The Semiconductor Cold War: U.S. vs. Russia, China and India

U.S. vs. RIC Troika: Who Will Dominate the Semiconductor Race?

In contrast, Russia’s position in semiconductor-dependent military industries is increasingly constrained. Although Russia retains expertise in weapons design, its reliance on imported materials and advanced chip-making equipment from Western countries exposes critical vulnerabilities. Western sanctions, introduced in response to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, have sharply limited Moscow’s access to these essential inputs. In response, Russia has sought alternative suppliers, with China emerging as its largest source of semiconductor materials. These dynamic forms part of the broader Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral framework, underpinning Moscow’s strategic pivot toward Eastern partnerships.

Meanwhile, India is rapidly evolving as a significant player in the semiconductor sector. The country’s announcement in September of its first indigenous chip, “Vikram 32,” marks a milestone in New Delhi’s pursuit of technological self-reliance and signals India’s potential emergence as a competitor to U.S. semiconductor dominance. India’s increasing engagement with Russia and China reflects a pragmatic alignment based on mutual interests, particularly in the context of escalating policy tensions with Washington. Notably, U.S. tariffs imposed on India’s trade in Russian oil have further incentivized this trilateral collaboration.

Collectively, the China-Russia-India “troika” represents a coalition of shared interests rather than a formal ideological alliance. Should this partnership strengthen, it could significantly bolster their semiconductor manufacturing capabilities and pose a formidable challenge to the American industry. Nevertheless, lingering frictions—such as unresolved border disputes, differing economic priorities, technological gaps, and the impact of sanctions—are likely to impede seamless technological integration. The U.S. still wields substantial influence over India, with opportunities to attract New Delhi through increased investments, tariff reductions, and advanced technology cooperation. Ultimately, the trajectory of the RIC semiconductor partnership holds profound implications for the global order. A successful integration of this “troika” chip industry with their respective military technologies could catalyse the rise of a multipolar system, revolutionizing surveillance, air defence, drone capabilities, and the broader defence industrial base, thereby reshaping international power dynamics.

The political and strategic motivations driving the RIC alliance are multifaceted and shaped by the distinct priorities of each member.

For India, the expansion of its semiconductor manufacturing capabilities aligns closely with its broader technological and defence needs. Technological support from Russia and China, combined with opportunities for market expansion into neighbouring countries, represents a strategic avenue for New Delhi. The deep-rooted cooperation between India and Russia, characterized by substantial military and energy supplies—particularly Russian oil and defence equipment—forms a crucial pillar of this partnership.

However, policy frictions with the U.S. have significantly influenced India’s foreign policy recalibrations. The imposition of 50% tariffs on Indian goods by the Trump administration, coupled with pressure on European allies to follow suit, was primarily a response to India’s continued imports of Russian oil despite Western sanctions. India viewed this punitive approach as selective and unfair, highlighting that both China and the European Union maintain Russian oil trade without facing similar consequences. This perceived “pushback” from Washington has prompted New Delhi to publicly assert a stance of non-alignment in technology diplomacy and to diversify its range of international partners.

India’s relationship with China within the RIC framework, however, remains circumscribed by longstanding geopolitical and environmental disputes. The unresolved Himalayan border tensions, compounded by China’s dam projects in Tibet that threaten India’s vital water resources, continue to fuel distrust. Despite these challenges, India is expected to adopt a pragmatic strategy, balancing cautious engagement with China against the imperative to maximize benefits from the trilateral semiconductor partnership. New Delhi’s approach prioritizes gains in the “troika” collaboration while carefully managing its strategic ties with the United States and other global partners.

From Beijing’s perspective, the ongoing geopolitical tensions present a strategic opening to strengthen the RIC alliance. The U.S. sanctions on Russia and tariff measures against India coinciding with the Shanghai Summit in September provide Beijing with an opportunity to reinvigorate the trilateral cooperation. China’s broader aspiration for a multipolar global order motivates its pursuit of multilateral partnerships that challenge U.S. hegemony. Similarly, Russia’s urgent need for advanced military technologies—ranging from missile systems to drones and air defence capabilities—underpins Moscow’s commitment to the RIC. Russia’s strong bilateral ties with both China and India offer a foundation for sustaining and potentially deepening the functioning of the “troika” partnership in alignment with its national interests.

The potential success of the RIC “troika” alignment hinges on a pragmatic convergence driven by the fulfilment of each actor’s interests. Issue-based cooperation in semiconductor research and development, as well as related defence technologies, appears plausible. Within this framework, cautious collaboration between India and China will likely be conditioned by their ability to manage ongoing tensions, particularly border disputes. Both Beijing and New Delhi are expected to adopt a pragmatic partnership approach in the RIC, emphasizing mutual trade in semiconductor technologies, machinery, and chemical inputs. Consequently, a likely scenario is selective cooperation grounded in aligned interests, while persistent mistrust—especially over territorial disputes—restricts full integration of the trilateral alliance.

Moscow and Beijing’s shared dissatisfaction with the existing Western-led world order, combined with their mutual interest in mitigating the impact of sanctions and their status as major trade partners, generates strong incentives for cooperation. Since the onset of the Ukraine conflict, Russia’s trade with China and India has increased significantly, with these two countries becoming its largest importers. China, in particular, has emerged as Russia’s primary supplier of high-tech imports, including semiconductors and microelectronic components. For Russia, strengthening trilateral ties with China and India serves vital economic and diplomatic objectives. India’s traditionally realist foreign policy aims to maintain balanced relations with both the U.S. and the Russia-China axis; however, U.S. tariffs and critical rhetoric from the Trump administration regarding India’s trade with Russia might push New Delhi closer to the “troika.” India’s rising semiconductor capacities and robust trade with Russia and China provide a pragmatic basis for moving towards a trilateral alliance that maximizes its strategic and economic interests.

Conversely, an alternative scenario involves potential fragmentation of the “troika” under U.S. inducements. Should the U.S. succeed in offering India a credible and long-term partnership in semiconductor development, New Delhi might pivot away from the trilateral framework. This would require substantial U.S. incentives tailored to Indian interests, such as enhanced cooperation within initiatives like the U.S.-India Critical and Emerging Technology partnership, focusing on joint R&D in chip manufacturing and design. Such a partnership could draw India closer to Washington and weaken the Russia-China-India alignment. Nonetheless, competition in this high-technology sector would likely remain fierce, complicated by intellectual property constraints and America’s development in chip technology.

Several critical drivers will determine which scenario prevails. First, the technological gap in semiconductor manufacturing is pivotal: Russia’s heavy dependence on Chinese high-tech exports and its restricted capacity to advance due to sanctions limit Moscow’s collaboration potential in military technology integration. Second, India’s semiconductor emergence may raise concerns in Beijing, which might seek to curb New Delhi’s technological progress to avoid future regional competition. Third, U.S. industrial incentives targeted at India could sway New Delhi deeper into the American sphere, undermining the trilateral alliance. Lastly, enduring China-India border tensions will continue to shape India’s willingness to engage closely with Beijing, particularly in sensitive military technology domains.

In conclusion, semiconductors play an indispensable role in the development of military technologies and industrial automation, including artificial intelligence. Advances by RIC alliance in this critical sector have the potential to reshape the global balance of power. However, the coalition faces significant internal challenges that may limit the extent of full collaboration in chip manufacturing. The ongoing rivalry between the United States and China is likely to persist, driven largely by their competition for global hegemony, while Russia’s position remains constrained by its war in Ukraine and the consequent U.S.-imposed sanctions, making any prospective partnership between Washington and Moscow improbable.

India’s role within this dynamic remains ambiguous. Following the production of its first indigenous chip, New Delhi appears poised to expand its semiconductor industry with aspirations of self-reliance, mirroring China’s strategic objectives. At the same time, the United States is expected to continue efforts to attract or apply pressure on India in line with its broader foreign policy aimed at containing the technological and strategic rise of potential competitors in the semiconductor arena. This complex interplay suggests that India’s semiconductor trajectory and geopolitical alignments will be decisive factors in shaping the future landscape of global semiconductor competition and great-power relations.

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