East Asia

The military operations that unfolded over twelve days in June 2025 between Iran and Israel marked a sharp breakpoint in the trajectory of regional military balance. The confrontation resulted in a substantial erosion of Tehran’s military infrastructure and inflicted significant material losses. The depth of this operational failure was most evident in the near-total collapse of Iran’s integrated air-defence system, with confirmed intelligence assessments indicating that Israel succeeded in neutralising more than 80 surface-to-air missile batteries and destroying over 120 launch platforms. This effectively stripped Iranian airspace of its protective shield and imposed a state of absolute Israeli air superiority.   Amid this collapse, Tehran effectively lost its entire arsenal of the Russian-made S-300PMU2 (“S-300 PMU-2”) systems, which it had acquired in 2016 after protracted negotiations and at considerable financial cost. These systems were systematically destroyed between 2024 and 2025. Iran’s domestic air-defence industries, represented by the Bavar-373 and Khordad-15 systems, also demonstrated clear operational inadequacy when tested in a real combat environment.   This exposed a wide technological gap between Israel’s offensive capabilities and Iran’s defensive assets. The Iranian air-defence network failed to record the downing of a single manned Israeli fighter jet, and Iran’s ageing air force, reliant on pre-revolution legacy aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat, the Phantom, and the Tiger, supplemented by 1990s-era MiG-29s, stood incapable of competing or deterring effectively.   This total inability to contest the battlespace not only underscored tactical failure but delivered a decisive blow to the strategic assumptions underpinning Iran’s defence doctrine for decades, particularly its reliance on “asymmetric missile deterrence” and hybrid layered-defence networks.   Confronted with a reality in which its missile capabilities were neutralised and its aerial shield dismantled, the Iranian leadership was compelled to adopt a “post-war reset” strategy, launching an urgent acquisition campaign aimed at closing the technological gap by turning eastward towards Russia and China to rebuild its lost deterrence.   The fundamental question that will shape the next phase in the Middle East remains: Can this “hybrid deterrence”, comprising domestic missiles alongside imported, only partially integrated weapon systems, endure against an adversary that has already demonstrated both the willingness and the capability to deliver devastating strikes deep inside Iran?

Since 2023, the uranium enrichment market has undergone its most profound structural transformation since the advent of the civilian nuclear era. After three decades characterised by persistent oversupply and the integration of Russian inventories with Western reactor fleets, the sector, valued at approximately $15.5 billion in 2025, now confronts a fundamentally altered geopolitical landscape. stems primarily from the fact that nearly 95% of global enrichment capacity is controlled by just four entities, placing Western supply chains under complex logistical and political pressures.     Central to this transformation is the evolution of what is known as the Separative Work Unit (SWU) from a readily available commodity into a strategic bottleneck capable of redrawing global energy maps. The market has shifted rapidly from a buyer-dominated structure to one characterised by seller leverage, amid an intensifying race to secure fuel for both conventional reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), which require advanced uranium grades for which Western markets lack adequate commercial infrastructure.     Accordingly, this analysis explores the contours of the new enrichment landscape, examining the principal actors and evolving pricing dynamics, while projecting the profound implications of this transformation for global energy security.

December 2025 marked a structural shift in the global technological balance of power, as a state-backed Chinese industrial consortium, coordinated by Huawei, approved the operation of a functional prototype of an extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography system at a facility in Shenzhen. This announcement dismantles a core assumption that has dominated geopolitical thinking in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo over the past decade, namely that the extreme engineering complexity of EUV technology would permanently confine China behind a technological barrier, preventing it from advancing beyond the 7-nanometre threshold in leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing.   Western containment strategies were grounded in a firm conviction that the Dutch firm ASML’s monopoly over highly complex supply chains would guarantee the exclusion of the world’s second-largest economy from producing the advanced semiconductors required for artificial intelligence applications. The new Chinese prototype, however, has invalidated this assumption, not by replicating Western engineering paradigms, but by pursuing an alternative physical and engineering pathway, shaped by imperatives of national sovereignty and enabled by effectively unconstrained state capital.   This prototype, based on laser-driven plasma (LDP) technology, demonstrates that Chinese engineering teams have mastered the core physical principles of optical control at 13.5 nanometres. In doing so, they have moved beyond a phase long framed as one of "scientific impossibility", shifting the contest decisively into a new stage defined by engineering scale-up and operational viability. This development signals the end of an era of unipolar technological dominance. It inaugurates a new phase of dual ecosystems within the semiconductor industry. This transformation will require a comprehensive reassessment of the economic and security assumptions that have governed the sector for decades.

Operation Absolute Resolve, which resulted in the removal of Nicolás Maduro and his spouse Cilia Flores on Jan. 3, 2026, constituted a watershed moment in the history of 21st-century geopolitical warfare. While initial indicators point to a seemingly limited regime change within Venezuela, the strategic repercussions of the operation inflicted severe damage on Iran’s forward-operating capabilities. For nearly two decades, Venezuela was not merely a diplomatic partner of Tehran; it served as an indispensable logistical bridgehead and a secure sanctuary in the Western Hemisphere. Through this platform, the Iranian regime was able to circumvent international sanctions, project asymmetric influence, and sustain a critical financial lifeline through illicit trade.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) defines the guiding vision of American power and provides a window into how the United States understands the international environment, identifies its priorities, and determines the political, military, and economic tools it will rely on to protect national interests. Accordingly, the NSS shapes defence planning, informs foreign policy doctrine, guides inter-agency action, and signals to allies and adversaries the direction of U.S. engagement in an evolving global landscape.   The 2025 NSS, issued by the Trump administration in November 2025, is a clear articulation of how this administration intends to position itself in a world marked by rising geopolitical fragmentation, sharpening competition, and growing domestic constraints. Its core purpose is to translate the administration’s worldview into a coherent framework that defines what the United States will prioritise, what it will deprioritise, and under what conditions it will expend political capital, economic leverage, or military force.   For the Middle East, understanding the 2025 NSS is essential because it captures the principles shaping America’s evolving posture toward the region. The strategy’s emphasis on burden-sharing, reduced military exposure, and transactional partnerships signals a shift in expectations for regional actors, while its focus on energy security, counterterrorism, and strategic competition with external powers continues to define the contours of U.S. interests. As a formal expression of how the administration interprets threats and opportunities, the NSS provides the clearest available roadmap of Washington’s intentions—and the framework within which its decisions toward the Middle East will be made in the years ahead.

AI is reshaping international competition in ways that governments are only beginning to understand. The spread of AI-enabled cyber operations has created a new landscape in which intrusions unfold rapidly, cross borders with ease, and often leave behind little that can be reliably attributed to a specific actor. States now find themselves navigating an environment where responsibility is increasingly difficult to establish, and where strategic judgement becomes far more fragile.   While espionage and covert action have always operated in murky territory, the introduction of AI into these practices has accelerated the pace of events and weakened the signals that national security officials have traditionally relied upon. This shift demands sustained attention, not only because the technology is advancing quickly, but also because the risks associated with misinterpretation and unintended escalation are becoming sharper.

China has a long-term goal to be a global leader in technology. To achieve such ambition, the country has taken serious steps widening its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) traditional infrastructure projects to incorporate digital infrastructure projects embodied in the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR was initially launched in 2015 by the government as an idea on paper and during the opening ceremony of the First Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, China’s President Xi Jinping, adopted the DSR term officially and it was incorporated in the government’s BRI strategy as the digital dimension.   The DSR initiative focuses on building digital infrastructure and exporting its technology to the beneficiary countries, it includes telecommunications infrastructure, like 5G networks, overland fibre-optic cables, data centres, cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), as well as applications that support e-commerce and mobile payments, along with smart cities and surveillance technology.  Additionally, the DSR provides support to Chinese tech companies, like ZTE, Huawei, and Alibaba, to carry on the work with the beneficiaries.   The DSR aims to enhance Beijing's global digital influence as it creates opportunities for a wide range of cooperation and partnerships between Chinses tech companies and other beneficiaries around the world in areas of digitalization and AI. China’s DSR encompass a variety of projects in 5G deployment, e-commerce platforms, and AI applications, such as DeepSeek which is an alternative model to ChatGPT.   China signed DSR cooperation agreements with several countries in Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. The cooperation takes place between scientists and engineers from the recipient country and Beijing, like opening a training centre or in research and development (R&D). The areas of cooperation are wide, including smart cities, AI and robotics, clean energy, and surveillance capabilities, like data localization. GCC countries are considered one of the important partners to China’s DSR, where it is closely integrating in the GCC digitalization goals.

China’s robotics drive is no longer just a story of factories becoming more efficient but a story of a new industrial revolution. Each year, hundreds of thousands of new machines are deployed across its production lines, reshaping global supply chains and altering the balance of technological power. For the Middle East and North Africa, this shift raises questions that cannot be postponed. Automation is moving from the margins to the centre of economic strategy, and regions that fail to build capacity risk being locked into systems designed elsewhere.   The future of robotics in MENA is therefore not only about who installs machines the fastest, but about who sets the standards, who controls the data, and who determines the terms of industrial competition. The region’s next chapter will hinge on whether it becomes a maker of the technologies that define the century, or simply a consumer of them.

The global competition over semiconductors and related military technologies has become the central axis of great-power rivalry. The United States maintains its leadership in the global semiconductor industry, with American companies securing roughly half of the global semiconductor market. However, this dominance faces a growing challenge from China, which accounted for 20% of global semiconductor sales in 2024. Beijing’s ambition to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductors is steadily advancing despite ongoing trade tensions and intellectual property restrictions imposed by Washington amidst the broader ‘tech war.’ China aims to reach 50% self-sufficiency in semiconductor production by the end of the year, reinforced by significant investments in R&D and market expansion by Chinese firms.   In contrast, Russia’s position in semiconductor-dependent military industries is increasingly constrained. Although Russia retains expertise in weapons design, its reliance on imported materials and advanced chip-making equipment from Western countries exposes critical vulnerabilities. Western sanctions, introduced in response to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, have sharply limited Moscow’s access to these essential inputs. In response, Russia has sought alternative suppliers, with China emerging as its largest source of semiconductor materials. These dynamic forms part of the broader Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral framework, underpinning Moscow’s strategic pivot toward Eastern partnerships.   Meanwhile, India is rapidly evolving as a significant player in the semiconductor sector. The country’s announcement in September of its first indigenous chip, “Vikram 32,” marks a milestone in New Delhi’s pursuit of technological self-reliance and signals India’s potential emergence as a competitor to U.S. semiconductor dominance. India’s increasing engagement with Russia and China reflects a pragmatic alignment based on mutual interests, particularly in the context of escalating policy tensions with Washington. Notably, U.S. tariffs imposed on India’s trade in Russian oil have further incentivized this trilateral collaboration.   Collectively, the China-Russia-India “troika” represents a coalition of shared interests rather than a formal ideological alliance. Should this partnership strengthen, it could significantly bolster their semiconductor manufacturing capabilities and pose a formidable challenge to the American industry. Nevertheless, lingering frictions—such as unresolved border disputes, differing economic priorities, technological gaps, and the impact of sanctions—are likely to impede seamless technological integration. The United States still wields substantial influence over India, with opportunities to attract New Delhi through increased investments, tariff reductions, and advanced technology cooperation. Ultimately, the trajectory of the RIC semiconductor partnership holds profound implications for the global order. A successful integration of this “troika” chip industry with their respective military technologies could catalyse the rise of a multipolar system, revolutionizing surveillance, air defence, drone capabilities, and the broader defence industrial base, thereby reshaping international power dynamics.

The 17th BRICS Summit convened in Rio de Janeiro on July 6–7, 2025, against the backdrop of accelerating geopolitical realignments. Under Brazil’s presidency, the summit sought to reenergize the bloc’s collective agenda, positioning BRICS as a more prominent actor in global affairs. Key declarations were issued, and the membership base was broadened—yet a cautious diplomatic tone accompanied these developments. The gathering appeared less as a turning point and more as a carefully choreographed exercise in articulating a shared vision for a multipolar world, tempered by the bloc’s internal complexities and external constraints.   Despite its symbolic achievements, the summit was marked by apparent limitations. The absence of certain high-profile leaders, coupled with underlying political divergences and institutional fragmentation, curtailed expectations for transformative decisions or a unified policy front. These constraints highlighted the gap between BRICS’s aspirations and its current capabilities. This analysis provides a focused examination of the outcomes of the 2025 BRICS Summit, assessing their implications for the evolving global order and the extent to which the bloc can credibly position itself as an alternative pillar in global governance.

Sports diplomacy is not something new. It can be traced back to the ancient Olympic Games, when Greek city-states suspended conflicts to compete peacefully. The modern Olympic movement, revived in 1896, was based on similar principles of fostering global unity. However, sports have also been used to serve political agendas, such as the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, during which Nazi Germany turned the games into a propaganda tool. In other cases, sports played an important diplomatic role to ease tensions between countries. The Ping-Pong diplomacy, for instance, facilitated communication between the U.S. and China in 1971, which later paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s historic visit in 1972. This analysis explores how sports diplomacy contributes to easing political tensions between countries.

Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations (U.N.) has played a central role in solidifying international cooperation and promoting global peace and security. However, the U.N.’s ability to fulfil its duties depends on financial contributions from member states. As an entity, the U.N. has several budgets, including the regular budget (covers political missions, the General Assembly workings, Security Council, human rights, and legal affairs), peacekeeping budget (covers the U.N. peacekeeping missions in areas of conflicts), and voluntary budgets (covers the activities of the UNHCR, WHO, WFP and other similar agencies). As advertised by the U.N., the organization is facing a huge financial deficit that can jeopardize its global role, thereby affecting global security.   Moreover, the U.N.’s financial deficit could have several implications, including worsening humanitarian crises, allowing regional organisations to fill the gap left by the U.N., and jeopardising the global order it has sustained following the end of the Cold War.