The Difficult Path to Regime Change in Iran

In remarks on 2 March 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump did not rule out the possibility of sending American ground troops into Iran if it became necessary. However, he didn’t acknowledge that such a move would carry serious risks given Iran’s size and military capability. Any U.S. ground invasion would likely involve significant casualties and could fail to achieve its goals.  Trump has generally shown reluctance to engage in large-scale ground wars. While he has authorized military actions, including airstrikes, against Iran and other states in recent months, his preference historically has been for limited use of force, such as air power and specialized units, rather than deploying tens of thousands of troops.

Part of this approach stems from his broader view that prolonged, chaotic conflicts are unpredictable and often produce uncertain outcomes. Major ground combat operations can create widespread instability and make strategic consequences hard to forecast. Throughout both his first term and the early part of his second term, Trump has shown no strong inclination to commit large numbers of U.S. ground forces abroad.

Trump and Bibi (also known as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) recognize that forcing a full regime change in Tehran would be one of the toughest strategic tasks imaginable. Iran’s political and military structure is robust and not solely driven by personalist rule; it is anchored in a religiously grounded system that has endured since 1979. With the challenges of a successful ground invasion in mind, their current strategy relies on a combination of military pressure and other techniques intended to weaken the regime over time, though there is no guarantee this will bring about its collapse.

Any serious discussion of regime change in Iran must begin with a basic observation which is that the Islamic Republic is not easily removed. It was not built as a fragile personal nor a sultanistic dictatorship. It was constructed as a layered, self-preserving system designed to endure shocks. In its earliest revolutionary phase, the regime did carry sultanistic features. Authority revolved around the personal charisma of the Supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. However, over time, this model evolved. Under Ali Khamenei, power was institutionalised rather than personalised. Loyalists were embedded across state structures, parallel institutions were strengthened, and overlapping authorities were deliberately cultivated.

The system today resembles a structure supported by multiple reinforced pillars rather than a narrow pyramid balanced on one individual. Beneath the formal political leadership lies a powerful security and intelligence apparatus, alongside economic networks tied to regime survival. These actors are not simply subordinates awaiting instruction. They are stakeholders whose power, resources and legitimacy depend on continuity.

This structure is not only symbolic, however, it is embedded within the regime and systematic. Iran’s constitutional architecture reinforces this resilience. Article 111 explicitly mentions the situation in case of the sudden death or incapacitation of the Supreme Leader. Authority transfers immediately to an interim council composed of the president, the head of the judiciary and a senior cleric selected through the Expediency Council. The objective is continuity, not transformation. A temporary three-member leadership council has been established to run the country in accordance with Islamic Republic law. The council includes Iran’s reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian, the hard-line head of the judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, and Alireza Arafi, a jurist who serves on Iran’s Guardian Council and heads the Basij volunteer paramilitary force. While this council will oversee governance on an interim basis, the responsibility for selecting a new supreme leader lies with the 88-member Assembly of Experts. Under Iranian law, the appointment must be made as swiftly as possible. The Assembly consists of Shiite clerics elected every eight years, with all candidates vetted and approved by the country’s constitutional watchdog.

Adding to this, it is also worth noting that the institutional web extends further. The Guardian Council filters legislation and electoral candidates. The Assembly of Experts selects and supervises the Supreme Leader. The Expediency Council resolves elite disputes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps safeguards the revolution internally and externally. These bodies overlap intentionally. This design is argued to reflect historical memory. Iranian political elites are deeply shaped by past periods of instability and foreign intervention. Political vacuum is perceived not as an opportunity but as a threat. The regime’s architecture is therefore defensive, almost allergic to disorder.

This structural resilience also explains why the “Venezuela Model” can’t be repeated in Iran. On the 2nd of March, U.S. president Donald Trump referenced what happened to maduro when speaking about regime change in Iran. Acordingly, Iran should not be equated with cases such as Venezuela or Libya whose regime fell with the death of Muammar Al Gdhafi. In highly personalised systems, removing the head can produce systemic collapse because the state is indistinguishable from the ruler. Iran is different. Its leadership operates within an institutionalised revolutionary framework that was deliberately constructed to outlast individuals.

With Ali Khamenei now dead, the frequently discussed scenario of assassinating him is no longer hypothetical. Yet his death in itself does not automatically dissolve the regime. While such an event is dramatic and potentially destabilising, it does not necessarily trigger systemic collapse. In the immediate aftermath, elite factions are more likely to close ranks than to fragment. The overriding instinct is usually the preservation of the system rather than its dismantling. The same logic applies to the broader public sphere. Popular protest has persisted since the killing of Mahsa Amini more than three years ago, reflecting and widespread societal discontent. However, sustained unrest has not translated into regime collapse. This is not because dissent lacks depth or significance, but because in moments of acute external threat, the dynamic can even reverse. Rather than weakening the state, external military pressure often produces a rally-around-the-flag effect. When bombs begin to fall, populations frequently gravitate toward national unity and, at least temporarily, toward the governing authorities.

Importantly, The Islamic Republic is also not merely a political arrangement. It rests on a doctrinal foundation, the principle of velayat el faqih. This fuses theological legitimacy with state authority in a way that embeds ideology within constitutional design. It is therefore not simply a theocracy in a loose sense. In Israel, for example, religion plays an influential role in public life, but there is no clerical guardianship structurally embedded above elected authority. In Iran, doctrine is constitutional. That deep ideological embedding reinforces elite cohesion and regime durability. Adding all these factors together, the Islamic Republic is difficult to dislodge because it is hierarchical, institutionalised, ideologically entrenched and historically conditioned to resist fragmentation. Removing individuals does not automatically remove the system.

If internal structural collapse is unlikely in the short term, what options exist for external actors such as the U.S. and Israel? The critical point here is that while several techniques are available, none guarantee regime change. At best, they can weaken, disrupt or pressure the system. However, whether that pressure translates into collapse is uncertain.

One pathway involves strategic military degradationa in the form of a large-scale air campaign. The U.S. and Israel can begin by suppressing and degrading Iran’s air defence systems to secure aerial superiority. Previous Israeli operations have demonstrated vulnerabilities in Iran’s defences, though not all systems have been permanently neutralised and some have reportedly been repaired. Once control of the skies is achieved, attention can shift to Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure. Tehran’s missile arsenal is central to its deterrence posture. It allows the regime to threaten military installations, regional energy infrastructure, maritime routes and civilian targets. This capability complicates any external intervention.

Additionally, Washington can attempt to dismantle missiles’ underground facilities, often referred to as “missile cities”, where short and medium-range missiles are stored. Degrading this network would reduce Iran’s ability to retaliate effectively. However, weakening military assets is not synonymous with regime removal. It may limit deterrence and increase internal strain, but the political core of the system can still survive significant military damage.

A second technique is simultaneous elite decapitation which involves targeting multiple senior figures simultaneously. Till the time of writing these lines, around 48 Irani leaders were killed in the latest strikes on Iran. Although the constitution provides for structured succession, removing several key leaders at once could create temporary confusion or hesitation within elite networks. In theory, overwhelming the succession mechanism might produce fractures. Yet experience suggests caution, as discussed earlier. Even after the deaths of several senior military figures and influential officials, the system has continued to function. Institutional redundancy absorbs individual losses. The challenge lies in the scale required. Disruption does not automatically become disintegration.

A third tool is deep infiltration aimed at encouraging an internal rupture or coup-like event. In practice, this is extremely difficult. Iran’s intelligence and security institutions were constructed precisely to prevent foreign penetration and internal subversion. Counter-intelligence is embedded at every level of the security apparatus. However, this is not impossible, on the night of 7–8 January, just before the peak of nationwide protests, an internal power struggle reportedly unfolded within Iran’s ruling establishment, according to French newspaper Le Figaro. The report claimed that senior figures, led by former president Hassan Rouhani and ex–foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, attempted to sideline Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei from managing the escalating crisis, aiming to remove him from day-to-day decision-making without dismantling the regime itself. The effort ultimately failed after Ali Larijani declined to support the initiative. Subsequent reporting by The New York Times suggested that Larijani later assumed an expanded operational role, overseeing security policy, regional coordination, and nuclear negotiations during a period of acute instability. However, while disagreements within the regime can be found, it is not yet confimred whether cooperation with external powers can become a case.

That said, regime change in Iran is clearly no simple undertaking. Still, in politics, few outcomes are ever entirely impossible. A sudden shift triggered by external powers cannot be ruled out. Yet strategic calculations would likely suggest that no single action would suffice. A combination of measures, targeted assassinations, sustained military degradation, and deep infiltration of the regime’s internal structures, would be required to meaningfully weaken a system that is deeply entrenched. This would not be a hit-and-run operation. For the regime to face genuine collapse, it would likely require prolonged pressure, a war of attrition conducted across multiple fronts. Only through sustained and cumulative strain might the regime erode to the point where it, might, ultimately fall.

The Economist. 2026. “War, Succession and the Perilous Test of Two Myths About Iran.” The Economist, Middle East and Africa, March 1, 2026. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/03/01/war-succession-and-the-perilous-test-of-two-myths-about-iran.

RT Arabic. 2026. “تقرير فرنسي يكشف محاولة إنقلاب على خامنئي بسبب لاريجاني.” RT Arabic, March 2, 2026. https://arabic.rt.com/world/1760422-تقرير-فرنسي-يكشف-محاولة-انقلاب-على-خامنئي-بسبب-لاريجاني/.

Sky News. 2024. “Who’s in Charge of Iran Now – and Who Will Be Its New Leader?” Sky News, <date published if available or accessed>. https://news.sky.com/story/whos-in-charge-of-iran-now-and-who-will-be-its-new-leader-13513739.

The Conversation. 2026. “Despite Massive US Attack and Death of Ayatollah, Regime Change in Iran Is Unlikely.” The Conversation, March 2026. https://theconversation.com/despite-massive-us-attack-and-death-of-ayatollah-regime-change-in-iran-is-unlikely-277180.