On Dec. 4 2025, Netanyahu decided to appoint his Military Secretary, Major General Roman Gofman, as the Director of the Mossad. Gofman will replace the current Mossad head, David Barnea, whose five-year term ends in June 2026. This decision signals a key leadership change in the country’s most important intelligence agency, particularly given Gofman’s lack of intelligence experience and aggressive decision-making approach. Moreover, this movement indicates Netanyahu’s broader pattern of politicising the appointments of high-ranking officials in security agencies, where loyalty to him appears to be a decisive factor. Accordingly, the politicisation of Mossad raises serious questions about the future of Israel's intelligence.
Historically, it has been customary for Mossad directors to meet certain criteria for appointment: prior service within the Mossad with steady progress in their career to reach senior positions; extensive experience in intelligence work, for instance, in the Israel Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman); engagement in field operations or special operations outside Israel, or work in the Shin Bet. In addition to that, some former Mossad directors also served in the Israeli military; for instance, Danny Yatom and Meir Dagan were prominent officials who served in the IDF and were appointed as Mossad Heads shortly after their military service in 1999 and 2002, respectively.
In general, a Mossad director must have a professional record that enables them to make sensitive and pivotal security and political decisions. Gofman’s appointment has sparked significant criticism concerning his competence to fit such a role, as his professional background does not meet these customarily established criteria. His current role as Netanyahu’s chief of staff is primarily administrative, and he lacks experience in intelligence or special operations. His appointment appears driven by personal loyalty to Netanyahu and alignment with his extreme security views. This loyalty facilitated his appointment as Netanyahu’s chief of staff during the Gaza war.
For Netanyahu, choosing close allies for senior positions in key security agencies has increasingly become a means of consolidating his control over the decision-making process. In October 2025, Netanyahu demonstrated this approach by appointing David Zini as the head of Shin Bet. The appointment faced widespread criticisms from Israeli officials, as Zini is closely associated with Netanyahu. This decision has shifted Shin Bet from an autonomous working agency to a politically controlled one.
Similar to Gofman, Zini aligns with the Netanyahu government’s ambitions. For instance, after his appointment in May 2025 as the next Shin Bet, the agency has conducted attacks targeting Hamas leaders in Qatar. Shin Bet’s involvement comes after the Mossad, under Barnea, opposed conducting the operation. This disagreement between the agency and the government could be one of the main reasons for Netanyahu’s rejection of Barnea’s candidates and appointment of an ally to head the agency.
Gofman’s appointment has drawn several criticisms within the Mossad for several reasons. First, Netanyahu’s military secretary possesses limited intelligence expertise, which is a vital requirement for the work in the Mossad, while suitable candidates were reportedly excluded. Second, the appointment reinforces concerns about the politicisation approach Netanyahu is adopting toward seniors in intelligence agencies, which could harm the professionalism of their operations.
Lastly, Gofman’s work ethic has been questioned, sparking fear about how he will handle sensitive information in the Mossad. In January 2024, allegations emerged linking Gofman to a scandal involving giving an Israeli teenager, Ori Elmakayes. Gofman was accused of giving classified information to Elmakayes to publish online, leading to the teenager’s arrest for 18 months. Although Gofman has denied his involvement and rejected the allegations, the scandal has fuelled more concern about the future of the Mossad under his leadership.
The consequences of Gofman’s appointment suggest that the Mossad could be utilised to advance Netanyahu’s personal agenda rather than Israeli security. This could undermine the agency’s independence and potentially turn it into a political tool, similar to the Shin Bet. Therefore, the criticism emerges from an important concern regarding the growing politicisation approach of senior intelligence officers, coupled with fears that this agency, like Shin Bet, will become a political tool serving Netanyahu’s interests rather than being an independent organisation.
Gofman, as the Director of the Mossad, is most likely to transform the security dynamics in the agency, manifesting in internal tensions and more aggressive operations in the Middle East. Furthermore, Netanyahu’s position is expected to strengthen by intervening in the agency’s decision-making process.
The decision is most likely to create internal friction inside the Mossad, as the decision has faced opposition due to Gofman’s lack of an intelligence background. Israel’s intelligence community is known for its technocratic and analytical methodology in carrying out operations; therefore, the decision is expected to trigger a wave of resignations from senior Mossad agents, signalling objections and concerns about a potential decline in the agency’s performance and transforming it into a political tool. These movements will increase public scrutiny toward the Mossad and the government, which is already encountering public disillusionment regarding the implications of October 7.
Additionally, Gofman’s position at the centre of the Mossad’s decision-making process will give leverage to Netanyahu to control many decisions taken by the agency, hence, controlling its operations in many strategic countries for Israel. By tightening his grip on the Mossad and Shin Bet, Netanyahu’s position will strengthen, especially amid the corruption allegations against him and the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant. This dynamic could make overthrowing Netanyahu’s government very challenging while facilitating targeting his political rivals and serving his regional strategic objectives.
The decision will affect the Mossad’s operations in the Middle East. Syria will still be considered a top priority on the agenda. As Türkiye supports the Syrian regime, the Mossad, under Netanyahu’s direction, could attempt to sabotage this relationship. For Netanyahu, the Israeli military presence in the Golan Heights is necessary to ensure the security of the country and to prevent attacks from areas adjacent to the border.
Similarly, countering Iran is expected to remain a top strategic priority. Gofman’s readiness to engage in escalatory measures would make him support strategies that amplify pressure on Iran, whether escalating strikes on Iranian nuclear weaponisation sites or exploiting the friction between Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, with Tehran to further isolate the country regionally. Finally, as a part of the plan to contain Iran, it is possible that the Mossad will increase its operations, such as espionage, assassinations, and strikes, in countries where Iran has influence, including Lebanon and Syria.
Lastly, to achieve Netanyahu’s ambitions in Gaza, the Mossad will work in a main direction. The Mossad is expected to intensify its operations regarding normalisation strategies, especially given the increasing pressure to improve Israel’s image after the Gaza war. Also, amid the Netanyahu government’s plan to build settlements in Gaza, the Mossad will seek to soften the regional and international backlash, which is similar to the time when the agency, under the former Director of the Mossad, Yossi Cohen, worked to soften the opposition of the Arab countries when Israel was annexing areas of the West Bank.
In sum, it seems that Netanyahu is continuing with politicising high-ranking positions inside the intelligence agencies, Shin Bet and Mossad, in an effort to control them and insert his political agenda into their work. It is most likely that Gofman’s appointment will lead to significant operational changes that politicise the agency’s decision-making process regarding Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.
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