Eastern Europe

The global competition over semiconductors and related military technologies has become the central axis of great-power rivalry. The United States maintains its leadership in the global semiconductor industry, with American companies securing roughly half of the global semiconductor market. However, this dominance faces a growing challenge from China, which accounted for 20% of global semiconductor sales in 2024. Beijing’s ambition to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductors is steadily advancing despite ongoing trade tensions and intellectual property restrictions imposed by Washington amidst the broader ‘tech war.’ China aims to reach 50% self-sufficiency in semiconductor production by the end of the year, reinforced by significant investments in R&D and market expansion by Chinese firms.   In contrast, Russia’s position in semiconductor-dependent military industries is increasingly constrained. Although Russia retains expertise in weapons design, its reliance on imported materials and advanced chip-making equipment from Western countries exposes critical vulnerabilities. Western sanctions, introduced in response to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, have sharply limited Moscow’s access to these essential inputs. In response, Russia has sought alternative suppliers, with China emerging as its largest source of semiconductor materials. These dynamic forms part of the broader Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral framework, underpinning Moscow’s strategic pivot toward Eastern partnerships.   Meanwhile, India is rapidly evolving as a significant player in the semiconductor sector. The country’s announcement in September of its first indigenous chip, “Vikram 32,” marks a milestone in New Delhi’s pursuit of technological self-reliance and signals India’s potential emergence as a competitor to U.S. semiconductor dominance. India’s increasing engagement with Russia and China reflects a pragmatic alignment based on mutual interests, particularly in the context of escalating policy tensions with Washington. Notably, U.S. tariffs imposed on India’s trade in Russian oil have further incentivized this trilateral collaboration.   Collectively, the China-Russia-India “troika” represents a coalition of shared interests rather than a formal ideological alliance. Should this partnership strengthen, it could significantly bolster their semiconductor manufacturing capabilities and pose a formidable challenge to the American industry. Nevertheless, lingering frictions—such as unresolved border disputes, differing economic priorities, technological gaps, and the impact of sanctions—are likely to impede seamless technological integration. The United States still wields substantial influence over India, with opportunities to attract New Delhi through increased investments, tariff reductions, and advanced technology cooperation. Ultimately, the trajectory of the RIC semiconductor partnership holds profound implications for the global order. A successful integration of this “troika” chip industry with their respective military technologies could catalyse the rise of a multipolar system, revolutionizing surveillance, air defence, drone capabilities, and the broader defence industrial base, thereby reshaping international power dynamics.

Amid Trump’s meetings with Russian & Ukrainian counterparts to reach a prolonged ceasefire, questions arise about the possibility of a successful peace plan occurring between Moscow & Kyiv with a U.S. mediation. Yet, with Putin’s demands from one side and Trump’s ambiguous promises to Zelensky from the other side, will the Ukraine war come to an end?

On July 28, 2025, during a joint press conference in Scotland with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, U.S. President Donald Trump issued an unexpected ultimatum to Russia. He declared that the Kremlin had no more than 10 to 12 days (until approximately Aug. 8, 2025) to make tangible progress toward ending the war in Ukraine. Should Moscow fail to comply, Trump warned that President Vladimir Putin would face a sweeping package of economic sanctions and severe trade restrictions. This escalation came on the heels of prolonged diplomatic stagnation and Trump’s increasingly vocal frustration with Russia’s continued military operations.   Subsequently, on July 31, 2025, former Russian President and current Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev responded with a pointed and ominous message via his Telegram channel. In his remarks, he invoked the “Dead Hand”—Russia’s semi-automated nuclear retaliation system designed to launch a retaliatory strike even in the event of a complete decapitation of the nation’s leadership.   In response, President Trump ordered the deployment of two U.S. nuclear submarines to strategic positions, framing the move as a necessary precaution in the face of what he described as “extraordinarily dangerous” nuclear threats. Notably, he refrained from specifying whether the submarines were nuclear-powered only or also nuclear-armed—introducing deliberate strategic ambiguity and reinforcing the doctrine of pre-emptive deterrence through calibrated uncertainty.   What renders this sequence of events particularly significant is that the confrontation did not remain confined to the U.S. and Russia. Its repercussions quickly extended to India, which was thrust into the geopolitical crossfire. On July 31, the Trump administration announced the imposition of a 25% tariff on all Indian exports to the United States, accompanied by threats of further penalties targeting Indian firms that continue to purchase Russian crude oil or engage in defence cooperation with Moscow. The rationale behind this punitive action lies in New Delhi’s deepening energy relationship with Russia.   Although the Indian government has not officially announced any suspension of contracts with Russian suppliers, discreet directives were reportedly issued to state-owned refiners instructing them to explore alternative sources in the global spot market. This pivot has begun to materialize reflecting New Delhi’s attempt to maintain equilibrium between preserving its strategic autonomy and mitigating mounting U.S. pressure.   Yet the broader implications of this crisis extend well beyond geopolitical brinkmanship. What is unfolding is a systemic shock to the global order—one that is reverberating through energy markets, food security systems, arms trade corridors, and supply chains. The consequences will not be distributed evenly: while some Middle Eastern states stand to benefit from surging demand and price shifts, others may face acute vulnerabilities due to trade disruptions, inflationary pressures, or capital flight.

The 17th BRICS Summit convened in Rio de Janeiro on July 6–7, 2025, against the backdrop of accelerating geopolitical realignments. Under Brazil’s presidency, the summit sought to reenergize the bloc’s collective agenda, positioning BRICS as a more prominent actor in global affairs. Key declarations were issued, and the membership base was broadened—yet a cautious diplomatic tone accompanied these developments. The gathering appeared less as a turning point and more as a carefully choreographed exercise in articulating a shared vision for a multipolar world, tempered by the bloc’s internal complexities and external constraints.   Despite its symbolic achievements, the summit was marked by apparent limitations. The absence of certain high-profile leaders, coupled with underlying political divergences and institutional fragmentation, curtailed expectations for transformative decisions or a unified policy front. These constraints highlighted the gap between BRICS’s aspirations and its current capabilities. This analysis provides a focused examination of the outcomes of the 2025 BRICS Summit, assessing their implications for the evolving global order and the extent to which the bloc can credibly position itself as an alternative pillar in global governance.

Sports diplomacy is not something new. It can be traced back to the ancient Olympic Games, when Greek city-states suspended conflicts to compete peacefully. The modern Olympic movement, revived in 1896, was based on similar principles of fostering global unity. However, sports have also been used to serve political agendas, such as the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, during which Nazi Germany turned the games into a propaganda tool. In other cases, sports played an important diplomatic role to ease tensions between countries. The Ping-Pong diplomacy, for instance, facilitated communication between the U.S. and China in 1971, which later paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s historic visit in 1972. This analysis explores how sports diplomacy contributes to easing political tensions between countries.

Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations (U.N.) has played a central role in solidifying international cooperation and promoting global peace and security. However, the U.N.’s ability to fulfil its duties depends on financial contributions from member states. As an entity, the U.N. has several budgets, including the regular budget (covers political missions, the General Assembly workings, Security Council, human rights, and legal affairs), peacekeeping budget (covers the U.N. peacekeeping missions in areas of conflicts), and voluntary budgets (covers the activities of the UNHCR, WHO, WFP and other similar agencies). As advertised by the U.N., the organization is facing a huge financial deficit that can jeopardize its global role, thereby affecting global security.   Moreover, the U.N.’s financial deficit could have several implications, including worsening humanitarian crises, allowing regional organisations to fill the gap left by the U.N., and jeopardising the global order it has sustained following the end of the Cold War.

In a few months, the Trump administration is expected to push Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to sign a peace deal which is supposed to be followed by a bilateral minerals’ agreement between the U.S. and the DRC. The agreement puts some parties in an advantageous position while leaves others with a less fortunate fate. The U.S. is supposed to gain economically and politically by this agreement especially when it comes to its rivalry with China. While the DRC is expected to gain in the short-term leveraging the “conflict minerals” narrative, the long-term consequences are not necessarily desirable. The EU is left with the undesirable situation. The bloc will either adjust its policies toward the DRC’s minerals or remain in a situation where a clash with the Trump administration is possible. While a direct military confrontation between the two powers remains improbable, a proxy war in which M23 rebels are a main actor is possible. Additionally, with minerals gaining increasing geoeconomic relevance, Trump has eyed several countries including Ukraine, and the DRC, who could be his next target?

Populism has recently risen in different regions, including Europe and the United States, constituting a challenge to local and global politics. While this phenomenon existed in Europe before the Second World War (WII), the rise of the Soviet Union as a principal threat to Europe after WII prompted them to neglect populism’s negatives and emphasise confronting the Soviet challenge. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe began an institutionalised process of identifying new internal and external threats, attempting to keep its capabilities mobilised for confronting challenges that might suddenly arise. This process led to identifying several internal threats, such as migration, lack of skilled employment, and populism as serious threats. Moreover, European integration began a new phase with the conclusion of the Maastricht agreement in 1992, creating the EU in its current form, which prompted Europeans to identify populism as a threat that might impede European integration.

Following the Arab Spring, Turkey and Iran started expanding their influence in the region, utilising the state of instability. While both countries compete over expanding influence in Syria, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, they managed to maintain strong mutual relations. The analysis examines foreign policy tools employed by both countries to maximise their benefits along with analysing the commonalities and differentiation of interests between them in the Middle East.

President-elect Donald Trump has pledged to bring an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, though he has yet to specify how. A negotiated settlement appears to be the only viable path forward, as a decisive military victory for either side seems unlikely. Western nations, particularly those in Europe, are struggling with internal challenges, leaving them in a weak position with limited leverage at the negotiating table. Meanwhile, Russia also finds itself in an unenviable situation, creating a potential opening for Trump to encourage both parties toward a resolution. However, for any agreement to lead to lasting peace, security guarantees for Ukraine must be a central component. These guarantees are likely to be the key trade-off for any concessions that Europe would likely offer.

More than a decade after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the unexpected fall of the Assad regime shocked many commentators and world leaders who believed that President Bashar Al-Assad had firmly consolidated his power. This development demonstrated that despite enduring years of civil war, Syria continues to hold strategic relevance at both regional and international levels. The conflict has provided an opportunity for regional and global powers to establish a presence in the country, amplifying the impact of the regime's collapse far beyond Syria's borders. Notably, the fallout has produced clear winners, with Turkey and Israel at the forefront, and losers, including Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, some European countries have discreetly benefited from the situation without openly acknowledging their gains.

On Wednesday, Nov. 27, 2024, Syrian armed factions launched a coordinated offensive targeting regime-controlled sites and militia positions in the western countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria. This operation marks the most significant joint military action since 2016, involving key groups such as “Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham” (formerly Jabhat Al-Nusra). In a video statement, the Joint Operations Room declared the initiation of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. The announcement emphasised that the offensive was necessitated by recent regime movements threatening civilian areas, framing the operation as a defensive imperative rather than a strategic choice. The statement underscored that this action was in direct retaliation for the Syrian regime's bombardment of north-western regions, signalling a potential escalation in the conflict dynamics of the region.