaining instrument, however, remains a possible development that requires separate evidence that export quotas are used to extract specific concessions.

This strategic trajectory raises serious questions about when retaining crops for domestic use becomes a foreign policy instrument serving geopolitical objectives. Establishing that such a shift has occurred requires evidence of decisions linking the provision or withholding of supplies to political or security demands, distinguished from trade restrictions aimed at managing domestic prices and stocks. An exporter’s capacity to exercise such influence depends on the concentration of an importing country’s supply sources, the flexibility of its alternatives, and the size of its financial and food reserves. This requires decision-makers across the Arab region and Africa to build strategic national reserves and diversify agricultural partnerships, without assuming that every export restriction reflects a deliberate strategy of coercion.

The repercussions of alternative energy policies reveal disparities in countries’ capacity to distribute the burden of a shock. Producing countries can meet part of their transport needs domestically, while developing economies may face higher costs when purchasing the same crops. The severity of this effect depends on supply responsiveness, changes in stocks, exchange rates and the cost of securing shipments. The coincidence of rising food prices and expanding biofuel production is therefore insufficient to establish the latter as the sole cause. The strategic vulnerability lies in the accumulation of pressures on countries with limited capacity to finance food purchases, transport supplies and protect consumers.

This geoeconomic dynamic becomes more acute when it encounters the underlying fragility of import-dependent states, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. These countries may face the twin burdens of imported inflation and the erosion of their currencies’ purchasing power, depleting foreign exchange reserves and weakening their capacity to finance wheat and rice imports. Core state functions begin to erode before unrest becomes visible. Fuel shortages may obstruct the distribution of grain already purchased, while expensive shipments absorb resources allocated to other essential sectors, such as health and electricity. This financial squeeze confronts governments with difficult choices between scaling back social support programmes and increasing external borrowing, while raising the risk that they will fail to fulfil the interdependent tasks of securing shipments, financing them and delivering supplies to consumers.

The extent of strategic exposure varies across the Middle East and Africa according to financial and logistical capacity. Importing countries with strong financial resources can fund alternative shipments for longer, but financial abundance does not guarantee secure transport routes or compensate for port disruptions. Countries with limited reserves, by contrast, face simultaneous constraints on financing and supply availability. In conflict zones, these disruptions obstruct humanitarian assistance and strengthen the influence of groups controlling distribution routes and storage facilities. The baseline reveals vulnerabilities that predate the current crisis. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2026 reports that around 309 million people in Africa were undernourished in 2025, despite a decline in the prevalence of undernourishment from 20.3% to 20% of the population. On 17 March 2026, the World Food Programme projected that around 45 million additional people worldwide could face acute food insecurity if the conflict continued until the middle of the year and oil prices remained above US$100 per barrel. This conditional estimate differs in scope, definition and time frame from the estimate of undernourishment in Africa. The two figures must therefore not be added together, and neither measures the effect of biofuels alone. Each, within its respective scope, illustrates the limited capacity of the most vulnerable households to absorb food and energy shocks.

The political consequences of these crises depend on the nature of institutions and how far societies perceive distribution to be fair. A survey experiment conducted in Johannesburg in June and July 2017, involving 608 participants and reported in a study published in 2024, found that expectations of higher food, fuel and electricity costs increased respondents’ stated willingness to take part in collective action, particularly among those who had previously experienced hunger. The finding concerns responses to hypothetical scenarios; it neither measures actual unrest nor establishes the inevitability of state collapse. Declining purchasing power does not make revolutions inevitable, just as the crises of 2008 and 2011 cannot be reduced to rising commodity prices alone. Such pressures may nevertheless activate latent grievances associated with inequality and exclusion. Supply crises can become crises of legitimacy when governments adopt policies that protect the privileges of particular groups while leaving the poorest households exposed to repeated shocks. Addressing these tensions solely through a security lens deepens the trust deficit, potentially widening instability and increasing the risk of effects spilling across borders.

Policies to expand biofuel production are generating growing pressures on land use over the medium term, extending beyond their immediate effects on crop prices. An estimate published on 21 September 2026 projects a 68% increase in biofuel production by 2030 relative to 2025 levels. Full implementation of the assumed increases in blending rates could require an additional 36 million hectares of land worldwide, an area roughly equivalent to Germany. This is a conditional estimate of the global expansion trajectory, rather than land already acquired or an area attributable to Africa alone. Some investors may turn towards Africa, which, according to a 2024 African Development Bank publication, holds more than 60% of the world’s remaining uncultivated arable land. The fact that this land is uncultivated does not mean it is free of local uses, tenure rights, or environmental and water constraints. These conditions create the potential for intensifying competition over African countries’ land resources, but do not in themselves establish that a new wave of acquisitions linked to the current crisis is under way.

Such acquisitions could extend beyond conventional agricultural investment to pose a structural challenge to Africa’s economic future if land is converted into isolated enclaves producing fuel crops, rather than used to strengthen local food security or build value chains that support national economic development. Financing pressures may encourage some African governments to exchange long-term rights to exploit land and water for immediate relief from financing or fuel crises. Without safeguards for local rights and benefits, this could transmit strategic vulnerabilities from one generation to the next. Nor does purchasing farmland abroad guarantee a food-importing country unconditional control over the harvest: the host state retains sovereign authority over export decisions, making overseas land investment an incomplete substitute for reliable access to supplies.

This wider transformation could bring competition over resources into Africa itself, where authority over land and water is dispersed in settings that afford weak protection to communities’ customary rights. The experience of previous investment cycles calls for caution. A systematic review published by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in September 2025, covering 25 studies, found that the failure of land-based biofuel projects in sub-Saharan Africa was associated with a complex interplay of financial, institutional and local conditions, with economic factors particularly prominent, rather than a single common cause. This finding reinforces the need to assess each project in its own context, without assuming that expansion will inevitably lead to civil conflict. Failed concession projects may leave disputes over tenure rights and the loss of access to local resources in their wake if restrictions on land persist after the investment has faltered. Obstructing seasonal grazing routes or access to water sources may also deepen disputes between local communities and investors or the state. Security outcomes depend on the protection of rights, mechanisms for resolving disputes, and the distribution of benefits, requiring policymakers to incorporate these safeguards into energy and agricultural investment policies.

In conclusion, accelerating shifts in energy and food markets are creating geostrategic vulnerabilities that extend beyond temporary disruptions to supply chains through straits and waterways. Biofuel policies suggest that converting crops into energy may become institutionally entrenched in some producer countries even if military tensions ease, while other measures remain open to revision. The impact on food supplies depends on the capacity of production, stocks and trade policies to accommodate additional demand. Where that capacity is constrained, sudden shocks can become sustained pressures on exportable supplies and the stability of global markets.

This geopolitical reality exposes import-dependent countries, particularly in the Middle East, to strategic vulnerabilities that may constrain their room for manoeuvre. The ability to supply crops or restrict access to them gives exporting countries varying degrees of influence, but translating that influence into political coercion requires intent, capability and a lack of alternatives for buyers. Imported inflation may accumulate as governments’ capacity to perform essential functions weakens, increasing the risk of crises of legitimacy when inadequate social protection and an inequitable distribution of burdens compound these pressures. Countering this trajectory requires securing finance for essential commodity imports, widening contracting and shipping options, and protecting the most vulnerable households’ access to food. Political outcomes depend as much on the effectiveness of national responses as on decisions taken by supplier countries.

The effects of these shifts extend to competition over land and water in Africa, underscoring the need to tie investment to safeguards for tenure, local access to resources and food security. International frameworks already address these trade-offs, including the Committee on World Food Security’s 2013 recommendations on biofuels; their ability to limit harm depends on their translation into national policies that can be implemented and monitored. For importing countries, a defensive response requires linking food stocks to reserves of the fuel needed to transport and distribute them, diversifying supply sources and logistical routes, and strengthening domestic production where resources permit. This must be accompanied by international coordination that allows fuel-blending requirements to be reviewed when pressures on food supplies intensify. Food security thus becomes a central line of defence for political stability, its effectiveness resting on reducing concentrated dependencies and strengthening the capacity to absorb shocks before they develop into institutional crises.

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