Where Does China Stand in the US-Israel-Iran War?

The U.S.-Israel and Iran War has affected the interests of many countries. In the last few days, China emerged as a significant player in these events. Beijing called for an immediate halt to the attacks by both sides and the protection of vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, culminating with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledging to send a special envoy to the Middle East for mediation.

Beijing has interconnected interests in the Middle East that are significantly affected by the war and will most likely reshape its strategic opportunities in the region, particularly in terms of energy security, trade routes, and diplomatic relations with key regional players. Beijing’s pragmatic foreign policy approach toward the region relies on protecting its economic interests and maintaining a strategic balance. So, the war could provide an opportunity for China to navigate new opportunities in the region and, consequently, expand its influence, particularly by strengthening ties with other oil-producing nations and increasing its investments in reconstruction efforts.

Likewise, China’s strategic partnership with Iran mainly revolves around oil supply and large-scale investments. The consequences of the war raise questions about the future of this relationship and the possibility that China may reshape its foreign policy toward Tehran if it faces a potential decline in Iran’s ability to sustain such interests as a result of the strain on its power after the war.

China and Iran had developed a strong partnership long before the war, despite the sanctions imposed on Tehran. China is considered Iran’s largest trade partner, reflecting the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. Beijing is a primary importer of Iranian oil and has significant investments in Iran under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, the two countries share close political ties, as Beijing has backed Tehran’s entry into the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). For Tehran, China is a part of its “Look East” economic strategy in response to the repercussions of the Western sanctions, which aims to strengthen economic ties and diversify trade partnerships away from Western nations. Beijing, in turn, views Iran as a potential energy transport hub linking Asia with the Middle East.

Iran is of great significance for China’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. Beijing seeks to expand its economic influence through doubling its investments and BRI projects while curbing U.S. influence in the region amid the growing American-Sino global competition. The pressure of economic isolation has made Iran a prominent landscape to meet China’s needs for energy sources to sustain its rapid development. It also provides an opportunity for Beijing to leverage its key geographical location to construct projects as part of the new “Silk Road” linking Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

The Chinese-Iranian partnership expanded in 2021 incorporating non-oil technological investments. On Jan. 22–23, 2016, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Tehran and his meeting with former President Hassan Rouhani, the two sides formally agreed to establish a “comprehensive strategic partnership” between the two countries. On March 27, 2021, the foreign ministers of both countries signed in Tehran the “25-Year Cooperation Program”, also known as the “Roadmap for Comprehensive Cooperation”.

The $400 billion partnership encompasses infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy investments. In the light of the war, the cooperation is less likely to be affected and may resume after the war. China has a long experience in continuing projects in countries involved or heavily affected by conflicts. Hence, BRI projects would be beneficial to Tehran following the destruction of several hotspots in the country, as they may assist in the reconstruction and recovery during the post-war phase by providing necessary infrastructure, investment, and economic support to rebuild the affected areas.

Furthermore, China has refrained from selling arms to Iran since 2005 following the UN Security Council de facto embargo on nuclear-related exports to Iran. Nevertheless, evidence shows that there is an indirect involvement. Reports indicate that China may have provided advanced air defence systems—“surface-to-air missile batteries”—following the 12-day war with Israel in 2025.

During the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, further evidence surfaced from The Washington Post ship-tracking data, satellite imagery, and Treasury Department records. Data shows that two ships – Shabdis and Barzin – owned by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), left China’s Gaolan port for chemical storage in the southeastern coastal city of Zhuhai this week, loaded with cargo and headed to Iran. Previously, the U.S. has accused IRISL of supplying materials to Tehran’s ballistic missile programme.

As the war escalates and the U.S.-Israel strikes increasingly target Iranian oil refineries, China could consider an indirect and cautious support, such as the supply of spare parts and missile-related materials and financial assistance. At the same time, Beijing will likely maintain its official neutral stance, calling for a ceasefire and the resumption of nuclear negotiations.

The foremost issue China endeavours to address as a result of the conflict is the disruption of the number one oil supply route in the region. Beijing is the world’s largest importer of fossil fuel oil and gas and has recently been the main buyer of Iranian oil, making it one of the countries that are most vulnerable to disruptions in energy shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.

About 13% of China’s crude oil imports come from Iran, and nearly one-third of its oil and 25% of its gas imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. As a result of the rise in the oil prices and the disruptions in the energy markets, China could resort to purchasing more Russian oil. This shift would likely strengthen relations between the two countries, raising concerns among European states amid the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war.

Although reports suggest that Iran could allow Chinese vessels to pass through the Strait of Hormuz amid the war and that Beijing is currently in talks to access safe passage in the Strait for crude oil and Qatari liquefied natural gas vessels, the war has intensified energy insecurity. As a result, China may be pushed to reshuffle a larger percentage of its energy supplies toward alternative, diverse sources.

Generally, the Beijing-Tehran partnership is largely pragmatic and motivated by mutual interests. However, the repercussions of the war on Iran’s investment landscape and its ability to supply energy could push China to redirect its efforts to other partners if the relationship proves to be asymmetrical, particularly if Iran’s instability leads to decreased energy exports or increased geopolitical risks that threaten China’s energy security. Currently, China will more likely advocate for peace talks, as it wouldn’t prefer the collapse of the regime in Iran. For Beijing, a regime change in Iran means a new regime that will most probably be a Western-aligned one that would hinder its economic agenda in the Middle East and strengthen the United States’ position against Chinese regional aspirations.

China will most likely benefit both economically and diplomatically from such developments. The conflicts indirectly intersect with the broader U.S.–China competition over global hegemony. If the war drains the American military resources and forces Washington to renounce its huge involvement in the region, it will provide an opportunity for China to enhance its position, denounce Washington’s global leadership, maximise its interests, and capitalise on business opportunities. Similarly, China could seek to increase its economic involvement in the region as a way to bolster its regional position.

China will have the opportunity to further advance its business agenda. The Chinese Digital Silk Road (DSR) would expand, and countries would prefer a more non-belligerent partner to associate business with. More tech and logistical projects, such as ports, railways, 5G networks, and smart cities, will be expanded in the region, as China’s investments will be proven to be credible and resilient in front of political and military hostilities. By the same token, China could increase its arms exports to the region, including air defence systems and AI-driven surveillance technologies, thereby surging its defence industry in the region.

Additionally, China expressing its willingness to mediate as the war intensifies enhances its global image. If such mediation contributes to the end of the conflict, China’s image will be enhanced as a peace broker. Previously, Beijing played a similar role when it mediated the 2023 Iran–Saudi Arabia normalisation agreement. Hence, the greater the probability for successful mediation, the more China’s soft power in the Middle East is likely to expand.

On a geopolitical level, the U.S.-Israel claim that the strikes are necessary to prevent Iran’s future threat and obtain nuclear weapons; China could use the same argument to justify a possible preventive military action against Taiwan. China considers Taiwan part of its sovereign territory, while the U.S. maintains arms sales with the country. In such a context, the U.S. will be in a difficult position, facing accusations of double standards, if China applies the same pre-emptive strikes as part of the self-defence doctrine.

In sum, China’s indirect involvement in the conflict is more likely linked to maintaining its energy supply and investments in Iran. In turn, its ability to influence the trajectories of the conflict, although limited, is not insignificant. Beijing has strong ties with Iran, a previous mediation triumph, functional relations with Israel, and considerable economic influence in the region. In addition, Beijing currently maintains a controlled and relatively stable relationship with the Trump administration, as the U.S. President is due to visit the country for a summit with China’s President Xi Jinping at the end of March. Hence, the country could provide strong intermediary channels between all parties, which may serve as a basis for a future resolution of the conflict.

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